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Abstract 
Poverty is a historical development curse in Tanzania, which has incited extensive 
institutional reforms and policy changes and received numerous analyses in development 
research literature. Paradoxically, taking actions to study and alleviate poverty have 
increased with its continuing severity. A substantial body of research on poverty in the 
country suggests that, the vast majority of these studies focus on the content rather than the 
context of poverty alleviation processes. Specifically, the focus has been on: ideas, 
interests and struggles for resources between political leaders and bureaucrats believed to 
be taking place at the expense of the poor; ill-informed and unrealistic development 
policies and strategies; anti-development behaviour and tendencies of the peasants and 
their alleged conservatism and resistance to modernity, and weak incentive structures of 
the economy. There is little focus on the character and dynamics of the (historical) 
institutional context in which these economic conditions, struggles and policy initiatives 
emerge and take place. 
Motivated by the disappointing results of anti-poverty initiatives and weaknesses of 
previous studies, this study uses historical institutional impact analysis guided by 
institutionalist theory to analyse the problem. The central argument is that the existence 
and functioning character of institutions are necessary conditions for any human 
development activity. So, acceptance of the crucial importance of historically oriented 
institutional context analysis in understanding poverty alleviation initiatives and outcomes 
is imperative. The study draws on primary and secondary data collected through 
documentary review and interview methods to explain the ways in which institutional 
reforms result in an institutional order tolerant of poverty and which create conditions that 
perpetuate it. It does this by exploring the mode of historical institutional development and 
by examining the functioning character of the institutional order in respect of poverty 
alleviation. The study argues that achieving success in poverty alleviation related reforms 
is dependent on proper understanding of institutional realities of Tanzanian society and the 
functioning character of the existing institutional order. It proposes a reform process in 
which institutional legacies and their impact on society become the focus of the reform 
process itself. 
The findings indicate that, while reforms and policy changes have taken place and new 
patterns of behaviour introduced, the logics of institutions central to development and 
poverty alleviation have not, been fundamentally altered and new patterns of behaviour 
have simply perpetuated it. Specifically, the findings suggest: first, that institutional 
reforms pursued by the government are inadequate due to misconception of institutional 
problems of Tanzanian society; second, that the reforms have created new conditions 
which perpetuate poverty; and, third, that fundamental character of the functioning of the 
Tanzanian institutional order will need to change before such anti-poverty measures can 
hope to succeed. Thus, the study offers a correction to ill-informed poverty analysis by 
providing an alternative account of the root cause of poverty while insisting that a better 
understanding of the failure of poverty alleviation requires a strong focus on the historical 
institutional realties of the country. 
xv 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
This study constitutes an attempt to examine critically the problems associated with 
institutional reforms in Tanzania. The principal focus is on how “the mode of institutional 
reforms” and “the functional character of the resultant institutional order” impacted on the 
government and citizens’ struggles against poverty, inequality and socio­economic 
insecurity. The main focus is on how and why institutional reforms failed to support 
struggles against poverty and inequality and ensure sustainable socio­economic security in 
the country. This is done through examination of how institutional reforms influenced the 
organization of production, accessibility to productive resources, public resource 
management, socio­economic security, and people’s commitment and engagement in 
socio­economic development in general, and poverty alleviation initiatives in particular. 
1.2 Background to the Problem 
Poverty and inequality entered Tanzania’s1 development policy discourses as socio­
economic problems and a threat to the country’s development initiatives in the late 1950s.2 
Limited access to resources and incomes were considered the principal sources of poverty 
and inequality. Poverty was also associated with socio­economic insecurity resulting from 
the institutional malfunctioning of both the traditional subsistence economy and the market 
economy. As a result, the attainment of independence was accompanied by the declaration 
of war against three chief national enemies: poverty, ignorance and disease. However, it 
was generally believed that poverty was the breeding environment for other enemies, and 
that it was by defeating poverty that the nation could defeat the others. Therefore, poverty 
became the central focus of development initiatives after independence and a national 
problem towards which the new government was to devote its resources. 
Between 1961 and 1966, the government adopted various institutional reforms, 
development policies and strategies (under a capitalist market economic framework) as the 
first generation of anti­poverty initiative. Despite the improvement in the indices of 
national economy, poverty and inequality developed and increased alongside these 
developments.3 By 1967, the country was progressing along a development path in which 
the benefits of policy changes and development strategies were enjoyed by a small, 
privileged group. For example, the urban population prospered at the expense of the 
peasants. As a result of these experiences, widespread disapproval of the capitalist (market) 
mode of production emerged among the leaders who were accusing it of perpetuating 
1 Before independence in 1961 and the Union with Zanzibar in 1964, the Tanzanian Mainland was known as Tanganyika. 
Although the name Tanzania stands for “the United Republic of Tanzania”, which includes the Zanzibar Islands, it is 
exclusively used in this study to represent the Tanzanian Mainland which is the geographical focus of the study. 
2 It was after the report of the “East African Royal Commission 1953­1955” which (among other things) revealed that 
poverty prevailed in Tanganyika and was the basic problem to be contemplated in any future agricultural and industrial 
development and in any discussion of such allied matters as wages, immigration policy, capital creation and the 
expansion of social services. 
3 There was an increase in the rate of economic growth accompanied by the expansion of industrial and agricultural 
production, wages and wage­earning activities, and an improvement in socio­economic welfare, which indicated not only 
progress in meeting some of anti­poverty development targets, but also an improvement in people’s standards of living 
compared to the situation during independence (see Chapter 5). 
2

poverty, inequality and socio­economic insecurity. This, led to a radical policy shift in 
1967, from capitalist (market) oriented development initiatives to Ujamaa.4 Several 
institutional reforms, policy changes and strategies5 followed the adoption of Ujamaa 
under the principles of Ujamaa na Kujitegemea (socialism and self­reliance) and economic 
growth with equity, which was accompanied by provision of free basic needs to all 
Tanzanians. 
Unfortunately, despite the achievements in the provision of basic social welfare,6 attempts 
to achieve poverty alleviation through equitable access to social needs failed (Fieldhouse, 
1986). The failure was associated with a severe economic crisis,7 which was linked to the 
failure of Ujamaa(Costello, 1996). Therefore, there was a call for institutional reforms and 
policy shifts away from basic needs oriented Ujamaaist development initiatives towards a 
capitalist (neo­liberal market) model. By the mid­1980s, the socio­economic reforms 
began, followed by political reforms in the early 1990s, under the market oriented 
economic (liberalization) reform initiatives commonly known as the “Structural 
Adjustment Programme” (SAP), which was designed and sponsored by the World Bank 
and International Monetary Fund. Liberalization was adopted on the assumptions that the 
economic crisis which Tanzania faced from mid 1970s and which drove people deeper 
into poverty, was due to over expansion of the State8; its unlimited interference in the 
economy; corruption; misallocation of resources and; limited private socio­economic 
engagement. It was thought therefore, that the only way to resume economic growth and 
reduce poverty was to reform the state and establish liberal market economy. The initial 
emphasis on economic liberalization (which essentially meant, a reduction in the direct 
involvement of the state in the economic activity; a reduction of state control of economic 
processes; giving leeway and encouragement to private sector; and liberalizing foreign 
trade) rested on a twofold argument: First, that the aim of development­reduced poverty 
and improved welfare­is best achieved through economic growth; and second that, in order 
to achieve economic growth it is better to rely on free­market forces (price mechanisms) 
than on state intervention. The free market, it was argued, would allocate resources much 
more efficiently than the state and that in turn would promote economic growth and reduce 
poverty. Therefore, “trade liberalization and getting prices right” became the central 
focus of almost all development initiatives of the international and national development 
4Ujamaa, which literally meant “familyhood”, was a Tanzanian version of African Socialism rooted in traditional African 
values and had the following as its core principles : the basic feeling of recognition and respect for one another; 
communal ownership of the major means of production as a way of avoiding class division in society and; the obligation 
to work (meaning rights come only with duties and, therefore, each person was entitled to rights accorded to his 
generation only as he fulfilled his duties of that generation). 
5The policy measures and institutional changes which were adopted and had the most important and far reaching 
consequences on the future socio­economic development of the country were: the leadership code of ethics; the 
nationalization of the major means of production; the villagisation of the rural population; and the expansion and 
provision of social services, including education, health and a water supply to rural areas. 
6There were substantial achievements in welfare which convinced the ILO Mission to commend the country’s record for 
providing basic needs (education, health, water and other community and social services) as exemplary. The result of 
these efforts was the rise in life expectancy at birth from 35 years in the 1960s to 54 years in 1986 and improvement in 
the quality of many aspects of human needs among the Tanzanian population. 
7The crisis was evident in the following economic indicators: while the inflation rate averaged only 3.5 per cent between 
1965 and 1973, it rose drastically to 15.4 percent from 1973 to 1980 and to 24.9 per cent between 1980 and 1987. By 
1987, the inflation rate had reached 31.2 percent. GDP growth was 4.8 per cent between 1965 and 1973, declining to 2.3 
per cent 1973­1980 and dropping further to 1.7 per cent between 1980 and 1987. The performance agriculture sector, 
which was the mainstay of the economy declined (in GDP) from 3.1 per cent between 1965 and 1973 to 0.2 per cent from 
1973 to 1980, while the manufacturing sector fell from 8.7 per cent from 1965 to 1973 to a deficit of a ­3.5 per cent 
growth rate between 1980 and 1987, while other industrial sectors experienced a downfall in production from 7.0 percent 
to ­2.4 percent over the same period. 
8 In a Weberian view, the “State” represents a set of compulsory institutions of control of people and their activities 
within a territory. It consists of administrative, legal and coercive institutions. However, it is used in this study to 
represent the influence of institutions beyond the boundaries of government such as Executive Agencies, Crop 
Authorities, Boards and Parastatals which were part of the state during Ujamaa. 
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agencies and the donor community in developing countries in general and Tanzania in 
particular. 
However, by the early 1990s, it had become clear that “getting prices right” alone was not 
helping much in promoting sustainable economic growth and reducing poverty and it 
perpetuated poverty and aggravated inequality and insecurity. The failure called for a new 
approach to development which put emphasis on addressing problems associated with the 
nature of the country’s initial socio­economic conditions and institutional context in which 
price mechanisms sought to produce the desired changes. This shifted the focus and 
emphasis of development strategies from “getting prices right” to “getting institutions 
right”
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. Behind renewed interest and focus on institutions was the call for a special 
responsibility of the government in creating institutional framework that markets required 
in order to, not only develop, but also work effectively by promoting sustainable economic 
growth and reducing poverty. Since then, institutional reforms and poverty reduction 
became the catchwords of international and national development agencies, governments 
and the donor community in developing countries and Tanzania in particular. 
However, by the mid­1990s, it had become clear that the reforms introduced by the SAPs 
were failing to raise sustainable economic growth and alleviate poverty, and had 
aggravated inequality and socio­economic insecurity. Consequently, the government 
adopted various anti­poverty initiatives, including the National Anti­poverty Strategies of 
1998 and the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper of 2000. These were adopted as new major 
macro­policy frameworks (Ellis & Mdoe, 2003) guiding initiatives for economic growth 
and poverty alleviation. The strategies were to establish an institutional order through 
which the government and people would construct sustainable pathways out of poverty and 
inequality. 
Again, despite all these initiatives, institutional reforms did not, as quickly or strongly as 
envisioned, promote economic growth and reduce poverty, and produced mixed or 
disappointing outcomes. Tanzania continued to experience problems of low and unstable 
economic growth as well as more poverty, inequality and socio­economic insecurity (URT­
PHDR: 2002, 2005 & 2007).  Now, because the experience indicated that institutional 
reforms had been the main strategy for promoting economic growth and alleviating 
poverty, the question became: Why did institutional reforms produce disappointing results 
or at least outcomes which were contrary to those envisioned in various documents and 
verbal aspirations of the international and national development agencies, the government 
and the donor community? 
Although, in Tanzania, poverty has received numerous analyses, a substantial body of 
research suggests that, the vast majority of these studies focus on the content rather than 
the context of poverty alleviation processes. The focus has been on: ideas, interests and 
struggles for resources between political leaders and bureaucrats believed to be taking 
place at the expense of the poor; ill­informed and unrealistic development policies and 
strategies (Fieldhouse, 1986; Hodd, 1988); anti­development behaviour and tendencies of 
the peasants and their alleged conservatism and resistance to modernity (Hyden, 1980), and 
According to Goetz (1997:1) the concept “getting institutions right” became central to development discourses and 
practices in 1990s as “getting prices right” was in 1980s. While the later focused on changing “supply signals”, the 
former focused on understanding the politics of how institutions regulated and coordinated societies, how people’s needs 
were interpreted by policy makers and how resources were allocated. The purpose was to promote institutional­building, 
to encourage the efficient use of public resources and private investments. That is, “getting institutions right” for market 
efficiency. 
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weak incentive structures of the economy (Lipumba, 1995). Apart from the biased research 
focus, the study was also motivated partly by dissatisfaction with the widespread view that 
Africa is in a state of disorder and chaos and, therefore, development is impossible. For 
instance, Chabal and Daloz (1999) described the African predicament or the widespread 
development failure as a result of the political disorder and chaos that are engineered and 
used by the political leaders and other key actors as political instruments for personal 
benefit. These views are shared by Bayart, Ellis and Hibou (1999), who argued that the 
1980s and 1990s’ institutional and policy reforms in Africa were nothing but “a return to 
the heart of darkness”, where the deviation from tradition and the criminalization of the 
state and economies are the order of the day. For Reno (2000), Africa is a continent of 
“shadow states”, dominated by systems of personal rule with the authority, based upon the 
decisions and interests of an individual rather than the law. 
Taken together, these scholars seem to suggest that Africa is not just a helpless victim of 
imperialism, but also a captive of the political and economic actors who (in seeking to 
maximize their return from the state of confusion, uncertainty and chaos) are conducting 
their business with unlimited impunity. Thus, most scholars point to the behavioural 
aspects, interests and struggles of the political actors while overlooking the institutional 
configurations that often influence those struggles. In other words, there is little focus on 
the character and dynamics of the historical institutional context in which these economic 
conditions, struggles and policy initiatives emerge and take place. 
As we shall discuss in this study, Africa and Tanzania, in this case, should be seen as being 
in the throes of a complex process of adjustment, mediated by a mix of traditional and 
modern institutions that make sustainable development hard, but not impossible, to 
achieve. A well­informed, determined leadership could overcome the constraints to 
sustainable development, if they understood the dynamics of the institutional functions and 
arrangements. 
Motivated by the disappointing results of anti­poverty initiatives and weaknesses of 
previous studies, this study focuses on the context and it is guided by three research 
questions derived from the above puzzle. 
1.3 Research questions and Objectives 
(a) Research questions 
1.	 What is the nature and character of institutional reforms in Tanzania? 
2.	 Why have those reforms failed to promote sustainable economic growth and

alleviate poverty in the country?

3.	 How have they promoted or inhibited people’s efforts against poverty? 
(b) Research Objectives 
1.	 To investigate the impact of institutional reforms on people’s agency in economic 
development and poverty alleviation in the country. 
2.	 To provide a historical­institutional analysis of Tanzania’s socio­economic and 
political development associated with development and anti­poverty initiatives 
3.	 To assess not only the nature and character of institutional reforms, but also the 
relevance, objectives and motives behind them in relation to the quest for 
sustainable development in general and poverty alleviation. 
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4.	 To create an awareness among actors in policy­making processes about the 
constraints and opportunities resulting from institutional reforms so that they can 
take them into account when planning for anti­poverty, inequality and insecurity 
initiatives 
5.	 To provide reformers and policy makers with evaluative information on the 
outcomes of the reforms on economic development and poverty alleviation 
processes for immediate and future policy considerations. 
6.	 To add to the existing scant knowledge on the historical institutional changes and 
dynamics and their impact on development and poverty alleviation strategies in 
Tanzania 
7.	 Generally, to add to the current international poverty research initiatives on 
understanding as to why people are poor, what keeps them trapped in poverty and 
what can be done to help them, particularly in developing countries. 
1.4 Significance of the Study 
This study was partly inspired by the fact that very little had been researched and written 
about the impact of institutional reforms on poverty, inequality and socio­economic 
insecurity in Tanzania. Therefore, it was our hope that the study could bring new insights 
and understanding of the reasons for the country’s disappointing performance in terms of 
its development in general and poverty alleviation in particular. The study was also 
expected to add to the knowledge and understanding about the reasons for massive poverty 
in developing countries, and what kept the poor trapped in poverty. Furthermore, the study 
acted as another test of the validity of the assumptions of historical institutionalist theory, 
in understanding development problems of developing countries, where it has enjoyed little 
currency. 
1.5 The Locus of the Study 
This study, built on the findings of various studies of poverty in Tanzania. But unlike other 
studies, it gave primacy of the impact of institutional reforms and the functional character 
of the resultant institutional order. It shared mainstream assumptions of historical 
institutionalism that: underdevelopment in general and poverty, inequality and insecurity 
in particular, can be comprehended by looking at their manifestations within the 
historically grounded institutional configurations in which they occur and struggles against 
them are waged. From this point of view, many aspects identified by various studies as the 
causes of poverty, inequality and insecurity turned out to be outcomes rather than causes 
and thus, their impact depended on other factors. From the outset of this study, 
understanding the nature, character and outcomes of institutional reforms constituted one 
of the promising attempts to identify the primary causes of emergence and persistence of 
poverty, inequality and insecurity in a developing country like Tanzania. 
1.6 Definitions 
Institutions: It is used to signify both formal rules and procedures of social conduct and 
informal patterns of behavioural regularities­the rules of the game. According to Easton 
(1990), they act like an unseen force operating on the system. Formal institutions are those 
established and constituted by binding laws, regulations and legal orders which prescribe 
what may or may not be done. Informal institutions are constituted by norms, values and 
accepted ways of doing things in the society and are embedded in traditional social 
practices and culture such as communal systems of land tenure (North, 1990). The dotted 
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line in Figure1.1 implies that, the use of the term excludes social structures in the form of 
formal and informal organizations or social entities. 
Figure 1.1: Conceptualization of Institutions 
Institutions 
Formal Rules and 
Procedures of Social 
Conduct Social Structures 
Informal Patterns of Behavioural 
Regularities 
Formal/Informal 
Organizations/Soc 
ial Entities 
Rules of the Game 
Poverty: Is used to signify both, limited access to resources and incapacity to produce 
other basic necessities of life. It goes beyond insufficiency of resources by taking into 
account, how resources are made unavailable and insufficient to a particular group due to 
limited accessibility caused by the functioning of an institutional order in which struggles 
take place. Therefore, to be poor is seen as not just having less than others, but being 
deprived of the means of securing more. 
Socio­economic Insecurity: It reflects exposure to several forms of risk and uncertainty 
and a limited capacity to cope with adverse outcomes and to recover from those outcomes. 
It involves risk of an adverse event that reflects life­cycle contingencies, such as a spell of 
unemployment, a work­related accident or illness, or a disabling accident and risks 
resulting from mishaps of previous adverse event. Thus, socio­economic security is limited 
exposure to risks and uncertainty as well as the ability to cope with adverse outcomes and 
ability to recover from shocks (Standing, 2001, 2004, 2007). It is about security of having 
stable sources of income and other amenities that are basic for survival (Dasgupta, 
2004:171). 
Inequality: It is used to signify the differences in people’s share of resources­ not just 
income, but chances of adequate health, education, clothing, shelter, safe water­and access 
to institutional safeguards supposed to protect them at risk (Payne, 2006:5; Standing, 2007: 
512). It is viewed as a socio­economic condition resulting from differential positions of 
groups in society which determines proximity to centres of resources and institutions of 
protection. It reflects differential sense of control and use of productive resources. 
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1.7 Shifts in the poverty, inequality and insecurity dialogue 
Concepts and concerns regarding poverty, inequality and insecurity have evolved over time 
and occupied different positions in the policy discourse in the country. The exploration of 
the evolution of the concerns about these problems reveals that the dialogue has inspired 
different questions, ranging from their origin, causes and conception to the validity of the 
approaches used to deal with them. For example, there is a question of whether these 
problems were inherent in the pre­colonial traditional subsistence economy or whether 
they are the legacies of colonialism. How their conceptions have changed over time and 
what the implications of those changes are for the current poverty alleviation initiatives are 
further concerns. There are also questions about what the central motive of the struggle 
against poverty was when it was first conceived in 1961, how that motive informed the 
struggles against other socio­economic problems and whether it is still valid today. Other 
issues include: the extent to which the conception of these problems (in the current policy 
discourse) reflects the material condition and historical evolution of the society; and the 
implication of adopting institutional reforms and policies from the point of view of poverty 
as opposed to other, equally important, socio­economic problems. Drawing on the analysis 
of the findings, this study explores and responds in detail to these and other relevant 
questions. 
1.8 The Plan of the Thesis 
While the focus of the study, in terms of periodisation, was the post­ujamaa period which 
began around the mid eighties; it was our belief that changes during this period could not 
be well understood without analysis of their historical context. So, part II provides that 
analysis. The setting of periodisation is somehow overlapping and is used mainly for 
analytical purpose and to emphasize specific changes. In most cases events occurred in an 
overlapping pattern and it would be misleading to confine changes to specific period. 
Thus, this thesis is organized into four parts. Part I is an “introduction” part consisting of 
three chapters: This chapter, chapter 2 and chapter 3. 
Chapter 2 presents a survey of literature on three main aspects: the relationship between 
institutions and poverty alleviation; the shift of concerns on the role of the state and 
institutions; the debate on institutionalist theory; and conceptual frameworks. The scope of 
review does not include Tanzania because most of its literature is used in other chapters. 
Thus, it covers literature on the experience of other countries with special attention to 
developing countries and Africa in particular. It is also important to note that, while there 
are diverse literature on poverty and economic development in general, there is not much 
on the relationship between institutions and poverty alleviation in developing countries. 
So, only that which has addressed that aspect was reviewed. 
Chapter 3 reviews how the study was conducted. It includes: the methodology and methods 
employed in data collection and analysis; their rationale; and fieldwork experience. 
Part II is the “context” part consisting of two chapters: Chapter 4 discusses the history of 
Tanzania’s socio­economic, political development and the institutional evolution up to the 
end of Ujamaa. Its focus is not on poverty per se, but conditions which influenced socio­
economic and political changes out of which the concept, concerns and struggles against 
poverty emerged. It also discusses the implications and ways in which those conditions 
provided grounds for anti­poverty initiatives discussed in chapter 5. Its belief is that, an 
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account of institutional transformations within a historical context is imperative because it 
enabled us to look at institutions as socio­historical “artifacts” and struggles against 
poverty as historical processes, rather than “pragmatic non­historical sets” of government 
strategies and actions. 
Apart from identifying the implications of the domestic oriented institutional changes to 
socio­economic development and poverty alleviation, it also discusses the external 
institutional dimension of poverty alleviation. At the core of this section is the conviction 
that the influence of internal institutional order on a country‘s development is important to 
our analysis as the influences of the external (international) institutional order. As Stanley 
(1954:200) argued, “whether or not a country will successfully move along a [sustainable] 
path to development depends on elements in its own socio­economic and political 
environment and on the interplay with them of the influences from international 
environment.” Therefore, the impact of international institutional context on Tanzania’s 
development and poverty alleviation cannot be discounted. Historically, the development 
trajectories left the international context playing a dominant role on development 
initiatives in the country that any analytical oversight of its influences must produce 
misleading conclusions. Based on the above arguments, this section focuses on the shift in 
the development doctrines and the change in development strategies against poverty. 
In general, the chapter is divided into two sections: The first explores major changes 
unfolded during colonialism (1885­1961) and three decades of independence (1961­1987). 
It is divided into historical epochs based on the need to accentuate key institutional 
developments and for explanatory clarity. The colonial period covers the German rule 
(1885­1918) and the British rule (1919­1961) and the independence period (1961­ 1987) 
which covers two epochs: immediate post­independence (1961­1967) and Ujamaa (1967­
1987). The second section discusses the external institutional context of poverty 
alleviation. It is divided into three epochs based on dominant development doctrine and 
associated strategies: the Keynesian consensus (1960 and 1970); the Washington 
Consensus (1980s and 1990s and; the Corporate governance era of the 2000s. 
Chapter 5 is concerned with the status, evolution and shifts in the conception and concerns 
of poverty in the country. It covers the period from independence in the early sixties to the 
end of Ujamaa in the late eighties.  The aim of the chapter is to explore initiatives 
associated with struggles against poverty and inequality by drawing attention to concepts, 
dilemmas, challenges and consequences of the struggles as they unfolded within 
institutional reform processes. Its central belief is that, any attempt to comprehend the 
post­Ujamaa struggles against poverty must take into account these historical changes in 
their rhetoric and praxis and the outcomes of government and people’s reactions to them. 
Part III is the “content” part consisting of four chapters. Chapter 6 discusses the mode of 
institutional reform and group dynamics during the transition from Ujamaa to Neo­liberal 
Capitalism. It also looks into tensions which characterize the reform process. The aim is to 
establish the main features of the mode of reform which provide the foundation of the neo­
liberal institutional context in which current struggles against poverty take place. 
Chapter 7 presents the analysis of the functioning character and impact of the Neo­liberal 
Capitalist order. There is a consensus among institutionalists that political struggles are 
mediated by the institutional setting in which they take place. The context provides the 
actors with resources and constraints that they must take into account when choosing 
between alternatives. In other words, institutions shape the goals that the social actors 
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pursue and structure the power relations and struggles among them, thus creating winners 
and losers. Because of that, understanding the functioning character of an institutional 
order is vital for ascertaining the reasons for the failure of poverty alleviation initiatives. 
This chapter focuses on the functioning character of the neo­liberal institutional order the 
ways in which it makes poverty alleviation initiatives defective. 
Chapter 8 discusses the extent to which, institutional reforms and the character of neo­
liberal institutional order have impacted on conditions of poverty, inequality and socio­
economic insecurity in the country. This is done by examining the character of 
organization of production, the structure and pattern of economic growth, sectoral policy 
prioritization, regional disparities, access to productive resources, mobilization of 
production, and status of poverty, inequality and socio­economic insecurity. 
Chapter 9 is about corruption and poverty alleviation with emphasis on how institutional 
reforms have created institutional breeding environment for corruption and its impact on 
poverty alleviation. It focuses on three aspects: corruption as an outcome and indication of 
reform failure; the relationship between corruption and poverty in the neo­liberal 
institutional order and; the ways in which corruption impact on poverty alleviation 
initiatives. For the most part, this chapter is confined to limited aspects of corruption which 
are closely relevant to the study objectives and the theoretical basis underpinning it. Its 
primary intension is to expose the controversies of institutional positions of the two 
problems and the dilemma of simultaneous struggles against them. The central argument is 
that, the nature, dynamics and magnitude of corruption are a function of the nature of 
reforms and the functioning character of the resultant institutional order. Thus, 
understanding them is essential for any analysis of how corruption and poverty interact in a 
developing country like Tanzania and its implications for development and struggles 
against poverty. 
Part IV consists of Chapter 10. This final chapter presents a summary of the findings, 
discusses the contributions of the thesis, makes an evaluation of methodology used and 
finally provides a conclusion. It consists of five sections: (1) summary of the findings; (2) 
implications of the findings for practice; (3) theoretical contributions; (4) methodological 
evaluation; and (5) conclusion. 
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___________________________________________________________________ 
Chapter 2 
Literature Review 
2.1 Institutions, Poverty and Inequality 
There is a large literature on the relationship between institutions and aspects of poverty 
and inequality at both the conceptual/theoretical and empirical levels and in a number of 
disciplines. The relationship between institutions, poverty and inequality have been 
approached differently by different authors depending on (among other things) their 
intellectual traditions and discipline orientations. 
2.1.1 General Empirical Experience 
From the economic perspective, poverty and inequality are considered to be a result of the 
nature and character of the relationship between the production and distribution of scarce 
resources featured by incapacity to produce adequately basic necessities of life. This idea is 
well captured by Hartwell and others when they argued that, “economics is [concerned 
about] resources in relation to mankind’s wants and with the problem of choice between 
wants and allocation of scarce resources to satisfy those wants. They further argue that 
“poverty of the past, from the earliest beginnings of human society up till very recently, 
was due to lack of power to produce adequately the necessities of life” (Hartwell, R.M et al 
,1972:3&6). However, relations in the production process which negatively affected 
production capacity did not happen in a vacuum, but were mediated by a particular 
institutional configuration. In other words, production relations were influenced by the 
socio­economic and political structural or institutional setting in which they took place. As 
Novak observed: “despite the popular mythology, poverty has not always been with 
us...poverty as we know it, is a much more recent and historically specific phenomenon...It 
occurred at a certain point in history, and is tied to a particular form of economic and 
social organization” (Novak, 1998:3) 
As political­related problems, poverty and inequality are defined in terms of power 
relations, which presuppose the existence of at least two groups: the powerful (rich or 
socio­politically advantaged) and the powerless (socio­politically disadvantaged). The 
differences are defined in terms of their power to force the economic, political and social 
system to respond to their needs; hence Heatley’s quip: “poor means powerless means 
poor” (Heatley, 1985). The relationship between the groups starts with a political 
construction of the concept of “poverty” itself and “the poor” as a politically defined 
category based on their institutional positions in the polity. Furthermore, the construction 
and the consequent image that a government has of the poor influences the politics, 
policies and institutional oriented actions with regard to poverty and inequality issues 
(Becker, 1997:2&6). 
But the politics, policies, actions and inaction of a government do not originate or operate 
in a vacuum. The institutional setting influences attitudes towards poverty, defines access 
to the key sources of power, and generally sets the limits in which legitimate politics can 
act. As Barrow observed: “....the organized control, possessions, and ownership of key 
resources (wealth, status, force, and knowledge) [is] the basis of exercising power in any 
society”. Institutions, he insists, organize power in a society by vesting the individuals 
occupying certain positions with the authority to make decisions about how to deploy the 
11

key resources mobilized by that institution (Barrow, 1993: 13). Therefore, just as the poor 
are defined and positioned differently in different institutional settings, so are other groups. 
Observations from political related literature share similar concerns, with arguments 
ranging from the primacy of institutional influences on political processes and outcomes. 
“Institutions”, says Thomas Dye “may be so structured as to facilitate certain policy 
outcomes”. They may give advantage to certain interests in society and withhold 
advantages from others. Certain individuals and groups may enjoy greater access to 
resources and power under one set of institutional characteristics than under another. 
Immergut (1998:8) has argued that “preferences or interests in a political system are 
advanced through institutions”. Institutional configurations may privilege particular 
interests at the expense of others. For Regini (1998:8­9) the institutional context provides 
actors with resources and constraints that they must necessarily take into account when 
choosing among alternatives. 
From a sociological perspective, poverty and inequality are conceived of as social ills 
resulting from people’s deprivation in terms of living conditions and amenities (including 
the social resources necessary for meeting the basic material and non­material 
requirements) which are customary and widely accepted and approved as the standard 
living requirements in the societies to which they belong (Becker,1997:24). In practice, 
deprivation entails (among other things) limited access to welfare needs which may result 
in social inequality, insecurity and vulnerability. From this perspective, deprivation, 
limited access to social welfare, social inequality and insecurity and vulnerability are not 
natural social conditions, but rather socially constructed through a particular social welfare 
institutional order. For example, it is argued that poverty is not simply a lack of or 
insufficient resources to meet basic physical requirements (Rowntree 1901, quoted in 
Becker, 1997:2&6) but about how resources are made unavailable and insufficient to a 
particular group due to the limited supply or accessibility caused by the functioning of an 
institutional order in which struggles for resources take place. Therefore, to be poor is not 
just to have less than others, but to be deprived of the means of securing the requirement of 
life (Novak, 1998:3). 
2.1.2 Developing Countries’ Experience 
In the early 1970s, Charles Elliott conducted a study on the Patterns of Poverty in 
developing countries, including Tanzania. His main focus was on the “Causes of Social 
and Economic Stratifications”. According to him, while the basic configurations of 
countries’ poverty were known, there were no answers to the question “why do people 
continue to be poor?” His main assumption was that “poverty or impoverishment was the 
result of a causal process of which enrichment was a major but not exclusive component”. 
He also believed that the fundamental cause of poverty was the ability of the privileged to 
protect and extend their privileges, a condition which he associated with the nature of the 
institutional forces that biased the distribution of social products against the poorest 
(Elliott, 1975) 
One of his key findings was that the institutional forces enabled some groups to manipulate 
the policy processes in order to limit the risk of resource loss and ensure continuous 
resource accumulation. He found that much of the anti­poverty planning in the 1970s were 
still based on the assumption of centralized planning, dictated by generalized international 
values which emphasized not the redistribution of existing assets and the restructuring of 
the relationships within which those assets were used, but on “redistribution from growth”. 
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These processes in turn left the mechanisms of the inter­group competition fundamentally 
unchanged. Therefore, Elliott’s study indicated that the major cause of impoverishment in 
developing countries was institutional bias against resource (re)distribution to the poorest. 
Elliott’s findings are reflected in Bates’ (1995:37­38) argument that, in order to understand 
the nature and character of the economies of developing countries or “the politics and 
economics of growth”, the role of both economic and non­economic institutions 
(particularly the wide variety of social institutional forms) within which development 
initiatives take place is imperative. She provided two reasons as justifications for the 
primacy of institutional analysis: first, it offers ways of understanding the economic 
significance of the features of developing societies and cultures that market­based 
reasoning might misunderstand or ignore. Second, exploration of the political and 
economic institutional configurations helps in understanding group dynamics, power 
relations and resource flow and control. Generally, she believed that the restructuring of 
the political institutions (specifically, reorganization of the structure of government) and 
economic institutions do promote or inhibit the capacity of the government, groups and 
individual persons in their struggle for material production by influencing their access to 
and control over the key resources. 
The renewed interest in institutions coincided with the shift of concerns, among 
international agencies and Western governments, about the role of state in promoting 
growth and reducing poverty in developing countries, particularly in Africa. The origin of 
the concern was the setbacks and failures in structural adjustment programmes in the 1980s 
and the normative and functional ideals of politics of neo­liberal thinking which was at the 
heart of the World Bank strategies (Leftwich, 1993: 606; Hyden and Karlstrom, 1993:41­
42; Campbell, 2001:157). Initially, the aim of adjustment was to shatter the dominant post­
war state­led development approach and overcome the problems of economic stagnation 
by promoting open and competitive market economies, supervised by minimal states. 
Adjustment involved profound change in the use, production and distribution of resources, 
giving rise to both winners and losers. Losers often included bureaucrats, public sector 
workers, party officials, farmers and manufacturers, for they all had something to fear from 
reduction in the size of the public service, diminution of the power of the party­state, more 
competition, withdrawal of subsidies and free trade. But the burden of change fell more on 
the poor who lost free services and experienced steep increases in basic food and consumer 
prices as well as medical and education costs. These hardships led to protests in many 
countries which called for review of the centrality of political factors and the role of the 
state in adjustment process. It became clear that the ability to design and implement 
adjustment programmes was largely a consequence of political commitment, capacity and 
skill, as well as bureaucratic competence, independence and probity (Leftwich, 1993: 607). 
These concerns were backed by strong normative and functionalist ideals of politics and 
state institutions which were the central themes in the 11 points of the Washington 
Consensus (see Chapter 4). In normative terms the Washington Consensus celebrated 
individual economic and political rights and minimal state as representing the essence of 
good society. So, all forms of constraints on the rights and liberties of individuals, interfere 
with freedom of choice, distort the free play of markets and hence harm economic 
development (Leftwich, 1993: 608). The argument was that, democratic politics is 
necessary for a thriving free market economy and an obese state, with a large stake in 
economic life, is in practice incompatible with democracy. According to the World Bank 
(1997:36), while protection of rights and freedoms of individual required democratic, 
strong and capable state, governments in developing countries had weak capabilities and 
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engaged in activities that were not the proper role of the state. Moreover, the legal and 
regulatory frameworks had become a bottleneck to development of private sector. Thus, 
both poor records of growth and failures in adjustment programmes became associated 
with political factors such as authoritarian rule or deficient democratic practice arising 
from excessive state or political involvement in economy and society. Likewise, the 
reluctance or inability of regimes to institute political liberalisation was regarded as a 
consequence of excessive concentration of economic and political power in the hands of 
state personnel, something which democratic reform would reduce and redistribute. It 
followed that, democratisation in the context of a market economy would compel 
governments to be accountable, less corrupt and efficient in promoting growth, delivery of 
public goods and reduction of poverty (Leftwich, 1993: 609; Hamdok, 2003:15) 
This culminated in the adoption of good governance agenda by the World Bank in 1989, 
when it redefined Africa’s development problem as “a crisis of governance” (World Bank, 
1989). Good governance defined as “the exercise of political power to manage a nation’s 
affairs” entailed three distinct aspects: the form of political regime, (parliamentary or 
presidential, military or civilian, and authoritarian or democratic), the processes by which 
authority is exercised in the management of a country's resources,  and the capacity of 
governments to design, formulate and implement policies, and discharge functions (World 
Bank, 1992:58; Campbell, 2001:157). The World Bank believed that, even in societies that 
are highly market­oriented, only governments could provide two sorts of public goods: 
rules to make markets work efficiently and corrective interventions where there are market 
failures (World Bank, 1992:6). 
Thus, from the early 1990s, developing countries were gradually moved into revived 
emphasis on institutional reforms as a way of promoting good governance which became 
an important focus and key ingredient in development efforts for governments, 
international agencies and the donor countries (Hyden and Karlstrom, 1993:55, Mugerwa, 
2003:1; Hamdok, 2003:15). 
2.2 Theoretical and Conceptual Landscape 
The rediscovery of institutions in the late 1970s (in what has come to be known as the era 
of New Institutionalism) has rejuvenated the analytical primacy of institutions and opened 
up a new research agenda in comparative politics and comparative political economy. This 
renewed attention to institutional variables in different fields of social sciences 
(particularly economics, political science and sociology) has been expressed through 
slogans such as “bringing the state back in” (Evans et al. 1985), rediscovering 
institutions” (March & Olsen 1989), and “structuring politics” (Thelen & Steinmo,1992). 
This has in turn led to an explosion of literature on the impact of institutions and 
institutional changes on socio­economic development across social sciences to the extent 
of casting, to use Hall &Taylor’s words, “considerable confusion about what the new 
institutionalism is, how it differs from other approaches, and what sort of promise or 
problems it displays” (1996:5). 
Against that background, an object here is to identify the basics of new institutionalism 
from which this study was constructed. It narrows the review of institutional literature to 
those aspects of significance in understanding the subject matter of our research: the 
impact of institutional reforms on poverty and inequality. Focusing solely on few aspects 
of institutional variables within a complex theoretical and conceptual enterprise like the 
new institutionalism has costs and benefits. A risk is the possibility of obscuring “what 
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Mulé called “the multiplicity of controversies and concerns” (1999:146) advanced within 
each strand of new institutionalism. The main advantage however is that, a narrow but 
careful review of new institutionalism, allow us to concentrate on the core questions and 
emphasis that unify the theoretical base of institutional approach: the need for 
understanding institutions that shape political strategies; the ways in which institutions 
structure relations of power among contending groups in society; and the focus on the 
process of politics and policy­making within a given (historically founded) institutional 
parameter (Theren and Steinmo, 1992:7). 
2.2.1 The Genealogy and Taxonomy of New Institutionalism 
New institutionalists drew inspirations and insights from older traditions in economics, 
political science and sociology. But renewed attention to institutional variables grew out 
of a critique of the behavioural traditions of comparative politics prominent in the 
1950s and 1960s. In behaviouralism, the properties and behaviour of individuals were the 
main explanatory variables of comparative politics. Individuals constituted the 
fundamental building blocks as political results were seen as the mere aggregation of 
individual actions. Behaviouralism for its part may be seen as a reaction to the institutional 
traditions prevalent in social sciences before 1950s with its focus on formal institutions 
(Thelen and Steinmo, 1992:3; Lowndes, 1996: 182­183; Hall and Taylor, 1996: 5­6; Blom­
Hansen, 1997: 674; Clemens & Cook, 1999:441; Lecours, 2005:1) 
Old­institutionalism consisted mainly, though not exclusively, of detailed configurative 
studies of formal administrative, legal and political structures. Its approach to comparative 
political analysis largely entailed juxtaposing descriptions of institutional configurations in 
different countries or different periods within a country. Institutions were perceived as 
formal government institutions, and analysis was directed towards their formal attributes. 
Old institutionalism did not encourage development of intermediate categories and 
concepts that would facilitate comparative research and advance explanatory theory 
(Thelen and Steinmo, 1992:3). It was this weak explanatory power that led to behavioural 
revolution and take over in political science, economics and sociology in the 1950s and 
1960s. 
Notwithstanding its attention to other important and previously neglected aspects of 
political life, Thelen and Steinmo (1992:1) argued that, behaviourists often obscured the 
enduring socio­economic and political structures that influence behaviour in distinctive 
ways in different national contexts. It was this weakness which spawned three interrelated 
strands of new­institutionalism: Sociological institutionalism, Rational Choice 
Institutionalism (RCI) and Historical Institutionalism (HI) (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992:6­9; 
Hall and Taylor, 1996: 5; Lecours, 2005:6­7). As theoretical and conceptual frameworks 
for research, these strands tried to provide answers to four questions: What are institutions? 
What is their impact on action? How institutions are formed and transformed? And, what 
methodological and epistemological positions best suit institutional analysis? These 
questions will guide our discussions in the subsequent sections. 
(a) Sociological Institutionalism 
The concern of sociological institutionalism is the role of culturally legitimate models of 
organization and action (Clemens and Cook, 1999:442; Lowndes, 1996: 184). Based on 
the choice­within­constraint framework, sociological institutionalism (in contrast to the 
rational choice institutionalism) emphasizes analysis that explores interrelationships among 
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formal rules, informal norms, social networks, and purposive action. Institutions are 
defined as constraining, constitutive, regulative, normative, or cognitive social structures 
exerting patterned effects on the actions of individuals and organizations (Clemens and 
Cook, 1999:443­445). Sociological institutionalists argue that many of the forms and 
procedures used by modern organizations are not adopted simply because they are most 
efficient for rational actions but as culturally specific practices devised by societies and 
assimilated into organizations. Under Sociological institutional analysis, the relationship 
between institutions and action is approached by associating institutions with roles to 
which prescriptive norms of behaviour are attached. In this view, individuals who have 
been socialized into particular institutional roles internalize the norms associated with 
these roles, and in this way institutions are said to affect behaviour­ the normative 
dimension of institutional impact. 
According to this perspective, institutions influence behaviour not simply by specifying 
what one should do but also by specifying what one can imagine oneself doing in a given 
context. Since institutions provide the terms through which meaning is assigned in social 
life, then they do not simply affect the strategic calculations of individuals, as rational 
choice institutionalists contend, but also, their most basic preferences and identity. 
(b) Rational Choice Institutionalism (RCI) 
Rational Choice Institutionalists criticise behaviouralists for their focus on characteristics, 
attitudes, and behaviours of the individuals and groups themselves to explain political 
outcomes. They also criticize sociological institutionalism for being too broad and defining 
ideas and behaviour as institutions. According to RCI, behaviouralists often miss crucial 
elements of the playing field and thus did not provide answers to the prior questions of why 
these political behaviours, attitudes and distribution of resources among contending groups 
themselves differed from one country to another or from period to another within the same 
country. They argue, for example, that, looking at the characteristics and preferences of 
pressure groups themselves these theories could not explain as to why interest groups 
with similar organisational characteristics and similar preferences could not always 
influence policy in the same way or at the same extent in different national contexts . 
For RCI, to explain these differences required more explicit attention to the institutional 
landscape in which interest groups sought to influence (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992:5). The 
RCI is premised on the assumptions that political actors are homo­economicus (rational 
income maximizers). Because they are rational, political actors will always act to 
maximize their self­interest. In this sense preferences are treated as exogenous to 
institutions. Institutions are only important as features of a strategic context imposing 
constraints on self­interested behaviour. Political actors make their preferences out of their 
free will and choices based on perfect knowledge on all existing alternatives and their 
associated consequences if preferred. In other words, action of a political actor is based on 
“a logic of consequentiality” (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992:7­9; Ostrom, 1991:238; Lecours, 
2005:11). 
Rational choice institutionalism is criticised by both sociological and historical interpretive 
institutionalism as ahistorical and overabstract, by taking institutional contexts as given, 
fixed and exogenous; by assuming that individuals are always income­maximizers and by 
claiming that institutions can be analysed within the mainstream equilibrium­oriented neo­
classical approach of economics (Lowndes, 1996: 183­184). The fundamental hypothesis 
of institutional change according to rational choice institutionalism is that institutions exist 
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where the benefits exceed the costs involved in creating and maintaining them (Lowndes, 
1996: 184). Put most simply, the approach sees the main purpose and effect of institutions 
as economizing on transaction costs (Khan, 1995:73; Furubotn and Richter, 2005: 47­77). 
Table 2.1: The Genealogy and Taxonomy of New Institutionalism 
Years Theoretical 
Perspective 
Main Focus Weakness/Strength 
Before 
1950s 
Old 
Institutionalism 
Normative configuration of 
structures Description of different 
formal institutional configurations 
No explanatory institutional 
accounts 
less inclination to theoretical 
construction 
1950s­
early 
1970s 
Behaviouralism Informal distribution of power, 
Ideas , attitudes and Behaviours 
Obscure structures that mould 
behaviour advocated for grand 
theorizing 
From Late 
1970s 
New 
Institutionalism 
The general concern is the question 
of how institutions shape political 
strategies and how do they 
influence political outcomes 
Sol­
Institutionalism 
Normative & Ideational 
institutional impact 
Inductive, Particularistic, 
Qualitative 
RC­
Institutionalism 
Institutions are important as 
features of a strategic context, 
imposing constraints on Rational 
self­interested behaviour 
Deductive, Universalistic, 
Quantitative 
ahistorical, overabstract 
H­
Institutionalism 
Institutions shape goals and 
strategies political actors pursue 
Political actors are seen as rule­
following “sartisficers” with 
limited knowledge on their goals, 
needs, strategies and context 
Inductive, Particularistic, 
Qualitative 
(c ) Historical Institutionalism (HI) 
The focus of HII are the immediate institutions that shape political strategies; the ways in 
which institutions structure relations of power among contending groups in society and 
the process of politics and policy­making within historically founded institutional 
parameters. The central theoretical argument of new historical institutionalism is that, 
institutions shape actions and, therefore, theorists must remember that actions do not occur 
in a non­historical context or institutional vacuum (Lecours, 2005:8). It also rejects any 
attempt to depict institutions as historically neutral social artifacts adjusting mechanically 
to social changes or purely instruments that can readily be manipulated by the actors to 
meet their interests.10 
Historical Institutionalists do not ignore the role of ideas in comparative political analysis. 
They view ideas in terms of norms and values of the material institutions from which they 
emanate (Lecours 2005:7). They are also not against the Rational Choice understanding of 
institutions. But they argue against treating institutions as mere “strategic contexts of 
rational political actors”. The core characteristics of Historical Institutionalism is emphasis 
on the immediate institutions that shape political strategies; the ways institutions structure 
According to Historical institutionalists, those perspectives ignore the possibility that institutions themselves can have 
effects on the socio­economic and political outcomes. They advance the idea that institutions represent an autonomous 
force in socio­economic and political struggles and that their weight is felt in both actions and outcomes, suggesting that 
socio­economic and political analyses are best served by taking institutions as the starting point or, methodologically 
speaking, institutions should be used as an independent variable or at least an intervening variables. 
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10
relations of power among contending groups and; the focus on the process of politics and 
policy­making within a given institutional parameters. 
For HII the idea that institutions provide the context in which political actors define 
their strategies and pursue their interests is unproblematic; it is a key premise in their 
analysis. But they go beyond seeing institutions only as strategic context of rational actors. 
Institutional factors shape the goals/objectives and strategies of political actors as well as 
the distribution of power among them. Political actors are seen as homo­sociologicus (rule 
following satisficers) with limited knowledge on their needs, interests, strategies and 
context. Institutional context may influence political actors to the extent of deviating from 
self­interest in favour of collective interests. In this sense preferences of political actors are 
endogenous to institutional setting and actors do not always make their choice out of their 
free will. They always make constructed preferences as they are dictated by existing 
institutional order. Action of a political actor is based on “a logic of appropriateness” and 
institutions are defined as collections of interrelated rules and routines that define 
appropriate action in terms of relations between roles and situations (Thelen and Steinmo, 
1992:2, 8; Ostrom, 1991:238; Lecours, 2005:11). 
2.2.2 Agency and Institutional Change 
The central claim of new institutionalism is that institutions shape actions and, therefore, 
theorizing must take into account the fact that actions do not occur in an institutional 
vacuum (Lecours, 2005:8). They advance the idea that institutions represent an 
autonomous force in the socio­economic and political struggles that is best understood by 
taking institutions as the starting point for analysis. By defining and treating institutions as 
relatively enduring features of political and social life (rules, norms and procedures) that 
structure behaviour and that cannot be changed easily or instantaneously (Mahoney and 
Thelen, 2010:4), the three institutional approaches are inclined to focus on explaining 
continuity rather than change. As a result, they find themselves in an everlasting debate in 
the field of social sciences concerning the relationship between “structure and agency” and 
the question of explaining “institutional change”. Despite this common tendency regarding 
the way in which they treat institutions, the three approaches do vary with regard to how 
they conceive institutions (Table 2.2), which in turn influences the way in which they 
theorize about agency and institutional change. 
Table 2.2 Conception of Institutions by the Three Institutional Approaches 
Approach Conception of Institutions 
Sociological 
Institutionalism (SI) 
� Non codified, informal conventions and collective scripts that regulate 
human behaviour, 
� They have self­reproductive properties and resistance to change, 
� They are tied to codes of appropriateness and reproduction occurs as the 
actors are socialized and learn to follow them, 
� They are taken for granted by the actors, 
Rational Choice 
Institutionalism (RCI) 
� They are coordinating mechanisms that sustain a particular equilibrium, 
and also self­enforcing mechanisms 
Historical 
Institutionalism (HI) 
� It acknowledges the cultural component of the institutions of SI, and the 
coordinating functions advanced by the RCI, 
� It views them as political legacies of concrete historical struggles, 
� It embraces a power­political view of institutions that emphasizes their 
distributional effects, 
� They explain institutional persistence in terms of increasing the returns to 
power, 
Source: Extracted from Mahoney and Thelen (2010:5­7) 
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According to Lecours (2005:8­9) the question of how structures affect agency requires an 
analysis of three aspects of structural impact on agency: the mechanisms through which 
institutions shape action; the extent of the weight of institutions on agency, and the depth 
of influence on socio­economic and political process (that is the weight of institutions felt 
only on strategies or /and preferences). The answer to the above question and its associated 
analytical aspects are approached differently by different strands of new institutionalism as 
presented in Table 2.3. In emphasizing the importance of institutions the new 
institutionalists, particularly from historical and sociological strand, reject any attempt to 
depict institutions as neutral artifacts adjusting mechanically to social changes or as just 
instruments that can readily be manipulated by actors to meet their interests. According to 
them, those perspectives ignore the possibility that institutions themselves can have effects 
on socio­economic and political outcomes. 
Table 2.3: How Structures affect Agency 
No. Questions Approach to Answers 
Sociological 
Institutional 
ism 
Rational Choice 
Institutionalism 
Historical Institutionalism 
1. What are the 
mechanisms 
through which 
institutions shape 
action? 
Path 
Dependency 
approach 
Constraints & 
Opportunities­ the 
calculus approach 
­Path ­dependency and incremental 
change approach: causal influence of 
preceding institutional order and the 
entrenchments of certain institutional 
arrangements which obstruct an easy 
reversal of the initial institutional 
choice. 
­Endogenously based gradual 
institutional change 
2. What is the extent 
of the weight of 
institutions on 
agency? 
Structuralist 
approach 
Relatively Less ­
Agents­driven­
process approach, 
but with agents 
manoeuvring 
Path­dependency and incremental 
change approach 
3. What is the depth of 
institutional 
influence on socio­
economic and 
political process? 
Existential 
& Relational 
influence 
approach 
Constraint on 
Strategy approach 
Constraints, preferences & outcomes 
Source: Extracted from the discussions on New Institutionalism in Lecours, (2005:9­11) see also Thelen and 
Steinmo( 1992:6­12) 
Institutions, according to rational choice institutionalists, may constrain action, define 
opportunity and facilitate patterns of interaction (Clemens and Cook, 1999:447). In this 
formulation, desires and interests are conceptually distinct from institutions. This approach 
suggests that institutions persist because they embody something like equilibrium. That is 
to say, individuals adhere to institutions because deviation will make them worse off than 
will adherence (Hall andTaylor, 1996:8). As indicated in Table 2.3, rational choice 
institutionalists suggest that the weight of institutions is felt on outcomes in so far as it 
affects individual and collective decisions by offering opportunities for action and 
imposing constraints. In this context, the importance of institutions stems from their 
mediating effect on the calculations of rational actors under what Lecours called, 
“institutional incentive or a choice­within­constraints approach”( 2005:11). Concerning the 
extent of the weight and depth of institutions on agency, rational choice institutionalists 
argue that because socio­economic and political processes are driven by actors; institutions 
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represent a context for action rather than autonomous force per se and interests and 
preferences of actors are formed independent of institutional environment, then there is 
less institutional influence on agency and the depth of the weight is felt only on strategies. 
Historical institutionalists reject the view of the rational actor on which the calculus 
approach is premised. According to them, actors cannot be assumed to have a fixed (and 
immutable) preference set, to be blessed with extensive (often perfect) information and 
foresight and to be self­interested utility maximizers (Hay and Wincott, 1998: 954). They 
emphasize the idea that once institutions are formed, they take on a life of their own and 
drive socio­economic and political processes. Because institutions have a logic of their 
own, they argue, their interaction and development result in consequences unplanned for 
and unforeseen by actors. Analytically, the focus is not only on institutions but also, and 
probably more important, on contingency and unpredictability of the impacts of 
institutional changes (Lecours, 2005:9). The “cultural approach” adopted by sociological 
institutionalism stresses that institutions provide moral or cognitive templates for 
interpretation and action (Hall &Taylor, 1996:8; Mahoney and Thelen, 2010:5). 
Institutions constitute the environment in which actors define their preferences and 
strategies and interact in their daily struggles. Actors are socialized to specific institutional 
functioning to the extent that complication to these institutions are taken­for­granted when 
actors contemplate about how best to organize, and towards what ends. Therefore, 
according to them, institutions express norms of decision making and behaviour providing 
logic of appropriateness. 
So, in contradistinction to the “calculus argument” of rational institutionalism, both 
sociological and historical institutionalists argue that, socio­economic and political 
processes are not always driven by actors and in many circumstances the autonomy of 
actors may be severely limited by the logic of institutional dynamics. Institutions, they 
emphasize, affect not only strategies and interests, but also patterns of relationships 
between actors, preferences, objectives, identities, roles, and indeed the very existence of 
actors (Lecours (2005:11). 
As noted, despite their diverse ways of approaching the question of interaction between 
structures and agency, new institutionalists seem to share one common problem: a focus on 
explaining institutional continuity or institutional dynamism rather than change (Thelen 
and Steinmo, 1992:15­16; Lecours, 2005:11; Mahoney and Thelen, 2010:4)). There is also 
a struggle against falling victim of “strictly institutional determinism” and analytically 
reducing institutions to a state of “epiphenomenal”­being treated as subject rather than 
force of change (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992:14­15). The aim of a focus on institutional 
dynamism is to not only look at how institutions mediate and filter political struggles but 
also how the impact is mediated by the broader socio­economic and political context (ibid. 
p.16). 
2.2.3 Models of Institutional Dynamism (MID) 
To avoid the tendency toward “static” institutional analysis (institutional determinism) and 
reducing the explanatory power of institutions (institutional epiphenomenalism) in 
explaining agency and institutional change, two models of institutional dynamism have 
been adopted: the Punctuated Equilibrium Model (PEM) and the Dynamic Constraints 
Model (DCM). 
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(a) The Punctuated Equilibrium Model (PEM) 
The model is based on the argument that “institutions” are characterized by long period of 
stability, periodically “punctuated” by crises that bring about relatively abrupt institutional 
change after which institutional stasis again sets in. The main source of institutional 
dynamism is institutional crises emanating from changes in the external environment 
(exogenous factors). In this formulation,  institutions are stable until disrupted by some 
force exogenous to the institutional system (Clemens & Cook 1999:447). These forces lead 
to the breakdown of old institutions, precipitating intensive socio­economic and political 
conflicts over the nature and shape of new institutional arrangements. As a result, actors 
are forced to adjust their strategies to accommodate changes in the institutions. According 
to PEM, socio­economic and political strategies matter only during moments of 
institutional breakdown (due to increased intensity of struggle) and institutional breakdown 
is the only source of institutional change (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992:15). 
For many institutionalists, the arguments advanced by the PEM are fundamental as they 
suggest an elegant and powerful theory of institutional change that emphasizes the 
“stickiness” of historically evolved institutional arrangements and rejection of the idea that 
institutions simply respond to changes in the balance of power in society around them. 
However, by dividing historical moments of institutional change into “stable” and 
“unstable” periods, the punctuated equilibrium metaphor seems to suggest that institutional 
arrangements help to explain policy outcomes only during institutional stability and, to 
borrow Thelen and Steinmo’s words, “institutions explains everything until they explain 
nothing”(1992:15). That is, institutions explain political outcomes in period of stability 
only and when they breakdown, they become subject to socio­economic conflicts that such 
breakdown unleashes. Put differently, at the moment of institutional breakdown, the logic 
of the argument is reversed from “institutions­shape­politics” to “politics­shape­
institutions”. Because of that anomaly, some institutionalists argue that conceiving of the 
relationship in these ways obscures the dynamic interaction of political strategies and 
institutional constraints. Therefore a more dynamic model to capture the interplay between 
institutions and politics is required. 
(b) The Dynamic Constraints Model (DCM) 
According to this model, institutional dynamism is caused more by piecemeal change 
resulting from specific political battles or ongoing strategic maneuvering within 
institutional constraints. The DCM emphasizes that institutional breakdown is not the only 
source of institutional change and that it is not just in the moments of institutional 
breakdown that strategies matter. Strategic maneuvering by political actors and conflict 
among them can influence the institutional parameters within which their interactions 
occur. The focus is more on endogenous factors of political change and on maneuvering 
within institutions in response to external and internal events. It acknowledges the 
importance of external pressure, but political actors respond to that by maneuvering and 
exploiting existing opportunities within existing institutions without necessarily creating 
new institutions. The emphasis is that, institutional change is determined by the character 
of prior arrangements and by their internal contradictions (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992:17). 
This model has been advanced by Mahoney and Thelen (2010) in what they have called “A 
Theory of Gradual Institutional Change (GIC)”, growing out of literature on path­
dependency. According to this theory, the features of the political context and the 
properties of the institutions themselves are crucial factors in explaining institutional 
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change. Once created, it is argued, institutions often change in subtle, gradual ways, over 
time and, although less drastic than abrupt, wholesale transformations, these slow, 
piecemeal changes can be equally consequential for patterning human behaviour and for 
shaping substantive political outcomes (Mahoney and Thelen, 2010:1). According to them, 
most scholars point to the exogenous shocks that bring about radical institutional 
reconfigurations while overlooking shifts based on endogenous developments that often 
unfold incrementally. Gradual and incrementally occurring changes, they insist, are more 
common phenomena than exogenously generated radical institutional shifts. This indicates 
that institutions normally evolve in more incremental ways (Mahoney and Thelen, 2010:3). 
In order to provide a general model of institutional change that can comprehend both the 
exogenous and endogenous sources of change, Mahoney and Thelen suggest a conception, 
common in historical institutionalism, that views institutions as distributional instruments 
that are laden with power implications (p. 2010:7). According to this view, institutions are 
fraught with tension because they inevitably raise resource considerations and invariably 
have distributional consequences. Because institutions (formal or informal) pattern action 
and have unequal implications for resources allocation, actors with different endowments 
of resources are normally motivated to pursue the creation of and influence different kinds 
of institutions. In this way, the institutional arrangements should be seen as characterised 
by both relatively durable and dynamic tendencies which make the institutions vulnerable 
to shifts. Thus, change and stability are mutually linked. Since institutional stability and 
change rests not just on the accumulation but also on the ongoing mobilization of 
resources, one important source of change is shifts in the balance of power among groups 
due to changes in the contextual conditions that reshuffle the power relations (Mahoney 
and Thelen, 2010:9). 
In general, therefore, this theory emphasizes the interaction between political context and 
the properties of the institutions themselves in explaining institutional change. It also seeks 
to underline the importance of understanding the different types of change agents and the 
associated strategies that are likely to flourish in a particular institutional context. One of 
its central arguments is that institutional change occurs when problems of rule 
interpretation and enforcement open up space for the actors to implement the existing rules 
in new ways. 
2.2.4 The GIC and Historical Institutional Analysis 
The theory of Gradual Institutional Change provides key aspects of institutional analysis 
which are inherently core to historical institutionalism: focus on constraints, dynamism, 
context, properties of institutions, strategies of agents, and incremental change. According 
to Hall (2010:205), approaches associated with historical institutionalism are more 
attentive to problems of institutional change because they offer correctives to the dualist 
view that separates periods of institutional stability and change. By so doing, they provide 
an opportunity to view changes as continuous, and transformation as a product of 
incremental adjustment. By being sensitive to the power relations associated with 
institutional change, it has more to offer than other approaches in explaining both how 
institutions structure the behaviour of the actors as well as the potential conditions for 
change emanating from the socio­economic and political context. Thus, through its power­
distributional approach, historical institutionalism provides a basic motor for change. 
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The focus on these issues helps researchers to answer about four questions: 
First, what are the sources of policy change under stable institutional arrangements? In 
other words, how can a researcher explain policy change if the institutions remain 
relatively stable? The idea here is that institutions do not operate in a vacuum (although 
some institutionalists insist on institutional stickiness regardless of changes in the context 
in which they exist). Institutions may be resistant to change, but their impact on the 
political outcomes can change in subtle ways in response to shifts in the socio­economic or 
political context (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992:20). 
Second, how and under what conditions do institutions become the object of change? This 
focuses on the issue of the internal character and contradictions within the institutions 
themselves. Sometimes, institutions become the object of contention, and change may 
result from deliberate strategies to win long­term political advantages. According to 
Mahoney and Thelen (2010:4), institutional change occurs when problems of rule 
interpretation and enforcement open up space for actors to implement the existing rules in 
new ways. In other instances, gradual evolution may emerge as the unintended 
consequence of political battles fought over other issues (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992:22). 
Third, how does the political context influence both the internal conditions of institutions 
and the struggles of the actors? This seeks to explore the dynamic interactions between the 
political context and the properties of institutions and the ways in which the interplay 
between the two affects the political struggles and outcomes. 
Last, how can path­dependency be employed in a more dynamic ways to reflect the 
incremental institutional changes resulting from both endogenous and exogenous forces 
and account for the formation and long­term reproduction of a given historical institutional 
pattern (Mahoney, 2000:508)? 
Methodologically, therefore, historical institutionalism conceptualizes the impact of 
institutions in terms of a relatively path­dependency and incremental change which 
employs “the inductive techniques of periodization” with an emphasis on four specific 
strategies: first, the institutional origins strategy (here, comparison is made between the 
periods before and after the adoption of an institution); second, context analysis strategy 
(the focus is on how the context influence the properties of the institutions and the 
struggles of the actors); third, endogenous and exogenous factor analysis (which involves 
comparing the periods before and after the occurrence of both internal and external forces 
responsible for institutional change); and, lastly, the change agents’ strategy (which 
examines the continuous struggles of the political agents in influencing institutional 
change). 
2.3 Historical Institutional Oriented Conceptual Frameworks 
Modern institutions in Tanzania were developed in line with the customary institutions as 
part of the state and economic formation. This was influenced by the desire to develop a 
dual order of both Western and African institutions, left to co­exist as independent 
frameworks for social action. So, understanding development in the country required one 
to pay special attention to the dynamics of the evolution of the state and the dual 
institutional order. 
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While it is acknowledged that historical institutionalism provides an alternative 
explanation of the nature of social actions by injecting a historical institutional dimension 
into the analysis, its application in developing countries and Tanzania in particular remains 
limited. A key challenge is how its methodological propositions, which were developed 
based on the experiences of Western society, can help to explain the nature and dynamics 
of institutional change in developing countries. The application of historical institutional 
methodology, therefore, calls attention to the contextual specificity of the societies in 
which it is employed. In the Tanzanian case, capturing the dynamics of the context in 
which modern and customary institutions co­exist as independent institutional order(s) 
needed a conceptual framework grounded in historical institutional theory but which 
reflected this contextual peculiarity. 
In an attempt to find out how institutional theory and methodology can be translated into 
fieldwork guide we identified three conceptual frameworks11 founded on historical 
institutional analysis of African context: Khan’s (1995) “Weak State Failure Model 
(WSF); Elliott’s (1975) “Goldfish Bowls Whimsical Analogy (GBWA)” and; Beetham’s 
(1994) “Mode of Transition to Democracy Thesis (MTDT). 
(a) Weak State Failure Model (WSF) 
According to Khan, problems of development in developing countries can be understood 
through two variant of state failure: The first is associated with the performance of the 
existing set of institutions which he called a Structural Failure(SF), we called it–an 
Institutional Performance Failure (IPF). The second is related to the efficiency of the 
process through which institutions are changed which he called the Transition Failure (TF) 
and we called it, the Mode of Institutional Reform Failure (MIRF). 
According to him, institutional performance failure (IPF) refers to the performance failure 
of the existing set of institutions to maximize the level of benefits for the society. IPF 
occurs when a particular institutional order results in lower net benefits for society 
compared to an alternative one. For example, new institutional economists use transaction 
costs and rent­seeking analysis to compare net benefit under alternative sets of institutions 
to analyze the possibility and magnitude of institutional failure. This kind of failure can be 
understood by comparing the outcomes generated by the existing institutions (or 
institutional order) on social agents with the outcomes generated by hypothetical 
alternative institutions using criteria such as net economic output or growth. The aim of 
this model was to analyze the contribution of different institutions to socio­economic 
performance as well as understanding the institutions responsible for socio­economic 
failure across countries or period of time within a particular country. According to this 
model, transaction cost analysis is based on determining the cost of agreeing on a 
particular institutional order, which is measured in terms of (among other things) the 
benefit to be forgone or which an alternative institutional order could provide. From 
political economy perspective, the costs may include the level and extent of people’s 
It should be noted that, some of these conceptual frameworks did not have a direct link to the subject matter of our 
research and were applied to the study of different social phenomena. For example, the Beetham’s MTDT was developed 
to analyze “Conditions for Democratic Consolidation”. However, the MTDT used the logics of historical context 
analysis which are akin to historical institutionalism. Our main interest in all these frameworks was the institutional 
oriented logics and arguments embedded in them. That being the case, we replaced some of the concepts used in the 
original frameworks to fit our theoretical inclination and analytical frameworks. Thus, for the original thesis of these 
frameworks please consult the references provided 
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11 
accessibility and control of policy making process and resources necessary for their 
development initiatives. 
The MIR­failure, on the other hand, refers to failures in the process through which 
institutional reform takes place relative to alternative processes. It is concerned with 
understanding of the nature and character of “paths” to institutional reform. MIR­failure 
occurs when, for example, the process of changing the structures of the state and the 
economy attains a lower cumulative set of net benefits for society compared to an 
alternative structure. According to the author, while the mode of institutional reforms may 
be less satisfactory than an alternative process (specified by theory or empirical evidence) 
it may also increase the magnitude of failures of resultant institutions. 
Analytically, it is important to note, that, a researcher (apart from using a hypothetical 
alternative institutional order) he can compare the net benefit of the previous and current 
institutional order using the previous one as alternative. He can also use both (the previous 
and hypothetical institutional order as alternatives. This is more applicable to a single 
country case study. 
(b) The Goldfish Bowls Whimsical Analogy (GBWA) 
From Elliott’s “Goldfish Bowls Whimsical Analogy(GBWA)” the analysis of the impact 
of institutional reforms on poverty and inequality were based on the belief that the 
pattern by which the growth rate of the economy is achieved and economic, social and 
political values (resources) are shared is vital than the rate itself, however high it may 
be. The main assumption was that, poverty or impoverishment is the result of a causal 
process of which enrichment is a major but not exclusive component” and is associated 
with the process of exclusion or inclusion in the main stream of resource flow (production 
and distribution). According to him, the nature of the functioning of an institutional order 
determined the extent of exclusion or inclusion in the main stream of resource flow and 
determines the power of particular group to extend its interests and impose its own set of 
preferences upon others. It enables some groups to manipulate policy processes in order to 
limit the risk of resource loss and ensure continuous resources accumulation. 
There are about five (different but closely related) key aspects associated with enrichment 
and impoverishment advanced under this analogy: resource accessibility and associated 
mechanisms (which determined how resources are distributed among competing group); 
patterns of resource flow and the nature of resource circulation in the economy and society; 
inter­group struggles (which determined which group acquired control over the resources); 
external­internal relations (which indicated how resources were shared between external 
and internal actors, the nature of external and internal resource flow , and negotiation 
mechanisms) and; areas of resource concentration (which indicated potential sources of 
resources and social groups’ proximity to them and determining their accessibility). 
According to Elliott, the analysis of existing institutional order enables us to understand 
mechanisms of establishment, entrenchment and protection of patterns of privilege. 
Therefore institutional analysis of poverty alleviation is fundamentally an analysis of 
“patterns of poverty and privilege”. 
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(c) The Mode of Transition to Democracy Thesis (MTDT) 
From Beetham’s “Mode of Transition to Democracy Thesis (MTDT) the main concern is 
the question of whether, and to what extent the process of institutional reforms affects 
subsequent prospects for poverty alleviation. There are three different aspects of 
institutional reform process advanced under the MTD­thesis: the character of the previous 
institutional order; the nature of the actual mode of institutional change itself; and the 
functioning character of resultant institutional order and its impact on poverty and 
inequality. These three aspects are further reflected in three hypothetical arguments: first, 
that, the prospects for poverty alleviation are affected by the character of the previous 
institutional order; second, that, the mode of institutional reforms against poverty affects its 
subsequent alleviation; and lastly, that, the functioning character of resultant institutional 
order affects poverty alleviation initiatives and outcomes. 
From these three conceptual frameworks we learned that there are three key aspects central 
to any historical analysis of institutional reforms and their impacts on socio­economic or 
political development: the context in which institutional reforms take place; the process of 
reforms themselves and; the outcome of the reform process which include the functioning 
of resultant institutional order. These frameworks helped in translating institutional theory 
and methodology into a conceptual framework namely “Historical Institutional Reform 
Impact Approach” which reflect the nature of historical development processes of 
Tanzania. 
2.4 Conclusion 
This chapter sought to present a survey of the literature covering three main aspects: the 
relationship between institutions and poverty alleviation; the shift in concerns about the 
role of the state and institutions; the debate on institutional theory; and the conceptual 
frameworks. The chapter reveals a shared concern among authors regarding the primacy of 
institutions in explaining development problems, like poverty and inequality, at both the 
conceptual/theoretical and empirical levels. Although the relationship between institutions, 
poverty and inequality have been approached differently, there is a common agreement 
that institutions influence relations in the production process, the mobilization and 
ownership of resources, and access to the means of securing the requirements of life. The 
argument is that the restructuring of the political and economic institutions does promote 
or inhibit the capacity of the government, groups and individual persons in their struggle 
for material production by influencing their access to and control over the key resources. 
However, constraints on resource accessibility lead to problems of rule interpretation and 
enforcement which, in turn, open up space for the actors to implement the existing rules in 
new ways and, hence, facilitate institutional change. The renewed interest in institutions 
provides a revolutionary change to the development research agenda in Africa in general 
and in Tanzania in particular, where the behavioural traditions of comparative politics (in 
which the properties and behaviour of the political actors are the main explanatory 
variables of development problems) have been dominant. 
The chapter has also revealed that, among the institutional approaches, historical 
institutionalism has the potential for explaining the socio­economic problems in 
developing countries. However, the limited application of this theory and the fact that it 
was developed based on the experience of western societies raises concern about its direct 
theoretical and methodological applications. The application of its methodology, therefore, 
calls attention to the contextual specificity of the societies in which it is employed by 
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translating its propositions into a conceptual framework founded on the material conditions 
of those societies. 
Lastly, we learnt from the chapter that there are three key aspects that are central to 
historical analysis of institutional reforms: the context in which institutional reforms take 
place, the process of the reforms themselves, and the outcome of the reform process. These 
aspects are used as the key components of our conceptual framework that is used as a 
guide in the research process, as discussed in Chapter 3. 
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___________________________________________________________________ 
Chapter 3 
Methodologies, Methods and Rationale 
3.1 Historical Institutional Reform Impact Approach (HIRIA) 
[I]t is the presentation and organization of data and its analysis which brings credibility… 
[W]hat happens around us is not [always] plain [and easy] to see. We have to work hard to 
organize our thought and experiences to discover what is going on (Holliday 2007:112, 
181). 
Methodologically this study employed a historical institutional reform approach as its 
framework for the analysis of the impact of institutional reforms on poverty and inequality 
in the country. HIRIA was constructed using ideas from Khan’s (1995) “Weak State 
Failure Model (WSF); Elliott’s (1975) “Goldfish Bowls Whimsical Analogy (GBWA)” and 
Beetham’s (1994) “Mode of Transition to Democracy Thesis (MTDT)” as discussed in 
chapter 2 
The adoption of HIRIA situated the study within the historical­institutionalist school of 
research which is sensitive to historical context of a particular country and in which 
inductive techniques can be employed. It allowed for integration of the institutions and 
actors within a framework which made possible the comparative analysis of the 
institutional reforms in Tanzania at different stages of its development. It also, provided an 
opportunity to reflect on the dynamics of the interaction between institutions and actors. 
HIRIA provided a “dual historical institutional impact analysis”: the contextual 
institutional impact analysis and instrumental institutional impact analysis based on three 
claims. First, that, the prospects for poverty alleviation are affected by the character of the 
previous institutional order. Second, that, the mode of institutional reforms against poverty 
affects its alleviation. Third, that, the functioning character of resultant institutional order 
affects poverty alleviation outcomes. 
(a) The Contextual Institutional Impact Analysis (CIIA) 
This aspect of institutional analysis helped to capture the impact of institutional reforms 
within the historically grounded socio­economic and political context of the country in 
which socio­problems under study (poverty, inequality and insecurity) emanated and 
within which old and new institutions interacted with competing actors. It also provided an 
opportunity to reflect on the nature of the process through which reforms took place (the 
mode of institutional reform) and its consequent reform outcomes (the resultant 
institutional order). Here we compare the character of the process of institutional change 
and the nature and character of resultant institutional order in relation to both, the existing 
problems and strategies adopted to deal with them. 
(b) Instrumental Institutional Impact Analysis (IIIA) 
This aspect enabled us to assess the impact of a specific institution, in terms of its 
constraining or enabling influence on the government and citizens’ struggles against 
poverty, inequality and insecurity. 
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3.2 The Workings of the Study 
According to Holliday (2007:42), a significant aspect of qualitative research is the need for 
researchers to show their workings, to reveal how they have managed the subjectivity 
inherent within this research paradigm. Explanations of the workings of this study are 
based on a theoretical position established in the form of a conceptual framework12 called 
“historical institutional reform impact analysis­HIRIA”. The framework was instrumental 
in organizing and aligning different aspects of the study in a chronological pattern, 
showing the interplay between the context, processes and the functioning of the resultant 
institutional order in a form of context­process­outcomes/impacts pattern of argumentation. 
Thus, patterns of events and meanings presented in different chapters are mutually 
interdependent and organized along this line. 
Apart from providing a framework for analyzing institutional reforms and impact, the 
HIRIA guided us in organizing thoughts and “developing sense of argument from corpus 
of raw data13” (Holliday, 2007:89). That is, the organization of data into sensible pattern 
which allowed for analysis and argumentation. It also helped to determine which data were 
rich in the sense of containing key information we were looking for. 
3.3 Sources of Data and Methods of Collection 
One principle that underpins poverty analysis is the multidisciplinarity of poverty itself. 
Therefore, there is a growing recognition that a judicious combination of qualitative and 
qualitative methods can help solve problems associated with each type of method taken 
separately (Ellis & Mdoe, 2003). In particular, qualitative methods seem more appropriate 
for capturing the social and institutional contexts of people‘s lives as required by HIRIA 
than quantitative methods. 
It is also argued in qualitative social research that qualitative data, usually in the form of 
words rather than numbers, are a source of well grounded, rich descriptions and 
explanations of processes in identifiable local contexts. With qualitative data, one can 
preserve chronological flow, see which events led to which consequences, and derive 
fruitful explanations (Miles & Huberman, 1994: 1). They are also more likely to help 
researchers to get beyond initial conceptions and obtain information with a quality of 
undeniablility. Generally, according to Miles & Huberman (1994: 10), qualitative data, 
with emphasis on people’s lived experiences, are well suited for locating the meanings 
people place on the events, processes, and structures of their lives. In so doing, they enable 
a researcher to have a strong handle on what real life is, and on the richness and holism of 
life that is potential in revealing the complexity of realities nested in a real context. In the 
view of these considerations, this study adopted qualitative methods. 
However, quantitative data from other works were used to strengthen evidence in support 
of research arguments and as a way of illustrating qualitative information. Due to the 
nature of the problem, and the need for rich qualitative data, the following methods were 
employed: Documentary review as the main method, interview as supplementary method. 
12 A conceptual framework is a thinking schema trough which different aspects of research project are organized and their 
presumed relationships are constructed. With respect to the workings of the research, it forces a researcher to be explicit 
and say what he thinks he is doing. Its main function is to guide a researcher throughout the process and position him in 
relationship to the research in terms of theoretical and ideological inclination (see Holliday, 2007:47). 
13According to Holliday (2007:89), the “corpus of raw data” is all the data collected to be used in the research. 
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3.3.1 Documentary Review Method 
Under this method, primary and secondary documents14 were collected from various 
sources and reviewed. They included: reports based on official statistics, government and 
private research reports and surveys; government records such as hansard; ministerial 
records and debates; political speeches; political party documents; administrative and 
government committee records and reports; scholarly books and journal articles; 
investigative news paper reports; newsletters and other library materials. 
The motive behind the choice of this method stem from the nature of the problem­the need 
to understand the impact of institutional reforms on poverty alleviation within “the deep 
rooted historical context” which could be well captured through large sample of data on 
reports of opinions, scholarly arguments and comments based on historically sensitive 
researches and writings on issues related to the problem. The inspiration of using this 
method also came from the ability of the method in providing rich qualitative information 
as depicted in previous sections. 
(a) Documents’ Quality Assessment (DQA) 
In determining the quality of documents used as sources of data in this study, we employed 
four criteria of assessment summarized in Table 3.1. 
Table 3.1: Criteria for Assessing the Quality of Documents 
No. Criteria for Quality 
Assessment (CQA) 
Quality Checking Questions (QCQ) 
1. Document’s 
authenticity: 
(the satisfaction that the 
documents were 
genuine) 
This was determined through nine (9) authenticity checking questions 
which were asked before using the documents: are the data genuine?; are 
they from a primary or secondary source?; are they actually what they 
appear to be?; are they authentic copies of originals?; have they been 
tampered with or corrupted?; can authorship be validated?; are they dated 
and placed?; are they accurate records of the events or process 
described?; and finally, are the authors of documents believable? 
2. Document credibility: 
(the extent to which the 
evidence was 
undistorted and sincere, 
free from error and 
evasion) 
In determining the credibility two questions were asked before using the 
document: are the people who recorded the information reliable in their 
translations of the information that they received? And, how accurate 
were their observations and records? 
3. Document’s 
representativeness 
This was assessed by determining the “typicality” of the documents in 
terms of their relevance to the aim of the research 
4. Document’s meaning: 
(the clarity and 
comprehensibility of a 
document to our 
analysis) 
Two questions were involved: what was it? And what did it tell us with 
regard to our research questions? 
Source: May, 2001:189­190 citing Scott, 1990 and Foster, 1994 
14 A document in its most general sense is a written text… [It is a] physically embodies text, where the containment of the 
text is the primary purse of the physical medium” (J. Scott 1990:12­13 quoted in May, 2001:178). Primary sources are 
those materials which are written or collected by those who actually witnessed the events which they describe. In 
other word they represent knowledge by acquaintance. It is therefore assumed that they are more likely to be an 
accurate representation of occurrences in terms of both the memory of the author (time) and their proximity to the 
event (space). Secondary sources are written after an event which the author had not personally witnessed and the 
researcher has to be aware of potential problems in the production of this data(May, 2001:180). 
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(b) Analysis of Documentary Data 
After being assured with the quality, the next step was to analyze data from those 
documents. In this process we used Miles & Huberman’s (1994: 10­12) Qualitative 
Content Analysis Approach15 (QLCAA). The QLCAA consisted of three interconnected 
data analysis processes. First process involved the extraction of the relevant information 
(in relation to the research variables) from the corpus of raw data­data reduction16. Data 
reduction proceeded with processes of organizing data into sensible patterns identified with 
specific themes which created a foundation for easy analysis and argumentation in later 
processes (Holliday, 2007: 89). The second process was data displaying, which involved 
organization, compression and assembling of information into an “extended data text”­a 
collection of information on a single text (Miles & Huberman, 1994: 11) and further 
reduced into small quotations and “discursive commentary” notes (Holliday, 2007: 90) 
presented in tabular form or left to be used as quotations. The last process was conclusion 
drawing and verification. This part involved noting data regularities, patterns, 
relationships, meanings and then, drawing conclusions in the form of research arguments 
and verifying them to ensure their validity. This was done through revisiting the theory and 
raw data and presentation to colleagues. 
17 
Figure 3.1: Interactive Model of Qualitative Content Analysis Approach (IM­QLCAA)
Data Collection 
Data Reduction 
Conclusion drawing 
/Verifying 
Data Display 
Source: Miles & Huberman, (1994: 12) 
15 According to May (1997:173­quoting Ericson , Baranetk and Chan 1991 :55) qualitative content analysis is a process 
whereby the analyst picks out what is relevant for analysis and pieces it together to create tendencies, sequences , patterns 
and orders. Qualitative content analysis emphasizes the fluidity of the text and content in the interpretive understanding 
of the social context (culture). It starts with the idea of process, or social context, and views the author as a self­conscious 
actor addressing an audience under particular circumstances. The task of the analyst becomes a reading of the text in 
terms of its symbols. With this in mind the text is approached through understanding the context of its production by the 
analysts themselves (May 2001:193). In the process, the analyst picks out what is relevant for analysis and pieces it 
together to create tendencies, sequences, patterns and orders. 
16 Data reduction refers to the process of selecting, focusing, simplifying, abstracting, and transforming the data that 
appear in written –up [books, reports,] field notes or transcriptions (Miles & Huberman, 1994: 10). 
17 The figure indicates that the three types of analysis activity and the activity of data collection itself formed an 
interactive, cyclical process. We steadily moved among these four “nodes” during data collection and then shuttled 
among reduction , display and conclusion drawing /verification for the reminder of the study. The coding data for 
example (data reduction) led to new ideas on what should go into and extended text and tables (data display). Specifying 
the data into sub­themes required further data reduction. As the table and quotations were developed, preliminary 
conclusions were drawn, but this process led another process of testing the plausibility of conclusions (For more 
discussion see Miles & Huberman, 1994: 12). 
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3.3.2 Interview Method 
Interview was selected as a supplementary method to provide the means for updating, 
clarifying and verifying information obtained from documentary method. It also provided 
an opportunity to experience the feelings of the key actors in the institutional reforms 
process as well as exposure to the undocumented discourses used by the actors in 
describing the processes and interactions. In other words, it was a way of getting inside the 
reform context. Unstructured interview protocol was used for this purpose. Respondents 
were drawn from purposively selected research sites18 using snowball sampling technique19 
(see Appendix 3A) .The process and rationale for adopting this type of interview method is 
summarized in Table 3.2. 
Table 3.2: Interview Process and Rationale 
Data Collection 
Techniques 
Data Analysis 
Techniques 
Rationale 
Unstructured 
interview 
protocol; 
Dictation 
Machine/Tape 
Recorder; Note 
Books and Pens 
Qualitative Content 
Analysis (QLCA): 
Interview 
transcription and 
translation; data 
reduction; data 
display and; 
conclusion 
drawing/verification 
The nature of the problem and research questions; the 
theoretical underpinning of the study; ability to yield rich 
insights into people’s life experiences, opinions, values, 
aspirations, attitudes and feelings; its flexibility and opportunity 
it provides to discover patterns of meanings attached to different 
social events unfolding within historically grounded social 
transformation; its open­ended character provided respondents 
the ability to challenge the preconceptions of the researcher, 
as well as enables them to answer questions within their own 
frame of reference; it provided the qualitative depth of 
information with a greater understanding of the subject’s point 
of view; it could also chart how relationships changed with the 
transformation of socio­economic conditions in the society ; the 
nature of the respondents –the elites­who are less inclined to 
“yes” and “no” types of questions. 
Source: Miles and Huberman, 1994: 11; May, 2001:119, 120, 124­125 & 138­139 
(a) Interview Quality Assurance (IQA) 
To ensure the quality of interviews the following measures were taken: to observe 
information accessibility by ensuring that the interviewee had access to the information we 
wanted; ensuring that the interviewees knew what was required of them by making them 
aware of the subject matter and the information required; ensuring that the interviewees 
were motivated for cooperation and felt valued in their participation during interviewing by 
paying attention to the issue of rapport and appreciation of their responses to our questions; 
by using probing and avoiding asking directive questions; to always keep in mind that it 
is not the obligation of a subject to be objective and to tell us the truth and therefore we 
ensured that, we were well knowledgeable about the subject we were interviewing for and 
the conditions surrounding interviewees which related to the subject matter; finding 
alternative information to minimize information exaggeration by asking other respondents 
similar questions and reviewing documents on similar issues; to be sensitive to time by 
determining earlier on in an interview, what part of the protocol was likely to yield the 
best answers (May, 2001:128­129; Berry, 2002: 680­682). 
18 These were people working in various organizations and with exposure to reform processes in the country 
19 This was done by first identifying one interviewee and then requesting him or her to recommend other interviewees 
whom he/she knew could have the relevant information for our study 
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3.4 Establishing the Quality of the Conclusions 
During Data collection, analysis interpretation and reporting stage, various strategies were 
employed to establish the quality of the findings (i.e., that they are correct, believable and 
trustworthy (Silverman, 2002; 2001; 2007; Robson, 1993; 2002; Bryman, 2004). Apart 
from adhering to quality assurance mechanisms of both of the two methods, three 
mechanisms were used to establish the quality of the research arguments and conclusions. 
These were: data collection method triangulation (Miles & Huberman, 1994, Flick, 2002; 
Lewis & Ritchie, 2003; Robson, 1993, 2003; Silvaman, 2006; Yin, 2008) which involved 
using multiple techniques of data collection ­interview, documentary review, observation 
and experience)­and during analysis we triangulated data received from different sources 
to establish patterns of coherence and incoherencies; application of refutability principle 
by consistently linking the findings with the analytical statements, mainstream assumed 
relationship and our own expectations regarding the data (Silverman, 2000; 2001; 2006). In 
this way, we were able either to support or question the theory of the study and the general 
belief about the relationship between institutions and their impact on poverty, inequality 
and insecurity; and detailed reporting by presenting the findings in detail along with some 
of the original quotations of both interview and documentary review extract (Bessey, 1999; 
Silverman, 2006; Holliday 2007:91). We also used quantitative data to support the 
qualitative data wherever deemed necessary. 
3.5 Generalizability of the Findings 
This study employed a single case (Tanzania) using historical interpretive institutionalism. 
Being a single case study, the findings cannot be simply generalized to the population 
(many countries in or outside Africa) but only to cases with similar characteristics, and to 
the theory (analytical generalization) used in this study. The detailed description and 
analysis of the characteristics of the case study (Tanzania) and full reporting of the findings 
of this study and the fact that the study findings match prior theory, suggest that the 
findings may be transferred and applied in context similar to that reflected in this study 
(Yin, 1993, 2003, 2008; Miles & Huberman, 1994; Merriam, 1998; Stake, 2000; Bryman, 
2004; Lincoln & Guba, 2000; Silverman, 2006). 
3.6 Ethical Considerations and Fieldwork Experiences 
According to Ryen (2004:230) fieldwork is definitely more colourful and challenging than 
most published version. Its sensation rests with the peculiar situations that the issue of 
delicate emotions in fieldwork is conspicuous in its absence from methodological 
textbooks or fieldwork reports. The most challenging is whether our experiences on what 
behaviour in the actual fieldwork process would be ethically acceptable and probably 
methodologically interesting!20 In most cases the discussion of the ethical dilemmas 
encountered in our fieldwork illustrates two challenges ­ethical practice, and how matters 
come to be constituted as ethical issues in social research. 
20 
According to Mann and Kreyche (1966:1) ethics is mainly concerned with what man should do, with what his action or conduct as a 
man should be. Based on the above conception of ethics we can reiterate that: Ethics in social research is mainly concerned with what a 
researcher should do, with what his action or conduct as a researcher should be. It is a body of normative principles of research conducts 
key to epistemological imperatives of social research. 
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There were four main ethical issues observed during our fieldwork. These were: 
Accessibility to sites and participants; Codes and Consent; Confidentiality; and Trust 
(Ryen, 2004:230­234) 
(a) Accessibility to Sites and Participants: Observing Protocol 
The procedure to conduct a study in Tanzania needs an Official Research Clearance Letter 
or Notification. So, the first step was an application for a research clearance to the 
University of Dar es Salaam. The clearance letter was an official introduction and was 
taken to organizations where respondents were drawn or directly to individual respondents. 
At organizations’ levels similar formal introduction were issued to sections where we had 
access to relevant documents and individual officials whom we interviewed. The following 
is a sample of the clearance letter: 
“The purpose of this letter is to introduce to you Mr. Godfrey Sansa who is a bonafide Staff 
member of the University of Dar es salaam and at the moment conducting research....In 
accordance with a government circular letter Ref. No. MPEC/R/10/1 dated 4th July 1980 
the Vice­Chancellor was empowered to issue research clearances to the staff...of the 
University of Dar es salaam on behalf of the government and the Tanzania Commission for 
Science and Technology...I therefore, request you to grant the above mentioned member of 
our community any help that may facilitate him to achieve research objectives. What is 
required is your permission for him to see and talk to the leaders and members of your 
institutions in connection with his research. The title of the research in question is “The 
Impact of institutional Reforms on Poverty and Inequality in Tanzania”. The period, for 
which this permission has been granted is from June 2009 to October 2009 and will cover 
the following offices...Should some of these areas or offices be restricted, you are 
requested to kindly advice him as to which alternative areas/offices could be visited. In 
case you may require further information, please contact the Directorate of Research – 
Telephone number…..” 
We have quoted this part of the letter in length because it had a great implication on ethical 
standards mostly advanced in social research as discussed below. 
(b) Codes and Consent: Informed or Imposed Consent? 
Codes and Consent refer in particular to “informed consent”. This means that research 
subjects have the right to know that they are being researched, the right to be informed 
about the nature of the research and the right to withdraw at any time (Ryen, 2004:231). 
The aforementioned author had already warned that different societies have different 
values and standard measures of ethical issues which may challenge the so called 
“universal ethical standard” in research (ibid. p.232). This was exactly the case we 
encountered in Tanzania. The formal clearance letters which granted a permission to have 
interview with respondents from public /government or any other offices had embedded 
tendencies of what we called an “imposed Consent” as opposed to the ideals of “informed 
consent” which is based on freedom of the respondents to withdraw their consent at any 
time of the study. In bureaucratic organizations any kind of instruction from higher 
authorities is treated as an order to lower levels and always presupposes compliance. In 
this situation there is no freedom or voluntary decision on the part of the lower authority to 
act otherwise. 
Moreover, there was no need for informed consent of the immediate respondent at the 
lower rank so long as the higher authorities had accepted it­a kind of derived informed 
consent! However, because our research was guided by the need to uphold “informed 
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consent” we verbally explained, to our interviewees, the aims and significance of the study 
insisting on their freedom to freely express their feelings. They were further assured that, 
the official letters notwithstanding, their participation in the study was voluntary and 
therefore, they were free to withdraw their consent at any time of the study and we could 
facilitate that by keeping their decisions to ourselves as secrets (not reporting to higher 
authorities) to avoid negative consequences. We also used both Kiswahili and English 
languages depending on the interest of respondents to ensure that they understood very 
well, the pre­information given regarding the study (Silverman, 2006) 
(c) Confidentiality: Illusive and Unethical Research Act? 
Another dilemma we encountered in the course of fieldwork was confidentiality. This 
refers to obligation of a researcher to protect the participant’s identity, places, and the 
location of the research (Ryen, 2004:233). With reference to the clearance letter again, this 
formal bureaucratic introduction implied in practice, an existence of a kind of a 
“translucent path” which made the “idealistic anonymity requirement” advanced in social 
research discourses illusive. For example, through the path on which the information about 
who we had to speak to was officially disseminated, one could trace and locate 
interviewees or any other person who was instructed to assist in the research process. In 
each office there was an official file for all research records including dated minutes of 
official notes directing who was supposed to speak to us when visiting the offices. 
Moreover, in Tanzania, there is an established and well accepted procedure that, sites and 
interviewees’ names and titles are given in the appendices (see also Ryen, 2004:233). To 
deviate from this procedure, to use Ryen’s words, “may be perceived as either confusing or 
arrogant”. Based on our experiences we can confidently argue that, being anonymous in 
Tanzania’s research context is not only perceived as arrogance as observed by Ryen, but 
also “unethical act” in itself. We also found that, discouragement of anonymity in Tanzania 
is aimed at minimizing the possibilities of researchers to cheat during their fieldwork by, 
for insistence, not conducting actual fieldwork and producing fake data on the pretence of 
“observing anonymity”. 
Despite the above dilemma, we adhered to ethical standards which require researchers to 
maintain confidentiality. As response to that, none of the research participant was 
identified by name in research report or any kind of presentation that involve use of these 
findings (Sarantakos, 2005; Hill, 2006). All recordings were taken subject to the 
interviewee permission and quotations were done following permission granted by 
interviewees. 
(d) Trust 
This refers to the relationship between the researcher and participants, and to the 
researcher’s responsibility not to spoil the field for others in the sense that potential 
research subjects became reluctant to research. In our case, trust was not the main problem. 
As already noted, the official introduction letter acted as a mechanism of ensuring 
trustworthiness on both parts: we as researchers, could easily be reported to higher 
government officials by respondents in case of un­trustful act and this could spoil our 
research, but we could also report similar behavior when they were committed by 
participants. This created a mutual interest of maintaining trust in the research process. 
However, being researchers trained on ethical standards in social research, maintaining 
trust was imperative regardless of the envisioned administrative sanctions associated with 
clearance letter. 
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______________________________________________________________ 
PART TWO

The Context
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_________________________________________________________________ 
Chapter 4 
Institutional Development and Change: a Retrospective Exploration 
4.1 The Colonial Period (1885­1961) 
A history of Tanzania's socio­economic and political development is fundamentally a 
history of the impact of institutional development associated with the imposition and 
consolidation of colonial rule and post­ independence reactions to colonial legacies. With 
the imposition of colonial rule, the institutional conditions for socio­economic and political 
changes were also established and wrought in the material conditions of the society. In 
turn, these changes created the conditions out of which the forces of both anti­colonialism 
and anti­poverty struggles emerged to challenge the colonial rule itself, and later its 
structural impact on socio­economic development. 
4.1.1 The German rule (1885­1918) 
Processes of modern institutional transformation began with the imposition of the German 
colonial rule in February 1885. Initially, the management of the territory was granted to 
“the German East African Company”, but subject to jurisdiction of the Imperial 
Government before the latter took over official administration of the territory as a colony 
in 1890. 
The early German policy was informed by its pervasive interest in economic than in social 
and political development. Through the German East African Company, much exploration 
of resources like minerals, water supplies, and profitable local plants were carried out. As a 
result, new trading items such as minerals, timber and tropical plantations of cotton, coffee, 
sisal and rubber were discovered and the German settlers became the major owners of cash 
crop plantations in Tanganyika. It was the establishment of German settler economy, 
mining, trading centres and firms, as well as German settlements, which provided the 
initial institutional foundations upon which “modern” Tanganyika's and later Tanzania’s 
socio­economic and political development were based. 
(a) The Administrative System 
The Germans established the first modern administrative system in Tanganyika which 
negatively affected Africans’ everyday life. It was highly centralised, military in character 
and harsh, with widely unchecked and arbitrary use of authority. Bates (1962:401­402) 
explained the character of the administrative system in the following words: 
“In the African memories…there remains…a vivid impression of the German 
administrative system and its effects on everyday African life. [With] the military… 
character…the…authority…acted most harshly. The German district officials...had very 
wide powers which were almost unchecked by the central­ government, and his use of 
judicial authority made a special impression on the African . Judgments tended to be 
arbitrary...made with little knowledge of local law and custom, and frequently included 
corporal punishment or penal labour. The sentence of twenty­five lashes with a rhinoceros 
­hide whip was so frequently imposed that the phrase “hamsa ishirini” (Kiswahili for 
twenty­five) is still a synonym for arbitrary use of authorities” 
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As a result of that experience, Africans created a negative perception of politics, state and 
administration which was echoed in the minds of future Tanganyikans as it passed from 
one generation to the next. 
It was based on direct rule approach with an organisation structure based on some Arab 
administrative techniques, which ran from central government to lower echelons. In the 
coastal towns and their immediate vicinity, government was directly in the hands of the 
German officials. In the coastal districts and certain districts in the interior the 
administration was headed by a German District Commissioner( DCs) or Station Chief, 
assisted by a number of Akidas ( middle rank officials) generally Arabs, to each of whom 
assisted as subordinates a number of Jumbes ( Village headmen) generally Africans. In the 
most interior districts the tribal, especially the paramount Chiefs (some appointed by the 
German authority) were directly subordinated to the German officials whose instructions 
they had to fulfill among their tribes (Stoecker, 1986: 106­107). Akidas and Jumbes were 
charged with day­to­day administration of local areas such as recruitment of forced labour 
and tax collection. 
Figure 4.1: German Administrative Structure 
Governor

German Officials German Officials 
German DCs Station Chiefs Paramount Chiefs 
Akidas Akidas Akidas Akidas 
Jumbes Jumbes Jumbes Jumbes Jumbes 
In as far as administrative system is concerned, the following lessons can be learned: First, 
the adoption of the Akida system was designed to replace chiefs and African elders of the 
tribal administrative systems. These traditional African systems were, in Bates' view, felt 
by the German administration to be obsolete. Second, the system lacked internal coherence 
and control mechanisms, especially to its lower echelons. For instance, Bates argued that, 
Akidas had so little supervision that the road to tyranny was wide open, which in turn led 
them into exaction of tribute and corruption. Third, little heed was given to the process of 
social change that was taking place in the territory. Fourth, the German rule was apolitical. 
Most of socio­economic development changes of the territory were treated purely on 
technical and administrative terms with economic benefit as central motive. The colonial 
authority paid little attention to the problem of political organisation and representative 
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political institutions or mechanisms were not introduced. Fifth, institutions were distorted, 
thus, creating negative impressions about their functions to the majority native Africans. 
(b) The Legal System 
In terms of legal institutions, the Germans introduced a dual system of law characterised 
by two branches of judicial adjudication: one for foreigners and the other for natives. 
While the white foreign population and persons deemed equal enjoyed a variation of the 
consular judiciary which applied German law, the native population did not enjoy the 
advantage of an independent judiciary (Bierwagen and Peter, 1989: 396) and were left 
under customary law subordinated to German Civil law traditions. The Germans 
maintained a close connection between the administrative and judicial systems. Bierwagen 
and Peter argued that, in civil matters district officers, or officers’ in­charge of military 
stations, delegated adjudication of cases to local leaders (liwalis, kadhis, and akidas) who 
continued to exercise administrative functions. 
(c) Resource Control and Management 
The interest of the German rule was exploitation of resources. Land and minerals and 
promotion of plantation agriculture were part of its colonial policy. Land alienation and 
control became crucial. To ensure effective exploitation of resources, the government 
promulgated the imperial decree in 1895 which declared all land, whether occupied or not, 
to be treated as unknown Crown land and vested in the Empire. It also established a dual 
system of land rights and ownership: the statutory rights and ownership which was enjoyed 
by the settlers and; the deemed or occupational (permissive) rights based on the fact of 
cultivation and possession applied to the majority native communities. In practice, only 
settlers could prove their titles and therefore, enjoy the attendant security of tenure while 
the indigenous people were left with unprotected permissive rights of occupation. The 
declaration of all land “Crown land” and vesting it in the State as the ultimate landlord was 
a response to colonial economic logic of resource control. This became the premise of land 
reforms throughout the history of the country. Moreover, the ultimate state landlordism led 
to the fusion of sovereignty (power) and property (the land) into one entity the State 
subject to administrative regulations and discretion (URT, 1994: 8­9; Shivji, 1998:2) 
In general, German rule set the foundation for institutional development in the country and 
established precedence on which future options were based. The introduction of an enclave 
market economy; rudimentary communication system; centralised and militaristic 
administrative system; mission schools and hospitals; dual legal system based on European 
statutory or civil law traditions and African customary law; the fusion of administrative 
and adjudicative systems and functions; forced labour; modern town centres; and distortion 
of modern institutions, set in motion a unique institutional trajectory. 
4.1.2 The British rule (1919­1961) 
British took over Tanganyika from the Germans in 1919 and it was to be administered 
under a Mandate of the League of Nations. Power transfer from German to British had 
three institutional aspects: change of the territorial status of Tanganyika from a full 
colonial status, as it was during German rule, to a mandated one. This new status required 
for the provision of paternal and impartial governmental structure aiming at protecting 
local Africans; the declaration of Tanganyika as a territory of equal accessibility to all 
member States of the League, a unique international position and; dual international 
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institutional protection­under the British Empire and the League of Nations21.These 
changes in status exposed Tanganyika to manifold international processes. 
Notwithstanding its new status, administrative and legal systems were a British replica. 
(a) The Administrative System 
With the Tanganyika order in council of 1920, a British colonial administration was 
established. The Governor was the principal executive and representative of the Crown 
assisted by an executive council of appointed civil servants. But these administrative 
changes were not immediately accompanied by the establishment of representative bodies. 
Bates (1962:404) observed that, “in the initial administrative instruments, there was no 
provision for a legislative body or for any sort of local representation”. The Governor 
alone promulgated all ordinances until 1926 when the first “non­native” and “non­elected” 
legislative council was created. 
Unlike the Germans, the British adopted an indirect administrative system­an 
administratively cost­effective and conflict­preventive model of indirect rule (Tangri, 
1985:1; Bates, 1962:405; Duggan and Civille, 1976: 25). The “indirect rule” or what Feit 
(1970:223) called “an administrative­traditional rule” entailed using African traditional 
authorities, administrative institutions and customary law as the major factor of 
administration to reduce the costs of running the bureaucratic machinery and 
administrative shield against protest resulting from socio­economic and political changes. 
The administrative system ended at district level with chiefs and other authorities subjected 
to the central government authority. 
In terms of institutional character, Mamdani (1996:5) argued that indirect rule was based 
on a policy of “institutional segregation” and a doctrine of differentiation in organizing the 
relationship between Europeans and Africans. While avoiding forcing African institutions 
into an alien European mould, he argued, “indirect rule preserved Africa’s unity with her 
own past and allowed for the free development of people along their own specific lines”. 
The aim was to facilitate the evolution of separate institutions appropriate to African 
conditions but which differed, both in spirit and in form, from those of Europe (ibid, p.7). 
According to him, the emphasis on differentiation meant the forging of specifically native 
institutions through which the colonialists could rule Africans as subjects. It was a way of 
preserving the native institutions while keeping them responsive to the colonial interests. 
Thus, in practice, indirect rule came to be the mode of domination over free natives by 
preserving their communal­customary institutions within the context of “native 
institutional autonomy”. 
In implementing indirect rule, the colonial government introduced received laws which 
regulated the civil and market oriented relations mostly in the urban areas or enclave 
economic zones along with customary laws that regulated the non­civil and non­market 
relations in the rural and semi­urban areas. The dualism in the administrative and legal 
practices led to the formation of two distinct, albeit related, forms of power: the centrally 
Tanganyika was part of the German East Africa and the colony which the Germans liked most. It was largest colony, 
the reasons of prestige and show place of the Empire which the Germans never thought of losing. So, there existed a fear 
of them reverting to the Territory after the WW I (Bates 1962:402; Duggan and Civille, 1976: 23). Because of that, 
Tanganyika was placed under dual international institutional protection: first under the British mandate; and second, 
collectively protected through the League of Nations. 
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21 
located modern state and the organized native authority. The hallmark of the colonial 
(modern) state became civil law, through which it governed the citizens in civil society 
(Mamdani, 1996:17, 109) while leaving the native community to the dictates of varieties of 
the customary laws. What Mamdani seems to suggest is that indirect rule, through its 
policy of institutional segregation and customary laws’ autonomy, created a divided 
society through the subjection of its members to competing institutions: the modern for the 
colonizers and their associates and the customary for the natives. This historical fact is 
fundamental to the understanding of the forms and functioning character of the state, 
economy and society in contemporary Africa. 
The consequence of this was the introduction of what Miller (1970:267) called “a 
syncretistic” local leadership featured by duality of response on the part of officials at 
lower administrative levels. A local leader caught between the needs of his traditional 
society and that of the colonial authority, was forced to respond to similar problem with 
different answers; and he could carry out a series of activities and decisions which were 
supposed to be acceptable to the most isolated tribes and to the modern colonial 
administrator. This kind of dual responsibility led, on the one side, to speculation or apathy 
and, on the other, to autocracy. 
Moreover, the introduction of indirect rule accompanied the destruction of the internal 
power balance in the tribal communities. According to Bryceson (1990:81), many of the 
authority figures who had imposed checks on the local leaders, particularly the chiefs, were 
not accorded legitimacy. The monetarisation of chiefly wealth made the commitment to 
material security personal and divorced them from any moral obligation towards the 
people. Due to the lack of internal accountability mechanisms, the remoteness of the native 
administrative divisions, and contradictory co­existence between customary law and the 
colonial state laws and policies, the colonial chiefs could engage in what she called the 
“extra­legal” or “non­bureaucratic” exercise of the native authority offices for prestige 
aggrandizement, which included: the non­execution of formal duties, discretionary 
decision­making in public office, the appointment of relatives to native authority posts, and 
financial irregularities in the form of fraud, privilege and embezzlement. According to her, 
while all of these activities were considered to be abuses of office by the colonial state, the 
chiefs saw them as part of a logical and often requisite behavioural pattern. She also noted 
that the non­execution of formal duties and discretionary decision­making arose in areas 
where the customary and colonial state laws and policies were at odds. 
Thus, dual institutional autonomy (modern vs. customary) was accompanied by dual 
ethical autonomy (morality as defined by European vs. Africans). This may be considered 
as the beginning of institutional syncretism and ethical duality, a condition which set in 
motion a unique development trajectory in Tanzania and which had consequences for the 
nature of state formation and the organization of the economy and society. 
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Figure 4. 2: The Organization Structure of British Indirect Administrative system

Governor 
Native Courts Native Admin. Legislative 
Council 
British­DOs British­DOs British­DOs British­DOs 
Akidas Native Chiefs Native Chiefs Native Chefss Paramount 
Chiefs 
Jumbes Jumbes Jumbes Jumbes Jumbes Jumbes 
Sub­Chiefs 
Throughout this period, representation of local interests was limited due to weak and 
discriminatory legislative and local representation bodies. Politics was reduced to 
administration, with policies and decisions made within bureaucratic cycles without inputs 
from local inhabitants. There was a great emphasis on administration and treatment of all 
socio­economic and political problems as purely technical, economic and administrative. 
These tendencies exacerbated the disequilibrium between administrative and economic 
institutions and between political representation and social welfare institutions. 
Administrative and economic institutional expansionism and development was not 
accompanied, in the same rate of change or growth, with those in social and political 
representation sphere. 
In terms of social relations, indirect rule also affected race relations, which had profound 
effects on later socio­economic and political development. The native institutional order 
separated the administrative and political status and allegiance of Africans and non­
Africans. A colonial Tanganyika had a non­ African population, a group outside the native 
administrative system. This consisted of Arabs and other Asians, who were mainly traders 
and artisans and Europeans, who were small in number as compared to Asians. A large 
part of the European group composed of civil servants and missionaries, whose residence 
was temporary. Both the Asian and European groups had their representatives appointed to 
the legislative council after 1926. Because of their heterogeneity, division of allegiances, 
which rested outside Tanganyika, as well as their temporary nature of their stay, they had 
no interest in pressurising the colonial authorities for political rights, privileges, social 
welfare and African participation in the development process (Bates 1962:411). Most 
colonial institutions functioned in favour of these groups than native Africans. 
At the start of World War II, Tanganyika had no central political institutions in which 
Africans were represented. Socio­economic and political changes still reflected the pre­
War period. However, the council had been created in 1926 based on appointed 
42

membership and racial discrimination22. Tanganyika entered a new stage in its institutional 
development in 1947, when its territorial and international status changed from a 
mandatory of the League of Nations to a trusteeship of the United Nations. The 
assumption of the trusteeship system was that territories under tutelage would be groomed 
for independence, and it was to be the role of the administering authority to expedite the 
process. As a response, rapid modernization of the native administration proceeded with 
the tendency towards widening representation of Africans. A series of measures to alter 
local institutions were tried and new authorities called “Liwali” with no formal traditional 
status were established in areas like the southern part of the territory, where no strong 
chiefdoms existed. The councils of chiefs were also created elsewhere and sometimes 
chiefs were made subordinate executives responsible to an appointed council. Tribal and 
district federations were encouraged, with variations in methods of appointment and 
elections from tribe to tribe. 
In the early 1950's, the government began experiments in local government. The aim was 
to modernize the native administrative system and make it more of local government 
system through improvement in financial competences and introduction of some popular 
participation23 . At one time, regionalism and provincial councils acting as electoral 
colleges for the legislative council, and another time, was the introduction of non­African 
representation in line with ideas of multiracialism. Commoners were also added to chiefs' 
councils, and in some instances the chiefs themselves become elected officials. Between 
1950 and 1960, two other changes took place in the local administrative system which had 
great implication to the development of local government after independence. The first was 
the local Council Ordinance of 1953, which provided for representative and eventually 
elected local councils; and the second was the entry of party politics into local government 
in 1958, and local government party officials began to take over both local politics and 
administration. 
While the native administration experiment continued, major political changes began to 
take place: enlargement of the legislative council with parity of representation of the three 
major races­Africans, Asians and Europeans; the enfranchisement based on common­roll; 
transformation of unofficial members’ organisation in a legislative council into a kind of “a 
government opposition” and hence a “parliamentary” form of representative government 
(Bates, 1962: 419)24 . 
22 The council had a total of 23 appointed members, 13 official members and 10 unofficial members. The racial 
composition of the council had never been legally specified, but in practice the unofficial side had always included 7 
Europeans and 3 Asians without a single African representative. These were chosen by the Governor after consultation 
with such local interest groups as the Sisal Growers Association (SGA), the Northern Province Farming Community 
(NPFC), and the Asian Association, which represented their own interests. The operated as a small group of advisers to 
the Governor (not as a representative body) and only opposition was occasionally directed to economic and financial 
matters. The legislative council was enlarged to include African members in 1945, during which council membership was 
raised to 29, with 4 new unofficial seats reserved for Africans. Interestingly, the Governor appointed only 2 African 
members among Chiefs and it took almost three years for another 2 African members to be considered. 
23 The guiding line for establishment of local government system in Tanganyika was “the Creech­Jones 1947 dispatch” 
on democratic local government in British colonies. According to this dispatch an overhaul of the system of native 
administration was important to allow democratic local councils and to establish some institutional relationships between 
central and local government. The central argument was that, without a well developed local government, all functions 
devolved upon the central administrative structures, making local social economic and political development difficult. 
Therefore, a local government system was to be established with local authorities accorded powers to make major 
decisions in line with their specific development needs( see Bates 1962:413; Pratt 1976:24). 
24 But this was just a small number of non­elected unofficial representatives. The representation in the council remained 
unequal. For instance, by early 1955, Tanganyika had a new legislative council of 61 members, 30 of them being 
unofficial members composed of 10 appointees from each racial group (10 Africans, 10 Asians and 10 Europeans) 
irrespective of the size of the population they represented. 
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Notwithstanding these changes, the nature and character of the colonial administrative and 
representation system remained unchanged. Members of the legislative council of all races 
remained businessmen, farmers or local chiefs. The council as an institution, operated as a 
paternal advisory body to the central colonial authority. It never functioned as a policy and 
decision­making body of the majority Africans and its seemingly new status as a 
“parliamentary body” was more symbolic and functionally premature. The parity and racial 
equality principle continued to keep the most Africans outside policy and decision­making 
spheres (Bates, 1962:420). 
(b) Transformation of Political Representative Institutions 
Development that went with the foregoing political development was the emergence of 
civil society organizations in the form of labour unions and political organisations in the 
form of political parties. This marked the beginning of nationalist struggles and 
construction of modern state institutions and political system in Tanganyika which later 
influenced the character of the post­colonial state and its relation with and role in the 
economy and society. 
The nationalist struggles which became more active in 1950s, after conversion of the 
TAA into TANU25 , was accompanied by the government efforts to prohibit civil servants 
from joining African nationalist movements as an attempt to remove the most educated 
component of TAA leadership (Iliffe 1979:505­7; Costello 1996:124­125). The separation 
between the TANU and bureaucracy had greater influence in the process of institutional 
construction of the post­colonial state. When TAA (the only influential government 
workers’ organization) was transformed into TANU, civil servants not only lost their 
organizational base, but were also prohibited from joining the new party which was created 
at the expense of their organization. Recognizing this dilemma, the TANU leadership 
decided to help the civil servants (in the form of paternalistic moral and material support) 
to create the new organization­“the Tanganyika Federation of Labour­TFL”­ the first 
national trade union organization, which served as a venue for participation in the anti­
colonial struggles (Costello 1996:125). This led to a de facto affiliation of workers unions 
to the party. 
Thus, the mode of institutional reform in the 1950s was characterized by two antagonistic 
tendencies which influenced the post­independence reform processes. On the one hand, 
there was a push for institutional separation accompanied by social group disintegration, 
depoliticisation and demobilization supported by the colonial government and, on the other 
hand, the nationalist movement (TANU) pushed for institutional interpenetration, social 
group integration, politicisation and mobilization. 
The emergence of TANU had a profound influence on the political system, forcing 
readjustments in the administrative system and legislative council. So, being dominant in 
electoral politics26 , TANU's pressure influenced the formation of an Elected Member 
Organisation (TEMO) dominated by TANU members, which began, for the first time in 
Tanganyika's political history, to function as a parliamentary opposition to the colonial 
25 As many other institutional development, emergence of political parties in Tanganyika followed what can be referred to as “a dynamic 
path­dependent” institutional route. The colonial government had allowed the establishment of an inter­tribal organisation called the 
Tanganyika African Association (TAA)­a society of urban Africans, mainly those in government employment who had western 
education­as far back as early 1930's. In July, 1954, the Association was transformed into a political party namely the Tanganyika 
African National Union (TANU), the Party through which independence was obtained. 
26 After electoral defeats between 1958 and 1960, the UTP faded from existence giving way to another TANU's opposition party called 
the African National Congress (ANC). It faced similar electoral catastrophes and followed the UTP's route to eternal rest, leaving TANU 
as the only dominant. 
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government, and the representative body of Africans' interests (Duggan and Civille, 1976: 
29; Bates, 1962: 428­430). Again, unlike a parliamentary representation system, TANU 
acted as “a single­party” in the legislative council opposing the colonial government, 
which was not “a party government”. In effect, there was “a single party system” within “a 
non­party government” system. 
(c) The Legal System 
Based on a philosophy of “indirect rule” the British introduced a dual legal system 
consisting of English common law and indigenous customary law (Allott, 1984:58). A 
native court system based on customary law was established but subordinated to English 
High Court system (Bierwagen and Peter, 1989) and administrative regulations. So, native 
courts and customary laws were recognised as an essential part of the apparatus of indirect 
administration rather than legal instruments of the native population and were left with 
considerable freedom to function in a traditional way. However, these customary courts 
were gradually integrated in the regular territorial court system and steadily brought into 
line with English ideas of common law, justice and procedures, hence, reiterating the 
prevailed system of separate jurisdiction. On the one side, there were the traditional native 
tribunals supervised by administrative officers; and, on the other side, the English­
orientated system of courts for white population­the district magistrates' courts, the 
resident magistrates' courts and the High Court (Allott, 1969:13; Bierwagen and Peter, 
1989: 398). 
There were two effects of the legal reforms: the subjection of legal institutions in general 
and customary laws and native courts in particular, to administrative authorities and 
regulations and; the subordination of the customary law and native courts to English 
(common law) legal procedures and morality. The Native Courts Amendment Ordinance of 
1929 put the courts under control of provincial commissioners and provided for an appeal 
from a native court to a superior native court, thence to a district officer, from him to the 
provincial commissioner and finally to the governor. British authorities appointed special 
officers within the administration to supervise and advise the work of the native courts. In 
all legal relations and cases in which Africans were parties, courts were: (a) to be guided 
by customary law so far as it was applicable, and it was not repugnant to justice and 
morality or inconsistent with any Order in Council or Ordinance; and (b) to decide all such 
cases according to substantial justice without undue regard to technicalities of common law 
procedures (Bierwagen and Peter, 1989: 398). In other words, the application of customary 
law was only acceptable if it conformed not to African, but to British standards of 
humanity, justice and morality (Allott, 1984:59). 
The repugnancy clauses gave the administrators and legal officials the power to modify the 
customary laws in favour of colonial interests and not to safeguard the interests of the 
native population or justice and morality as implied in the customary law. The notions of 
property rights, economic principles and social protection embedded in the UN­
Trusteeship Agreement remained theoretical, while subordination and exploitation of the 
native population and their resources for colonial economic interest remained paramount. 
Legal reforms on land tenure system and resource control and management illustrate the 
argument. 
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(d) Resource Control and Management 
The British land reforms were influenced by Tanganyika’s status in international law as a 
Mandate and then a Trust Territory. The other factor was the colonial policy to develop the 
territory as a plantation/peasant economy (as opposed to a settler colony) producing 
essentially for cheap agricultural raw materials. It was the need to resolve tension between 
the land interests of the peasants and plantations sector which underpinned much of the 
colonial land reforms and policies. Article 8 of the UN­Trusteeship Agreement reiterated27 
that: in forming laws relevant to the holding or transfer of land and natural resources the 
Administrative authority should take into account native laws and customs and respect the 
rights and safeguard the interests of both peasants and future of the native population. 
No native land or natural resources was supposed to be transferred except between natives, 
and no real rights over native land or natural resources in favour of non­natives could be 
created except with consent of the competent authority (URT, 1994: 10). This provision 
played an important role in shaping land reforms during British rule. 
The British adopted the land Ordinance, the major land legislation, in 1923. However the 
Ordinance did not safeguard the interests of the native population as the Administrative 
authority was obliged to under the Trusteeship Agreement. Just like the Germans did, the 
Ordinance declared all lands, whether occupied or unoccupied, as public lands, vested 
under the control and subject to the disposition of the Governor to be held for the use and 
common benefit, direct or indirect, of the natives. The British established dual rights of 
occupancy with different legal status: the deemed (customary) rights of occupancy­
including the title of a native or a native community lawfully using or occupying land in 
accordance with native law and customs (customary law) and; granted (statutory) rights of 
occupancy granted to non­natives and protected by laws rooted on common laws (URT, 
1994: 10 & 11; Shivji, 1998:3). The deemed rights of occupancy lacked legal security 
enjoyed by the statutory rights of occupancy. It was subjected to the shifts of 
administrative regulations and land alienation policies to save the colonial economic 
interests. Moreover, by vesting the radical title in the state, as a way of allowing colonial 
authority control over land, the Ordinance reiterated the German’s fusion of the 
sovereignty (state power) and property (the land). Furthermore, the conception and 
declaration of “all land” as “public land” expressed an administrative rather than legal 
relation between the state and that public lands (Shivji, 1998:3&4; URT, 1994: 12). 
The distinction between legal and administrative relations underlay the practice of the state 
in respect of land rights of the indigenous population. It allowed the government to have 
full powers to deal with land according to whatever administrative policy was adopted. 
This suited the colonial political economy. So long as the state desired peasant production, 
the occupants would be considered to have deemed or permissive rights. But when land 
was needed for the purpose of alienation, the Governor would withdraw his consent and 
alienate it on a granted right to a settler. Thus, to avoid being bound by law in matters 
concerning customary land rights, the colonial authority subjected it to administrative 
regulations while alienation was left to legal institutions (URT, 1994:12­13). It was this 
dual and syncretistic institutional approach to land reform and management which led to 
administrative subordination of legal institutions on land management in independent 
Tanzania. 
This article was equivalent to Article 6 and 7 of the Mandate under the League of Nations Agreement. The provisions 
of these Articles were reiterated in the Preamble of the Land Ordinance of 1923. But in legal traditions a preamble is not 
part of the law, and therefore less binding on the part of the authority drafted it. 
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(e) Organization of Production: The Bureaucratic Model 
Economic production during British rule was mainly organized through Cooperatives and 
bureaucracy under the native administrative system. Initially, the impetus for Cooperatives, 
in the form of marketing associations, came from emerging African traders and farmers in 
cash­crop regions (Kilimanjaro, Mwanza and Bukoba) as a reaction against the unfair 
marketing practices of mainly non­African (Asian) traders in the free market colonial 
economy in 1920s (Coulson, 1977: 82; Mporogomyi, 1988:78; Curtis, 1992:513). 
According to Coulson, these traders were neither typical rural inhabitants nor peasant 
farmers. They were mainly educated colonial civil servants and traders frustrated by the 
racial discrimination and indirect rule policies of the colonial government, who found in 
the Cooperative movement a way to African success in business. The central aim was to 
benefit from what Curtis called, “the new economics of peasant commodity export” by 
either integrating with the Asian commercial networks as it was in Bukoba, or driving the 
Asians from the trade altogether, as was the case in Kilimanjaro. Thus, they developed 
autonomous bases of power and operated independently of the native authorities (Curtis, 
1992:507). 
Because the economic logic behind Marketing Cooperatives was promotion of African 
business through cash­crop production and capitalistic commodity export, which matched 
with the colonial economic interest, the government encouraged them to take over the 
marketing of peasant crops from Asian and Arab traders. So, in much of their functions, 
Marketing Cooperatives were supported by the British colonial policy, which by the early 
1930s had identified “cooperative rule” as identical to “indirect rule” the essential aim of 
both being “to teach some Africans, personal responsibility and development initiative as 
agents of transformation of illiterate and conservative agricultural majority” (Lugard, 1933 
cited by Coulson, 1977: 82). 
The bureaucratisation of cooperatives and economic production began in 1923 when the 
British adopted “a closed credit system” under Credit to Natives (Restriction) Ordinance, 
which made it impossible for a "non­native" to recover debt from an African unless it had 
been approved by a district officer (Curtis, 1992:508). Since Africans had no other access 
to commercial loans it was almost impossible for potential traders to get credit, or to 
penetrate commercial information networks, without being integrated into the Asian 
system. As a result, Africans were restricted to the margins of commercial activities and 
few of them identified trade as their primary occupation. Commerce became a part­time 
occupation, supplementing the more important business of cash­crop production. In 1932, 
the government passed the Cooperative Societies Ordinance to reorganize and regulate 
production and commercial activities of Cooperatives. Under the Ordinance, the 
government reorganized cooperatives into administratively controlled “primary societies” 
operating within a single channel government­controlled marketing system. The 
government subsumed independent African Cooperatives into the bureaucratic system 
(Curtis, 1992:513­514) marking the beginning of bureaucratic model of economic 
organization. 
Curtis described the model as highly bureaucratic with overwhelming administrative 
regulations and control which transformed Cooperatives into vehicles for promoting 
greater involvement of government officials in peasant production. They became 
government means of controlling strategic produce markets and infiltrating peasant 
production, as a way of “capturing” them (Hyden, 1981; Curtis, 1992:515). The model was 
adopted elsewhere in Tanganyika, and Cooperatives became nothing more than 
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transmission belts of official agricultural and marketing policy. In some places, 
cooperation was founded solely on official initiative and had no purpose other than 
establishing regulated markets. Thus, Cooperatives became government initiatives rather 
than voluntary organizations of buyers and producers. By the end of 1930s Cooperatives 
had turned into instruments of government economic production (Curtis, 1992:515­516). 
Guided by bureaucratic calculus of colonial production and market regulation of peasant 
cash­crops, Cooperatives became institutions of State­based accumulation rather than local 
development. 
Cooperatives became associations of emerging African capitalist groups by a combined 
process of African initiative and colonial co­optation (Curtis, 1992:515).Thus, organization 
of production through Cooperatives was capitalistic in nature, dominant in cash­crop 
producing areas and aiming at promoting cash­crop production through marketing 
cooperation. Although co­existing uneasily, cooperatives and the state bureaucracy became 
the key institutions of the colonial economy and exercised some control over peasant 
production via the marketing system. Despite being controlled by the government, 
Cooperatives were left to operate in their natural setting in cash­crop regions. They 
evolved not as primary (grassroots) societies, but as intermediary associations covering 
large part of areas and serving between peasants and primary societies at local level and 
colonial government and trading companies at national and international level28. Just like 
cooperatives, the colonial government allowed for the lower level bureaucracy to purchase 
crops from the farmers and Cooperative primary societies within a framework of “state­
controlled marketing system” (Coulson, 1977: 83). Throughout colonial period, the 
development of Cooperatives and commercial peasant agriculture remained a rare 
phenomenon in non­cash crop producing parts of the country. 
As discussed earlier, like Cooperatives, Local Authorities emerged and later incorporated 
into the colonial system of organization of production as important institution in 
development. The governments promoted Local Authorities as administrative control units 
and Cooperatives as economic production organization units, particularly in cash crop 
producing areas. So, the two institutions became important instruments in the organization 
of production in the colonial economy. 
(f) Social Group Formation and Relations 
The impact of colonial rule and its institutional development and patterns of economic, 
political and social sectors influenced the formation of social groups in Tanganyika. At the 
core of these influences were the establishment of colonial capitalist market economy 
(cash­crop farming, commercial and manufacturing activities), Communications and other 
infrastructural construction activities, administrative services and social welfare services 
(education and religion). Many social groups were formed reflecting these socio­economic 
and political changes. As discussed earlier, Cooperatives emerged as a means through 
For example the Kilimanjaro Native Planters' Association (KNPS) of 1925 consisted of a single organization covering 
the whole mountain (it later expanded to include Meru and the Pares as well). Even when KNPS was transformed into 
Kilimanjaro Native Cooperative Union (KNCU) in 1932 and the Government insisted on a structure with at least one 
separately registered primary society in eachchiefdom, it still maintained its intermediary institutional character. In a 
similar way, the Victoria Federation of Cooperative Unions in Lake zone ­Mwanza , was organised on the basis of 
individually registered primary societies of not less than 500­600 members ( see Coulson, 1977: 83). At the time of 
independence, the Bukoba Native Cooperative Union was the sole legal market for Bukoba's coffee, one of the country's 
most valuable exports (Curtis, 1992:505) 
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which African farmers and peasants protected their interests against the foreign dominated 
marketing groups in cash­crop areas. Like trade unions, co­operatives provided a forum for 
the airing of political grievances of the peasantry. In general, four social groups can be 
identified (Table 4.1). 
Table 4.1: Different Social Groups and Status in Tanganyika 
No. Social groups Status 
1. Big Commercial 
Social Group­
(BCSG) 
These were big cash­crop farmers, traders and miners and private capital 
owners. They were predominantly Europeans and some Asians, some big 
commercial and manufacturing entrepreneurs (sisal processing or general 
agricultural product processing plants and local as well as international trading 
activities). They were by in large, a minority group. 
2. Petty Trading and 
Artisanal Group 
(PTAG) 
These were predominately Asians engaged in small and medium trade activities 
based mainly in urban areas. 
3. Urban middle 
“class” or social 
group (UMSG)29 
These included men and women in such middle­rank positions in the colonial 
civil service as teachers, clerks and medical and veterinary assistants, and a 
small number in similar positions in the private sector. A small number of self 
employed Africans running small business such as retail shops or trucking firms 
was also part of the group. 
4. Poor Urban­
Workers and Rural 
Peasants ( 
UW&RP) 
The poor urban wage earners composed of skilled and unskilled workers in 
agricultural processing plants, mines, communication and other infrastructural 
works and private socio­economic activities. The poor rural peasants were those 
in subsistence crop production and pastoral activities. These were the majority 
and the most disadvantaged group within the colonial social, economic and 
political institutional setting. 
Source: Pratt 1976:22; Tangri 1985:84) 
These groups shared some characteristics which included: heterogeneity, segmentation, 
separatism, internal instability, and lack of self identity and common consciousness as a 
single unified interest based class. They were, as Tangri (1985:84) put it, more “social 
groupings” than “social classes”. The same social groups continued in Tanganyika after 
independence, with only some changes in composition and shift in their power relation as a 
response to institutional reforms. 
4.2 Post ­Colonial (Independence) Period (1961­ 1987) 
4.2.1 The Immediate Post­Independence Period (1961­1966) 
Tanzania's institutional development immediately after independence was complex and 
rapid. After independence, it adopted a parliamentary system of government largely 
inherited from its colonial past as informed by the Tanganyika Order in Council of 1961. 
The structure of government was not different from that of the colonial period. The only 
difference was that cabinet members were drawn from parliament rather than appointed. 
(a) The Political and Administrative System 
Two fundamental changes occurred in 1962. The first was establishment of political 
representative structures in regions and districts headed by central representatives called 
29 Most were town people living apart from their tribal area though often still closely associated with it. Pratt argued that, members of 
this group saw that wealth, status and influence in their society were very largely in European and Asian hands. They were searching for 
ways to acquire these advantages for themselves. The common element in their various activities was, as Iliffe quoted by Pratt (1976) 
had observed, a concern for self­improvement. Therefore, as their aspirations widened to include their fellow Africans, they came to see 
that many of their objectives could best be pursued by coordination of their efforts. The African Association (AA) founded in 1929, and 
transformed into TAA in early 1930's, was a product of that recognition. 
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commissioners. They were created as structures of control of local politics and linking 
local administration to central government (Bates, 1962:447). The second change was 
transformation of political system from predominantly monarchical parliamentary form of 
government to republican government and the subsequent creation of “the Presidency” as a 
strong central structure vested with all executive powers (Duggan and Civille, 
1976:60).The presidency inherited most of the powers, functions and duties which were 
under the Governor­General's arrangement30 and became the chief executive structure of 
the government with power to hire and fire. It was also charged with responsibility for 
building an efficient civil service, capable of making, interpreting and giving effect to all 
policies. From April 1963, it assumed power to impose taxes without previous approval by 
the Assembly, provided that the latter was notified and did not disapprove within six weeks 
(Bates, 1962:448 & 523). The creation of the presidency acted as an institutional protection 
of the executive and bureaucrats from Parliament, and a move toward control of the latter 
by the former. 
In terms of administrative system, Tanzania inherited the colonial bureaucracy 
predominantly controlled by British expatriates. As a result, the government faced pressure 
for Africanisation of the civil service, to make it look more African, reflecting real 
independence and, to change its negative colonial image and restore public faith and 
support for its development tasks. Under these circumstances, the bureaucracy began to 
expand in structures, manpower and functions. Given the historical context of the rule of 
administrative services in colonial Tanzania, with control of development information, 
important position it held as well as its indisputable functional responsibilities, the 
bureaucracy came to dominate socio­economic and political development in the country. 
Essentially, just as colonial rule was by nature and functions bureaucratic (Holmquist, 
1979:133) so was the independent African rule. Tanzania was created as a country run by 
bureaucrats and their dominance in socio­economic and political development during 
colonialism informed similar desire and tendencies after independence. The only 
difference was a call for the bureaucracy to be controlled and run by the Tanzanians. 
Africanisation had an impact on the nature, character and functional capacities of the 
bureaucracy. The melding of the civil service with the party machinery permitted the 
former to take an active role in politics. There was constant interchange between the civil 
service and party positions, with little consideration to skills and expertise. It also rapidly 
expanded in structure and functions. The bureaucracy become pro­party and efforts to keep 
political and administrative matters separate by government leaders made things more 
complicated (Bates, 1962:462). Furthermore, an attempt was made to establish an 
independent local government system, parallel to the central government structures of 
regional and district commissions. Local governments were also left to assume some 
powers of taxation and responsibility for local services as way of turning them into 
statutory local councils. Unfortunately, local government structures were fused with the 
central administrative system and local party (TANU) structures. This made it difficult to 
keep the state and party structures separate, undermining the power and autonomy 
necessary for proper and effective functioning of local government. In practice therefore, 
Africanisation affected the efficiency of the bureaucracy, while consolidating its control 
over socio­economic and political development. 
The president became the head of State and Commander­in ­Chief of the Armed Forces who was to be elected by 
universal suffrage and ,therefore, claimed to be much more responsible directly to the public electorate (the Citizens as 
Voters) than to parliament ( just a political institution made up of elected individuals representing constituency 
interests). 
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(b) The Formation of One­party State 
Tanzania got independence through electoral processes with TANU as a dominant political 
party, subjected to little party opposition. After independence, TANU transformed itself by 
expanding and consolidating institutional posture at national apex while establishing its 
base at village and family level. In an attempt to correct the weakness of colonial 
administrative system, which put emphasis on national and intermediary institutions at the 
expanse of grassroots institutions, TANU gave little heed to intermediary institutions. 
Therefore, while colonial rule undermined grassroots institutions, TANU abolished 
intermediary institutions creating a gap between national and grassroots levels. 
TANU's governing, administrative and other associational branches were consolidated at 
national and village levels of the country's political hierarchy, with the district level acting 
as information exchange “chamber” and a meeting point of the two. At each level there 
was an executive committee and an annual conference. At national level the highest body 
was the party annual conference charged with approving decisions made by the national 
executive committee of the party. Below was the National Executive Committee (NEC) 
responsible for major policy and decision making, then the party's Central Committee 
(CC), a party bureaucracy charged with day­to­day administration, appointed by the party 
chairman whom the annual national conference elected. Most of these structures were 
replicated at lower levels from regional to village. 
In terms of policy and national decisions, NEC was the most important body. TANU 
developed representative and administrative structures more or less operating in the same 
way as those of the government: the NEC acted as a National Assembly (legislature) and 
all members of the Parliament were NEC members. The Central Committee (CC) 
functioned exactly like the central government bureaucracy with branches at regional, 
district and lower levels. When Tanzania modified its constitution to make it a de­jure One 
­Party State in 1965, TANU introduced the “ten cell system” into its structure. Designated 
as a group of approximately ten houses, grouped as a basic organisational unit, a cell was 
an institutional means of improving and consolidating TANU's administrative and political 
control of society (Duggan and Civille, 1976:65) and more importantly, its mobilization of 
resources together with control of all socio­economic and political development at local 
level. Later, almost all these party structures, from national to “ten cell” level, were fused 
with central and local government structures at every corresponding institutional level. The 
new system functioned in such a way that TANU was in government and the government 
in TANU and the government behaving like TANU and TANU exactly like the 
government. In fact for most ordinary Tanzanians, TANU was the Government and the 
Government was TANU. It was institutional confusion. Policies, and major development 
decisions, were introduced to the public as made by both the Party and Government 
authorities at the same time, while leaders introduced themselves as both government and 
party officials. Statements like: this is “the government and party decision”, “according to 
our party and government”, “on behalf of the party and the government”, “as party and 
government officer...”.etc. became common. The pertinent point is that, with the 
declaration of Tanzania as a republic in 1962, and adoption of one­party Constitution in 
1965, not only did TANU become the dominant institution, but it also assumed an 
enormous role in policy and decision making. 
51

Figure 4.3: TANU­Government Interpenetration
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(c) The Legal System 
Tanzania inherited a legal system based on English Common law system. The Tanganyika 
Order in Council of 1961 provided for a first Constitution of Tanzania. However, legal 
reforms took place quickly to replace the Constitution and repeal legal institutions and 
praxis created during colonialism. One challenge faced by the leaders was to redefine the 
role of customary legal institutions. Customary law as a decentralized and separately 
administered set of institutions seemed unfit to serve the needs of a Western­educated 
urban elite and increasing economic specialization. There was also a fear that the diversity 
of customary institutions would create ethnic factionalism and act as a disincentive for 
numerous tribal groups to remain loyal to the nation if incorporated into an unreformed 
legal system. This called for the unification and codification of legal systems. 
Three legal reforms took place. One was adoption of the republican constitution in 1962, 
which made changes to the government system but maintained a capitalist market economy 
as the dominant system. It also separated the State and Party constitutional status. 
The second reform was the unification and codification of the country’s sets of customary 
law, which resulted in the Local Customary Law Declaration of 1963­an “indigenous 
common law” reflective of the country’s diverse traditions (Chirayath et al., 2005: 14; 
Allott, 1969:15, 1984:57; Bierwagen and Peter,1989: 400). The government passed the 
Magistrate Courts Act of 1963, to incorporate formerly native courts into the national 
judicial system and later a legislation requiring that “lay judges” consult with at least two 
“assessors” drawn from the local pool of village elders. It put to an end the common 
colonial tendencies of administrators’ involvement in adjudication of cases. The 
government also did away with the separate court system established by the colonial 
authority on the basis of the colour of the litigants by introducing a single three­tier court 
system composed of the primary court at the bottom, followed by the district court (which 
included the resident magistrates' court), and the High Court at the top. Hence, the subject 
of the suit and not the colour of the litigants became the determining factor in deciding 
which court to apply to for relief (Bierwagen and Peter, 1989: 400). 
However, while unification and codification of customary law partially resolved 
community concerns, judges still retained ultimate control over rendering judgments, and 
as a result, the new legal institutions were often rejected or avoided by local communities, 
which established informal mechanisms of dispute resolution based on traditional practices 
(Chirayath et al., 2005: 14). The people’s disapproval of the formal (Western based) 
judicial system and consequent growth of informal (African customary) dispute resolution 
systems forced the government to pass an additional law, establishing village Arbitration 
Tribunals for reconciliation mostly run by elders faithful to the local party. In a climate of 
liberalization and increasing lawlessness in the mid 1980s, the Arbitration Tribunals were 
placed under the control of local administrative officials and renamed Ward Tribunals. 
They were managed by district­level government administrators and were not part of the 
judiciary, though cases could be appealed to the primary courts. So, just as during 
colonialism, customary courts were subjected again to administrative control. 
Moreover, by adopting the republican constitution, the government introduced a civil law 
system forcing it to coexist with the common law and customary law system. Thus, it 
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created a kind of “a hybrid­tripartite legal order” composed of three incoherent legal 
traditions (Table 4.2) 
Table 4.2: Key Characteristics of Common Law, Customary Law and Civil Law Traditions 
No. Key Legal systems 
Aspects Common Law Civil Law Customary Law* 
1. The Origin The Common law or 
judge made law’s origin 
is the customary law of 
England developed and 
evolved through case 
by case decisions of a 
judiciary independent 
of the state 
The Civil law and code­based 
law are based on written codes 
handed down by the state. 
Evolved out of the 
experiences of 
traditional conflict 
reconciliation and 
resolution practices 
2. Adjudication 
Procedure 
The common law is 
based on the private 
enforcement of rights 
by those affected by a 
breach of law, 
adversarial trials and, 
originally juries. 
The Civil law system is often 
based on prosecutors; the system 
is inquisitorial, with a greater 
role given to judges, who are less 
independent (appointed by the 
state) 
The customary law is 
based on a kind of 
inquisitorial system in 
which elders play 
greater role. 
Proceedings are made 
orally and no 
intermediary persons 
involved 
3. Judiciary­
Executive 
relationship 
At the heart of the 
common law is the rule 
of law (in most cases 
courts are not beholden 
by the sovereign or 
executive 
In Civil law traditions, the 
sovereign appoints the judges 
and in a way blocking them from 
controlling the actions of the 
state. It is also argued that in 
civil law system the executives 
are more dirigiste and have less 
respect for the rule of law. 
There is inherent 
fusion between 
administrative and legal 
institutions 
4. The Costs of 
Litigation 
The common law is 
said to have higher 
costs and uncertainty 
of litigation , which 
makes many legal 
disputes and potential 
cases settled outside the 
court or abandoned 
In the Civil law traditions, 
litigation costs and uncertainty 
are reduced by the state 
involvement through 
investigation and prosecution of 
cases, particularly on the side of 
the aggrieved parties 
Conflict resolution is 
part of the 
responsibility of the 
elders involved and the 
duty of the society to its 
members for its 
survival. So the 
concept of cost is not 
the major factor. 
5. Economic 
efficiency 
It contributes to greater 
economic welfare 
because it is less 
interventionist, less 
under the tutelage of the 
state, and better able to 
respond to change than 
civil legal systems. It 
leads to a spontaneous 
order like a free market 
system and its hidden 
functioning logic is 
wealth maximization. 
It is effective and has inherent 
authoritative power. Its method 
of adjudication is inherently 
superior to common law because 
of its low costs, efficient means 
of ascertaining the facts, and its 
scope for wealth­facilitating 
judicial activism. 
The common law is in the eyes 
of many lawyers incoherent, 
irrational and frequently unfair, 
the nature that makes it share 
many of the attributes of the free 
market system. 
It is closely related to 
common law traditions 
Source: Veljanovski (2008:84­90); Joireman (2001:571­596). * The characterisation of this legal system is 
based on Author’s own experience and inference from literature 
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From the foregoing discussion and information presented in Table 4.2, one can argue that it 
was the Civil law tradition which appealed more to leaders than Common laws. The 
negative feelings against the common law created by colonialism, its inherent logic of 
competitive wealth maximization through free market, adversarial trial system, litigation 
costs and less inclination to administrative control, were added disadvantages in the eyes of 
leaders. 
The third change was adoption of the One ­Party constitution in 1965, which declared 
TANU the sole ruling party. This was the turning point in TANU­state­society relations 
over major policy decision­making and control of development. The TANU constitution 
was made an integral part of the State constitution. These changes gave TANU high 
constitutional status and increased its powers, functions in governmental affairs and in the 
management of development. Thus, TANU became a constitutional category, whose role 
in government and development became constitutional and bidding. Any opposition to its 
institutions, functions, decisions, or leadership at whatever level of the hierarchy, not only 
constituted disloyalty, but was deemed unconstitutional and liable for punishment. As a 
way of consolidating its capacity and domination, the party decided to establish its own 
bureaucracy parallel to that of the government (Okumu, 1979: 52 &55). 
(d) Social Group Dynamics 
At independence, Tanzania also inherited colonial social arrangements, with a few 
European at the apex of the hierarchy as owners of major means of production, dominating 
all major economic and trade and commercial business, as well as control of the civil 
service as senior and technical staff. Next came the Asians as traders and artisans owning 
big, medium and small business in urban areas; then followed the new governing elites 
owning State power; and finally the majority poor workers in urban areas and peasants in 
rural areas. 
With the transfer of power, it was “the middle class” or “the middle status group” as 
Tangri (1985:84) called it, or the governing elite, that was favoured. State power was 
transferred from colonial elite to African elite, not to the majority workers or to the 
peasants. While the middle class and the workers and peasants occupied more or less the 
same institutional position during colonial rule, sharing the same common feeling of 
colonial constraints, by occupying state power, the governing elite were elevated into a 
higher institutional position. They no longer shared the same feelings. In fact, a struggle 
was now between workers and peasants against the new governing elite, and between the 
Europeans and Asians against the new State power occupants. Simply put, the 
transformation from colonial rule to independence set in motion a new struggle of workers 
and peasants against the governing elite. It was due to that inequality that various social 
organisations came onto conflict with the government and TANU, leading to the latter co­
opting the former as a way of keeping them under control. All trade unions, cooperative 
movements, women’s and youth associations that become militant after independence were 
co­opted by TANU, transforming some into party organs or sections while others were 
integrated into the central government system. They no longer functioned as autonomous 
institutions advancing the interests of their respective constituencies, but as party and 
government organs. Their members were transformed into subjects. 
Thus, as part of post­independence state construction, two processes engineered by TANU 
took place: institutional interpenetration between the party, bureaucracy and civil society 
and social group integration and depoliticisation of civil servants, workers and peasants. 
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While at institutional level, there was a tendency towards interpenetration, at political 
(policy) process level, the desire was for social group separation from politics. The tension 
between the contending political logics: the need for citizen participation on the one hand, 
and control on the other, became the central feature of Tanzanian politics and became more 
vivid during Ujamaa. In most cases, the need for and commitment to citizen participation 
became overwhelmed by the emphasis on the need for centralized control to maximize 
political loyalty and utilization of scarce resources. The challenge which remained 
unresolved was one of increasing the feelings of citizen participation without increasing 
their input into public policy. 
4.2.2 The Ujamaa (Socialist) Phase 1967­1985 
The period between 1967 and 1985 saw initiatives towards alternative institutional reforms 
influenced by traditional tribal ways of life. Ujamaa as a form of socialist mode of 
organization was rooted in traditional values as reflected in Tanzanian tribal structures. Six 
key aspects of traditional social organization became the founding stones of ujamaa. First 
aspect was patrilocal extended family social organization in which married women took up 
residence in their husbands’ family homesteads and married daughters were counted as 
members of their husbands’ family than of their own families (Appendix 4A). Second, a 
clan political organization led by male elders thought to be wise, skillful and charismatic. 
He was assisted by a council of elders as a key institution for decision making, conflict 
settlement, resolution and judgment (Figure 4.4). Third, was social stratification based on 
sex, age and generation class system which were instrumental in forming a person’s 
identity, social and political status. According to generation class system, each man was a 
member of the generation class that came after that of his father and his public position 
was determined by the level of his generation class. Fourth, an existence of a system of 
socio­economic security in the form of reciprocal help from extended family, free access to 
land for shifting cultivation and grazing and unlimited number of livestock. Fifth, a 
communal ownership of means of production in which the right to use land and access to 
other resources rather than ownership was determined by male lineage, and land remained 
a property of the society. Last, social status in society was mutually shared as a symbol of 
a call to the service of the society and its members. Nobody felt superior to others because 
of his status and individual status was socially rather than politically defined. A political 
status was only attained after one had acquired a certain level of social status (Appendix 
4B). 
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Figure 4.4: Clan Political Organization Structure
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In 1967, the government adopted the Arusha Declaration, a TANU’s official Policy 
document on Socialism and Self­Reliance, which aimed at putting all principles, goals and 
beliefs of Ujamaa into practice­the creation of “Ujamaa­society”. It defined ujamaa as 
familyhood featured by a strong sense of communal spirit and mutual responsibility as the 
basic principles of traditional extended family. Thus, ujamaa was to be founded on 
principles of human equality; communal ownership of major means of production; a 
classless society of equal members free from exploitation; People, Land, Good Policies and 
Good Leadership, not Money, as the basis of development; and moral leadership free from 
corruption. These became the guiding principles of political and socio­economic 
organization. 
(a) Political Organization and Leadership 
We have discussed key structural characteristics of the government and party in previous 
sections and there is no need to replicate them. The aim is to identify institutional features 
and functioning which were adopted as part of transposing tribal structures into modern 
political systems and processes. The aspects emphasised are: what Samoff (1974:195) 
referred to as tripartite structure and structural interpenetration. 
TANU was structured to form a tripartite structure­three organs and corresponding 
leadership at every level of organization and leadership from national to village and similar 
pattern extended to branch levels (Figure 4.5). The party institutions paralleled those of the 
government at each level of its organization. 
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Figure 4.5: TANU Tripartite Structure
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The, tripartite structures and leadership provided structural links and interpenetration 
between the party and government. Though they were distinct, the overlap between them 
from national to village level was substantial. For example, Members of Parliament were 
delegates to the Party NC and NEC, while Regional Commissioners sat in Parliament and 
the NEC. 
The Regional and District Commissioners served as government and party officials in their 
areas of jurisdiction.The Regional Commissioner, a presidential appointee, was responsible 
for all government activities at the Regional level, serving as the “proper officer for 
District Councils within the Region, he/she presided over all meetings of Regional 
Development Committee (RDC), and by virtual of his/her appointment, automatically 
became the regional “political” Party secretary, working with a regional “executive” Party 
secretary appointed by Party headquarters. The District Commissioner, also a presidential 
appointee, was in charge of business in the district and a chairman of the District 
Development and Planning Committee (DDPC).The TANU District Chairman served as 
Chairman of the District or Town council, thus holding both local government and party 
posts. A council chairman had to work with District commissioner as his party secretary, 
while the latter had to work with party executive secretary as his assistance. The party 
executive secretary worked with the District commissioner as his government official in 
the area. 
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Figure 4.6: Schematic Representation of Linkages within the District Executive
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At the bottom of the tripartite structure was the TANU cell­the replica of traditional tribal 
extended family. A cell was the lowest party structure which linked government, party and 
people at grassroots level. It was under a local leader elected by all adult members of the 
ten families, which constituted a cell. Cells were established to facilitate communications 
between the mass of the population, and the leadership at village, district, regional and 
national levels. It was also charged with the tasks of managing party maintenance, to assist 
in maintaining security, and to mobilize people for development purposes. Along the above 
responsibilities, cells were grassroots institutions for dispute settlement and conflict 
resolution. Cell leaders (most of them male elders) were responsible for dealing with 
disputes and conflicts in their respective cells and it was only when resolutions failed, the 
case was referred to TANU Elders’ Council. It was the elders, under cell leaders, who 
controlled resources and made all major decisions about resource allocation and other 
socio­economic and political affairs of the cell. It was a social, economic and political 
structure operating on traditional tribal extended family basis in which male elders 
controlled resources and principal means of production, and made all major decisions. The 
Village Development Committee (VDC) which attended by village party and government 
leaders constituted largely of the local ten cell leaders leading to a formal merging of the 
party, government and society. The cell, therefore, was the lowest level of political 
structure which provided the point of contact between the people, party and government 
leadership in the country (Samoff, 1974:135­136). 
However, the desire to transpose tribal values, principles and institutions led to 
interpenetration accompanied with problems that contravened the objectives of Ujamaa. 
While institutions that aggregate interests were numerous and diverse, interest articulation 
was largely confined to party structures. That is, while a wide range of groups –trade 
unions, women and youth organizations, co­operatives and the like­ merges diverse 
demands into recognizable alternative course of action, communication of demands and 
proposed courses of action to decision­makers at the centre was confined within party 
structures. Many of the interest groups were party auxiliaries reinforcing this pattern. 
Institutional interpenetration was also instrumental in what Samoff (1974:164) called 
“mobilization of bias
31
”.A proposal to any course of action in opposition to TANU’s belief 
of what was desirable, could only be mentioned in private discussions and never rose in 
public. Ujamaa inculcated societal sentiments and values which excluded or set substantial 
obstacle before individuals as well as issues. In many cases, any person championing 
private property or capitalist kind of socio­economic undertaking received severe 
community disapproval because of its acceptance of immorality and illegitimacy of 
capitalism. Therefore, many ideas alternative to Ujamaa were excluded from the decision­
making process. 
Institutional reforms under Ujamaa was also motivated by the need for leadership morality 
with emphasis on leadership that refrains from capitalist motivated acquisitive 
individualism and commits itself to human equality and dignity which were considered 
necessary for public good. As a result, a leadership code of conduct was adopted 
prohibiting anyone in a middle or senior rank position in either the government or party 
from engaging in the following five activities associated with exploitation: (1) holding 
shares in a private company; (2) being a director of a private company; (3) receiving more 
than one salary; (4) owning one or more houses which are rented to others; and (5) 
Mobilization of bias refers to the ways in which prevailing community sentiments and values rendered it difficult or 
even impossible for some issues and some points of view to enter decision­making structures. 
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31 
employing others to work for him. It was believed, living on the labour of others was 
exploitation and morally wrong. The activities prohibited, aimed at denying all leaders any 
opportunity to exploit fellow citizens. They were forced to accept that, surrender their 
personal possessions and remain leaders. 
There was a great deal of discontent over the leadership rules. According to Pratt 
(1976:238­239), many members of the political and civil service elite expressed 
unhappiness over these restrictions on their earning activities. It was a threat even to the 
socialist project itself. Now, nationalisation and adoption of the leadership rule triggered 
institutional compromises and sacrifices which proved necessary as a means of appealing 
to the elites' negative reactions to socialism, but which unfortunately, became source of the 
evil that the socialist project wanted to prevent: leadership individualistic material 
acquisitiveness, immorality and corruption. He identified two compromises: (a) leaders 
were allowed to transfer ownership of property to a trust they could set up in the name of 
their children. This meant investment in property, whose purpose was to provide for the 
future needs of a leader's children was permissible; (b) the compromise limited the ban on 
the employment of workers on a permanent and full­time basis. This permitted leaders in 
the rural areas who were also substantial farmers to continue to employ casual labour in 
periods of peak need. 
(b) TANU’s Social Organization 
The party was organized like a traditional tribal extended family, with four tiers below 
national headquarters: regional, district, rural (or local) and cell levels (See Figure4.7). 
Apart from this national organization, TANU had two other categories: the Party Section 
groups and Party Affiliate groups. 
Party sections, were, the TANU Elders, Women Organization (UWT) and Youth League 
(TYL). As senior members of “the TANU extended family” TANU elders held various 
positions in local party and government offices and became key actors in decision making. 
They were often considered to have the right to leadership as “taifa la leo” meaning “the 
nation of today” and in most cases, major policies, strategies and programmes were 
explained first, to them before they were subjected to public actions. UWT, with pressure 
from the elders32 , was mainly confined to “domestic reproductive roles and political 
mobilization, thus reversing women back to their traditional domestic roles common in 
most patrilineal societies in Tanzania. From the logics of traditional tribal extended family 
organization, TYL represented the lowest generation class which was a preparatory stage 
for manhood and for future active leadership role in society33. It was considered a group of 
immature people to be entrusted with national political leadership positions and was 
commonly referred to as “taifa la kesho” meaning “the nation of tomorrow” as opposed to 
Elders. As a result their role and participation was confined to their party section and 
reduced to mere instruments of the party, government and political leaders. Structurally, 
each of these sections had an administrative counterpart at national, regional, district and 
32 
Men accused politically active women of disrespecting or a shaming their husbands by attending TANU meetings 
despite the warnings not to do so. In some places, men were clearly hostile to women's participation beyond attendance at 
mass rallies, and there were elders who initially complained that it was wrong for a woman to address men and in some 
areas men closed down the women's TANU section. As the tension grew, endangering unity between men and women in 
the party, UWT leadership had no option but to accommodate men's insistence that women remain under their control 
and that it was necessary that women should be eligible for employment, but a married woman should not be allowed to 
work in the party without her husband's consent. It was particularly insisted that, UWT should not accept a married 
woman to work in TANU without receiving a letter from her husband after seeking his consent (see Geiger, 1982: 48­49). 
33 It is important to remember that, the concept “youth” was associated with “young males – boys” as “young females­
girls” were defined as Women and associated with UWT. 
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village levels and operated alongside the party and government structure. The party cell 
structure organized below the village party branches linked family members to party 
branches and to these party sections. 
Along with party sections, TANU had three affiliates namely, the National Union of 
Tanganyika Workers (NUTA), Cooperative Union of Tanganyika (CUT), and the 
Tanganyika African Parents Association (TAPA). With the exception of TAPA, which had 
branches up to village level, NUTA and CUT organizations were confined to areas where 
many members were found, and their organization and activities ended mainly at district 
level. As social groups, they were deprived of their freedom of associations and expression 
of their grievances as independent groups representing interests and plan of actions of their 
members which could be alternative to that of the party and the government and therefore, 
facilitate socio­economic and political development of the country. 
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6Figure 4.7: The Organization of TANU’s Extended Family
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(c) Resource Management and Organization of Production 
The government inherited, virtually unaltered, the legal framework on land tenure from the 
colonial period. All lands declared to be public lands were vested in the President in place 
of the Governor. The statutory control of resources (land) reached its climax in the first 
half of 1970s following the adoption of Villagisation policy, which not only changed 
profoundly the legal framework of land tenure in rural areas but also entrenched even 
deeper the bureaucratic control of land. The system removed land tenure from the domain 
of customary law by assimilating it in the statutory rights of occupancy under the 
supervision of administrative organs of the government. The perceptions and practices of 
the people on land tenure embedded in their customary systems and their associated rights 
were disregarded (URT, 1994:42­44; Shivji, 1998:6&13). According to Shivji, 
villagisation in effect meant expropriation of customary rights and compulsory acquisition 
of land under customary law, implying that customary occupiers did not occupy land as a 
matter of their rights but as a favour through Presidential (administrative) discretions 
under the slogan “ardhi ni mali ya taifa” (land is the property of the nation). These reforms 
reiterated legal institutionalization of administrative based accessibility to land without 
ownership and struggles between common, statutory and customary legal practices of land 
resource management. 
In terms of organization of production, the government saw cooperatives and local 
authorities as institutions through which the benefits of development could spread to the 
population. While Cooperatives were regarded as the most important rural institutions for 
introducing socialism to farmers (Mporogomyi, 1988:78; Samoff, 1989:5), Local 
Authorities were considered legitimate administrative intermediaries and representative 
organizations of local politics, mobilization of labour, transformation of agricultural 
practices, regulation of commerce, and management of social services. However, the 
autonomy of these institutions posed a challenge to the legitimacy and authority of central 
government and interests of governing elites: the need to create a central unit of authority 
to direct national development; to abolish ethnic (tribal) divisions and maintain national 
unity; reduce regional inequalities and capitalist exploitation; establish socialism and 
ensure compliance to national policies. So, the assertiveness and autonomy of these 
institutions became a source of challenge to the development agenda of the central 
authority (Samoff, 1989:5 &6). 
After Arusha Declaration in 1967 and Villegisation in 1975, Local Authorities and 
Cooperatives were accused of being economic and political power bases of the rural rich 
farmers, inefficient, and promoting local interests at the expense of national policy. The 
TANU leadership saw this as a threat to the Central Authority and socialist nation building. 
As a measure against exploitation, institutional reforms were adopted to restrict capitalistic 
practices by destroying institutions which supported the emerging African entrepreneurial 
business class and rich farmers (Maghimbi, 1999:80). Thus, the very role­the aggregation 
and expression of local interests­for which many Cooperatives and Local Authorities were 
created and regarded as pillars for the nationalist demand for independence became 
illegitimate and a threat in the Ujamaa era. 
The adoption of the Ujamaa Villages Act of 1975 abolished Cooperatives and their 
functions were transferred to villages that were legally organized as Cooperative Societies. 
Through political and bureaucratic pressure, Ujamaa Village Cooperatives were formed 
even in areas never existed before and without local demand or understanding (Coulson, 
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1977: 85). As economic units, they had to receive financial support from regional 
development funds under the principle of collective production for the state and equal 
distribution of the results by the state. In 1976, the Cooperative unions were also abolished 
and replaced by state controlled Crop Authorities (Yeager, 1982:86; Mporogomyi, 
1988:81). After 1972, local authorities were abolished and their responsibilities assumed 
by central government through regional and district authorities. Hence, both Local 
authorities and Cooperatives became subordinate to, and dependent on, the regional and 
national administration. 
The new institutional setting created the district as the operative level for the 
administration of Village Cooperatives, and district officials thus became the main 
initiators of new development schemes. The centralization tendencies subjected village 
cooperatives into dependence of resources and decisions from district, regional and 
national authorities. Thus, while it was intended that the Village Cooperatives should be 
voluntary and independent, there remained a high level of bureaucratic control which 
turned them into institutions of controlled production (Picard, 1980:445). This led to 
concentration of government staff and administrative regulations behind the Ujamaa 
Village Cooperatives in an effort to direct and monitor development activities in line with 
national policies and principles of Ujamaa. 
Finally, a bureaucratic model of Statist­accumulation from above, which depended on 
mobilization of privileged connection with the State and coercion and plunder from 
peasants (Neocosmos, 1993), was created. Under Ujamaa, the model was presented as 
“public resource accumulation” for collective responsibility and communal benefits. The 
model was characterized by accessibility and production without ownership of the means 
of production and the surplus. So, because agriculture was the major economic sector and 
land the major means of production, the government developed what can be termed as 
“state feudalism and landlordism”. But state­landlordism co­existed with communal­
lineage mode of production. Put differently, there was state­directed collective production 
through village cooperatives and private family­based communal mode of production. So, 
there were a de­jure statist­communal mode of production and de­facto family­communal 
mode of production. The former was for state accumulation, the latter for family 
subsistence. This is not to suggest that state accumulation did not contribute to the 
subsistence needs of the rural population or that subsistence production did not assist state 
accumulation. But the point is that, the functional logic of their supporting institutions 
presupposed the existing of a differentiated interest and objectives of the two systems. The 
tendency was that, resources were transferred from production areas to the State machinery 
and thus, individual or collective advancement required State contacts. State contacts 
entailed existence of political and administrative network between the politicians and 
bureaucrats at national level and elites at local level. This was more advantageous to 
enclave economic zones which, because of ecological and historical privileges, had many 
representatives in the State. So, the Ujamaa organization of production reinforced 
accumulation and inequality from above and dispossession or impoverishment and equality 
from below. That is, accumulation and equality by dispossession. This induced what can be 
called “negative development”. That is, a production without organic self­sustainable 
wealth accumulation necessary for socio­economic security and independence that is self­
regulated by what the community enables each individual to afford. 
Under Statist­accumulation, Village Cooperatives were directed and encouraged by 
government to produce strategic food and cash crops without a guarantee of ownership and 
control of the value of their produce. This system tended to concentrate on state interests of 
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wealth accumulation at the expense of the peasants (Mporogomyi, 1988:71). Re­
distribution of the benefits of Village Cooperatives was dictated by the bureaucrats at 
national level. They could allocate the benefits from the production according to what they 
saw as national priorities. Moreover, because cooperatives developed in enclave economic 
areas and statist­wealth accumulation depended on cash­crop exports, it became clear that 
government incentives to stimulate production were biased in favour of these areas. As a 
result, organization of production through bureaucratically controlled cooperatives and the 
redistributive policies of Ujamaa ended up perpetuating regional inequality and insecurity. 
The changing organization of rural production and administrative order had implications 
for accessibility to resources and peasants’ commitment to engage in production. As noted 
earlier, Village Cooperative production was developed without looking into historical 
realities of the evolution of Cooperatives and the negative feelings of peasants against 
bureaucracy. Cooperatives emerged as intermediary marketing institutions in “colonial 
enclave economy” influenced by geographical differences. They were not necessarily 
formed as primary societies for collective production and were less known in non­enclave 
economy. So, the transformation of Cooperatives into some forms of socialist (collective) 
socio­economic Village Cooperative Societies embedded in the administrative system was 
abortive. While they were in tension with the institutional and economic logics of enclave 
economy, Village Cooperatives found no roots in non­enclave economy. As a result, they 
turned into instruments of local resource exploitation for state­accumulation and 
bureaucratic elite reproduction (Shivji, 1976; Boesen, 1976 and Leonard, 1976 cited in 
Coulson, 1977:95). While Cooperatives and the bureaucracy became central in the 
organisation of production, the former was put under the control of the latter creating 
institutional conflicts which undermined rural development. It was this which led to the 
controversial restoration of Cooperatives and Local Authorities in the early 1980s (See 
Chapter 8). 
4.3 The External Institutional Context of Poverty Alleviation 
International development policies on poverty have always been concerned with the 
question in political economy of how best can production and distribution of wealth and 
other necessities of life be organized in the society (Snooks, 1999:126­127). It is this 
question of what is the best way for effective wealth creation and distribution that has 
historically, ignited debates between state and market­centred development doctrines. 
(a) The Keynesian Consensus (1960s and 1970s) 
The primacy of the market and its role as engine of production and distribution of 
resources dominated development thinking until the mid 1940s when the great depression 
spawned the Keynesian revolution. This shift in development philosophy coincided with 
the end of colonial rule and the emergence of independent states. It was a period in which 
these states began to evolve from symbiotic to inward­looking growth and from dependent 
to more independent relations vis­a­vis ex­colonial powers (Thorbecke, 2000:1). However, 
the newly independent states did not have a development doctrine that policymakers could 
use as a guide to the formulation of socio­economic policies. As a result, the selection and 
adoption of a development strategy depended on the prevailing international development 
philosophy and opportunities provided by existing institutional order. In most African 
countries including Tanzania, the Keynesian consensus became the first option after 
independence. 
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That consensus emphasised protectionist and interventionist economic policies and 
promoted extensive government involvement in the economy as the only way of promoting 
full employment (sic) and economic growth. Based on the belief that escape from 
underdevelopment and poverty trap could only be engineered through a developmental 
state (Snooks, 1999:128; Utting and Zammit, 2006:1), along with a functioning private 
sector and market economy, world leaders began to advocate policies to promote economic 
growth and development built on social and economic security. While in industrialized 
world most citizens were protected by social services, transfers and institutions providing a 
dense network of security, in most of the developing world there was merely a 
commitment to achieve it in the longer term (Standing, 2004:2) 
At international level, the Keynesian consensus was accompanied by what Ruggie (1982) 
called the “embedded liberal compromises” which allowed for government liberty to 
organize national life and intervention in development to ensure socio­economic and 
political harmony. The compromise produced liberalizing practices such as most favoured 
nation status, non­discrimination and progressive tariff reductions which fostered 
multilateral liberalism in the international economy. It also allowed a series of safeguards 
and exemptions and permitted customs unions. Therefore, notwithstanding the quest for 
full employment and sustainable economic growth through government interventions­
which became the main policy objective to newly independent countries­private sector and 
market economy mostly prevailed in the early years of independence (Lancaster, 1991:46). 
The liberty to organize national life extended to independent countries allowed them to 
exercise certain level of freedom in their domestic development decisions and initiatives. 
This enabled them to push their agenda for rapid domestic development and redistribution 
of wealth. Conditioned by the prevailing development philosophy and the cold war, the 
response of the developed countries to the challenges posed by the new states seemed to 
work in favour of the latter. For example, although upheld private enterprise and free 
market economic principles, the governments of developed countries were more tolerant to 
protectionism, investment control and strong role for the government in managing the 
economy and supporting limited global redistribution of wealth mainly through foreign aid 
(Berro, 2002:35­36). It was these circumstances which conditioned the nature of 
development strategies in developing countries. There was a belief in many countries that 
State intervention was a legitimate tool of development (Lancaster, 1991:46) and that 
through formal employment, economic growth and modernization, income and social 
inequalities would be eliminated (Thorbecke, 2000:4). All these propositions put emphasis 
on the importance of government intervention in development and viewed growth in 
developing countries as requiring a large discrete injection of investment which could 
alleviate poverty and promote economic security. 
Shifts in development strategies from industrialisation as the engine of growth and 
promotion of employment in the 1960s, to rural and agricultural development and basic 
needs as a way of promoting equitable growth, rural­urban equality and socio­economic 
security in 1970s in Tanzania were mainly conditioned by the prevailing international 
development doctrine. A good example was the launch of the World Employment 
Programme by the ILO in 1969 emphasising that the primary objective of developing 
country governments should be to raise the standard of living of the poor through increased 
employment. Governments were urged to engage in generating greater productive 
opportunities as means through which the welfare of the poor could be improved. The 
result was a change in the meaning of development to connote a process with triple 
objectives: economic growth, equal distribution of resources and poverty alleviation. This 
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is what led many developing countries including Tanzania, supported by donor countries 
and international financial institutions, to adopt state­driven development strategies with 
emphasis on public sector, integrated rural development and growth with equity under the 
basic needs approach. The approach underpinned the international institutions in their 
response to development challenges and it had elements which coincided, if not informed 
Tanzania’s agenda, institutional reforms and policy changes throughout this period. 
Table 4.3: Top Five Recipients of Aid to Africa between 1970 and 1995 
No. 1970 1980 1990 1995 
1. Nigeria Tanzania Kenya Zambia 
2. DRC Sudan Tanzania Ivory Coast 
3. Kenya DRC Mozambique Mozambique 
4. Tanzania Kenya Ethiopia Ethiopia 
5. Ghana Zambia DRC Tanzania 
Source: Lancaster (1999:40) 
The elements included: a massive escalation in the World Bank’s resource lending which 
rose from an average of $2.7billion a year in 1968, to $8.7 billion in 1978 and $12 billion 
in 1981; adoption of a global programme aimed at ending poverty by focusing aid on 
improving the productivity of the poor and effort to split developing countries by picking 
a few as “countries of concentration” to which the flow of Bank assistance was to be 
higher than for other countries of similar size and income (Berro, 2002:38). Interestingly, it 
was during the later part of that period that aid flow to Tanzania increased tremendously 
relative to many other African countries, indicating that Tanzania was one of the 
experimental countries (Tables 4.3 & 4.4). 
Table 4. 4: Total effective development Assistance in relation to GDP for East African Countries, 
1978­1997 (in %) 
Country/Year 1978­81 1982­85 1986­89 1990­93 1994­97 
Uganda 0.94 1.52 3.58 4.83 4.68 
Tanzania 6.81 5.69 6.02 5.79 4.49 
Kenya 2.22 2.38 2.93 2.98 2.18 
Source: Devarajan et al., (2001:13) 
Thus, Western aid shifted to poverty alleviation with priority given to projects to develop 
rural areas, implying emphasis on agriculture (Gibbon, 1992:193). This was also 
accompanied by a tendency among donors to emphasise redistributive goals while down­
grading the importance of growth. In general the emphasis was on state­led­development 
(Lancaster, 1991:46). 
Table 4.5: Total Aid to Tanzania, 1970­1981 (in Millions of U.S Dollars) 
Year Total Aid Share of Tanzania in Total Aid to Sub­Saharan Africa (%) 
1970 37.70 4.6 
1971 39.10 3.8 
1972 91.70 6.3 
1973 155.40 9.6 
1974 194.70 8.0 
1975 303.30 9.8 
1976 257.90 8.9 
1977 306.90 9.3 
1978 533.10 12.0 
1979 557.10 10.5 
1980 761.40 11.2 
1981 660.90 9.5 
Source: Devarajan et al, eds., 2001., p. 291. 
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Bigsten et al (2001:294) described the period between the late 1960s and 1970s as aid 
expansionist phase featured by a willingness of donors to extend aid to Tanzania due to the 
country’s development policies. The emphasis on self­ reliance and growth with equity, 
poverty alleviation, targeting of government programmes on basic needs, and emphasis 
on cooperatives and Ujamaa villages motivated donors to provide aid .They argued that, 
such policies were in line with the thinking of social democrats in the North, notably in the 
Nordic countries, Germany (under Willy Brandt), and Canada. These governments took a 
positive view of Tanzania’s strategy. The World Bank also increased its lending 
programme during this period because Robert McNamara President of the Bank 
championed a policy of growth with equity that was in line with Tanzania’s development 
strategy (Bigsten et al, 294­295; Gibbon, 1992:193). 
(b) The Washington Consensus (1980s and 1990s 
Towards the end of 1970s Keynesian doctrines gave way to neo­liberal capitalist doctrines 
commonly known as the “Washington Consensus” which, according to Standing (2004:3), 
involved 11 policy commitments (Table 4.6). Underlying this doctrine was the belief that 
the economic crises which hit the developing countries in the late 1970s and debt crisis that 
erupted in the early 1980s were a result of the failure of the developmental state, 
interference in the functioning of the market and suffocation of the private sector. Thus, 
governments in developing countries were not only forced to move out of the economy, 
reduce their size (structure and number of workers) and re­instate private sector, but also 
accept less discretionary power over national policymaking and adapt to the dictates of a 
global model, identified and promoted by the Washington­based international financial 
institutions (Standing, 2004:3). The shift towards neo­liberal policies became a global 
trend. Its emphasis on market driven development, economic growth and private sector 
rejuvenated the primacy of the market as the engine for production and resource 
distribution while discrediting the role of the State in the economy and society. 
Table 4.6: Washington Consensus’s key Policy Commitments 
Key policy commitments 
1. international financial market liberalization; 
2. domestic capital market liberalization; 
3. trade liberalization (particularly in developing countries); 
4. labour market “flexibility”; 
5. secure individual property rights over physical and financial assets; 
6. weak property rights over human assets (particularly skills); 
7. a reduction in the size and role of the public sector, including privatization of publicly­
owned productive assets, and an end to managed trade and industrial policies; 
8. a system of taxation that is not only less progressive, but also that shifts taxes from capital 
to labour, and subsidies from labour to capital; 
9. independent central banks (as part of a more general move towards the 
“technocratization” of economic policymaking); 
10. a “social safety net” type of approach to social protection: i.e., more targeting, selectivity 
and conditionality; 
11. Privatization and liberalization of social policy. 
Source: Standing, 2004:3 
This was also the period when the conservative governments (Reagan’s Republican 
government in 1981­1988 in US, and Thatcher’s UK Conservative government (1979­
1992) came into power. There was also a change in leadership of the IFIs particularly the 
World Bank when the welfare technocrat McNamara was replaced by the neo­liberal A.W 
Clausen. This was the period of triumph of neo­liberal ideology and the fading of 
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communism and socialism accompanied by drastic ideological change and international 
reorientation, which left many developing countries, including Tanzania in a predicament. 
The dictates of the Washington consensus as a global model and the Bretton Woods 
institutions as the midwives of economic liberalization led these institutions and their 
regional associates to interfere with the domestic policies of developing countries using the 
conditions attached to their discretionary provision of aid as weapon. An example was the 
structural adjustment programmes (SAPs). Berro (2002:43) defined structural adjustment34 
as a new lending approach, which unlike the traditional World Bank project loan, was 
intended to push for a programme of reform that would cut across the whole economy or a 
whole sector of a developing country. One of the programmes was market liberalization 
applied to all developing economies suffering debt crises. 
Many developing countries struggled against structural adjustment and stabilization 
policies proposed by the IFIs in fear of the consequences of policy and institutional reform 
conditions attached to them. Therefore, the IFIs resorted to the use of aid as a means of 
enforcing compliance. In 1980, for example, Tanzania rejected the World Bank and IMF 
reform package because Nyerere’s government was afraid of the consequences. Following 
the breakdown of negotiations, the general view among the donor countries was that aid to 
Tanzania could not be effective unless the country agreed to adopt the IMF and World 
Bank’s stabilization and adjustment package. By 1983 as a reaction to the refusal to accept 
the package, aid flows declined (Table 4.7). 
Table 4.7: Total Aid to Tanzania, 1982­1996 (in Millions of U.S Dollars) 
Year Total Aid Share of Tanzania in Total Aid to Sub­
Saharan Africa (%) 
1982 634.10 9.2 
1983 584.30 8.4 
1984 534.30 7.3 
1985 482.60 5.8 
1986 789.60 7.9 
1987 751.50 7.1 
1988 1,043.60 8.4 
1989 842.30 6.7 
1990 1,055.60 6.4 
1991 1,090.70 6.9 
1992 1,158.00 7.2 
1993 1,154.50 7.8 
1994 927.20 5.8 
1995 854.00 5.7 
1996 830.50 6.0 
Source: See Table 4.5 
The structural adjustment programmes had the following core demands: radical reduction of the government spending, 
to control inflation and reduce demand for capital from developed countries, a measure that translated into cutting 
government spending on basic needs (health, education, water and other social­welfare services); liberalization of imports 
and removal of restrictions on foreign investment, to make local industry more efficient and competitive; privatization of 
state enterprises to promote efficient allocation and use of productive resources though free market mechanisms instead 
of government decree and; cutting or restraining wages and elimination of mechanisms protecting labour such as the 
minimum wage to remove what were seen as barriers to mobility of local and foreign capital and labour 
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34 
Ultimately, the magnitude of the crisis, pressure from the IMF and World Bank and 
bilateral donors, and failure of independent national efforts (mainly due to lack of funds) to 
revive the economy combined to force the government to adopt an economic recovery 
programme (ERP I) in 1986, with IMF and World Bank support. It was this interference in 
domestic decision making that led to Nyerere, while addressing diplomatic representatives 
to Tanzania in 1980 to ask “When did the IMF become an International Ministry of 
Finance? And when did nations agree to surrender to it their power of decision making? 
(Nyerere, 1980). These conditions, Standing (2004:3) argued, were extended to the 
privatization and liberalization of social policy, thereby accentuating social and economic 
insecurity. According to him, governments of poor countries lost control over their 
policymaking. 
Another feature of international institutional order during these years was the growing 
tension between the Bretton Woods Institutions and the UN­System and developing 
countries on trade governance. As the emerging countries gravitated towards the UN 
system, the developed countries increasingly relied on the IMF and World Bank to push 
their agenda. 
The escalation of developing countries’ demands for redistribution of global economic 
power which dominated international forums in 1960s and 1970s, were put to an end by 
replacing GATT with WTO and then subjecting the latter to undemocratic international 
financial agencies. While GATT acted as an instrument of trade governance and provided 
an institutional mechanism for developing countries to push for a New International 
Economic order (NIEO) and did not interfere much with domestic policies, the rules of the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) placed constraints on domestic policies. Unlike GATT, 
which was concerned mainly with tariffs and trade in manufactures, WTO rules covered 
many issues once considered the sovereign territory of governments, including industrial 
policy, farm subsidies, regulation of services and intellectual property protection 
(Standing, 2004:3). 
The WTO was dominated by the international financial agencies and big trading powers in 
setting the trade agenda and determining the outcome of negotiations. According to 
Standing, this led to what many developing countries claimed as a bias in WTO rules 
against their interests, including constraints on industrial policy and failure to tackle the 
huge subsidies rich nations pay to their farmers and industrial corporations. In general, 
there was a steady move away from what is known as the Westphalian system, which 
granted states jurisdiction over their own territory, to the new liberal cosmopolitanism, 
whereby national sovereignty is limited by institutions of a global order, set up to uphold 
liberal internationalism based on common legal norms and free trade (Standing, 2004:4). 
The result was subordination of domestic policies of developing countries to the dictates of 
global governance through international agencies working in collaboration with 
bureaucratic and technocratic­elite policy making institutions outside political decision 
making processes (Chapter 6). By discrediting politics, shrinking the role of the state, 
enhancing the independent power of technical institutions, such as central banks, other 
commercial institutions and elite dominated policy research institutions and replacing 
collective socio­economic entitlements by individual contributions, the Washington 
Consensus inculcated a sense of powerlessness and insecurity among developing countries. 
Based on the belief that public enterprises, especially monopolies, are inefficient and 
contrary to “free markets” the Washington Consensus advocated economic liberalisation 
and social policy privatization. So, governments were forced to adopt a mixed social 
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welfare provision, allowing more private competition where the public sector was once the 
sole provider, or indulging in some “public­private” partnerships. Once that step was 
taken, external pressure built up to allow foreign as well as national firms to enter the 
market. In Tanzania, this led to the state withdrawing from a commitment to provide social 
protection, leaving people to make their own arrangements. Furthermore, liberalization of 
economic activities meant transferring opportunities and power to private actors. This was 
done through removal of trade barriers, market re­regulation and privatization. This 
transfer of opportunity and power had profound consequences for socio­economic policies 
during this period. Possibilities for private actors to bypass governments (because they 
operated outside formal lines of democratic accountability) grew and corruption increased. 
The challenge was how to expand private sector and enforce compliance to broader 
national issues such as socio­economic protection. 
According to Gibbon (1992:200), one impact of neo­liberal changes was elimination of the 
question of poverty from the development agenda of most donor countries. Such concerns 
came to be seen as economically misconceived and politically weak­minded. Throughout 
this period, if poverty was mentioned at all in the discourse of the international financial 
institutions it was typically in formations which saw its mitigation arising from “trickle 
down” effects of economic growth. When studies indicated that poverty in developing 
countries had worsened under the Washington consensus package, efforts began to 
persuade the IFIs and the major industrial nations to acknowledge the importance of 
getting “poverty” back on their agenda under what came to be known as “ adjustment with 
a human face”(Unicef:1987). 
Drawing many of its ideas from the World Bank Report of 1980, “adjustment with a 
human face” was based on the belief that, since the income of the poor grows slower than 
the average income during the early phases of development, intervention to increase 
growth needed to be accompanied by measures to raise the income of those in absolute 
poverty (Gibbon, 1992:201). Policy options such as land reform, new forms of credit, 
better health and nutrition to improve physical efficiency, better education to raise 
productivity, transfers and subsidies were proposed. The target was to be in geographical 
areas where the poor are concentrated and on education and health, especially primary 
schooling and child immunisation. Macro­level policies to assist vulnerable groups, 
including increased investment in infrastructure, the productive sector and human capital 
were also encouraged. 
The debate in international fora triggered by the “adjustment with a human face” coincided 
with growing disapproval of the role of IFIs and their sponsored SAPs which influenced 
what Gibbon (1992:202), referred to as “inter­donor consensus” on social dimensions of 
structural adjustment and adoption of what came to be known as the “Social Dimension of 
Adjustment” (S.D.A) and the Programme to Mitigate Social Costs of Adjustment 
(PAMSCAD) in 1987­8. The World Bank, together with other donors, began engaging in a 
programme of activities known as “Social Dimension of Adjustment” (S.D.A) as a pro­
poor development initiative (Gibbon, 1992:193). Notwithstanding its rhetorical appeal to 
the poor, S.D.A remained entrenched in the neo­liberal prognosis or, according to Gibbon, 
“dressed in neo­liberal clothes [and] philanthropic [façade with little concern for] the 
question of politically strengthening the poor (ibid.p.201). It was governments that were 
seen as the instruments of improving the lot of the poor, via the manipulation of economic 
policy and a battery of compensatory measures. There was no discussion about how the 
poor could ensure that anti­poverty measures were taken in ways consistent with their 
interests, and as a long­term feature of national agendas. 
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Another influence of the Washington Consensus was a global restructuring of the role of 
regulation and regulations associated with erosion of the legitimacy of neo­corporatist 
governance, characterized by tripartism and various boards setting prices, wages, incomes, 
standards and procedures. The tripartite system of decisions through negotiations between 
collective labour and collective industrial capital were dismantled and statutory regulations 
restructured in favour of capital (Standing, 2004:18) adopted. The weakening of statutory 
protective regulation was accompanied by the promotion of voluntary codes of conduct 
under the guise of corporate social responsibility initiatives as alternatives to statutory 
regulation. In poor countries like Tanzania where trade unions and other civil organizations 
are weak, corporate social responsibility initiatives ended up creating unfavourable labour 
relations. Moreover, the weakening of institutions of protection of collective labour rights 
and growing pretence of protection of individual labour rights in a country with weak 
legal institutions and bureaucratic regulations (see Chapter 7) not only imprisoned workers 
to the whims of firms but also to socio­economic insecurity. 
(c) The Corporate Governance and Poverty Alleviation (2000s) 
The beginning of the new millennium was characterised by lack of a dominant 
development doctrine. Many conceptual frameworks alternated between the development 
doctrines of 1960s/1970s and those of 1980s/1990s with a continuation of the Washington 
Consensus through other forms35 . One conceptual contribution was what came to be 
known as the Growth­Inequality Poverty Nexus (G­IPN). This viewed growth as a process 
of transformation characterised by structural and institutional change. The nature of growth 
depended on the structural transformation and institutional rearrangements within which 
change took place. According to this line of thinking, growth was a necessary but not 
sufficient condition for poverty alleviation. The argument was that, growth oriented 
policies and strategies did not always lead to inclusive growth, but to polarization in terms 
of widening income differentials at the expense of the poor (Wuyts, 2008:10, 19­20). 
Inequality was considered to be a filter between growth and poverty. In addition to initial 
income distribution, the pattern of growth played a fundamental role in their impact on 
poverty. 
At international level, outcry of the devastating socio­economic impact of the World Bank 
and IMF Washington Consensus policy package and the institutional legitimacy crisis of 
these financial institutions, led to the establishment of an international advisory 
commission, known as “the Meltzer Commission” appointed in Washington in 1998 to 
assess the performance of the IMF and World Bank in the two decades of their 
involvement in the development of developing countries. The Meltzer Commission Report 
launched a devastating attack on the performance of these institutions. Among the 
conclusions were that; instead of promoting economic growth, the IMF institutionalized 
economic stagnation; the World Bank was irrelevant rather than central to the goal of 
eliminating global poverty; both institutions were to a great extent driven by the interests 
of political and economic institutions in the then G7 countries, particularly the US 
According to Standing (2004:5), while there are countervailing forces, it would be a mistake to think that the 
Washington Consensus has been a fixed set of policies or that it has been ‘discredited’ among those who subscribed to it. 
It is like a rubber ball. Hit it and it bounces back, with new nuances and buzzwords, such as social capital, safety nets, 
good governance. The evolution of the Washington Consensus shows paradigmatic consistency. Its essence remains­the 
promotion of an individualistic, market­based society geared to consumerism, in which collective bodies for universalism 
and social solidarity have no place.. 
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35 
government and financial institutions; the dynamics of both institutions drove not so much 
from the external demands of poverty alleviation or promoting growth as from internal 
bureaucratic empire building. In general, the report seemed to find little value in the 
Bretton Woods institutions and indicated that the IMF foray into macroeconomic reform 
via structural adjustment institutionalized economic stagnation, poverty and inequality in 
developing countries in the 1980s and 1990s (Berro, 2002:93). It was against this 
background that the rhetoric of anti­poverty reappeared in development policies of the 
second generation of structural adjustment programmes of the 2000s. 
At the World Bank­IMF meeting in the autumn of 1999, the extended structural adjustment 
facility (ESAF) was renamed the poverty reduction and growth facility. This was followed 
by adoption of new approach consisting of a move from an IMF centred process that had 
focused on narrow macro­economic objectives to broader inclusive process that would 
involve multiple international organizations and give national policy makers and civil 
society groups a more central role. But the new approach was, to use Berro’s phraseology, 
“suspiciously like the old one”. It continued to advocate support for market opening and 
trade liberalization. Beneath the rhetoric of anti­poverty and human development, the neo­
liberal economic model prevailed. As for the PRSP process, the preparation of the poverty 
reduction strategy papers between the IMF, World Bank and local government officials 
turned out to be nothing more than an effort to add a veneer of public participation and 
anti­poverty rhetoric to the same model emphasizing liberalization and re­regulation. 
The objectives of development were broadened in this period. Improvement in human 
development was increasingly seen as the goal. Since a case was made that less income 
and wealth inequality was conducive to growth and development, equality took its place 
along poverty alleviation as joint objectives to be reached through growth sensitive to the 
needs of the poor. The Millennium Development Goals provided a framework for strategic 
setting and monitoring progress in developing countries in their search for improved living 
standards. Another objective that informed development strategies was a call for “reduced 
vulnerability”. The main argument was that, since the poor in an era of globalization are 
more vulnerable to macroeconomic shocks it was important to adopt social security 
mechanisms against inequalities so as to reduce vulnerability (Wuyts, 2006:2­3). 
4.4 Conclusion 
This historical exploration of institutional development in Tanzania has shown two parallel 
developments. On the one hand, there were positive developments associated with colonial 
and post­colonial institutional changes that were necessary for struggles against poverty. 
These included market economy, financial institutions and services, cash­crop production, 
infrastructure and communication, urbanization, social services such as housing, education 
and health care, socio­economic security systems, socio­political institutions and 
processes, as well as transposition of egalitarian moral values and institutions of ancient 
tribal ways of life. But, those changes were accompanied by developments that became the 
breeding ground for poverty, inequality and insecurity: the distortion of modern 
institutions, institutional syncretism, primary production for global capitalist economy, 
regional and rural­urban development inequality, biased infrastructure and communication 
development in favour of urban and enclave regions, suffocation of indigenous 
entrepreneurial class, limited and discriminatory social services, discriminatory financial 
institutions and services, parasitic bureaucratic expansion, weak legal and political 
institutions, incoherent ethical standards and more unequal social groups. 
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Moreover, shifts in international institutional functioning, development doctrines and 
strategies shaped the background against which domestic policies were negotiated. 
Interacting with domestic changes, international institutions provided a context in which 
anti­poverty initiatives emerged and were sustained. 
Thus, the institutional change brought opportunities in the struggle against poverty and 
inequality, while developing new challenges towards the same efforts. Central to these 
challenges included: shifts in the conceptions and concerns of poverty, the character of the 
mode of the institutional reform, the nature of social group struggles, the ambivalence of 
the new institutional order, the character of the organization of production, and the 
conditions of poverty and corruption. These aspects constitute the main subject matter of 
the subsequent chapters. 
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___________________________________________________________________ 
Chapter 5 
The Evolution of Poverty and Inequality (1961­1985): Rhetoric and Praxis 
5.1 Early Concerns of Poverty and Inequality 
“One of the most vivid impressions which we have formed as a result of our enquiry is the 
fundamental poverty which prevails in [Tanganyika]...The output of…economy when 
related to the size of population is low both in absolute terms and by comparison with 
the output of other [territories]…we regard this fact as basic to any future agricultural 
and industrial development which may be contemplated , and we regard it as equally 
basic to any discussion of such allied matters as wages, immigration policy, capital 
creation and the expansion of social services” (East African Royal Commission 1953­
1955 Report, 1955:40­41). 
The concepts and concerns of poverty and inequality entered development policy 
discourses in Tanganyika in 1955 after the report of the East Africa Royal Commission on 
conditions of economic and social development in the territory. According to the 
Commission, the rapid rate of socio­economic and demographic development and the 
challenges these placed on land and traditional tribal economic system deemed it expedient 
to consider the conditions of development and measures needed to achieve an improved 
standard of living. In particular, measures were to address the question of enabling peasant 
farming to expand production to meet the demands of the growing population and 
struggles against poverty. The concern was how the tribal economy could be transformed 
to help overcome poverty. 
As the quotation above suggests, poverty was identified by the report as one of the main 
factors that had limited economic development and threatened future development. It 
argued: “poverty is a natural breeding ground for poverty. To some extent the same basic 
poverty sets a limit to the degree of economic development...which may be envisaged in 
the foreseeable future” (ibid, p.41). There were two main concepts of poverty reflected in 
the report used to explain the socio­economic conditions. The more obvious and 
emphasised was “basic poverty” and the less emphasised, but identified as a challenge to 
development, was “enforced poverty”. Let us examine these two and the way they were 
related to development conditions. 
5.2.1 The Basic Poverty (BP) 
“Basic poverty” of Tanganyika was defined as lack of resources necessary to meet the 
needs of the population, reflected in the low level of output relative to the size of 
population and as compared to the output of other territories (ibid, p. 40) .Two factors were 
held responsible: limited geographical products (LGP) and restrictive dual economy 
(RDE). 
(a) Limited Geographical Product (LGP) 
Basic poverty was determined by examining estimates of the geographical products­
resources available as given by nature and climatic conditions such as agricultural 
products, minerals, forest products and water resources, measured in terms of their export 
value. How much did Tanganyika produce and export relative to its population and exports 
of other territories in East Africa and beyond, constituted the basic poverty (Table 5.1). 
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Table 5.1: Comparative Net Geographical Product of East African Territories in 1952(in 
£millions) 
No. Kenya* Uganda Tanganyika 
1. Total net geographical (money) product 
(excluding subsistence activities) 
80.8a 81.2 62.0 
2. Net (money) product of commercial, agriculture, 
and other enterprises of indigenous economies 
4.7 51.1b 10.0 
3. Wages earned outside indigenous economies 13.2c 9.3d 12.8e 
4. Total money product of commercialised 
activities of indigenous economies outside 
wages (2 +3 ) 
17.9 60.4 22.8 
Source: East African Royal Commission 1953 ­1955 Report 1955:479 (Appendix IX) 
a. includes export taxes; 
b. includes export taxes and the profits of statutory marketing boards, representing income withheld 
from the producer; 
c. include cost of living allowances and the value of free rations of quarters; 
d. excludes the value of free housing; e. cash earnings plus value of free rations and values of free 
accommodation 
* Data are for 1951 
Within the territory, regions were examined on the same basis. Export enclave regions 
were compared with hinterland regions, the latter being considered poorer than the former. 
Economic zones developed by colonial economy based on climatic conditions and natural 
resource endowments became the first factors responsible for poverty and inequality. So, 
just as Tanganyika’s basic poverty was due to limited geographical products for export as 
determined by climatic conditions and natural resource endowments, so was basic poverty 
among regions. Export regions attracted colonial development and white settlement, which 
led to infrastructural development and social services provision in favour of them. The 
biased colonial development led to unequal integration into modern exchange economy 
and socio­political ways of life. The result was inequality between regions and their 
respective inhabitants. 
Therefore, the natural resource and climatic conditions of the territory determined its 
geographical products and value of its exports, which provided an indication of the state of 
poverty. Inter­regional differences in geographical products and exports led to poverty. 
The conclusion was that, limited natural resources resulted in limited geographical 
products and exports, causing poverty and inequality. This basic poverty led to limited 
investible resources, lower labour productivity, and consequently set a limit to socio­
economic development, forcing people deeper into poverty. Hence the assertion: “poverty 
a natural breeding ground for poverty”. 
(b) Restrictive Dual Economy (RDE) 
The relative economic backwardness of Tanganyika was also associated with the dual 
economic system36. Both, market economy in which activities were oriented to the earning 
of money through wage labour and /or production of goods and services for sale and 
The concept “dual economy” denote an economic system inherited from colonialism characterised by co­existence of 
two economic systems: (a) market economy in export enclaves (cash­crop producing areas and urban centres) with 
relatively modern production and export of few raw materials for processing in the factories of developed industries, and 
the imports of manufactured consumer goods. (b) Traditional subsistence economy in hinterland areas­where majority of 
population lived and worked in the traditional life producing for subsistence needs and providing cheap labour for wage 
earnings in export enclaves. For more explanation, see Seidman, Ann (1972) 
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36 
subsistence, where activities were oriented to the subsistence need only, did exist. The 
range of market activities was narrow and restricted to export enclave areas and urban 
centres. Many features associated with a modern market economy did not exist, including 
division of labour and specialization, well­functioning financial institutions, wide range of 
goods and services, potential markets and investible resources. The economy was 
predominantly subsistence, which was one of the main causes of poverty. The argument 
was that, a great proportion of resources was channelled not into relatively high income ­
producing activities for wide and specialized market but into subsistence production of 
the local community which by its nature could not yield a surplus above what was 
required to meet the subsistence necessities of life. 
It is acknowledged in the economic literature that the division of labour is limited by the 
scope of the market, and that anything which enlarges the market increases opportunities 
for more specialized production. The growth of income and living standards, which the 
division of labour through exchange made possible in other societies, were difficult in the 
tribal subsistence economy in Tanganyika. According to the Royal Commission, the 
reasons included: First, production for markets presupposes that markets exist. By contrast, 
tribal subsistence economies are economies in which development of commercial markets 
is inhibited. Second, in subsistence economies, not merely does the population live a low 
standard of life, but the nature of the economy makes it impossible to discover a route of 
escape from poverty. Third, traditional methods of land use and tribal restraints on 
departure from subsistence practices, coupled with ignorance, low technology and lack of 
resources stood in the way of any escape route. Lastly, the absence of markets which 
would make it worthwhile for peasants to specialize on any appreciable scale was an 
obstacle to the struggle against poverty. 
So, the nature of tribal organization of subsistence production not only put limit to market 
development, but was also unable to ensure to a considerable proportion of the population, 
either the income or socio­economic security. It was emphasized that it was only the 
exchange economy which could produce the wealth necessary for poverty alleviation. 
Wage earning activities outside tribal economies were low because of the non­
development of commercialized production. Money earning opportunities had not 
developed to support anti­poverty initiatives. The cause of poverty rested on the absence of 
commercialized and wage earning activities for the indigenous population. The limited 
geographical products and wage­earning activities affected productive activities in 
agriculture and industry, and consequently the value of exports was minimal. 
From the “basic poverty” perspective, the concept of poverty was based on a monetary 
indicator­ per­capita net product. Lack of resources and limited incomes were considered 
the principal sources of poverty. The solution was to raise the income of the territory 
through transformation of tribal subsistence into market economy. A measure of 
encroachment on the primitive societies by market forces was perceived vital for 
development and poverty alleviation. This was considered important in establishing 
effective way of using land and other natural resources, promotion of division of labour 
and specialization, increase geographical products and productive efficiency of agriculture 
and livestock, promotion of entrepreneurial spirit and skills, diversification of production, 
widening sources of income, ensuring sustainable economic security and provision of 
incentives for indigenous technological innovation and development. Poverty was also 
associated with lack of formal wage labour. It was a failure of the market economy and the 
tribal subsistence economy to absorb surplus labour through expansion of wage labour. 
Poor people were referred to people not engaged in wage employment to earn enough 
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income to sustain their living. The struggle against poverty was viewed as a struggle 
against unemployment. 
Because land was the principal means of tribal subsistence and the tribal land tenure 
turned to be the most resistant to market oriented land use, land reforms became the 
focus of the colonial government. Many reforms stressed the need to move away from the 
tribal control of land tenure and ownership and encourage market land tenure system. 
However, the shift from tribal to market tenure system was encouraged without 
realizing that the better technical use of natural resources could not emerge unless 
production was enabled to shift from a subsistence to an exchange basis. The question 
then was: What institutional reforms were necessary to enable the subsistence economy to 
be transformed into an exchange economy? Finding solutions to this question became a 
major concern of post­independent government. 
5.2.2 Enforced Poverty (EP) 
“Enforced poverty” was defined as dispossession of, and limited access to, resources and 
other necessities of life due to the functioning of a particular institutional order. According 
to this view, the main factors which laid the breeding ground for poverty and inequality 
was not insufficient resources and income, but the character of modes of wealth 
accumulation and the accompanying restrictive tendencies of both tribal subsistence and 
colonial market economy. 
The process of dissolving subsistence, for example, had consequences that perpetuated 
poverty. The tribal economy endeavoured to afford to its members an acceptable form of 
socio­economic security appropriate to the subsistence social conditions under which the 
people lived. Commercialization of economic activities made it possible for the indigenous 
population to attain higher standards of life than would have been possible, but it did not 
necessarily guarantee the majority the minimum socio­economic security needed for a 
decent life. The transformation through land reform and other measures constituted a threat 
to economic and social security. 
Furthermore, the restrictive effects of tribal subsistence rested mostly on its socio­political 
organization, the age, sex and generation system associated with marginalisation of youth, 
women and children; traditional land use system; communal ownership; narrow and 
restricted range of economic activities; limited division of labour; limited wealth 
accumulation and; fragile socio­economic security. Colonial market economy was based 
on exploitative and unequal mode of wealth accumulation: raw material production for 
export; cash­crop production on few regions; suffocation of indigenous entrepreneurs; low 
wages; taxation; biased infrastructural and communication development favouring export 
enclaves and urban centres; unequal integration of regions into modern socio­economic 
and political systems and; limited access to decision making. All these created a breeding 
ground for poverty and inequality. 
Recognition of these threats and the dilemma which emerges when it is desired to enable 
the indigenous population to raise their standard of life, and to avoid the harmful effects of 
social disintegration that accompanies the break­up of the tribal order of socio­economic 
security, was fundamental in post­independence development initiatives and struggles 
against poverty. It was also feared that, if the process of change created new problems of 
adaptation for the people affected, it could also increase demand to more resources with 
which to deal with those problems, diverting them from economic activities. Throughout 
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this period, poverty signified both a limited access to resources and an incapacity to 
produce other basic necessities of life. Its conception went beyond an insufficiency of 
resources by taking into account how resources were made unavailable and insufficient to 
a particular group due to the limited accessibility caused by the functioning of an 
institutional order in which struggles took place. Thus, to be poor was seen as not just 
having less than others, but also as being deprived of the means of securing more. 
5.3 Post­Independence Period (1961­1985) 
5.3.1 The Immediate Post­independence Initiatives (1961­1966) 
Tanzania attained independence with the majority of people living in extreme poverty. 
Very few Tanzanians participated in the market economy and although some cash­crop 
farming existed, very few substantial indigenous commercial farmers existed. Many parts 
of the country were dominated by subsistence economy and were predominantly 
agricultural. Table 5.2 shows that agriculture accounted for 59 % of gross domestic 
product in 1961; by contrast the manufacturing sector provided only 3.6% . Other 
sectors of transport, construction, mining, commerce and public utilities (electricity and 
water supply), and services were also very small. This economic structure of 
predominantly agricultural output supporting few other small sectors to meet local 
requirements, produced only a bare living for the majority. Since population, stood at 9.4 
millions, per capita income was just £21, which put Tanzania firmly among the world’s 
poorest countries (Silver, 1984:72). 
Table 5.2: Gross domestic product at factor cost and current prices, 1961 
Sector £ ‘000’ Percentage (%) 
Agriculture 114,087 59.0 
Commerce 22,239 11.5 
Services 20,582 10.6 
Transports 8,585 4.4 
Rents 8,377 4.3 
Manufacturing 6,958 3.6 
Construction 5,840 3.0 
Mining 5,476 2.8 
Public U utilities 1,360 0.7 
Total* 193,504 100.0 
Source: Silver (1984:72). * Figures may not sum to the total because of rounding. 
Other indicators (Table 5.3) show a similar picture. Average life expectancy at birth was 
35 years, with an infant mortality rate of 190. Percentages of children enrolled in primary 
and secondary schools were 25 and 2 respectively, while the adult literacy rate was only 
10%. 
Table 5.3: Selected indicators of development in Tanganyika (1960/61) 
Indicators 1960/61 
A. Population ( millions) 
Population growth 
Average life expectancy at birth 
Infant mortality rate 
8.8 
2.7 
35 
190 
B. GDP (US$ millions) 
Agriculture (%) 
Industry (%) 
Services (%) 
550 
57 
11 
32 
C. Education 
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Primary school enrolment (%) 
Secondary school enrolment (%) 
Adult literacy rate (%) 
25 
2 
10 
D. Labour Force (%) 
In agriculture (%) 
In industry (%) 
In services (%) 
54 
89 
4 
7 
Source: World Bank (1981, 1984) 
(a) The Declaration of War against Poverty 
Soon after independence, the TANU leadership declared poverty a development problem 
which the government was to declare war against and devote its resources. Poverty, 
ignorance, disease and corruption, became the chief national enemies. The declaration was 
a formal introduction of poverty into development policy circles with direct link to 
education and health as basic social services to be guaranteed to all citizens. The 
conception of poverty as a national enemy introduced a “collective or communal” concept 
of poverty and a militaristic view of struggles against poverty in national development 
initiatives. Poverty was viewed as a problem and enemy of “all” requiring efforts of “all”, 
hence “the war against poverty”. 
It was acknowledged that poverty was the breeding environment for other enemies (disease 
and ignorance) and it was by defeating poverty that the nation could defeat the others. 
Poverty became the central focus of development initiatives after independence. The party 
and government shifted attention from war against colonial rule to war against poverty. 
However, the question was how this could be fought successfully, given the socio­
economic and political circumstances at independence. Two options were available for 
TANU and its government: to fight poverty through free market economy with private 
initiatives and minimum government intervention or, through modified tribal subsistence 
and collective initiatives with maximum government intervention. Development 
circumstances forced the government to accept continuation of the inherited colonial dual 
system with free market economy providing a mode of wealth creation and accumulation 
and regulating relations in the production process in urban and cash­crop areas, while tribal 
subsistence was left to organize production in most rural areas. However, this was to go 
with institutional reforms as a way of setting the ground for an alternative mode of wealth 
creation and regulation of production relations to be applied to all parts of the country. 
(b) The Market Economy and Poverty Alleviation 
Adoption of a market economy meant that poverty was to be associated with individual 
unemployment and the war against it was to be fought through expansion of production 
and formal wage earning and transformation of tribal subsistence into a market economy. 
Hence the war against poverty became a war against unemployment. As a consequence of 
the centrality of unemployment, the government adopted various institutional reforms and 
policies aimed at (among other things) expanding formal wage­earning activities through 
expansion of public services, industrial activities, encouraging workers to settle 
permanently in towns and increasing minimum wages (Pratt, 1976:216). 
The most important development initiatives during this period were embodied in the 
Three­Year Development Plan of 1961­64 and the more coherent and ambitious First 
Five Year Development Plan (FFYP) of 1964/65 ­1968/69. The thrust of these plans was 
rapid economic growth. More specifically, the enhancement of production in industry and 
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agriculture constituted the central objective of the FFYP. Some of the major targets of the 
latter were : an increase in per capita from sh.392/­ in 1960/2 to sh.586 in 1970 and over 
sh.900/­ by 1980; growth of product was set at 6.7%; to make Tanzanian self­sufficient 
in manpower in all economic fields and at professional levels; to increase the number of 
wage earners from 340,000 in 1960/2 to 800,000 in 1980 implying an increase of wage 
earners from about 3.4% of the population to 5.7%. Half of the employment was to be in 
agriculture by 1980 and; to raise the life expectancy from 35 to about 40 and 50 years 
through (among other things) the reduction of infant mortality (Rutman, 1968:30). 
If one examines the economic indices between 1961 and 1966 there seems no obvious 
malaise necessitating adoption of radical institutional reforms and policy changes in 1967. 
Increase in economic growth accompanied by expansion in industrial and agricultural 
production, wages and wage­earning activities and, improvement in welfare indicated, not 
only a progress in meeting some development targets, but also an improvement in levels of 
living compared to the situation at independence. So, what went wrong? 
Rweyemamu (1973:46) identified two aspects of development associated with growing 
poverty and inequality alongside the above mentioned development which could have 
necessitated changes in 1967: unequal resource allocation and social differentiation. Let us 
examine these in relation to economic growth, employment, wage earnings and socio­
economic security. 
(i) Economic growth and performance 
By 1966 real output was growing at 4.8% (at 1960­2 price base) and 5.8% at current prices 
although GDP increased at 6.7% per annum as planned. In 1965 there was slowing of the 
rate to1.8% in 1965. GDP at current prices (factor cost) rose at an annual rate of about 
7.1% reaching Tshs. 5,444 millions in 1966. The non­agricultural sector, particularly 
manufacturing, continued to expand. Agriculture’s contribution to GDP (at factor cost) 
which averaged 59% during 1961 to 1964 declined in 1965 to 54% and in 1966 to 53%. 
National income at current prices rose fairly from 1962, except for the 1965 slowdown, at 
an average annual rate of about 6.7% to Tsh. 5,003 million in 1966, or roughly Tsh.505 per 
capita (Table 5.4) 
Table 5.4: Gross Domestic Products (at factor cost) and National incomes at Current prices ­
1961­1966 (Values in Millions of Tshs) 
GDP at Current prices 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 
Agriculture 2282 2,485 2,787 2,805 2,651 2,905 
Mining 109 103 88 121 121 141 
Manufacturing 139 154 156 194 134 283 
Construction 117 122 124 154 151 172 
Transport 172 188 188 197 216 247 
Public utilities ( Electricity& 
Water) 
27 30 32 35 37 48 
Commerce 445 484 517 600 658 766 
Rent 167 175 187 222 246 267 
Other services 412 448 468 509 580 615 
Total GDP at Current Prices 3,870 4,189 4,547 4,837 4,894 5,444 
GDP at 1960 prices 3,543 3,796 3,932 4,194 4,271 4,645 
National Income at Current 
prices 
3,622 3,924 4,222 4,517 4,565 5,003 
Annual growth rate (%) 
GDP at Current Prices( at 4.5 8.2 8.5 6.4 1.2 11.2 
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factor costs) 
GDP at 1960 prices (at factor 
costs) 
­4.3 7.1 3.6 6.7 1.8 8.8 
National Income at Current 
prices 
5.0 8.3 7.6 7.0 1.1 9.6 
Source: IMF: Surveys of African economies (1969), vol.2, p. 213 
Estimates of the growth in manufacturing production (Table 5.5) shows the net output of 
the sector, at constant prices, to have increased between 1960 and 1961 at the rapid rate 
of 23.9%. Other industrial sectors experienced lower growth over this period, the annual 
average compound growth rates for the mining and quarrying industry being 0.2%, 
electricity and water 4.5%, and the construction industry only 1.8%. The large 
agricultural sector grew at 4.8% per annum between 1961 and 1965, with transport 
growing at an annual average of 4.7% and commerce, rent and services at 5.2%. This 
rapid growth in output of the manufacturing sector relative to the growth in other sectors 
was reflected in the change in relative contribution of manufacturing to GDP at current 
prices over the period. The percentage contribution of manufacturing to GDP in 1961 
was only 3.6%, but this had more than doubled to 7.6% by 1965. Thus manufacturing 
real net output increased at a faster rate (8.9% per annum) than GDP (5.1% per annum) 
over the period 1961 to 1965. The industrial sector accounted for 10.1% in 1961 but it rose 
to about 14.1% 1965 (Silver, 1984:133). 
Table 5.5: Gross domestic product* at factor cost and constant prices (1960­1965) 
Sector Net output to constant prices, Tshs. million 
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 
Agriculture, hunting, 
forestry & fishing 
2,256 2,047 2,171 2,232 2,517 2,471 
Mining & Quarrying 104 111 105 87 97 112 
Manufacturing & 
handicrafts 
109 135 146 158 168 190 
Constructions 91 111 113 114 114 119 
Electricity & Water 25 26 29 29 30 31 
Transport, storage & 
communications 
175 174 186 182 202 209 
Commerce, rent & services 941 961 1,030 1,027 1,115 1,179 
Total 3,701 3,544 3,796 3,951 4,209 4,324 
Source: Silver (1984:111). * Includes subsistence and money sector 
Notwithstanding general relative growth of industrial production and establishments this 
period witnessed a fall in price and relative slow growth in the output of the sisal 
industry (the major employment­providing industry) which made a substantial 
contribution to the relatively poor performance in the agricultural processing sector and 
consequent decline in employment in this sector (Table 5.6). 
Table 5.6: Total employment in major agricultural estate Industries, 1962­1966 
Estate Industry 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 
Sisal 117,898 94,537 96,396 76,493 64,593 
Tea 19,239 14,900 13,882 11,757 12,106 
Coffee 15,958 12,713 13,823 13,616 14/93 
Sugar 8,704 8,275 8,442 8,739 8,758 
Sub­Total 161,799 130,425 132,543 110,605 100,440 
Agriculture 192,924 155,506 153,410 127,336 114,319 
Percentage (%) 83.9 83.9 86.4 86.9 87.9 
Source: Seidman (1972 :185). 
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The share of subsistence incomes in national income (Table 5.8) declined from 37% in 
1961 to 30% in 1966, while the monetary incomes of rural households rose from 16% to 
18%. This trend indicated the increasing monetization of the economy through production 
for the market (IMF, 1969:213). Therefore, according to Rweyemamu (1973), though GDP 
in current prices increased at the 6.7% per annum as planned, real income lagged behind 
real output at a growth rate of 3.5%. Assuming a 2.5% rate of population growth, real 
income per capita seems to have increased at an average of 1% per annum. 
As noted, the rapid growth in manufacturing went with declining agricultural production 
and growing unemployment. Given this anomaly it is imperative to examine the growth in 
employment and wage earning in relation to poverty and inequality. 
(ii) Employment and Wage Earning 
Employment expansion and increase in wages in many sectors were the major aspects in 
resource allocation as a way of improving workers’ levels of living due to the fact that 
African wages had been kept usually low by the colonial administration. This was in line 
with the Keynesian thinking dominant at that time, which associated poverty with lack of 
wage employment. There was remarkable increase in localization of the senior and middle 
grade civil service (Table 5.7) from 26.1% in 1961 to 71.8% in 1966. 
ST 
Table 5.7: Localization of the senior and middle grade civil service as at 31 December 1968 
Citizenship of 
officers 
1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 
Tanzanian Citizens 1170 1821 2469 3083 3951 4364 4937 6208 
Foreigner Citizens 3282 2902 2580 2306 2001 1710 1817 1619 
Total Number of 
Officers 
4452 4723 5049 5389 5962 6074 6754 7827 
Percentage of 
Localization (%) 
26.1 38.5 48.9 57.2 66.3 71.8 73.1 79.3 
Source: Second Five Year Plan: Economic and Social Development. 1st July 1969­30th June 1974.p.24 
In terms of employment in agriculture and related sectors, Table 5.8 shows that the bulk of 
the population remained engaged in subsistence activities. According to the IMF 
(1969:237), under­employment and disguised unemployment which characterised the 
subsistence sector were wide­spread in the mid 1960s. There was also a declining in 
employment of about 80,000 persons during the period, indicating a growth in 
unemployment. Many seasonal and casual labourers who constituted a significant 
proportion (about 25%) of total employment lost their jobs. There was an indication that 
increase in urban unemployment was partly based on the fact that not all those who lost 
jobs as casual labourers in agriculture and non­agriculture sectors were re­absorbed into 
subsistence sector. According to Silver (1984:208), the dismissed employees either 
returned to peasant farming where productivity was low or remained unemployed in urban 
areas. 
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Table 5.8: Net output of private Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing, 1965 & 1966 (in millions 
of Tshs) 
1965 Crop 
production 
Livestock Forestry Fishing Total 
Subsistence 1,033.0 277.0 33.0 10.0 1,353.0 
Smallholder 680.0 122.0 23.0 40.0 865.0 
Estate 374.0 ­ ­ ­ 374.0 
Total 2,087.0 399.0 56.0 50.0 2,592.0 
1966 Crop 
production 
Livestock Forestry Fishing Total 
Subsistence 1,160.0 311.0 33.0 11.0 1,515.0 
Smallholder 757.0 142.0 23.0 60.0 982.0 
Estate 347.0 ­ ­ ­ 347.0 
Total 2,264.0 453.0 56.0 71.0 2,844.0 
Source: Extracted from IMF: Surveys of African Economies, vol.2, p. 218 
Furthermore, while employment in manufacturing increased faster than employment in 
other sectors at an average rate of 5% in 1961 to 8% in 1965, the growth of employment in 
this sector did not favour all regions (Table 5.9). In 1961 one­third of African employees 
worked in Dar es Salaam, by 1965 nearly half of all employees in manufacturing were in 
the region. In general, by 1965, 87.2% of all employees in manufacturing were engaged in 
four export enclave regions of Dar es Salaam, Coast, Northern, Tanga and Lake. About 
72.8% of African employees in this sector were concentrated in these four regions at 
independence. 
Table 5. 9: Regional distribution of manufacturing employees, 1961, 1965 and 1972 
Region Africans 1961 All employees 1965 All employees 1972 
Number % Number % Number % 
Dar es salaam & 
Coast 
5,869 33.6 12,528 48.7 27,432 49.5 
Northern 2,479 14.2 3,292 12.8 6,391 11.5 
Tanga 2,331 13.3 4.032 15.7 4,438 8.0 
Lake 2,048 11.7 2,580 10.0 6,962 12.6 
Eastern 1,649 9.4 852 3.3 3,328 6.0 
Western 1,526 8.7 538 2.1 746 1.3 
Southern Highlands 515 2.9 723 2.8 1,508 2.7 
Southern 449 2.6 535 2.1 1,728 3.1 
Central 376 2.2 354 1.4 243 0.4 
West lake 142 1.4 305 1.2 2,613 4.7 
Total 17,484 100.0 25,929 100.0 55,389 100.0 
Source: Silver (1984:148) 
Marked changes took place in the sex composition of manufacturing employees during 
this period. In 1962, for example, manufacturing employed 1,598 African women, 194 
non­African and 1,204 African young persons under the age of 18. By 1965, the number 
of females and young employees had fallen substantially­774 female citizens; 242 young 
citizens and 167 young and female non­citizens. In 1962, female and young employees 
made up 10.7% of manufacturing employees; however, by 1965 this had fallen to 4.5% 
(Silver, 1984:147­148) 
In terms of wage earnings, there was growing inequality within manufacturing and 
between it and other sectors, resulting from the disparity and decline in employment. 
While the majority of employees lost their jobs the total annual wage bill rose steadily 
during the period with the total share of compensation of employees increasing in absolute 
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amount and as a share of national income. In 1961, total compensation of employees 
amounted to Tshs. 1,080 million or about 30% of national income; in 1966 it amounted to 
Tshs. 1, 545 million or 31% of national income. This indicated that the remaining wage 
earners acquired a significant share of the meager increase in real per capita income 
(Rweyemamu, 1973:52). According to him, between 1961 and 1966 wages rose by 80%, 
while prices rose by 11%, resulting in a real income gain for wage earners. This was in 
addition to welfare benefits which they had come to enjoy since independence such as 
severance pay, employment security provisions, fringe and annual benefits and provident 
fund contributions. 
Thus, wage increments were not shared equally by wage earners because wage increase 
went with massive lay­offs in agriculture particularly sisal industry as well as general fall 
of employment in other sectors. Furthermore, workers in large enterprises, mainly 
subsidiaries of multi­national corporations where the national workers unions concentrated 
their demands, were able to obtain minimum wages of upwards of shs 330/­ per month 
while workers in smaller establishments obtained only half as much or less (Rweyemamu, 
1973:53). There was also a continued discrepancy of pay scales among the regions as well 
as different sectors of the economy. The rise in wages in agriculture was less than in other 
sectors and if increase is considered on regional basis, it seems to have concentrated 
largely on export enclave areas and more on people employed in Dar es Salaam and 
Tanga­ while wages in other regions rose comparatively little (Table 5.10). 
Table 5.10: Trend of monthly legal minimum wages for regular employees aged 18 + in 
shillings between 1957 and 1975 
Year Date effective Coverage Dar & Other Rest of the 
Tanga urban areas country 
1957 1 April All regular employees in Dar, 
excluding Tanga 
82 ­ ­
1963 1 January All regular employees excluding 150 125 100 
Plantation agriculture, old 
mining &tea industry 
1964 1 September Tailoring , garment­making and 155 ­ ­
associated trades in Dar exc. 
Tanga: unskilled workers & 
apprentice tailor 170 ­ ­
1965 1 June Regular employees in non­
plantation agriculture & 
­ ­ 80 
gold mining & tea industry (exc. 
domestics) 
­ ­ 100 
1965 1 November Wholesale and retail trade: 
labourers, etc, 
180 155 130 
clerks, shop assistants 230 205 180 
1967 1 August Domestic employees: gardeners 
and ayahs, 
170 145 120 
watchmen and indoor staffs 180 155 130 
chauffeurs 250 225 200 
1969 1 July All regular employees, 170 145 120 
excluding Plantation agriculture, 
old mining & tea industry 
1972 1 July All regular employees 240 240 140 
1974 1 May All regular employees 340 340 200 
1975 1 May All regular employees 380 380 230 
Source: Silver (1984:177) 
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One result of these wage differentials, according to Rweyemamu (1973:53) was the 
anomaly created whereby equal work yielded different rewards to workers. Although he 
did not explain the main cause of the anomaly, one explanation would be that of workers’ 
differential institutional capacity and positioning within the economy. This influenced their 
capacity to influence wage policies, resource allocation and negotiation capabilities in 
labour relations. Inequality existed also between a class of senior civil servants and senior 
managers in industry (who had inherited a “European’s salary structure) and lower civil 
servants. The former enjoyed employment security and had access to public utilities and 
credit facilities as compared to the latter group. 
There was also increase in unemployment due to the rise of school leavers. But the school 
leavers’ problem was complicated by its regional inequality incidence. Owing to the 
government’s decision to hand over primary schools to district councils in mid 1960s, then 
two problems according to Rweyemamu (1973:53­54) arose: First, there was variations 
in the number of school leavers due to differentials in the district’s per capita expenditure 
on education due to poor economy and education infrastructure as a result of colonial 
legacy. Second, the school leaver problem was potentially explosive in export enclave 
regions that were also highly represented in the civil service and in senior positions. These 
problems created the possibility for civil servants and politicians from highly represented 
regions to manipulate the selection procedures and education policies to maintain the status 
quo. As Art van der Laar argued after observation of the nature of growth and income 
distribution in the country in 1967, “…therefore, those who largely at public expense have 
received their education which brought them to the position of power in the government, 
subsequently have the opportunity to perpetuate the oligarchy” (cited in Rweyemamu, 
1973:54). 
These factors fostered great income differentiations among the workers depending upon 
size, sector and region. The situation was also supported by the employment policy which 
was directed towards the creation of a small, comparatively higher wage, employed 
population than large one at lower wages. During the period there were significant indices 
of social differentiation among urban­workers and peasants. The rural sector was also 
undergoing differentiation between smallholder peasants producing for subsistence and 
limited cash crops and an emerging kulak class with large farm holdings employing labour 
for profit (Rweyemamu, 1973:54). Another problem in rural areas was growth of what 
Hyden (1980:86) called “patronage politics” in which party members and bureaucrats 
created private fiefs, and in turn were influenced by the demands of their peasant 
clients. If peasant resistance to economic change was an obstacle to rural 
transformation, Fieldhouse (1986:179) agued, such a socio­political system was a threat 
to the power of TANU as the dominant force in a centralised socialist state. The need for 
neutralization of alternative power centres, particularly dilution of the political influence of 
the rural petty bourgeoisie, was inevitable (Hyden, 1980:105). 
5.3.2 Ujamaa Period (1967­1985) 
By 1967, the country was moving along a development path in which the benefits of 
institutional and policy changes were enjoyed by a small privileged group. Urban 
development had prospered at the expense of the countryside, a worrying factor in view of 
the absolute and relative size of the latter. The assumptions of past reforms and policy 
changes which relied on financial resources (money) as major instrument of 
development, emphasis on industries as a way of expanding wage­earning and as a 
consequence, concentration of resources on urban development were perceived by the 
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leaders as inadequate in promoting economic growth and fighting poverty (Rweyemamu, 
1973:58). As a result, a widespread disapproval of capitalist production emerged among 
leaders, alleging it was perpetuating poverty, inequality and socio­economic insecurity. A 
need for reforms to promote agriculture and rural development was required. The Arusha 
Declaration and Ujamaa became part of leadership responses to that. 
(a) Arusha Declaration and Ujamaa 
The Declaration charted a new course of development under Ujamaa ideology emphasizing 
the creation of egalitarian and democratic society under two principles: Socialism and Self­
reliance. Socialism was defined to mean the absence of exploitation; the workers’ and 
peasants’ ownership of the major means of production and exchange, and the 
establishment of a political democracy. Self­reliance, on the other hand, entailed 
dependency upon the people, land, good policies and good leadership, as opposed to 
financial resources which was central in the pre­Ujamaa period. 
As discussed in Chapter 4, Ujamaa was a reflection of the socio­cultural life of African 
society. According to Bryceson (1993:12), the leadership believed that development could 
only be realized through the transformation of the peasantry socio­economic system, but 
that this had to be done with a peasantry which superseded its narrow local identity. 
Sensitive to the egalitarian values of the peasantry, she argued, the leaders adopted ujamaa, 
which translated the “kin”, associated with the narrow, local identity of the peasants into 
the “national identity” of the national­state. The egalitarian exchange taking place amongst 
kin was therefore posited as perfectly feasible and natural at the level of the national state. 
Thus, apart from being an economic philosophy, ujamaa carried with it the socio­cultural 
values and principles of African society. The challenge was how to extend these traditional 
values to the modern political and economic setting. The transposition of these socio­
cultural values into a modern socio­economic and political system through the Arusha 
Declaration in 1967 became one of the mechanisms. 
The main argument was that in those “kin­”based societies, individuals and families were 
rich or poor according to whether the whole tribe was rich or poor. A person depended on 
the wealth possessed by the community of which he was a member. Community 
membership was a guarantee of protection against poverty and insecurity. This is vital to 
understanding the way in which poverty was perceived and fought during ujamaa. 
(i) Wage labour and Poverty Alleviation 
In tribal life, wage labour was never considered an important means for access to 
community wealth and services; after all, it never existed. Therefore, wage­employment in 
whatever manifestation could not be the best alternative means to life under Ujamaa. Wage 
was neither necessary nor sufficient condition for human development. This tribal concern 
against wage­earning activities coupled with increasing inequality and insecurity were 
attributed to two factors: first, erosive impact of exchange economy on moral basis and 
institutions of tribal extended family system through its compelling motives for individual 
wealth acquisition; second, government’s wrong focus on struggles against poverty 
through promotion of wage labour or believing that money was the basis of development 
(Arusha Declaration­Part III). Furthermore, emphasis on wage­earning implied that 
poverty was perceived as “destitution”­lack of resources (money) to sustain physical needs. 
The government and TANU leaders believed that poverty was not a question of destitution, 
but deprivation of resources necessary for human life and dignity. Poverty was perceived 
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as an enforced state of inequality and insecurity resulting from exploitation of man by man 
and this was attributed to capitalist institutions and market economy. According to 
Nyerere, capitalism bred poverty, inequality and insecurity. Poverty was not only lack of 
resources and other means for obtaining the necessities of life, but also the reason for 
exploitation. To fight poverty was to fight exploitation; not unemployment or 
unavailability of basic necessities alone, for their absence or existence was not natural but 
created in the course of production of wealth. Therefore, struggles against poverty were 
associated with struggles against “exploitation” and part of the solution was to 
institutionalize equality in access to resources and other basic necessities of life and 
universal socio­economic security. 
(ii) Institutionalization of Equality and Resource Accessibility 
Several institutional and policy reforms followed adoption of Ujamaa and the Arusha 
Declaration37 . The leadership had decided that government and people must work for 
economic growth in a manner which would bring benefit to all and provide basic needs to 
all (SFYP, 1969: viii). For the first time, Tanzania became a pioneer among African 
countries in adopting as a central theme of the development strategy, the development of 
man by meeting his/her basic needs. In this context, a number of institutional reforms and 
policy measures were adopted of which the most important and far reaching consequences 
on future socio­economic development of the country were a leadership code of ethics and 
anti­capitalist socialization, the nationalization of the major means of production, the 
villagisation of the rural population and expansion and provision of social services 
including education, health and water supply to rural areas (Kaijage and Tibaijuka, 
1996:42). 
(iii) Leadership Code of Ethics and Public Morality 
Because of the centrality of “good leadership” and “equality” in the recipe for self­reliance, 
a rather stringent leadership code was adopted. Leadership rule was introduced as a 
mechanism of enforcing a socialist­oriented leadership ethic. It specifically aimed at 
preventing leaders and civil servants from engaging in private economic activities and 
accumulating wealth while in office. This was seen as a measure for ensuring leadership 
morality and fighting corruption and inequality. Efforts to ensure leadership morality were 
accompanied by reinforcement of feelings against capitalist institutions and actions as a 
way of creating the “state of mind” among Tanzanians which could support Ujamaa 
principles of morality. It was believed that the creation of pro­Ujamaa moral life could not 
be achieved without creating an anti­Capitalist “state of mind”. This was done by 
socializing people against capitalist (market economic) institutions, transforming some into 
Ujamaa institutions, undermining or allowing them to operate under strict control of the 
government or abolishing them altogether. 
(iv) Nationalization 
Nationalization of private (mostly foreign owned) enterprises embodied both growth and 
equity considerations. The main aims were: first, to mobilize surplus resources generated 
by the nationalized enterprises in order to enhance the productive capacity of the 
Most of practical measures were stipulated in the Second Five Year Development Plan (SFYP) of 1969 to 1974, an 
Interim Development Strategy (IDS) of mid­1974 to 1976 and, the Third Five Year Development Plan (TFYP) of late 
1976 to 1978. 
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37 
economy( Kaijage and Tibaijuk, 1996:42); second , to secure ownership of capital and 
use it and the surplus it generated to meet society’s needs; third, to limit various forms of 
income drain associated with foreign dominated market economy and; lastly, to reallocate 
the surplus from export of investment income, invisible payments and conspicuous 
consumptions to serve the requirements of primary accumulation as well as to alter the 
structure of investment such as choice of techniques, sectoral distribution and employment 
in order to meet national priorities( Rweyemamu, 1973:62) particularly, equal 
redistribution of social benefits. 
(b) Institutionalization of Socio­economic Security 
(i) Social Security System 
The form of modern Social Protection adopted by the government after independence and 
expanded during Ujamaa was Social Security.38The origin and development of formal 
social security system in Tanzania dates back to colonial period. As discussed in Chapter 4, 
the introduction of modern economy, administrative system and urban settlements forced 
the colonial government to introduce some social security institutions mainly protecting 
expatriates against some social contingencies (Dau, 2003:25, Mchonvu et al., 2002:23, 
Tostensen, 2004:3). They included the Master and Native Ordinance of 1923, as amended 
in 1954, the Provident Fund Ordinance of 1942, the Government Employers Provident 
Fund Cap.51 of 1948 as amended in 1962, the Local Authority Provident Fund Cap. 53 of 
1944 and the Workmen’s Compensation Ordinance Cap. 262 of 1948 as amended in 1963 
(Dau, 2003:26). Social security services provided under these institutions included old age 
pensions, compensation payments to workers injured while performing their duties, and 
provision of health and education services. 
So, formal social security was initiated by the colonial administration and was not the 
result of pressure from African workers (Bossert, 1987 cited by Mchonvu et al., 2002:23). 
It was initially adopted as part of the extension of imperial social security system to 
expatriates working in the colony and later as an obligation to international human right 
instruments.39Thus, in practice, social security was State­based, foreign and paternal, and 
modelled on European experiences catering for few people in the modern sector of the 
colonial economy (Tostensen, 2004:4). Its service was discriminatory and in the eyes of 
many Africans “a statutory social privilege” rather than “a human right”. 
38 
According to Standing (2007), social protection broadly signifies the full range of protective transfers, services, and 
institutional safeguards supposed to protect the population at risk of being in need, while Social security covers the 
State­based system of entitlements linked to what are often called contingency risks. Much of the literature on social 
security in Tanzania has defined social security as the protection provided by society to its members through public 
measures against the economic and social distress which otherwise would be caused by the stoppage or reduction of 
earnings arising from contingencies. Examples of contingencies include sickness, employment injury and occupational 
disease, maternity, old age, invalidity, death and unemployment. However, there is a consensus that such a definition 
does not adequately fit the context of developing countries such as Tanzania where the majority depend on a variety of 
traditional and informal social protection schemes associated with the extended family and other new systems of social 
organization (Mchonvu et al., 2002:13; Dau, 2003:25). 
39 The Article 22 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of the 10th December 1948 which emphasized States’ 
obligation to ensure that every member of society has the right to social security to cover all the main contingencies of 
life; the ILO Convention No. 102 of 1952, which emphasises among other things the extension of a comprehensive 
social security measures of a universal nature and; Article 9 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights from 1966 which recognises the right of everyone to social security, including social insurance (Mchonvu 
et al., 2002:17; Kulke, 2007:120; Dau, 2003:25). 
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The post­independence government inherited the system but made amendments, 
introducing new institutions as a way of extending formal social security to African 
workers so as to supplement the traditional extended family forms of security. They 
included: the Statutory Severance Allowance of 1962, the National Provident Fund Act of 
1964 amended in 1975; the Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania of 1977 and; 
the Parastatal Pensions Fund Act No. 14 of 1978 (Dau, 2003:26). Major changes took 
place after adoption of Ujamaa in 1967. With support from ILO and other agencies and 
donor countries, Tanzania became one of the champions of universal social protection 
beyond the confinements of ILO’s social security concept. The right to social security was 
extended from social insurance for workers as established during colonialism and 
immediate post independence period to new forms of social security schemes which 
included other citizens as well. Under Ujamaa the right to social security became a 
fundamental right of everyone as a member and part of human society. Apart from social 
security schemes other measures such as villagisation and free Basic Needs Provision were 
introduced to institutionalize universal social protection. 
(ii) Villagisation 
Embodying growth and equality as its central objectives, Villagization (involving 
resettlement of peasants previously living in dispersed homesteads) was justified by three 
arguments: first, it would make possible for economies of scale to be reaped in the 
provision of social services and in the organization of co­operative agricultural production 
and provision of technical services; second, it would enhance political organization and 
democratic participation ( Kaijage and Tibaijuka, 1996:43) and; lastly, it would provide 
institutional protection for social and economic inequalities and insecurities. 
To avoid class differentiations which had emerged among peasants (as they became 
engaged in expanding private cash­crop production) Ujamaa villages were organized in 
the form of the old­traditions of tribal living, involving working together and sharing the 
proceeds. Defined as co­operative production units, they were identified as institutions for 
socialist and rural transformation. They also operated on the principles of extended family 
as a way of providing socio­economic security. As a form of socio­economic security 
system, Ujamaa Village co­operative production and life, endeavoured to combine the 
benefits of both statist­universal basic needs provision and traditional systems of social 
protection through extended families. Thus, villages became the focal points of universal 
socio­economic security in rural areas. 
(iii) Basic Needs Provision 
The expansion of social services (education, health and water in particular) was by far the 
major thrust of the anti­poverty and insecurity policy, which dominated government 
activity in this period. In the field of education and training, a policy of education for self­
reliance was translated into action through adult literacy campaigns in the 1970s, 
expansion of primary education which culminated in adoption of universal primary 
education policy in 1977 and expansion of secondary and tertiary education. In the field of 
health, a strategy of universal primary health care was adopted resulting in the expansion 
of rural dispensaries and health centres all over the countryside. With regard to water 
supply, the target was universal coverage by 1990 (Kaijage and Tibaijuka, 1996:43). Other 
measures adopted included introduction of subsidies, entitlement and allowance system; 
provision of transport, food( breakfast and lunch), children’s socio­economic support 
(four children per every worker); affordable housing; recreation (sports, dancing, and 
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ensembles); clothing ( uniforms) ; paid leave; hardship loan; provision of farm inputs; 
adoption of equitable income and price policy and availability of credit services through 
banks and co­operatives; continuation of payment of salaries at times of illness and paid 
maternity leave and; provision of family allowances and tax relief for employed couples 
(SFYP, p. 12& 36; Kiragu and Mukandala, 2005:218; Mchonvu et al., 2002:24) 
These measures were implemented through Ujamaa Extended Family Social Organization 
(Chapter 4) and became the central feature of the Universal Social Protection system in the 
country. However, while the expansion of social security schemes may seem to have been 
partly a result of the influence of Workers and Peasants, the logic of the Ujamaa Extended 
Family Social Organization limited that possibility and instead, most of these initiatives 
came from the government as part of its obligation to society as “the Father” and 
implemented by various sections and associations of the government under closer 
assistance and monitoring from the Party (TANU/CCM) as “the Mother”! So, its universal 
character notwithstanding, formal social protection, and social security, remained state­
based and paternalistic in character, organization and functioning. The unique aspect of the 
system was its emphasis on government commitment reinforced by the principles of 
Ujamaa. 
5.3.3 Impact of Ujamaa institutional and policy reforms 
There were both positive and negative effects of institutional reforms and policy changes 
adopted during Ujamaa. The most conspicuous positive outcomes included: (a) expansion 
of employment opportunities through expansion of state organisations. For example, 
government employment grew from 196,966 in 1979 to more than 272,000 in 1983 (Table 
5.11); (b) expansion of basic needs (e.g. education, health and water) to the majority of 
rural population; (c) establishing a network of socio­economic security schemes­social 
security funds, free basic social services, farm input subsidies, price regulation, co­
operative credits, village organization system, traditional security system (extended family) 
and access to land­ which provided institutional protection for socio­economic insecurity 
to many urban and rural inhabitants; (d) reduction of illiteracy from 80% in 1960 to 21% in 
1980; and (e) increase in life expectancy at birth from 35 years in 1960 to 54 years in 1986. 
All these indicated improvement in the quality of many human needs in Tanzania 
(Appendices, 5A & B). 
Table 5.11: Government Employment, 1979­83 
Year Ministries Town council Regions(exc. Dar) Total % Change 
1979 67,989 655 128,322 196,966 ­
1980 69,783 10,652 138,357 218,792 +11.1 
1981 75,456 15,244 152,938 243,638 +11.4 
1982 78,588 18,815 165,761 263,164 +8.0 
1983 80,300 20,489 171,561 272,350 +3.5 
Source: ILO Mission Report (1988:32) 
In general, there were substantial achievements in social welfare which convinced an ILO 
Mission in 1988, to commend the country’s record in providing basic needs as exemplary. 
The Mission also made an observation that the country’s experience demonstrated the fact 
that some of the worst features of poverty could be alleviated at low income levels within a 
short period by appropriate selective government social policies in a peaceful manner and 
in conditions of political stability (ILO Mission Report, 1988:39). 
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What the Mission failed to appreciate was that the leadership commitment to universal 
basic needs provision was an important factor if not the main one. Without that 
commitment and interest of the ruling class over the need for basic social services to the 
public at that time, nothing could have been achieved. Therefore, any change and shift in 
the composition and interest of the ruling class have consequences in terms of how social 
policy is conceived as instrument of socio­economic development. Nyerere himself 
appreciated his leadership and government commitment in provision of social services by 
1977 when he argued: “...over the last ten years we have done quite well in spreading 
basic social services to more and more people in the rural areas. More remains to be 
done; but we shall only be able to do it if we produce more wealth. And we have not been 
doing very well on that front” (Nyerere, 1977). 
Unfortunately, as Nyerere had already observed, attempts at achieving poverty alleviation 
through equitable access to social welfare needs were eroded by poor economic 
performance from the late 1970s. This was characterised by a balance of payment crisis, 
decline in agricultural and industrial production, high acceleration of inflation rate (Table 
5.12) and informalisation of employment (Table 5.13) 
Table 5.12: Growth of Production, Population and Inflation (annual average %), 1965 to 
1987 
Indicators 1965­1973 1973­1980 1980­
1987 
1987 
GDP growth rate 4.8 2.3 1.7 5.1 
Agriculture growth rate 3.1 0.2 3.8 4.4 
Manufacturing growth rate 8.7 2.6 ­3.5 4.5 
Industry growth rate 7.0 1.8 ­2.4 ­
Services e t c. 6.9 5.5 0.8 ­
Population growth rate 2.3 2.6 2.7 3.2 
Inflation growth rate 3.5 15.4 24.9 31.2 
Source: Bank of Tanzania (1981­1987); Bureau of Statistics National Accounts of Tanzania 1976­1990 
(1991); World Bank (1989:221) 
In the case of informalisation of employment, while in 1978 there were about 6.9 million 
self­employed (of whom 6.4 million were in rural areas) and 0.8 million in wage 
employment (of whom 0.5 million were employed in the formal sector) and 0.3 million in 
informal sector, by 1988 self­employed increased to about 8.6 million (of whom 7.8million 
were in rural areas) and 1.1 million in wage employment (of whom 0.7 million were 
employed in the formal sector) and 0.4 million in informal sector. Rapid growth of self­
employment implied contraction of formal employment and the rapid increase of people 
working outside the formal socio­economic security system­mainly in low­income earning 
activities and insecurity susceptible working environment. Moreover, from 1983 
employment growth continued to slow as a result of the freeze on recruitment announced 
by the government for 1983­84. 
Table 5.13: Type of employment in Tanzania (1978­1988) 
Type Employment in Millions 
Wage Employment: 1978 1988 
Formal urban 0.3 0.5 
Informal urban 0.1 0.2 
Formal rural 0.2 0.2 
Informal rural 0.2 0.2 
Total wage Employment 0.8 1.1 
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Self­employed : 
Urban 0.5 0.8 
Rural 6.4 7.8 
Total Self­employed 6.9 8.6 
Source: Population Census 1978 & 1988 
As the economic and financial crises deepened, leading to a fall of government revenue, 
the government adjusted its revenue by cutting back on resources allocated to the basic 
social services. The total share of basic social services in the budget declined from 25% in 
1970­71 to 20% in 1980­81, 15% 1985­86 and 11% in 1986­87. In other words, while 
expenditure on all basic needs sectors constituted roughly one quarter of government 
expenditure in the last years of 1970s, expenditure in 1982 ­83 was about 3% points 
lower. The annual per cent increase in expenditure in basic needs sector was 4% in 1979­
80, 5% in 1980­81, and 39% in 1981­82 and 0.8 % in 1982­83 (Appendix, 5C; Kaijage and 
Tibaijuka, 1996). 
The question of what might have led to the drastic shift in development and recurrent 
expenditure on basic needs sector is relevant here. Notwithstanding the great role played 
by foreign assistance in maintaining basic needs achievements, withdraw of which must 
have negatively affected the sustenance of the sector, and the dwindling of economic 
growth, impact of shift in the composition and interest of the ruling class in the party and 
government as well as in the IFIs cannot be completely overruled. In fact, might turn to be 
the most important factor while the other two being used to justify the whole process. In as 
far as the politics of budgeting is concerned, budgetary allocations reflects the policy 
priorities of those in control of resources and the budgeting process. In this respect the 
budgeting process is the battle field of competing interests the result of which must reflect 
the dominant one. For this matter, a relative shift of power centres in policy making 
process will be reflected in the budgetary allocation (Ndumbaro, 1993:4). Social group 
dynamics and shifting policy making power centres as a result of institutional reforms 
contributed to the decline in budgetary allocation for basic social service sector (see 
Chapter 6). 
For example, the pattern of public expenditure did not discriminate against basic needs 
expenditure up to 1984 and the government continued to emphasize its committed role on 
basic needs sector. In June 1984, the government reiterated its commitment and necessity 
of consolidating the basic services established since independence (education, health and 
water) and stressed that the desire for maintaining social equity and welfare of workers and 
peasants without discrimination was to guide implementation of institutional and policy 
changes (ILO Mission Report, 1988:48). Surprisingly, the 1984/85 budget introduced a 
change in the approach to basic needs policies by cutting funds channeled to the regions 
for, amongst others, primary schools and health service by ordering districts councils to 
collect some of their own revenues to finance social services. As a response, the following 
policy changes were made from 1984: the subsidy on sembe (the major staple) was 
abolished and farm­gate prices for food crops and export crops were increased; school fees 
for secondary education and financial responsibilities for primary education to local 
councils were introduced; parastatal reforms and changes in the organization of the public 
sector were announced; and to cushion the inflationary impact of the above measures, 
minimum wages were raised. 
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Table 5.14: Development trends between 1983 and 1986

Indicators 1983 1984 1985 1986 
Real growth rate (% ) ­2.7 +1.9 +2.6 +3.8 
Real per capita growth (%) ­6.0 ­1.4 ­0.7 +0.5 
Minimum wage (Tshs.) 600 810 810 1,035 
Primary school enrolment (%) 99.7 94.8 83.5 n.a 
Inflation (%) 27.0 36.2 33.3 32.4 
Annual increase producer price coffee (%) 10 51 30 54 
Maize grain price (Tshs. per debe ): 
Unofficial 187 240 200 220 
Official 80 100 135 220 
Exchange rate ( Tshs. per dollar) 12.5 18.1 16.5 51.7 
Exports (US$ millions) 379 367 286 248 
Imports (US$ millions) 829 839 997 1,047 
of which own­ account import scheme) ­ 40 232 247 
Debt service ratio 30.2 62.1 53.3 63.9 
Source: ILO Mission Report (1988:72) 
Understanding the impact of these measures is not difficult. A comparison of the minimum 
wage (Tshs. 820 in June 1984), Tshs. 1,035 in the same Month ­1986 and, Tshs. 1,230 in 
July 1987) (Table 5.14) with the inflation figures shows the deterioration of the position of 
minimum wage earners irrespective of increase in minimum wages. This is indicative of 
the position of other wage categories. The social consequences of shifting the financing 
of primary education from central government to local authorities led to drastic decline 
in the quality of education and the primary school employment rate dropped from 99.7 
% in 1983 to less than 83.5% in 1985. The quality of primary health care was also 
deteriorating (ILO Mission Report, 1988:74). 
As a result of these changes, by the mid 1980s most workers could no longer support their 
households. Household members began to engage in parallel market activities to 
supplement their dwindling incomes. The growth of parallel economy and its interlinkages 
with formal sector activities provided a “buffer” for socio­economic insecurity. The 
question posed by the ILO Mission was whether parallel activities were to continue to 
provide a “buffer” for future shocks , and whether the government could rely on that 
“safety­valve” for years. Part of the answer to this will be reflected in subsequent 
Chapters. However, the foregoing analysis indicates that growth in informal production 
and exchange; informal employments and self­employment and; parallel market economy 
were to become quasi­permanent aspects of development in the country. 
5.4 Conclusion 
The struggles against poverty and inequality during the post­independence period 
alternated between two concepts of poverty: the basic poverty and enforced poverty. The 
first was associated with differences in natural resource endowments and limitation of both 
tribal subsistence and colonial economy. Although measuring net geographical product in 
an underdeveloped territory in which the majority were engaged in traditional subsistence 
activities could be misleading, the basic poverty concept provided a starting point in 
understanding the impact of differences in natural resource endowments, integration in 
modern economic sectors and climatic conditions on poverty and inequality. The restrictive 
effects of insufficient resources and the limitations of what climatic conditions can provide 
for development attracted biased colonial development favouring a few regions and 
creating conditions unfavourable for the majority to escape poverty and at the same time 
setting in motion inter­regional development inequalities. It was also associated with a 
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problem of institutional incoherence in which the restrictive nature of both of the economic 
systems affected people in their mode of wealth creation and accumulation. Predominance 
of tribal subsistence economy for example, undermined the emerging market activities, 
while the latter exacerbated regional inequalities. 
However, ujamaa re­defined poverty and associated it with enforced socio­economic 
inequality and insecurity due to dispossession of, and limited access to, resources as a 
result of capitalism. This approach put emphasis on achieving poverty alleviation through 
redistribution and equitable access to basic needs while undermining economic production. 
The impact of this was the weakening of economic foundation for poverty alleviation and 
sustainable socio­economic security which became one of the justifications for the return 
to “the basic poverty” approach and neo­liberal reforms in the mid 1980s. 
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______________________________________________________________ 
PART THREE

The Content
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___________________________________________________________________ 
Chapter 6 
40 
From Ujamaa to Ubepari:
The Mode of Institutional Reform and Social Group Dynamics (1980­1995) 
6.1 Institutional Reforms in Perspective 
A careful review of literature on State formation and socio­economic development in 
Tanzania reveals basically two perspectives on the politics of institutional reform which 
help to explain the character of the mode of reform and its resultant institutional order. The 
first perspective is institutional dualism associated with the basic poverty concept 
discussed in Chapter 5. According to this perspective, the underdevelopment of Tanzania 
or the continuation of its poverty is founded on the disintegration of the ‘traditional” 
peasant economy into a “modern” market economy (formal economy). Ujamaa, according 
to this perspective, was characterized by “excessive state­directed economic activities”, or 
what Tripp and Swantz (1996) called “directed development”, which undermined the 
“competitive peasant based accumulation” in favour of state­based accumulation­a version 
of “accumulation from above” (Neocosmos, 1993:145) or, as Gibbon (1993:24) 
characterised it, “the model of public economic accumulation”. This state­regulated model 
of accumulation perpetuated the same evils that it sought to undo­poverty, inequality and 
insecurity. Therefore, the only way to promote development and alleviate poverty, 
according to this perspective, was to remove what Mlambiti called “the Ujamaa virus” 
(1999:29) from the economy and politics through institutional reforms. Promotion of 
capitalism and money earning activities became part of development and anti­poverty 
initiatives. 
The second perspective is the pragmatic­nationalist critique of traditional institutional 
dualism, again, associated with the enforced poverty concept of the Ujamaa era. Although 
it has never provided a clear, strong alternative to the “dualist” perspective, it has retained 
the fundamental argument that poverty in Tanzania is founded on the integration of the 
traditional peasant economy with an “exploitative and immoral capitalist economy” 
(Nyerere, 1962, 1967, 1987). According to this perspective, poverty is a function of the 
inequality and insecurity resulting from the exploitative and competitive capitalist 
economy, at both international and national levels. As Nyerere once argued: "What is 
wrong with capitalism? To my mind, capitalism went wrong when it divorced wealth from 
its true purpose…the banishment of poverty; and wealth is to poverty what light is to 
darkness…When wealth is accumulated, not for the satisfactions of basic needs, not for the 
abolition of poverty, but for the purpose of acquiring power and prestige, then wealth is no 
longer to poverty what light is to darkness. Here wealth begins to tolerate poverty, by 
undermining anti­poverty social desires (emphasis added, Nyerere, 1962). Therefore, 
Ujamaa provided a model of public economic accumulation, which insulated society from 
ruthless capitalist exploitation and its consequent inequality and insecurity as a pre­
condition for poverty alleviation. In other words, Ujamaa aimed at preserving the 
institutional order (the customary order) that is necessary for the functioning of what 
Polanyi called the “human economy”, Scott’s “moral economy” or even Hyden’s 
40 Ubepari is the Kiswahili word for “Capitalism”. After Arusha Declaration it was taken to be the opposite of 
Ujamaa and stigmatized as associated with immorality, exploitation, selfishness, individualism and disrespect 
for human equality. In this study, this term is used to represent the capitalist market economy adopted in 
Tanzania to replace the Ujamaa statist economy from the early 1980s. 
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“economy of affection” which, according to this perspective, has a greater sense of 
humanity and security than a capitalist economy (Tripp and Swantz, 1996:11; Scott, 1976; 
Nyerere, 1962, 1966, 1967a & 1967b). Moving away from the moral economy of Ujamaa 
which prevents the majority from becoming capitalists and exploiters of their fellow 
citizens, could achieve little more than perpetuate the poverty, inequality and insecurity in 
the country. 
6.2 The Politics of Institutional Separation and Group Disintegration 
6.2.1 The Party­IMF Tension 
Tanzania’s submission to neo­liberal reforms began with a protracted stand­off with the 
Bretton Woods institutions in the early 1980s before the beginning of a gradual transition 
to a market economy (Cooksey, 2003:69) to mark the official beginning of “the second 
capitalist experiment” following “an aborted Ujamaa experiment”.41 Initially, both the 
party and government protested against Bretton Woods’ neo­liberal reform proposals that 
were based on a diagnosis that it was Ujamaa and its policies which had plunged the 
country into an acute socio­economic crisis, questioning in particular, the behaviour of the 
IMF which, according to Nyerere, had acrimoniously transformed itself into an 
“International Ministry of Finance” without the international community’s consent 
(Baregu, 1993). In its “Mwongozo wa Chama (the party guideline)” of 1981, the party 
reiterated its position on the predicament of the economy in the country by insisting that, it 
was caused by oppressive and exploitative capitalist international business system and not 
Ujamaa policy (CCM, 1981:14). 
As a result of these divergent views, the government (supported by the party) and the IMF 
were locked in a protracted conflict over which policies and reforms were appropriate for 
addressing the problems (Baregu, 1993:107). While, the IMF maintained that Tanzania 
must change its economic policies by limiting the role of the state in the economy in order 
to allow room for the market forces to operate freely, the government insisted on Ujamaa 
policies and castigating the former for taking advantage of the country’s crisis in order to 
impose capitalist system. As a result, the government adopted the National Economic 
Survival Programme (NESP) in 1981 as its own initiative against the crisis. However, the 
programme never succeeded partly, because of lack of financial support from the donor 
community and international financial institutions (Kiondo, 1992:23­24). 
6.2.2 The Party’s Soul­Searching and Coalition Politics 
During the same period, the party began to engage in self­examination, the end result of 
which, was acknowledgement of three facts: that the economic problems gripping the 
country were partly a result of failure to lead the citizens towards the envisioned 
development; that public resources were being destroyed or misused and; that there was an 
increasing tendency among government officials to misappropriate and embezzle public 
property (CCM, 1981: 22; Mkandala, 1995:58). That “soul searching” and confession 
played a role in justifying the country’s transformation and opening up of an avenue for the 
41 Shortly after gaining independence in 1961, Tanzania adopted the capitalist­market economy inherited from the 
colonial economy as her first “capitalist market economy” experiment in a newly independent country. The experiment 
ended in 1967 following the adoption of the Arusha Declaration, which introduced Ujamaa as the “first Socialist 
experiment” or what Yeager (1982) called “An African Experiment”. Therefore, the re­adoption of a capitalist market­
economy from the early 1980s was the second experiment after the failure of Ujamaa. 
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domestic anti­Ujamaa groups to resurface under the guise of searching for solutions to 
reverse the then deteriorating socio­economic conditions. 
6.2.3 The Triumph of the bureaucrats 
The first of these groups was the bureaucrats who, according to Costello (1996:123), 
throughout the ujamaa period, had relentlessly opposed the initiatives of the political 
authorities to render them subordinate and responsive to the Party and its definition of the 
social role of the state. There is an important observation here. In the late eighties, Adam 
Przeworski, in his studies on the problems associated with transitions from authoritarian 
regimes, observed that, in most cases, “the transition from authoritarian rule is possible 
only when there is a viable alternative” (Przeworski, 1986 quoted in Costello, 1996:123). 
The argument is that, while an economic crisis may erode the capacity of the existing 
regime, thereby eroding its legitimacy and empowering intervention by an outside force, 
that factor alone does not necessarily determine a transformation of that regime. In the 
Tanzanian case, the economic crisis eroded the capacity of the government and the ruling 
party to cater for the needs of the society which in turn, triggered their legitimacy crisis. 
Initially, however, the crisis of capacity and legitimacy and intervention by the IMF 
generated only certain policy shifts. This result confirmed the argument that “it is only 
when a sufficiently coherent counter coalition exists within the state to represent an 
alternative ruling elite that the state transformation is possible” (Costello, 1996:123). 
According to Costello, the crisis of the state capacity and intervention of foreign actors 
generated such a transformation because the bureaucrats presented a political counter 
coalition that made it possible for other likeminded groups to join. The important questions 
are: Why did the bureaucrats develop into such a strong counter coalition? And what are 
the implications for the institutional and policy reform in the country in general and for 
poverty alleviation initiatives in particular? Finding answers to these questions is one of 
the aims of this study; however, at this point, let it suffice to say that the reasons for this 
phenomenon lie in the weakness of the reforms associated with the restructuring of the 
state and economy. Costello identified some of these weaknesses: the bureaucrats were 
never adequately incorporated into the party (CCM)­dominated state; and their retention of 
their elitist norms, viewing themselves as a development vanguard, contrary to the role 
specified for them by the party (1996:123). According to him, although the political 
authorities sought to render the bureaucrats subordinate and responsive to the Party, which 
defined the social role of the state, the degree of bureaucratic autonomy remained high. 
When the economic crisis undermined the party’s capacity and legitimacy, the bureaucrats 
were never fully incorporated into it and, bolstered by their ties to foreign actors; they 
became an increasingly coherent and dominant force within the state, defining a new role 
for the state in society. Therefore, he concluded, these factors permitted them to become a 
counter authority. One interviewee explained the situation in this way: 
Truly, the issue of reforms should not be seen as a current initiative and fundamentally 
externally imposed. In terms of origin, there are two explanations: one, the initial reforms ­
in mid­1984, under structural adjustment, they were pushed by the international financial 
institutions which took advantage of the then deteriorating socio­economic conditions in 
the country to enforce those changes. Although the government resisted, it had to succumb 
to the pressure because there were no reliable alternatives; two, from the early 1990s, there 
was a growing convergence between the IFI’s interests and those of most of the developing 
countries’ governments, including Tanzania, and therefore the question was not an 
imposition of reform but partly a domestic initiative too. However, these domestic 
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initiatives should not be seen in isolation of the requirements that the international financial 
institutions and donor community imposed on the government due to its dependency on aid 
(Interview No. 19). 
Moreover, the politics of structural adjustment that favoured bureaucrats over the Party, 
combined to transform the state (Costello, 1996:124). What Costello forgot was the fact 
that Ujamaa, as both an ideology and mode of production, was characterised by what 
Campbell and Stein (1992:8) called “Ethical Duality”­the existence of vague ideological 
postures containing egalitarian ideals and goals along with the ideals of capitalist private 
accumulation­indicating the existence of what can be termed “Ujamaa embedded 
capitalism”. Therefore, while the rhetoric of Ujamaa, together with its institutions such as 
the leadership code of ethics, prevented the reorganization of the legal instruments of the 
state for individual accumulation, its ideological posture and institutional weakness 
provided opportunities for individual private accumulation and for public officials to 
contemplate the validity of the policies related to individual property ownership and 
private enterprise. As we shall see, during this transition, while the party maintained the 
Ujamaa ethical standards, the government, influenced by both domestic and foreign private 
interests, pushed for capitalist ethical standards using the same Ujamaa ideological posture 
as the justification of the call for neo­liberal oriented reforms. 
Furthermore, we have seen in Chapter 4 that, the evolution of bureaucracy in Tanzania was 
associated with less integration and conformity to the general societal ethos and interests. 
Unlike in developed societies (like in Europe) where the emergence of the State and its 
bureaucracy was part of the general social transformation, in developing societies like 
those in Africa, these same institutions were imposed from outside. The experience in the 
ex­colonial Tanzania shows that, the formation of the modern state and bureaucracy was 
not the product of the material conditions of the society. These institutions were imposed 
from outside and carried with them, functional and ethical logics contrary to those found in 
society. Their link with society in which they operate and supposed to serve is weak to 
guarantee any reasonable responsiveness to its needs. In other words, while bureaucracies 
in Europe were institutionally and ethically linked with the society and made responsive to 
its needs, in Tanzania the bureaucracy is delinked from the society. Its allegiance as public 
institution resides outside the society and therefore, it has little incentives to respond to 
societal needs unless there is a convenient point of unit of interest between its members 
and those of the society. However, it is important to note that the bureaucracy does not 
necessarily constitute a coherent social group due to various factors including diverse 
influence from Western education and development doctrines which sometimes makes it 
isolated from the society and vulnerable to external interests. 
But in reform process, the bureaucrats knew how difficult (because of the nature of the 
State formation) it was to push for liberalization and benefit from it without creating 
alliances with both the domestic and international commercial and business class and some 
likeminded political/governing elites in the Party. Fortunately for the bureaucrats, the 
Party’s confession also aroused the interest of the other groups, particularly members of 
the intellectual community at the University of Dar es Salaam, the majority of whom were 
US­trained, neo­classically oriented economists from the Department of Economics and its 
Economic Research Bureau (ERB). Again, interesting questions here are: Why did the 
Economists rise as key actors in the reform and policy making processes during that 
period? What were the implications of their rise and dominance in the reform and policy 
making processes to the country’s development in general and poverty alleviation in 
particular? 
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6.2.4 The Rise of the Economists 
The rise of the Economists as key players in institutional reforms and policy­making 
system in the country can be understood when put within the context of: first, expanding 
corporate global capitalism and its struggle for centres and groups necessary for promoting 
corporate global capitalist economy and governance and; second, shifts in higher education 
lending policies in African countries in 1970s and 1980s. 
According to Utting and Zammit (1991:6), corporate globalization­a process of 
restructuring and legitimisation of global economic system that is not only increasingly 
interdependent and interconnected but also moulded and controlled by global corporation 
and corporate elites­took place through, among others, privatization, foreign direct 
investment, commodification and expansion of global value chains and cultural 
penetration. This process involved the capture of higher education system and the strategic 
knowledge centres and economic institutions in developing countries. This was seen as 
important strategy of recruiting corporate globalisation agents who would become 
counterparts to global corporate elites in promoting and managing a new set of institutions 
and relations that promoted global capitalist economic ethos and governance. This was the 
logic underpinning the Washington consensus’s higher education lending policies in 
Africa. 
From the mid 1970s the IFIs and particularly, the World Bank, began to emphasise the 
importance of primary and basic education, urging for the need to raise the proportion of 
lending to this sector at the expense of higher education (World Bank, 1974; Brock­Utne, 
1996:336). At a meeting with African Vice­Chancellors in Harare in 1986, the World Bank 
gave reasons as to why higher education had been and continued to be not a priority to 
IFIs. Its argument was that, higher education in Africa was a luxury and therefore, most 
countries were better off closing universities at home and training graduates overseas or 
produce only those skills which the markets demanded (Brock­Utne, 1996:336; Banya and 
Elu, 2001: 24). Despite the opposition from policy­makers that, education contribution to 
economic growth and reduction of poverty could not be achieved by expanding basic 
education and limiting higher level man power training and expansion of indigenous 
capacity in research and expertise, the World Bank maintained its position. Furthermore, 
many fields which were singled out for lending cut­backs were social sciences, including 
economics and politics. Thus, they had to be studied outside Africa, mostly in Northern 
America or Europe. 
Many scholars saw the effects of this lending policy a further starvation of higher 
education and intellectual life in Africa (Brock­Utne, 1996:338) and the vanishing of 
national priorities based on indigenous research findings and the preponderance of foreign 
institutions in policy­making (Mkandawire, 1990 quoted in Ibid. p. 339). The tricky way in 
which the issue of higher education lending was posed left little room for contemplation of 
the hidden global agenda of corporate global elites, who needed counterparts all over the 
world. 
As a result of this, governments and universities were forced to meet the crisis by seeking 
donor support for departments, faculties and research institutes which came in a form of 
“link arrangements” mostly between the government departments and universities in 
Africa and North America or Europe. In the case of universities, in most cases, graduates 
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were sent to North America and Europe for studies and even when they were to be trained 
in Africa, experts, books, and curricula offered were from donor countries (Brock­Utne, 
1996:338). The following quotation from the University of Dar es Salaam Staff 
Assembly’s (UDASA) Editorial Newsletter, captures the character of the link 
phenomenon: 
The situation at the University of Dar es Salaam is a microcosm of that in the nation as a 
whole. Here, in the midst of filthy toilets and classrooms with broken windows and 
furniture thrives the link phenomenon. Virtually every department, under the threat of 
material and intellectual starvation, has been forced to establish links with one or more 
institutions, mostly from the West. We depend on the links for the training of our junior 
staff, for teaching material and equipment and a host of other things. The link agreements 
are, almost without exception, as unequal as would be expected (UDASA, 1990: 1) 
The result of the link phenomena was creation of a group of economic elite trained in the 
West and mainly in the Northern America, indoctrinated with neo­liberal development 
doctrines. Through their training, they became expatriates with great allegiance to 
corporate global capitalist interests and priorities than those of their own country. By the 
late 1990s, many of these economists42 had moved into government departments and 
established the most influential policy­oriented NGOs (ESRF and REPOA),43 through 
which they began dealing with the IMF and offering advice and consultancy to the 
government. They also became the main actors in an enclave policy­making system, as 
local policy experts. They therefore, provided much of the momentum that sustained the 
reforms in the late 1990s and became important drivers of the later reforms and the 
changes in the functioning of the government. 
From this perspective, the rise of the Economists cannot be considered as a mere 
coincidence, but a predetermined outcome of corporate global capitalist interests. For 
example, Utting and Zammit (1991:7) argued that, the logics behind a worldwide call for 
promotion of private­public partnership are nothing but creation of organised and 
hegemonic interests of corporate and other elites as part and parcel of their strategy to 
monopolize and exercise intellectual, moral and cultural leadership which promote global 
capitalist economic system and corporate governance. So, the link projects and technical 
training schemes were part of the several set of instruments used to expand, consolidate 
and reinforced the logics of corporate global capitalist economy and governance. The 
reduction of higher education lending and creation of “link projects” paved the way for the 
Economists’ capture of reforms and public policy­making processes in the country. 
Back to coalition politics; finally, the IMF found domestic allies (the neo­liberal 
economists at the University of Dar es Salaam; the state bourgeoisie composed of the 
bureaucrats and some officials in the party and the government; and emerging private 
business community, mostly Asians). The struggles between the Ujamaa coalition (mainly 
42 They included professors Benno Ndulu, Joseph Semboja, H.K.R Amani , Samuel M. Wangwe and N.E. Osoro; 
Doctors Servacius B. Likwelile, and Ben Tarimo. By 1990s, many of these had moved on (and up) from the University. 
Professor Benno Ndulu and Dr. Tarimo went to work at the World Bank; Professors Wangwe and Amani joined the 
Economic and Social Research Foundation (ESRF); Professor Osoro joined the Ministry of Finance’s think tank, while 
Dr. Likwelile went on to become head of Poverty Eradication at the Vice President’s Office. Currently, Professor Ndulu 
is the Governor of the Bank of Tanzania (BOT). 
43 According to Holtom (2002) the organisations themselves (ESRF and REPOA) formed a duopoly dominating the 
Tanzania consultancy field, and were heavily donor funded, in the case of REPOA by the Netherlands, in the case of 
ESRF, by the African Capacity Building Foundation (ACBF) He also quoted the currently executive director of ESRF 
(Prof. Amani) going as far as describing ESRF as the ‘World Bank’s baby’ 
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among those in the Party plus a few members of the government) on the one hand, and the 
Ubepari coalition led by the IMF on the other began. Capitalising on the deepening crisis, 
the dwindling capacity and legitimacy of the Party and the government, and the “silent 
strikes” and continuing drifting away of the masses from the formal institutional circles of 
the state and the Party, the Ubeparists finally began forcing the Ujamaaists to succumb to 
their demands. 
6.3 The Beginning of the End of Ujamaa 
In 1982, the government (on the basis of the advice of the externally oriented advisory 
group ­the Tanzania Advisory Group­TAG), adopted a programme known as “home­
grown Structural Adjustment”, which initiated reforms which marked the turning point 
towards market­oriented policies. This was the beginning of the end for Ujamaa and its 
policies and institutions. It was a capitalist programme in spirit, character and intent, but 
sugar­coated with Ujamaa rhetoric to deceive the political leadership and other social 
groups who might have sensed the negative consequences of its adoption. For example, the 
proposed changes included: stimulation of exports through currency devaluation; 
introduction of a sliding­scale price system as a way of promoting effective marketing and 
producer prices to boost export production; cutbacks in government expenditure and 
reductions in the rate of monetary expansion; and improvement of efficiency in the 
parastatal sector. It is important to remember that, the TAG was a technical group and its 
suggestions reflected the technical­economic rather than socio­political aspects of the 
crisis. 
To allow a technical team to advice on reforms (which had been the domain of the Party) 
had significant implications. First, the party and its leadership acknowledged their failure 
to provide reliable policy options to solve the problems of the country. Second, it indicated 
acceptance of the substitution of the politically­informed policy­making processes 
predominant during Ujamaa, for policy­making processes that were technically dictated 
and based on the economic logic of market system. Third, the beginning of the transfer of 
policy and decision making from the leadership of the Party to technical groups outside the 
party and government but which had close affinity with the bureaucrats and allegiance to 
the Bretton Woods Institutions. Interestingly, these “policy advisory technical groups” 
were based on research institutions mainly formed and run by economists from the 
University of Dar es Salaam. Lastly, was the creation of “an enclave policy making group” 
that was in control of the policy processes, claiming a monopoly of knowledge about what 
was good for society (Chachage, 2004:1). Therefore, at the heart of the reforms in the early 
eighties was the emergence of the policy making model close to what Mkandawire and 
Soludo (1999: 24) referred to as “’the capture of policy’ by societal elements in a manner 
that particularizes policy and drives it away from the larger societal concerns”. 
Parallel to these developments were overgrowing second (informal) economic activities 
which, under Ujamaa, were categorised as unproductive and unwanted seedbeds of 
capitalist exploitation, and legally prohibited. Despite government’s efforts to suppress this 
sector, its activities continued to expand, as both the means of survival for the majority 
poor rural population and workers in urban areas and as a means of illicit private wealth 
accumulation by the state and private bourgeoisie (Maliamkono, 1985:13; Lipumba, 
1989:9; Mkandala, 1995:62) which became the foundation of corruption in the country. 
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44 
6.3.1 Legitimating Protected Capitalism
In June 1984, the government adopted a budget which placed emphasis on reforms in the 
direction of liberalization. The following were announced: abolition of subsidies in various 
economic areas such as agriculture (on maize flour, the main staple food and fertilizers); 
reduction of a number of commodities on the price control list; and devaluation of the 
shilling. More importantly, a reform that had profound economic and political significance 
was liberalization of the external trade arrangement. In this, the participants in the then 
muted and protected capitalism, who had accumulated foreign currency, were allowed to 
import goods and sell them at market­determined prices (URT, 1986b:16; Kiondo, 1992:25 
& 30; Bryceson, 1993:27) 
Again, like the 1982 reforms, these changes had significant effects. First, they marked the 
second step towards neo­liberal policies away from Ujamaa, not only contradicting Ujamaa 
policies and ethics but also challenging Ujamaa ideology and the institutions associated 
with it, including the Party and the state in general. Second, by adopting these changes, 
almost all the Ujamaa institutions, including the most inspired “leadership code”, were 
rendered obsolete, exacerbating the Party and government’s legitimacy crisis. Third, they 
set free the commercial and business class, who were hiding behind the protected 
capitalism from “the Ujamaa prison” of anti­individualism, private property ownership and 
economic engagement. They reinstated the value of money (as the key factor for 
development) which until then, had been castigated as the root of all evil by the majority of 
Tanzanians. Lastly, they implied a de facto declaration of the public official’s freedom to 
participate in private accumulation. Therefore, by late 1984, the reform movement was 
shifting from an externally oriented process to one that was putting down domestic roots. 
This was the beginning of the opening up of the country to capitalism and rejuvenation of 
the “protected capitalism’ created during Ujamaa. Capitalists (both foreign and domestic), 
who were treated as lepers by the state bourgeoisie and who were never welcomed into the 
Party, and the government or any other policy organs and were constantly under 
ideological attack (Kiondo,1992: 26 & 62) were made partners, and attracted to make 
private investment in the country. 
The post­1984 era was marked by the beginning of state reorganization. Nyerere stepped 
down from the presidency in desolation that the government was abandoning Ujamaa and 
hence betraying the masses (Baregu, 1993:108). While he still retained the chairmanship of 
the party, Mwinyi was elected president so, for the first time, the leadership of the two 
important institutions was separated (Bryceson, 1993:31), meaning that the government 
could engage in some of its activities without necessarily engaging with the Party. As a 
result, the government quickly embarked on negotiations with the IMF in 1985, and 
accepted and adopted economic reforms proposed by the Fund in 1986. In 1987, the first 
phase of the Economic Recovery Programme (ERP) began to be implemented, after which 
external forces began to be deeply involved in the policy­making in different parts of the 
state (Mukandala 1995:61). 
By the end of 1980s, private capital had already been accepted as the basis of the socio­
economic development of the country. The opening up of the economic gates to both 
foreign and local capitalists and enticing particularly local capitalists to invest meant that 
44 According to Mlambiti (1999:29), Ujamaa created what he called “protected capitalism” for the people in power” and 
for the Asian business class, which was allowed to run private business in the market economy of the Ujamaa regime. 
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denunciations of capitalists as exploiters and money as the root of all evil gradually died 
away. In this regard, “partnerships and other business relationships between the private 
bourgeoisie and state bourgeoisie had been consummated” (Mkandala, 1995: 62), even 
when the Arusha Declaration and its Ujamaa ideology and associated institutions were still 
at work. These developments gave the majority of workers and peasants, whom the 
government and party had promised to protect, an astonishing surprise. While they were 
surprised, the government began the process of denationalising some of the properties that 
had belonged to members of the private bourgeoisie, before abandoning the “the leadership 
code” in February 1991. 
Finally, against the wishes of the majority of Tanzanians,45 the government enacted the 
Political Parties Act No.  5 of 1992, which set out procedures for establishing political 
parties, and legalized the competitive multiparty political system from above. This was 
accompanied by emergence of elitist civil society organizations created mainly by the 
emerging middle class as “technical projects” for socio­economic gains, and, on the other, 
the mushrooming of weak “primary level organizations of the society”, isolated from the 
socio­economic and political institutional order acting as survival nets for the majority of 
the poor in both rural and urban areas (Sansa, 2004; Shivji, 2003). The adoption of 
multiparty politics marked the end of the process of separating the state from both the 
Party and society, thus making it susceptible to predatory private bourgeoisie. It 
specifically eroded the accountability umbilical cord between society and the government, 
rendering control of the government by the masses virtually impossible and thus providing 
a fertile environment for corruption to flourish. 
6.3.2 The Ruksa Economy and the Rise of the Nyang’au Society 
1985­1995 is well known as the “Ruksa” period, in which every Tanzanian was left to do 
whatever s/he liked. Ruksa is the Kiswahili word for “permit” and is closely associated 
with the concept of “Laisser­Faire”. This concept emerged in the political and economic 
discourse in the country during the government of President Mwinyi (1985­1995), who 
was nicknamed Mr. Ruksa (Mr. Laisser­Faire). According to Hussman and Mmuya 
(2007:183), Ruksa “was a reference to the ease with which all necessary permits could be 
gained under his rule” [regardless of their authenticity]. Nyang’au is also a Kiswahili word 
meaning “dirty dog” or “bloody brute” (dog eat dog) and it specifically referred to Kenyan 
capitalism, which was considered by the leadership and many Tanzanians during Ujamaa 
as cannibalistic capitalism of the highest immorality. So, during Ujamaa, the Kenyans were 
simply referred to as “the Nyang’aus”; an example of a society with nothing to emulate. 
Interestingly, during reform processes the Nyang’aus turned into “partners in 
development” and the leading African investors in Tanzania! 
This period witnessed the rise in the defiance of primitive private wealth accumulation 
through the plundering of natural resources using both private institutions and the State 
machinery. A nyang’au society emerged and, after capturing the State, it began preying on 
both the state and society. No services whatsoever could be obtained without corruption. 
The nyang’aus, being in control of both the economy and the state, paralysed the state, 
enjoying their self­imposed tax holidays and foreign aid46. Thus, by the end of 1995, the 
45 
The Nyalali Commission Report (1991, vol. 1 pp 69 and 70) on whether Tanzania should opt for a Multiparty System indicated that 
77.2% (of the 36,299 Tanzanians interviewed) wished to retain the Single Party system, and only 21.5% wanted Multiparty politics, but 
the government proceeded to change the system, against the majority’s wishes, in 1992. 
46 At some point in the early 1990s, Nyerere, being provoked by the growth of corruption in the country, decided to speak out against his 
own CCM­party government, that it was stinking with corruption, had failed to collect taxes from big businesses, and kept itself busy 
chasing innocent small business groups. 
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level of corruption had increased, resulting in “a near abdication of the government from 
its reformist role causing a slowdown in reform process and exodus of key development 
partners” (Kilindo et al., 2006:8). Therefore, a group of “predatory elites” (Hussmann and 
Mmuya, 2007:177) established itself, exploiting opportunities arising from the reforms and 
able to manipulate the State and the economy in its favour. 
6.4 The Economic power transfer and Aid­dependence Syndrome 
One component of the second generation of reforms in the early 1990s was privatization. 
This implied the handing over to the private bourgeoisie as many as possible of the 
economic functions and associated benefits previously enjoyed by the State bourgeoisie. 
This involved the shift of economic power from the State to the private sector. The reforms 
provoked “the vested interests” of the State bourgeoisie and unearthed the question of the 
lack of local ownership of reforms, about which, despite being the main weakness of the 
IMF/Word Bank imposed reforms since the early 1980s, the State bourgeoisie kept silent. 
Moreover, the question of the local ownership of the reforms was mainly discussed in 
isolation from the question of the economic power shift due to the reforms and it was 
presented simply as a matter of “weak Tanzanian ownership of programmes and projects 
for which aid was received” (Helleiner Report, 1995:9). 
Despite the IFIs and donor community acknowledgement of the need to respect the local 
ownership of reforms, they never put it into practice. Many Tanzanians and the 
government alleged them of having their owned individual agendas and being reluctant to 
conform to national priorities and paying little more than lip service to the principle of 
local ownership. As a result, the government became passive and reluctant with regard to 
the reforms proposed by IFIs and donors. The government’s passivity and reluctance was 
also contributed by what the Helleiner Report (1995:13) called the “aid­dependence 
syndrome” which, according to it, had created an attitude of mind in which, over time, it 
came to be expected that most initiatives would originate from the donors, while the 
government and its officials feeling overwhelmed by the magnitude of the task of trying to 
impose their own will. 
We do not dispute the report’s observations; merely insist that the reluctance of the 
government to cooperate with its partners stemmed from their privatization agenda 
introduced during this period which antagonized the state bourgeoisie. The most pressing 
issue was the shift in economic power from the State to the foreign­dominated private 
sector. The implication was that the process was leading to a double deprivation of 
economic power: from the majority of poor Tanzanians and from the State bourgeoisie, 
who were the only people in control of the economy. The reasons for that fear were clear: 
while on the one hand, the historical circumstances had made it impossible for indigenous 
Tanzanians to engage in market activities and had suffocated their entrepreneurial capacity 
required for them to benefit from privatization process (URT, 2004), the same processes 
promoted the enormous power that Asia wielded in the national economy and which rose 
significantly after trade liberalization in the mid 1980s (Kilindo et al., 2007:34). The state 
bourgeoisie immediately came to the conclusion that the whole process of privatization 
meant only one thing: depriving them of economic power and consequently their capacity 
for maintaining political power. This was seen as the agenda of the private bourgeoisie, 
carried out under the guise of the imposed aid conditioned reforms. Capitalising on the 
issue of local ownership, the government decided to let the donors play their own song, 
alone. As one interviewee observed: 
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You know...the issue of the...relationship between the Mwinyi government and donors and 
the allegations that it was corrupt and did not bother to collect taxes and so on, for me, I 
see it in a different way. It is not that the government simply decided not to collect taxes 
and be passive about the reforms proposed by the donors...I think there was something 
behind the whole issue...I remember from the early 1990s that there was a growing concern 
over the privatization of the parastatals, which was the main economic base of those in 
power and although, before that, there has been a growing convergence between the IFI’s 
interests and those of the government, the question of privatization created a temporary 
divergence. The donors misconceived the problem. Here, the issue was the government 
officials’ loss of economic power to a group of minority Asian businessmen. Do you 
remember the issue of indigenization? Eheee! So, when the IMF and World Bank, 
supported by the donors, began pushing for the privatization agenda alongside the aid 
programmes, what did they expect? That was their own “song” and the government let 
them play it alone! (Interview No. 6) 
6.5 The Church: An Emerging Counter Resistance Force 
After independence the leadership declared that, while the government didn’t have 
religion, people did, and were free to join and worship in any religion of their choice. So, 
unlike other social organisations religious associations were left to operate autonomously. 
Nyerere himself, was a practicing and devout Catholic, who however, never permitted his 
religious convictions to interfere with his leadership. In his search for attributes of “a good 
society” to be developed in a newly independent Tanzania he was inspired by the teachings 
of his Church in the 1960s and 70s. Thus, his approach to a good society to be constructed 
through Ujamaa was in line with the teachings of the Catholic Church on social justice 
(Table 6.1). In both the teachings of the Church and Ujamaa, there was a primary concern 
for commitment to moral and collective responsibility in the development of man. The 
sharing of what constituted a good society created a point of unit of interest and shared 
social responsibility between the Church and Government. Ujamaa was considered a true 
reflection of the Church teachings in the eyes of the Church leaders and therefore, needed 
support and respect. Many schools and hospitals which were under the Church were given 
to the government to facilitate its basic­needs provision schemes. The Church and 
government existed in harmony and mutual respect throughout the Ujamaa period and 
Nyerere’s life in political office and in retirement. 
Table 6.1: The link between the Catholic Church and Ujamaa approach to a “good society” 
No. Key Teachings 
Aspects The Church Ujamaa 
1. Human 
Dignity 
and 
Rights 
� Dignity means respect for the 
human body and the quality of human 
dignity demands that excessive 
economic and social differences 
between the members of human family 
be eliminated. 
� Man has the right to live, 
including the means necessary for the 
proper development of life , namely 
food, clothing, shelter and medical care 
and necessary social services 
� The right to dignity and respect 
implies that a person be guaranteed the 
necessities of life. 
� There is no human dignity in 
extreme poverty or debilitating disease nor 
in ignorance 
2. Duties of 
the 
Person 
� The possession of rights 
involves the duty of implementing 
those rights, for they are the expression 
of a man’s personal dignity. 
� The right a person has to 
provide a livelihood for himself and his 
� The state has the function to 
organize men inequalities to serve their 
equality. 
� The equality of all people 
guaranties their rights, which in turn 
imposes certain duties. 
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family imposes on him the duty to 
work 
� Rights come with duties and there 
is no such thing as socialism without work. 
3. Develop 
ment 
� All things on earth should be 
related to man as their centre and 
crown. 
� The right to development is 
the right to take an active part in the 
shaping of one’s own life. 
� As a liberation, development 
is concerned with interior freedom on 
man which opens his heart to the needs 
of others 
� The purpose of and all social 
activity is the human person. 
� Man cannot be developed, he can 
only develop himself 
� Ujamaa is fundamentally an 
attitude of mind in which one sees every 
person as his brother and people care for 
each other’s welfare. 
4. Private 
Property 
� The goods of this earth are 
intended for the use of every human 
being. 
� The right of the state to 
regulate the control over property is 
derived from God, as a way of bringing 
to society peace, prosperity for all and 
long life. 
� Exploitation is making a living 
from the work of others and the source of 
this kind of exploitation is private ownership 
of the means of production. 
� Communal property is necessary to 
limit private property ownership which exert 
control over others and perpetuate 
exploitation 
5. Leadersh 
ip 
Morality 
� Politics is the affirmation of 
the duty of every living Christian 
based on moral obligation to the good 
of his fellow men 
� For a country to develop, it needs 
good leadership and good leadership must be 
ethical and uncorrupt 
Source: Ujamaa (Nyerere, 1967, 1968, 1973); the Church (Duggan and Civille, 1976) 
The tension between the government and religious associations began in the early 1980s 
following the economic crisis and consequent state transformation which affected the 
economic and social roles that the government played during Ujamaa. Furthermore, the 
erosion of the dominance of the ruling party which combined in it, socio­economic and 
political roles, the weakening of the capacity and legitimacy of the government and the 
party as well as the shift away of policy priorities from basic­needs oriented development 
further severed the relationship. As many people (who happened to be Church members) 
were subjected to socio­economic insecurities as the party and government began 
withdrawing from Ujamaa in the mid 1980s, the Church expanded its role in providing 
basic social services. As a result, some of the schools and hospitals which the government 
took from the Church during Ujamaa were brought back. 
Moreover, the impact of privatization, particularly, the transfer of resources from the state 
(public) control to private companies and individuals, mostly Asian businessmen and 
foreign investors and the alliance of the government officials and businessmen in resource 
exploitation which became vivid in 1990s and 2000s (see Chapter 9) threatened the 
economic security of the majority of poor members of the Church. This coincided with the 
call for economic self­dependence of African Church particularly the Catholic, which had 
been dependent on aid from Vatican and Western Churches. The Church was also 
subjected to global capitalist economic changes and commercialization of various products 
and services some of which were produced by it as part of a response to the call for self­
sufficiency and economic independence. Increasing pressure on socio­economic services 
provided by the Church due to government failure, erosion of resource base of the Church 
and its members due to corruption and the fact that, effective delivery of church services 
requires sustained access to resources made its intervention inevitable. The question of 
struggle for resources which corruption seem to work at the disadvantage of the Church 
and the freeing out of the country, most of resources which Church leaders thought could 
have been re­invested in the country for its benefit and that of its members, cannot be 
ignored. 
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Thus, economic reforms deprived the majority of Church members of economic 
opportunities at the time when it needed their economic support most. The Church 
attributed these problems to the abandonment of Ujamaa and consequent declining 
leadership morality and care for the poor in favour of corrupt private wealth accumulation. 
Part of the response to these problems has been the expansion of various economic 
activities such as establishment of Banks and Microfinance schemes as a way of providing 
accessible and secure economic opportunities to members and expanding its financial and 
economic base. It also began the struggle against corruption in the government and misuse 
of natural recourses. 
The Church maintained that, the main challenges of leadership facing Tanzania were still 
the same as those for which independence was fought for: poverty, ignorance, diseases, 
corruption and exploitation. But unlike those days, the Church argued, those problems 
were not a result of absence of resources, but defective leadership, policies and 
development plans and priorities which the Tanzanians are forced by developed countries 
to adopt­an enforced conception of poverty. According to the Church, problems of poverty, 
ignorance, diseases and exploitation do not affect the government officials and their 
international counterparts. This makes them less concerned to the sufferings of the 
affected­the poor. Furthermore, development priorities are biased in favour of economic 
sectors of which the government officials have interest and they give the same sectors to 
foreign investors with favourable investment conditions which are detrimental to the lives 
of the poor. So, in the views of the Church, the central problem was in the government 
authorities that are corrupt, individualistic, unaccountable and irresponsive to the needs of 
the nation and the poor. Thus, a new leadership that was moral and capable of bringing 
development and hope to all (CPT, 2009:12 ­13) was needed. Morever, the Church leaders 
believed that, the government failed to impose rational ethical principles to the public 
which manifested itself through corruption and, the Church felt justified to fill that gap. 
Therefore, the failure of the state to deliver, the growing pressure over the services 
provided by the Church, the pressing need for resources to effectively deliver the services, 
the call for self­sufficiency and financial independence and increasing corruption trigged 
the current Church’s concern on economic and political plight of the country as counter 
resistance force to neo­liberal order. However, the growing tendency of the Church taking 
the positions traditionally supposed to be held by political organizations poses a challenge 
to Tanzania’s politics which has implication to future social welfare initiatives. 
6.6 Characteristics of the Mode of the Institutional Reforms 
Since the main concern of this study is the impact of the mode of institutional reform on 
the market economy, the characteristics of this mode merit a detailed discussion: 
First, the mode was closed, secretive and erratic. Discussions on what should constitute the 
new institutional order were not subjected to public discussions and kept secret, not only 
from society but even from the Party and government officials themselves (Kiondo, 
1992:22; Campbell and Stein, 1992:15). 
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Second, there was the separation of the Party and the government leadership and, later, of 
the government and society. According to Bryceson (1993:13), one central aim of Ujamaa 
was to minimize the distance between the bureaucrats and peasants to ensure not only 
social equality and socialist morality, but also accountability and responsiveness on the 
part of the bureaucrats to the needs of the society by putting them closer to the party 
scrutiny through the one­party machinery. 
The genesis of the checks and balances between the party and the bureaucracy dates back 
to the era of party supremacy beginning in 1965 with the establishment of the one party 
state and then reinforced by the Arusha Declaration in 1967 and legalized by the 
amendment to the constitutional in 1975, before it was consolidated by the merger of 
TANU and Zanzibar’s Afro­Shirazi Party (ASP) into Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) as 
well as the adoption of the new constitution in 1977. The reason for advancing party 
supremacy was to mitigate the alienating effects of the inevitable spread of bureaucracy 
associated with development. Equating the party with the grassroots democracy and the 
government with a leadened bureaucracy, she argued, the leaders saw the party as the vital 
check on the bureaucratic performance (Bryceson, 1993:15). Thus, the separation eroded 
the institutional checks and balances between the government and the Party created during 
ujamaa. 
The collapse of the checks and balances was accompanied by the breakdown of what Tripp 
(1997:12) called the “institutional resources” of survival (the formal, party­state controlled 
social and economic associations) through which the government provided socio­economic 
(public) services to maintain income, social welfare and security. As the formal institutions 
of protection collapsed and the reliance on the government diminished, people increasingly 
sought private and informal socio­economic survival strategies which, however, were 
susceptible to the adverse economic conditions and stringent policies, making it more 
difficult to engage in secure, productive economic activities (Tripp, 1997:58). The 
breakdown further triggered the reconstitution and reposition of the social groups in the 
emerging institutional order. While the State, and private bourgeoisie, and the emerging 
middle class elites, were reconstituted into an enclave section of society regarding the 
control of resources and political power, the poor, such as the peasants and urban workers, 
were pushed to the margins of the socio­economic and political landscape, becoming 
isolated and marginalized. 
In all, the separation and disintegration of the party and government and the collapse of the 
checks and balances associated with it undermined the engagement in secure, productive 
economic activities; weakened the institutions of participation and negotiation capability of 
the poor groups; and eroded the umbilical cord between society and the government, thus 
providing a fertile environment for corruption and insecurity to flourish. 
Third, the mode maintained dual ethical standards. While some leaders of the government 
and Party, who wanted to remain true to the spirit of Ujamaa, maintained Ujamaa ethical 
standards, the government (entrenched in both domestic and foreign private interests and 
capitalizing on the market oriented reforms) became inclined to push for capitalist ethical 
standards. One result of these tensions was the emergence of a tendency towards 
institutional and policy incoherence. For example, while there were considerable reforms 
in the direction of a free market economy, several policies still reflected Ujamaa ethical 
standards (Stein 1992:68; Kiondo, 1992:28). 
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Fourth, the mode was external in origin guided by the neo­liberal philosophical and 
ideological foundations that were premised on the existence of a competitive market and 
politics. In other words, the reforms did not grow organically, but had their source in the 
pressures brought to bear on the state by the IMF and donor countries taking advantage of 
severe economic crisis experienced in the country (Kiondo, 1992:35). This problem is also 
revealed by the following interview quotation: 
But there is something which we need to acknowledge. I think the main problem of all 
these things, the market economic reforms or liberalization policy, is that…actually we as 
Tanzania did not have time to analyse, strategize and decide on what we wanted and how 
to undertake the reforms and what could be the effects. We just took everything given by 
the World Bank. Even the driving force, the themes or ideas of privatization, as we 
perceived it when we received it, was to transfer the parastatals from the state to the private 
sector. And when we said private sector, remember, we meant mainly foreign 
companies…because we were saying…you know…Tanzanians do not have capital! So, 
our privatization agenda basically meant to facilitate FBI…(laughs briefly)…I mean, 
foreign based investment…and we forgot everything about our own people! This is the 
problem when you don’t own a policy agenda or a programme...you are forced to think and 
act on the basis of what the owners tell you. That is all. And we just did it! (Interview No. 
11). 
The mode, therefore, lacked a clear workable theory and philosophy of the process of 
institutional change in a Tanzanian context. As a result, it became difficult to sustain 
market economy­based development tasks and objectives in relation to the country’s 
circumstances. It was also top­down, dominated by the elite and based on a narrow reform 
focus­a mere transplantation of new institutions and policies without reforms in the pre­
existing social, economic and political relations. The development was conceived as the 
mere existence of market institutions, irrespective of the nature of their supportive 
environment and their effective contribution to the promotion of market economic 
practices. It seems that, the role of market institutions was not to promote development as 
such, but to assist the process of destatisation of the economy. Moreover, the mode paid 
little attention to historical realities of the country, a situation which led to establishment of 
economic and political systems which had no input from the society and therefore, less 
legitimate. 
Fifth, the mode was associated with the development of what can be called “an enclave 
policy making system”­a skewed system of policy­making, in which the authoritative 
resource allocation power is concentrated in a small but dominant section of society. What 
this means is that, policy articulation and generation are confined to small social locales, 
which claim to have prime knowledge about the problems and solutions needed by the rest 
of society and therefore limit the alternative policy input from the majority. This makes the 
concerns of people outside the enclave secondary. In Tanzania, an enclave policy­making 
system has been featured by depolitisization of the policy process through the transfer of 
the role of policy­making from the Party and government to a group in private research and 
policy analysis institutions. 
Sixth, continuous alienation of previously excluded groups in formal economic 
engagements and increasing dependence on the informal economy is another feature of the 
mode. As discussed in chapter five, the transition to market economy was accompanied by 
exclusion of people from the formal economy. Therefore, for many people, the mode of 
reform was nothing but a forced de­participation and consequent retreat from the formal 
economy. Acting as a survival net, the informal economy increased its legitimacy, leading 
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to the growing dependence of the masses on it and thus its unlimited expansion. The over­
expansion of informal economy tilted the institutional imbalance between itself and the 
formal one, making the latter ineffective in saving the poor (see Chapter 7). 
Seven, the mode was characterised by anti­market tendencies. Any transition from one 
system to another suffers from inheritance of negative aspects of the old system, which 
may hinder the development, operations, and sustainability of the new system. The 
construction of a market economy has not avoided this problem. There were some anti­
market tendencies of the statist economy of the Ujamaa regime, which became part of the 
emerging market economy. The most notable one is the persistence of excessive 
administrative regulation of the economy. The whole process of reform was based on 
administrative decrees, and decisions were taken with regard to the economy without 
recourse to its legal foundations. This problem coexisted with weak legal foundation of the 
market. 
Last and interestingly, while for the first time in Tanzania’s history, institutions of 
capitalism and market economy were adopted and forced to function in the way they 
functioned in Western societies, the reform processes failed to address historical legacies 
of distortions of these institutions imposed during colonialism and Ujamaa period. 
6.7 Conclusion 
This chapter focused on the mode of institutional reform from Ujamaa to Ubepari with 
emphasis on the dynamics of reconstruction of the new institutional order and re­
constitution of social groups. It also reviewed some tensions which characterised the 
reform process. The chapter reveals that, reforms were imposed on society with 
discussions on what should constitute the new system and possible consequences of its 
functioning kept unknown to the majority of Tanzanians. The secrecy of reforms was 
accompanied by the continuation of unresolved tensions which became the central feature 
of the emerging neo­liberal order. These include: the tension between the “basic poverty” 
and “enforced poverty” conceptual premises; continuation of ethical duality­the existence 
of vague ethical postures containing capitalist individualistic ideals and goals along with 
the ideals of Ujamaa egalitarianism which became sources of institutional and policy 
incoherencies; alienation of previously excluded groups in formal economic engagements 
and increasing dependence on the informal economy; existence of pro­capitalist market 
economy and Ujamaa’s anti­market and capitalist tendencies; continuation of excessive 
administrative regulations and weak legal institutions and; introduction of institutions of 
capitalism and market economy without resolving the legacies of their distortions. 
The chapter has also revealed the separation between the party and government, a process 
which abolished the Party­centered accountability system established during Ujamaa, 
thereby creating fertile environment for corruption. Finally, the chapter provides evidence 
of the importance of internal factors in reform processes which confirms the argument of 
historical institutionalism that, in most cases, political actors respond to external pressure 
for reform by maneuvering and exploiting opportunities within the existing institutional 
order without necessarily creating new institutions. 
113

___________________________________________________________________ 
Chapter 7 
The Character of Neo­Liberal Institutional Order 
7.1	 The SAP and MKUKUTA: Getting Institutions Right and Rediscovering 
Poverty 
The period after 1995 marked the beginning of “second­generation” reforms which ended 
in 2005. It was a period characterised by fast­tracking and deepening market oriented 
reforms spearheaded by the third phase government, under President Benjamin William 
Mkapa. The reforms targeted the pillars of public sector management in creating an 
enabling environment for free market and private operations. They included privatization 
of parastatals, reforming the civil service, local government, legal and financial sectors and 
land tenure system47 . These were considered strategically important measures for 
achieving high economic growth and quality public service delivery (URT, 1999:8; 
2004:3). 
According to the government, the aim was to promote a market economy and re­organize 
the government by changing its practice of directly involving itself in the management of 
the economy to that of regulating the economy, supervising the market, managing the 
social affairs and providing public services. The goal was to create an administrative 
system featuring standard legalised behaviour, coordinated operations, fairness, 
transparency, honesty and high efficiency. The vision was that the public services would 
be transformed into an institution of excellence that would play a pivotal role in achieving 
sustainable national economic growth and prosperity and in the alleviation of poverty 
(URT, 2003:7). In general, the reforms were supposed to bring about five main changes: a 
shift from a government dominated economy to one dominated by market forces; a shift 
from an economy first target to the harmonious development of society and the economy 
by properly addressing issues, such as unemployment, the distribution of income, social 
credit, and market order, to provide a conducive environment for economic development; a 
shift from a discretionary administration to a service oriented one by improving legislation, 
putting the government’s work under the control of the law through proper regulation of 
the property, credit and contract relations in a market economy. It also aimed at 
establishing and improving socio­economic security within the framework of effective 
public services delivery; and a shift from an administrative control system to a law­ruling 
system. The idea was that government must carry out its official duties in accordance with 
the law as a way of ensuring fair market competition and proper behaviour of the various 
players in the society and; to establish a sound public administration and good governance 
to foster sustainable development. 
While the second generation reforms were on track, there emerged a consensus that the 
adjustment and stabilization measures of the first generation had resulted in erosion of the 
previous gains in social development (Wangwe and Prosper, 2005: 5­6). The government 
started to address poverty as the central feature of major policy actions. One early initiative 
47 Specifically, the reforms included: reduction of the scope of functions, size (number of departments and employees) 
and overlapping law enforcement. It also introduced executive agencies, decentralization of government functions, 
transfer of ownership of parastatals and commercialization of land. 
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was adoption of homegrown National Poverty Eradication Strategy (NPES) in 1997 which, 
was abandoned prematurely and its role subsequently overtaken by the PRSP process48 
Following the debates and controversies in the field of international development in the 
late 1990s with regard to the mandates of the Bretton Woods Institutions in the light of the 
deteriorating economic growth in developing countries, particularly in sub­Saharan Africa; 
the dissatisfaction and outcry of the international community and governments in 
developing countries on the plight of the poorest in the countries subjected to the Structural 
Adjustment Programmes were high. It was estimated that, by 1998, a quarter of the 
population of the developing world, i.e. 1.2 billion people, was living below the poverty 
line­ below US$1 per day in 1993 in purchasing power parity terms. Excluding China, the 
number had risen from 880 million in 1987 to 986 million in 1998. The corresponding 
figures for sub­Saharan Africa were 217 million and 291 million respectively, averaging at 
around 46% of the total population over the period49. Furthermore, there was a declining 
legitimacy of the World Bank and IMF with regard to their role in development and 
concerns about debt relief, which made the adoption of the new approach to aid and 
development assistance to less developed countries inevitable (UNCTAD, 2002:1; 
Christiansen and Hovland, 2003:vii &2­3). This culminated in the adoption, by the Bretton 
Woods Institutions, of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) as, to use 
Christiansen and Hovland’s (2003:2) phraseology, “a new piece of aid technology” or, as 
Spanger and Wolff (2003:i) called it, “a new development assistance strategy”, in 1999. 
Linking the question of debt relief, aid modalities and poverty reduction in developing 
countries, PRSP became a policy criterion for accessing debt relief under HIPC, bilateral 
grants and the low income country concessional lending streams of the IFIs (UNCTAD, 
2002:2; Christiansen and Hovland, 2003:3­4). 
Towards the end of the 1990s, poverty reduction became the prime objective of the 
programmes and operations of the IFIs in the least developed countries. Notwithstanding 
its emphasis on poverty eradication, participation and ownership, the policy contents of the 
PRSPs did not imply any fundamental departure from the mode of policy making and the 
kind of policy advice espoused under the “Washington Consensus”. The policy initiatives 
continued to contain all the main elements of the first generation of economic reforms, 
designed to “getting prices right”. 50 According to UNCTAD (2002:4, 6) the only 
components added were three. First, the consideration that economic growth was essential 
for poverty reduction and the recognition that growth may not trickle down to the poor. 
This led to emphasis being placed on policies that facilitate the access of the poor to 
human, physical and financial assets as a way of improving their earning capacity. In this 
respect, particular attention was paid to public provision of education and health services. 
Second, while macroeconomic stability and structural reforms continue to be considered as 
holding the key to sustained and rapid growth, it was recognized that stabilization and 
structural adjustment policies may have a temporary adverse impact on the poor. Thus, it 
was advocated that such policies should be accompanied by safety nets and targeted 
spending programmes to mitigate their possible adverse consequences for poverty. Third, 
there was a great emphasis on the importance of “getting institutions right” or simply 
48 Tanzania started to address poverty as a major policy concern in the mid 1990s. One of the early initiatives to address 
poverty was the adoption of the NPES in 1997. Based on Tanzania’s experience, it defined poverty as "a state of 
deprivation prohibitive of human life" and aimed at eradicating poverty by 2025. But it was replaced by the PRSP in 
1999, two years after it was adopted, to meet the HIPIC conditions imposed by the IFIs. 
49 For a detailed account, see UNCTAD (2002) and Christiansen & Hovland (2003) 
50 Based on key elements of the conventional stabilization and structural adjustment policies emphasizing the primacy of 
the market mechanism and poverty reduction through the liberalization and rapid and close integration into the global 
capitalist economy as the key to fast, sustained growth. 
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engaging in “good governance”. Hence, the importance of institutional reforms and the 
need for certain mechanisms to ensure rapid economic growth that benefits the poor. So, 
reforms were expected, under the new aid technology, to play a central role in the 
eradication of poverty. 
These international developments coincided with concerns of poverty unfolding in the 
country. The Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper was hastily prepared in 2000, through a 
technocratically guided and compressed top­down consultative process that involved a 
predetermined enclave of stakeholders51 with the aim of meeting the HIPIC debt relief 
conditions. The government viewed the PRS as both, an instrument for channeling national 
efforts towards broadly agreed development objectives and, an integral part of the ongoing 
macroeconomic and structural reforms (URT, 2002:1). 
The PRS(P) replaced the home­grown NPES and was linked to HIPC initiative, thus, 
remained questionable in terms of ownership and participation in the policy­making 
process. Its focus on a few “priority sectors” of education, health, water, agriculture, rural 
roads, the judiciary and land, according to the government, could not have a greater impact 
on poverty reduction. Therefore, a more participatory strategy was required. The first PRS 
were implemented from 2000/01­2003/4. Thereafter, the government carried out a review 
which resulted in the development of the second generation of poverty reduction strategy 
namely, the National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty (commonly known in 
Kiswahili as MKUKUTA). The strategy composed of three clusters: (a) growth and 
reduction of income poverty; (b) improvement of quality of life and social well­being and; 
(c) good governance and accountability (URT, 2005:1; 2008:1). 
During that period, there was a strong argument that the fast­tracking privatization and 
other reforms had led to a radical policy shift from Ujamaa to neo­liberal market 
capitalism, without preparation for the majority. In essence, according to some analysts, 
that led to de­indigenization of the economy by shifting economic control from the 
government to the minority non­indigenous business community (composed mainly of 
Asians and Arabs). 
According to Heilman and Lucas (1997:155), liberalization gave rise to a new group of 
business leaders (many with close connections to the ruling party) and influenced social 
relations as the economic power shifted away from an African dominated state sector of 
the economy to an Asian dominated private sector. When the state felt the need to open up 
formal linkages with the business community, the Asian community which continued to do 
business during ujamaa and had accommodated itself within the confines set by the state 
According to Alison and Ngalewa (2003), the preparation of the iPRSP was hurried and non­consultative and it was 
briefly written with the help of the Bank Staff, based largely on the policy framework set outside the existing policy 
framework paper (PFP). The lack of any real discussion around the interim document meant, however, that few national 
stakeholders were prepared when the full PRSP process began. From initiation to cabinet approval, the full PRSP process 
took only six months, the preparatory process was managed by the PRSP Technical committee, and the data collection, 
analysis, consultations and drafting processes were managed by a series of technical working groups. The two Dar based 
research institutes ­ REPOA and ESRF ­ were responsible for coordinating the drafting of several Chapters. 
Representatives from the World Bank and the IMF participated in working group meetings. The consultative process was 
short­lived, focusing on seven simultaneous zonal workshops on two consecutive days and a national workshop to 
discuss the draft. The participants were pre­determined and invited mainly from the central and local government. 
Private sector groups and selected government friendly NGOs were invited through formal invitation letters. This 
resulted in a insufficiently broadly based PRSP document, characterized by a lack of depth and breadth of understanding 
of its contents and targets, even among the government staff below the senior government staff who were directly 
involved in the PRSP process. 
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51 
was best positioned to take advantage of the economic liberalization which brought new 
prosperity for them. 
Thus, by putting more resources into the hands of the private sector, the creation of the 
dependence of the state on local business, the incorporation of business associations into 
the policy process, and the formalization of the relationship between the business 
community and the state (ibid., 162 & 166), economic liberalization opened up new 
opportunities for Asians’ political involvement. With the control of the economy and 
business, they were able to take advantage of the new system and expand their influence 
over the economic liberalization. This situation triggered African resentment of Asian 
traders (Heilman and Lucas, 1997; Heilman, 1998:158). 
It was argued, therefore, that the government should adopt a policy aimed at empowering 
the historically disadvantaged citizens (Simba, 2003:100) through the institutionalization 
of a process of integrating the indigenous community into the modern (market) economy. 
It was this debate which forced the government (since the early 2000s) to adopt an 
ambivalent indigenization agenda through a National Economic Empowerment Policy and 
various empowerment strategies within the framework of MKUKUTA. 
The “rediscovery of poverty” (Spanger and Wolff, 2003:3) was linked with the reform 
processes as a new focus and direction of both, the international development initiatives 
aiming at “helping people to help themselves” (ibid., p.14) and domestic socio­economic 
empowerment and poverty eradication efforts. This is where the issue of examining the 
nature of the institutional order, intended to assist the empowerment of the poor and 
alleviate poverty, becomes imperative. What is the nature and functioning character of the 
new market oriented institutional order bestowed with the role of empowering the poor and 
alleviating poverty in the country? 
7.2 The Ambivalence of the Neo­liberal Institutional Order (NLIO) 
7.2.1 Institutional Syncretism and Ethical Duality 
It can be argued that, syncretism and ethical duality occupy a central position as the 
organizing principles of the neo­liberal order. A syncretistic order is an institutional 
archetype which is a synthesis and reconciliation of the opposing forces of traditional and 
informal institutions with modern and formal institutions. The result is a form of an order 
which is neither traditional (informal) nor modern (formal­legal) but an incorporation of 
both. In this situation, a reform is one of accommodation and compromise and a 
reconciliation of the demands from the contending institutions. 
Ujamaa was a typical example of what can be called “neo­traditional syncretistic” order, in 
which traditional values, principles and ethical standards were brought forward in slightly 
altered form and applied to modern conditions as revived values. This revivalism was not 
necessarily a resurgence of interest in the past, but a revival of past moral prescriptions for 
application to modern behaviour. After the de facto demise of Ujamaa in the mid 1980s, 
Tanzania faced a situation in which institutions changed abruptly in favour of capitalist 
principles without significantly altering the Ujamaa principles, particularly their informal 
existence and functioning. The result was creation of a system made up of unstable 
synthesis of ethical standards of ujamaa and capitalism. 
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Table 7.1: Reflections on the Unstable Synthesis of Ethical Duality during Ujamaa

No. Ujamaa (Statist­Socialism) Neo­Liberal (Market Capitalism) 
1. All citizen together possess all natural resources All human beings are equal 
2. Economic justice is ensured only by the state’s 
effective control of the principle means of 
production 
Every individual has the right to dignity and 
respect 
3. The state is responsible for intervening actively in 
the economic life of the nation to prevent 
exploitation and excessive private wealth 
accumulation 
Every citizen has the right to the freedom of 
expression, movement and worship within the 
context of the law 
4. Support for collective/communal production and 
ownership of goods and services 
The right to protection of life and property held 
according to law 
5. Support for the existence of one party democracy 
6. It is foolish to depend on money as the major 
instrument of development when the country is 
poor 
7. Money is not the basis of development 
Source: TANU (1967) The Arusha Declaration and TANU’s Policy on Socialism and Self­Reliance; CCM, 
Dar es Salaam 
A key characteristic of syncretistic order is constant shifts in the balance of institutions 
between the two competing systems. In our case, this is the imbalance between modern 
(formal­legal) and traditional (informal) systems. The archetype is one in which the values, 
principles and ethical standards for social actions come from two competing systems­a 
fluid situation which allows a great deal of personal jousting and bargaining on the part of 
the social actors. The individual actor(s) can respond to a social problem based on modern 
(formal­legal) values and ethical standards in a given circumstance and, at the same time, 
respond to the same problem using traditional (informal) values and ethical standards 
depending on the changing circumstances. One example of this is how the issue of land 
ownership was legally addressed (Table 7.2). 
Table 7.2: Examples of Institutional Syncretism on Legal Response to Land Accessibility and Poverty 
alleviation 
Issue Syncretistic Response 
Ownership of 
Land 
The laws provide that foreigners cannot own land in Tanzania. Insofar as rural people are 
concerned, according to section 32 of the Village Land Act, a foreigner may obtain a 
derivative right from a village council. He may also have a right of occupancy or a 
customary right of occupancy from the market place. Thus, the harsh reality is that the 
laws do not protect the rural poor since they can actually be forced by circumstances to 
relinquish their means of livelihood 
The Tanzania investment Act, which guides investment activities, aims at providing 
statutory guarantees to foreign and local investors that would encourage them to invest in 
the country. The Act (supported by the Land Acts) provides that a foreigner can only own 
land if it is for investment purposes through the Tanzania Investment Centre (TIC). The 
land intended for investment is identified and allocated to the TIC, which is given the 
right of occupancy. Then it, in turn, grants investors derivative rights­a long term lease 
equivalent to ownership! 
Customary 
Right of 
Occupancy 
The Land Acts recognize that a customary right of occupancy can be registered and a title 
deed issued. It is however questionable to what extent the Laws recognize the rights of 
nomadic and pastoral tribes who traditionally believe that all land is theirs. In most cases, 
this category of people has been denied the right to use land because of the nature of their 
activities. 
Source: Ajakaiye et al (2006: 26 &28); Land Acts No. 4 and 5; PCILM 1994. 
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In terms of leadership, an individual leader can respond to the poor (or actors in the 
informal sector) in one way for a given social problem and address the rich (or those in the 
formal­legal sector) regarding the same problem in another manner. This phenomenon 
promotes what Miller called “speaking to two worlds in different tongues” ­ a duality of 
response to social problems based on dual ethical standards, which creates uncertainty, 
confusion and less common understanding of the problems and ways forward. So, for the 
poor, the situation is often in flux. The new guidelines, principles and practices for poverty 
alleviation are mixed and not fully understood. The leader himself is unpredictable; s/he 
will often vacillate between extremes of traditional (informal) and modern (legal­formal) 
values and ethical standards. Table 7.3 depicts some of these tendencies. 
Table 7.3: Some Reflections on the Syncretistic Leadership View and Response to Poverty 
Alleviation 
No. Issue Leadership View/Response Source 
1. On Ideological 
Stance & Party 
System 
The United Republic is a democratic and 
Socialist State which adheres to Multiparty 
Democracy. 
URT (1998) The Constitution 
of the United Republic of 
Tanzania of 1977: Article( 3) 
The Objective of this constitution is to facilitate 
the building of the…Nation of equal and free 
individuals enjoying the freedom … through the 
pursuit of the policy of Ujamaa and Self­
reliance… [with] the application of socialist 
principles while taking into account the 
conditions prevailing in the [country]. 
URT (1998) The Constitution 
of the United Republic of 
Tanzania of 1977: Article( 9) 
The CCM Party Manifesto 
2005, page 58 
2. On the 
Creation of an 
Inclusive 
Economy 
The economic reforms we have embarked upon 
are increasing wealth gap, and this could 
potentially lead to social stress and instability. 
The solution, of course, is not to take away from 
those who have, but to help those who are left 
out to get in by creating space for those excluded 
and encouraging those who do not yet benefit 
from the reforms to take advantage of the 
government initiatives taken to empower them. 
(URT 2005) Speech By The 
President on Inaugurating the 
Fourth Phase Parliament of the 
United Republic of Tanzania 
4. On the role of 
the Private 
Sector on 
Agriculture 
The objective of the ASDS is to achieve 
sustained agricultural growth through the 
transformation from subsistence to commercial 
agriculture. The transformation is to be private 
sector led... 
URT (2001:11) Agricultural 
Sector Development 
Programme (ASDP) 
[T]he private sector lacks the capacity to play a 
more pro­active role in crop development... 
The Minister for Agriculture 
and Livestock Development 
(see Cooksey 2003:78 and 
Footnote No. 42) 
From the institutionalist perspective, such syncretistic order cause difficulty and delays in 
decisions and sometimes, create conditions for corruption. Each development initiative 
usually needs an institutional re­balancing that must be reconciled with both traditional and 
modern ethical standards and values. There are no precedents or procedures that can be 
easily repeated, in the struggle for maintaining the synthesis. Actually, every initiative is 
adopted as “new” and there is little recourse to past failures or successes. 
7.2.2 Legal and Administrative Institutional Discrepancy 
Another feature of the NLIO is its imbalance between legal and administrative institutions. 
As discussed in chapter 4, the genealogy of the legal and administrative foundations of 
modern Tanzania goes back to the days of colonialism. We have learnt that the evolution 
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of the state, from Companocracy52 to Bureaucracy, suggests that, legal institutions were 
not created or adopted as instruments at the disposal of the Africans in their search for 
freedom and rights against the colonial state nor to promote resource accessibility, and the 
protection of their well­being. They were adopted as state instruments for control of the 
natives and their resources and as a means of exploitation, rather than people’s mechanism 
for freedom, protection and prosperity. The status of legal institutions was that of 
“administrative mechanism for rulership”. Laws were considered as the means for 
legitimating and enforcing administrative actions for the preservation of the interests of the 
rulers, rather than regulating or controlling them, in protecting interests of the native 
citizens against debilitative administrative actions as it is assumed in Western legal 
theories and practices. As a result of this, legal institutions became “secondary in status” 
and “inferior” to administrative institutions. Moreover, due to its oppressive and 
discriminatory character, legal institutions rendered themselves “useless” and therefore 
“illegitimate” to the majority of native Tanzanians. 
The elevation of bureaucratic regulations above legal institutions on development matters 
institutionalized the domination of bureaucracy and exposed legal institutions to 
bureaucratic manipulation and inferiority. Due to its inherent nature of multiplicity and 
volatility, the overriding influence of bureaucratic institutions have inflicted the Tanzania’s 
economic management system with uncertainty and weakened the legal foundations of the 
market economy. The current bureaucratization and institutional discrepancy of poverty 
alleviation are actually a reflection of that historical legacy. Since major anti­poverty 
initiatives are based on market economy and on the assumptions of effective legal 
institutions, these administrative tendencies remain the main challenge to reformers and 
policy makers. 
(a)	 The Legal vs. Administrative Order: the case of Land Resource 
Management 
We have learnt in chapter 4 that, the legal and administrative machinery governing land 
tenure in Tanzania has its genesis in the colonial period. The land management system 
established by both the German and British colonial authorities assumed that the 
indigenous occupants had no ownership rights over land, so the colonial authorities 
established a property regime in which the ownership and control of land was placed in the 
hands of the colonial state. The legal system developed by the British under the Land 
Ordinance of 1923, was based in essence on giving the state a free hand over land 
resources which was a necessary condition for the exploitative colonial economy. The 
legal institutions, therefore, were adopted to legitimize the state’s monopoly over land 
resources as well as the control and alienation of indigenous lands, unencumbered by any 
legal obligations. 
The Land Ordinance (Amendment) Ordinance of 1928 defined and recognized customary 
land rights (under the deemed rights of occupancy) without the legal protection, and 
declared all lands to be “public lands”, the occupation and use of which depended on the 
Governor’s consent. Despite the ambivalence over whether that legal provision 
safeguarded the customary rights of indigenous people, the Ordinance created statutory 
land rights for non­native occupants. The result of this legal discrepancy was the creation 
Companocracy is hereby defined as the rule by the Company’s men, based mainly on trade and economic principles in 
the early days of colonial establishment. Bureaucracy refers to the rule by Bureaucrats through administrative principles, 
adopted later on, after full colonial rule was established (see Chapter 4). 
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52 
of dual land rights (customary and statutory rights) subject to different legal system with 
consequent differential rights over land resources and the relationship between the 
occupants and the state ­ the ultimate owner of the land. Thus, while statutory rights 
enjoyed legal protection, customary rights fell squarely within the domain of 
administrative regulations and actions rather than being regulated by law. While the 
relation between the state and the statutory rightholder was contractual and regulated by 
law, the relation between the state and customary rightholders was only declaratory. The 
Ordinance did not define the rights of the customary land holders as against the state, nor 
were these rights entrenched in law in any form. The lands occupied by indigenous people 
remained public lands under the control of and subject to the disposition of the state. Thus, 
the customary rights, although recognized by law, were not protected by it and remained 
within the domain of administrative policy and actions (Shivji, 1998:3­4). 
This discrepancy was not without consequences. First, control of land resources was 
legally transferred from the native population and vested in the administrative authority of 
the colonial state where it remained until 1961, when it was transferred into a new 
independent state53. Second, in terms of legal and administrative practices, land resource 
management was regulated by the dual conceptions of justice and ethical standards: one 
rooted in the material conditions of the traditional (customary) social practices of 
Tanzanian society, the other based on common and statutory practices of Western 
(European) traditions (Table 7.4). 
Table7.4: Divergent Views on Rights and Justice in the Context of the Land Tenure Reform 
in Tanzania 
The Colonial Heritage 
“Dual Land Tenure and Ethical/Justice) System” 
Formal Institutional Order/Statutory 
Land Tenure System 
Informal Institutional Order/Traditional 
(Customary) Land Tenure System 
1. The 
origin 
Embedded in Western­English traditions 
& Statist law ­ Land Ordinance, 1923 
Embedded in African traditions & customs 
2. Principles All land in the country is the public land 
at the disposal of the Governor 
The land is the gift of nature 
No occupation of land is valid without 
the consent of the Governor (the 
ownership of radical title vested in the 
state) 
The principle that Society guarantees each person 
the right to the land needed to obtain subsistence 
The right of occupancy is contractual ­
the relationship between the state as the 
grantor and occupier as the grantee of the 
right of occupancy is contractual. This is 
what determined the rights of the parties 
to Land accessibility and use 
That the occupation and improvement of land 
bestows rights. This is what determined the rights 
of the parties to Land accessibility and use 
The relationship of the Statutory 
occupier with the state is contractual 
The relationship of customary owners among 
themselves and the authority is customary 
3.The 
Objective 
To serve the Economic and Political 
interests of the State 
That collective property rights or resource 
accessibility ensures collective socio­economic 
survival and security 
Source: Giblin, 1998:38; Shivji, 1998: 61­63) 
The result was a creation of a dual system of land tenure and justice organized 
hierarchically in which the customary systems of tenure and justice were considered 
inferior to statutory forms of land tenure and justice. The reforms and development 
According to the PCILM, the post­independence government inherited the conceptual and the major part of the legal 
framework of the colonial land ordinance virtually unaltered, and this continues to be the case to this day (URT, 1994:17) 
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initiatives from the age of fading colonialism (the 1950s) to the early period of post­
colonial modernization (up to 1966) were based on the assumption of the superiority of 
western systems of land tenure and justice. These problems continued throughout Ujamaa 
and later, inherited in the neo­liberal order from the 1980s, as the following interview 
quote illustrates: 
Perhaps let me say this...the issue of land and, most importantly, its ownership is 
something which has resulted in a continuous conflict between the government and people 
in many parts of the country. And the main reason is the difference in perspective and the 
criteria used as evidence for the ownership of the land. A good example is one case here in 
Kilimanjaro; during ujamaa, people were allowed to continue with the customary 
procedures of the use and ownership of land mainly through inheritance. They used things 
like burying their deceased relatives...father, mother or any important member of their 
family, on the borders of their farms as evidence of ownership. So, for a very long time, 
the society had recognized tombs as accepted evidence of ownership. Now, the government 
comes in and says...look here…what we need is a piece of paper which shows that you are 
the owner of this land and not a tomb! You see? You can understand now the differences. 
As officials, we are living in very hard times. These new laws seem to contradict the 
customary procedures and this is one source of conflict... (Interview No.12) 
(b)	 The Restoration of Traditions and Consolidation of Administrative 
Institutions 
The Ujamaa period was characterized by institutional rebalancing and rejuvenation of the 
traditional value system, which led to the expansion and consolidation of administrative 
institutions at the expense of legal institutions. As discussed in Chapter 4 and 5, Ujamaa 
combined in itself the notions of human equality and social justice associated with both 
Western liberal and African family­hood social life. However, the leadership (under 
Nyerere) believed that, though they sounded the same, the principles of human equality 
and social justice embedded in African traditions and customs were of greater human value 
than those of the western individualist liberal traditions imposed on Africa. The most 
cynical aspect of it was the belief that those value systems were protected by an alien legal 
system, which was nothing but “a pastime of layers” practised in “legal football grounds”­
the courts where (in practice) freedom, equality and property meant “inequality for the 
propertyless and freedom of the property­owners” (Shivji, 1998:66). 
The discretionary character of traditional institutions came to be associated with that of the 
modern administrative system inherited from colonialism. So, enforcement of many 
policies and development strategies became more dependent on administrative regulations 
and decrees than law. As a result, the concerns of social justice were not embedded in law, 
but translated into action by state or party or both, often contrary to law (Shivji, 1998:65). 
The tension between the concerns of social justice embedded in African traditions and the 
fears that the laws could frustrate those concerns (by co­opting and transforming them into 
individualist procedural rights in the form of natural justice), became one of the 
justifications for administrative interference in the legal system. Other justifications 
included: the need for protection of the country’s resources; the quest for unrestricted state 
resource accessibility and control of public interest; and socio­economic security for 
development purposes. 
It is interesting, however, that, despite the apparent disapproval of western legal 
institutions, Ujamaa incorporated both the statutory and customary land tenure systems and 
their differential systems rights. The statutory rights of occupancy were confined to the 
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government agencies and few private operators in the protected capitalist market economy 
in urban and some cash crop producing areas, protected by the statutory legal regime. The 
customary rights of occupancy were left to the majority rural and peri­urban poor 
inhabitants who were without legal protection and subject to administrative regulations. 
Since the private ownership of the means of production was prohibited and the rights to 
land resources only vested in the president (head of the administrative system) entrusted 
with control of the means of production and engaged in the direct production and 
accumulation of wealth, national resource management became a matter of administrative 
practice. The dominant assumption was that land resource management and customary 
land rights could be handled through administrative regulations and discretions (URT, 
1994:20) with little recourse to legal requirements. The dominance of bureaucratic 
regulations in resource management and organization of production did not change with 
institutional reforms to market economy in 1980s and became part of the new sytem. 
7.2.3 The Legal and Administrative Status of the Neo­liberal Market Economy 
For the past 25 years or so, the government has been engaged in devising comprehensive 
reforms that focus on the restructuring of the state and economy and the establishment of a 
property right regime for the protection of individual property rights, as a way of 
promoting effective functioning of the market economy. Despite all these reforms, the 
quality of institutions with respect to a legal and administrative regulatory balance was 
never attained. In other words, the legacy of weak legal foundation of the market economy 
and invasive tendencies of administrative institutions remain the main challenge to the 
reformers (Ajakaiye et al., 2006:28­29). 
But what is more exigent is the stereotypical view created by leaders during Ujamaa, 
which defined modern legal institutions as alien, individualistic western traditions imposed 
on Africa societies. They were considered to be of low human value (with regard to 
principles of resource distribution, human equality and social justice) compared with 
African institutions. This mobilization of bias inculcated in the minds of the majority of 
Tanzanians, particularly rural and peri­urban inhabitants, a distrustful attitude towards 
legal institutions, the same institutions currently upheld by the same government and the 
party as the key to effective participation in the market economy and to poverty alleviation. 
For example, while on the one hand, there were statist structures and practices abusing 
their powers against the large majority of rural and peri­urban landholders, on the other, 
the alternatives offered by the liberal western law and human rights­in its construct of 
individual rights and procedural notions of equality, freedom and private property 
ownership­ never appealed to the demands and interests of these groups (Shivji, 1998:67). 
The tensions and imbalances between the legal and administrative institutions reveal 
themselves in the questions of land dispute settling; excessive formal market regulations; 
private property rights and the legal empowerment of the poor; all of which form the core 
of anti­poverty reform programmes. 
(a) Land Dispute Settling System 
According to the PCILM, the principal machinery for settling land disputes is the judicial 
system, with the primary court as its focal point (URT, 1994:10). The primary court54 has 
54 The primary courts are the lowest courts in the hierarchy of judicial system in Tanzania established under the 
Magistrates Courts Act of 1984. They deal with criminal cases and civil cases it is a level where the Magistrates sit with 
lay assessors. 
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the original jurisdiction over land governed by customary or Islamic law provided that the 
matter concerns title or interest in land is not registered under the Land Registration 
Ordinance, and it has concurrent jurisdiction in land matters other than granted rights of 
occupancy. This means that, most disputes relating to rural land which is not held under 
granted rights of occupancy must commence in the primary courts which may also hear 
cases involving the short term (i.e. held for up to five years) rights of occupancy, although 
these can be commenced in district courts. Appeals from primary courts go before district 
courts and thence to the High Court and eventually the Court of Appeal (URT, 1994:101). 
However, the findings show that the administrative system has been central to land 
resource allocation and dispute settling to the extent of undermining the legal system. The 
tendency of the administrative arm of government to become heavily involved in the 
administration and allocation of land resulted into a mass of complaints involving land 
alienation being charged against the administrative authorities and officials (Table 7.5) 
Table 7.5: Spread of Authorities Complained against (in %) by 1994 
No. Region Civil Society State 
Authority 
Village 
authority 
Others 
Other 
1. Arusha 25 48 25 2 
2. Dar es salaam 29 59 6 6 
3. Iringa 18 60 21 1 
4. Kagera 37 45 10 8 
5. Kigoma 29 49 21 1 
6. Kilimanjaro 37 37 20 6 
7. Lindi 48 52 ­ ­
8. Mara 14 73 11 2 
9. Morogoro 30 62 5 3 
10. Mtwara 23 64 13 ­
11. Shinyanga 26 44 18 12 
12. Tabora 27 64 7 2 
Total 30 52 14 4 
Source: URT­PCILM (1994) Report ­Volume I (page 103, Sections 10). 
As for the dispute settlement machinery, the findings shows that, the organs of the 
executive, from village level to the Ministry, were heavily involved in attempts to settle 
disputes. A comparative overview of the extent of the involvement of different organs in 
the process of resolving land disputes (Table 7.6) shows that the incidences of involvement 
of the judiciary ranged from between 30 to 40 %, while that of the executive organs, 
including the Party, ranged from 60 to 70%. 
Table 7.6: Extent of Involvement of Different Organs in the Resolution of Land Disputes (in 
%) by 1994 
No. Region Village 
Authority 
CCM­
Organs 
Executive 
Organs 
Judiciary Administra 
tive 
Tribunals 
Other 
1. Arusha 16 5 42 34 3 ­
2. Dar es salaam 4 6 62 20 6 1 
3. Iringa 12 17 46 25 ­ ­
4. Kagera 9 14 40 34 1 2 
5. Kigoma 4 8 48 32 8 ­
6. Kilimanjaro 5 13 41 31 8 2 
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7 Lindi ­ 9 82 9 ­ ­
8. Mara 12 5 48 34 1 ­
9. Mtwara ­ 8 67 25 ­ ­
10. Morogoro ­ 9 62 20 6 1 
11. Shinyanga 16 24 33 27 ­ ­
12. Tabora 7 10 65 16 ­ 2 
Total 8 9 52 27 3 1 
Source: URT­PCILM (1994) Report­Volume I (page 104, Sections 13). 
The above figures show that, once again, it is the executive arm that is heavily involved in 
the process of dispute resolution. The involvement of the judiciary, the primary organ for 
resolving disputes, is less extensive than would have been expected. According to the 
PCLM, this could have been partly due to the relative inaccessibility of the judiciary to the 
large number of people but, it insisted, it was also due to the dominant tendencies of the 
executive arm to arrogate extensive powers to itself. The spread over all kinds of organ to 
which aggrieved persons resort to resolve their disputes, it argued, was also a marked 
feature of institutional incoherence and confusion, adding that: “it was an indication that 
there is no certain, known, accessible and generally satisfactory machinery for resolving 
[resources accessibility] disputes. Overlapping jurisdictions and powers­whether or not 
legally sanctioned­were one of the major causes of confusion and delays in the resolutions 
of land disputes” (URT, 1994:104 ). 
Similar observations of the superiority and invasive character of the administration were 
presented by Deborah F. Bryceson to the Commission in a form of a memorandum entitled 
“Tanzania land Tenure at the Crossroad”, in which she argued that, for several years the 
state, especially its local agents, have had enormous discretionary powers over land issues 
with virtually no counterbalancing checks, leaving rural producers with virtually no powers 
of address in disputes (Quoted in URT, 1994:115) 
(b) Excessive Administrative Regulations of the Market Economy 
Writing on marketing reforms and agricultural liberalization in Tanzania in the early 
2000s, Cooksey presented similar trends in the excessive and invasive nature of 
administrative institutions, indicating that little had changed in terms of the status of the 
legal and administrative institutional balance. 
In his review of the laws governing cash crop production and marketing in the country 
which were reviewed by the government in 2001 and which established the new marketing 
boards for Coffee, Tobacco and Sugar, Cooksey observed that, apart from being bestowed 
with the powers of registering and licensing growers, buyers and exporters for the three 
sectors, the boards’ actions were subjected to overriding discretionary powers of the 
respective sectoral Minister. And, in case the Board failed to perform any of its functions 
without reasonable cause, or to give effect to any of the Minister’s directions, the Minister 
could exercise disciplinary powers as s/he deemed fit against it and, on the failure of the 
Board to give effect to any of his directions, he could order any other person or institution 
to give effect to his directions. Furthermore, the Acts made it illegal for a farmer or group 
of farmers to grow coffee, tobacco or sugar without obtaining permission of the boards, 
and severe penalties for contravening these conditions were imposed.55 Thus, rather than 
Penalties for contravening these conditions range from Shs 100,000 ($107) for coffee to Shs 1 million ($1,060) for 
tobacco and Shs 10 million ($10,695) for sugar, and/or prison sentences of up to two years in all cases. For tobacco: ‘Any 
seeds or plants imported, bred or multiplied without the authority of the Director shall be destroyed by the Board at the 
expense of the offender’ (Cooksey 2003:77). 
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55 
facilitating private initiative, the state sets out with a disposition to control almost all 
aspects of crop development, with the criminalisation of unauthorised activities as the 
ultimate sanction (Cooksey, 2003:78; see also Chapter 8). 
According to him, it was unsurprising that the first attempt radically to reduce the role of 
the state in agriculture could lead to such a strong reaction from a large section of 
political­bureaucratic class and its clients in co­operatives and crop boards. For him, being 
accustomed to the exercise of discretionary powers in all aspects of agricultural 
production, the political­bureaucratic class at national and local levels had little experience 
of or sympathy with the logic of market economics (Cooksey, 2003:86). Moreover, the re­
empowerment of state agencies on agricultural production does not protect the poor against 
the depredations of corporate capitalism; on the contrary, it threatens to dis­empower and 
impoverish them even further (Cooksey, 2003:69). 
(c) The Dilemma of the Legal Empowerment of the Poor 
According to the government, the fight against poverty through legal empowerment of the 
poor is imperative if it is to be successful and sustainable. The main argument being that, 
clearly defined and accessible property rights56 create a better environment for investment 
which eventually, facilitates access to credit and bank loans (CLEP, 2006:21). But the 
challenge is how best to create a legal empowerment scheme that reflects the historical 
legacies of the legal system and the popular negative attitudes against its functioning. The 
experiences of the reforms, however, show that the realization of that goal is an uphill 
struggle, for the socio­economic realities and institutional experience are pulling the 
pendulum in the opposite direction. 
For instance; although, during Ujamaa, private property existed for the small business class 
(mostly Asian), their rights to private ownership, statutory status notwithstanding, were 
mainly guaranteed by administrative regulations. This was done purposely to avoid legal 
recourse in the case of the state confiscation of private property for the “public interest”. 
As far as “resource accessibility and ownership from below”57 was concerned, statutory 
(legal) regime was “artificially” made inferior to customary regime, but when it came to 
“resource accessibility and ownership from above”,58 the opposite existed. The two 
systems were mediated by the administrative system and bureaucrats who were at liberty to 
choose upon which system to rely, when, in what circumstances, and for which interests. 
This tendency had two effects. First, it denied the majority of Tanzanians the orientation to 
the application of statutory (legal) institutions in relation to resource ownership and socio­
economic security. Second, while denying the majority sustainable accessibility and 
orientation to legal institutions, it provided that same right and opportunity to the few (the 
Asian business class, top bureaucrats and politicians) who were exposed to it and who 
interacted regularly with private business dealers in both domestic and international 
56 “Social scientists define property rights as a bundle of rights, entailing the control and use of property; benefit from the 
property; freedom of transfer or sales of property; and excluding others from the property. To make this bundle of rights 
relevant. They should be enforceable by law. This will minimize disputes that arise during possession, transfer and 
disposal of property. So in essence, the building of a modern market economy and society entails promulgation of 
appropriate laws, a properly functioning and credible judiciary, and effective enforcement mechanisms.” (CLEP 2006:21) 
57 Resource accessibility and ownership from below represent a situation when the government wants the people to have 
access to land for state accumulation or for any other socio­economic engagement which seem to combine both 
government and public interest. Here the government allows people to enjoy their customary rights to resources. 
58 Resource accessibility and ownership from above represent a situation when the interest is mainly for the state and it is 
perceived to be contrary to the wishes of the majority citizens and customary principles. To justify and legitimize the 
state actions, legal instruments are revived in defense of the state against the customary principles. 
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transactions. So, two classes were created in terms of proximity to legal system: the 
majority (poor) located at the margins of the system and exposed to bureaucratic 
regulations and; the few (rich and privileged) located at the centre and protected by the 
system. 
Therefore, legal empowerment­oriented reforms may imply, in the first place, a de­facto 
overwhelming advantage to those with a greater historical orientation towards its 
functioning and a serious disadvantage to the majority poor who were denied the same. In 
this context, private property legislation result into greater exclusive than inclusive effects 
due to that historical discrepancy. And because of the inferior position to which the legal 
institutions had been subjected by administrative institutions, laws are easily abused and 
ignored by government officials, even when Tanzania is professing a commitment to 
making the most of socio­economic activities legal. 
(d) Underdeveloped Commercial Laws 
In theory, the law of contract and other commercial laws (being part of the market 
economy) aim at facilitating and enhancing economic participation. The main assumption 
is that the existence of protective and facilitating legal institutions enables people to take 
risks by soliciting financial capital from banks and other financial sources for economic 
ventures. Furthermore, the laws, it is argued, protect persons who own property by 
insulating it from commercial risks which encourages more people to participate in 
productive undertakings. Exchange and trade are also believed to flourish under effective 
contract laws (Ajakaiye et al., 2006:27). Moreover, Contact laws govern and regulate 
legally binding agreements and provide the parties freedom to make their own decisions 
regarding regulations that are required to be within the confines of the law. Contractual 
relationships between individuals that involve the exchange of property assume a 
commitment and adherence to the law of the parties to the contract; thus, a breach of 
contract leads to violation of the other parties’ rights, which calls for penalties or other 
remedial measures. But the contract and other commercial laws in Tanzania are 
rudimentary and have been introduced recently. The functioning of these laws is unknown, 
not only to the common citizens, but even to well placed government officials and high 
ranking politicians. Dubious government contracts, the government’s acknowledgement of 
its ignorance of them and regular initiatives for reviewing these laws are testimony to this 
abnormality (See Chapter 9). This problem was also identified by one interviewee, as 
presented below: 
You see, the way our fellow Kenyans were left to continue with their involvement in the 
market economy, and the way we Tanzanians were restricted to do the same during 
Ujamaa, it is very difficult to imagine a mutual cooperation...You cannot compare our 
capacity to compete with that of the Kenyans in a market economy! For example, when we 
began the liberalization and privatization, the issue of allowing Tanzanians to have a joint 
venture like establishing a bank was difficult. Even the government itself could not accept 
it. It always believed that Tanzanians couldn’t run the bank or any other big business. You 
could hear them saying: they don’t know how to run the bank. After all, they don’t have 
expertise and capital…what are they going to do with the bank? This is true! It is only 
recently that we began hearing about commercial law and courts or property rights. Most 
people didn’t know about these things at all. Now if you tell me…eeh that we are going for 
the East African Common Market…to me, it is as if we are dead on arrival! (Interview 
No.25) 
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sSo, the question here is: how can a person who has been kept away of these laws and never 
given an opportunity to reorient himself of their functioning be a free, independent party to 
a contract and carry out contractual obligations properly without breach and consequent 
loss? This historical fact makes any attempt to subject the poor to the logics of property 
rights and benefits illusory and defective. 
(e) The Influence of Informal Institutions and Economy 
The overriding influence of informal rather than formal institutions as well as the 
expansion of an informal economy is another dominant feature of the neo­liberal 
institutional order. According to Tripp (1996:44­45), informal economy refers to economic 
activities that are subject to regulation, but in fact operate outside government control. A 
further distinction can also be made between the licit informal economic activities which 
have a legal counterpart in the society in question such as doing any legal business without 
a license and the illicit informal economic activities which have no legal counterpart in a 
given society such as all forms of corruption and criminal activities for which one cannot 
obtain a license. 
Evidence that the informal sector was becoming a major occupation of the majority of 
people in the country became vivid in the early 1980s. Discussing the growth of the rural 
informal sector as an indication of the de­agrarianisation process, Bagachwa (1997:140­
141) stated that, from the early 1980s, wage labour began to assume an increasingly 
important role in the rural economy. For example, he argued, while the 1991 labour force 
survey indicated that almost one out of four rural households had at least one person who 
was self­employed in the informal sector during that year, the proportion of non­farm cash 
incomes in total cash income per household rose from 33% in 1977 to 38% in 1980 and to 
47% in 1993. According to him, the increased importance and growth of the early non­
agricultural sector was partly induced by the economic crisis and the deterioration in real 
rural official incomes. As real farm incomes declined, more people began to derive an 
increasing part of their cash income from non­agricultural sources, giving rise to a thriving 
rural informal sector (see also Tripp, 1997:58). In 2005, the government found that most 
Tanzanians operate outside the formal (legal) institutional order (Figure 7.1and Table 7.7). 
Figure 7.1: Percentage of Extralegal Entrepreneurs and Property in Tanzania 
Extralegal 
entrepreneur Legal 
Entrepreneurs 
98 % 89 % 
Extralegal 
properties 
2 % 
Legal 
Properties 11 % 
Businesses Property 
Source: URT­MKURABITA, (2005:3): Diagnosis Report Volume II 
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For example, by late 2005, 98% of all businesses were operating extralegally (a total of 
1,482,000) and 89% of all properties were held extralegally (1,447,000 urban properties 
and 60,200,000 rural hectares) (URT, 2005:3). According to the ILD, “extralegal” refers to 
economic activity that takes place outside, or is limited or handicapped by, the law, and to 
economic agents or business and real estate assets that are missing fundamental legal and 
economic mechanisms that not only empower all economic agents, small as well as big, 
but are indispensable for the creation of wealth, the elimination of poverty, and the 
foundation of an inclusive modern economy (URT, 2005:5). 
Table 7.7: The Size of the Extralegal (Informal) Economy in Tanzania 
Size in Percentage (%) Estimated Value 
98% of businesses in Tanzania (1,482,000 units) are 
extralegal 
81% of urban property in Tanzania (1,447,000 units) 
is extralegal 
94% of rural property in Tanzania used by private 
economic agents is extralegal. 
The replacement value of urban and rural extralegal 
real estate and business assets is US$ 29.3 billion 
34 times the investment in infrastructure projects in 
1990­2000 (US$870 million) 
9 times Foreign Direct Investment in 1964­2003 
(US$3.1 billion) 
6 times the total net financial flows from the World 
Bank in 1964­2003 (US$5.3 billion) 
4 times the concessional and non­concessional net 
financial flows from multilateral institutions since 
1964 
Source: URT­MKURABITA, (2005:1­2): Diagnosis Report Volume II 
The crucial question is: Why do most Tanzanians remain under the confines of informal 
institutions and are less entrenched in the neo­liberal formal (legal) market­oriented 
system? Is it because of what Huntington described as a “regressive and anti­market 
African culture” or David Hume’s prejudiced declaration that “Africans don’t have what it 
takes to get organized” or the “legacies of African colonial and post­colonial institutional 
distortions” (URT, 2005:3­4)? The weight of the findings so far presented suggests that the 
explanation of the aforementioned problem lies more within the historical institutional 
experiences of Tanzanian society. 
(f) The Institutional Experience of the Informal Economy 
The issue of how the poor in the informal economy have experienced the state in trying to 
survive is vital in understanding the contemporary tensions between the formal and 
informal economy and the policy ambivalences adopted by the government in an attempt 
to strike a balance between the two systems. 
As discussed in chapters 4 and 5, colonial Tanzania was characterized by two distinct 
socio­economic systems: a large traditional (informal) sector largely catering for the native 
population and a small formal sector controlled by government and foreigners. After 
adoption of Ujamaa in 1967, the economy largely remained in the two blocks, the formal 
sector being controlled by the government and state enterprises, the informal sector 
continuing to be dominated by the smaller native entrepreneurs and peasants. Above all, 
Ujamaa was accompanied by expansion of bureaucratic regulations, legal institutional 
malfunctioning and introduction of regressive institutions (Table 7.8) to control the 
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informal economy, which was described by government officials as the seedbed of 
capitalist exploitation and corruption. Since then, the relationship between the informal 
economy operators (the majority of whom were the poor) and the government has been 
that of a rat and a cat in a cage! 
Table 7.8: Selected Institutional Reforms Responsible for Suppressing Informal Economy 
and Private development Initiatives 
No Institutional 
Reform 
Impact on the Informal Economy 
1. The 1967 
Arusha 
Declaration 
� After the Arusha Declaration, the role of the private sector in the Tanzanian 
economy in general, was muted 
� Both formal and informal private small scale production were defined as sideline 
activities offering the potential for corruption and a “seedbed of capitalist 
exploitation” whose participants were nothing but exploitative idlers and disorderly 
people; loiterers; and unproductive members of society 
� Money was discredited as a factor in economic development and source of 
capitalist exploitation and immorality 
2. The 1967 
Leadership 
Code 
� The Leadership Code prohibited the involvement of both the Party and government 
leaders in the informal sector and in any other second income generating economic 
activities as a way of preventing them from engaging in capitalist production and 
the consequent exploitation of their fellow citizens 
3. 
4. 
The 1967 
Licensing 
and 
Regulation 
Act 
The 1972 
Business 
Licensing 
Act 
� They stipulated that, units with investment higher than 5 million Tshs ( $72,740 at 
that time) needed industrial licenses, while units with investment below this were 
required to have a certificate of registration 
� Induced the major constraints on small and micro­entrepreneurs through licensing 
and taxation regulations that were inappropriate to the realities of production in the 
country 
� The manner in which they were implemented became a serious constraint on 
informal business operation and disincentive to become a formal establishment 
� The excessive red­tape involved in the process of obtaining a business license, 
which could take up to a year, induced the entrepreneur to pay several bribes 
� When it came to taxation, the government placed the same kind of regulation on 
small­scale producers as large scale producers 
� They resulted in harassment by the local authorities of micro­entrepreneurs 
without licenses or proper registration, and who failed to meet the standards of 
public health requirements 
� The inconsistent and arbitrary enforcement of these measures, especially against 
the poor who do not have the political or economic clout to protect their interests, 
was especially resented – a practice that serves only to delegitimize the authorities 
and undermine their authority 
5. The 1975 
Ujamaa 
Villages Act 
� Effectively burnt private enterprises in villages and did away with the independent 
industrial cooperatives in the village 
� It prescribed that all businesses be owned communally 
� It had the effect of pushing small­scale and micro­entrepreneurs out of the villages 
and into the cities where they could operate without such legal restrictions, 
consequently denying the rural population of the goods and services, as well as 
entrepreneurial skills, that could have been passed on to younger artisans 
6. The 1982 
Cooperatives 
Act 
� The Act which permitted the formation of cooperatives only when there were more 
than 10 individuals involved but did not encourage autonomous cooperatives apart 
from those formed at the village level 
7. The 1983 
Penal Code 
� It expanded the categories of idle and disorderly persons to include: any able 
bodied person who is not engaged in any productive work and has no visible means 
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Amendment of subsistence; and any person engaged in lawful employment of any description 
who is, without any lawful excuse, found engaging in a venture of his own at a 
time when he is supposed to be engaged in activities connected or relating to the 
business of his employment 
8. The 1983 
Nguvu Kazi 
(Human 
Resource 
Deployment) 
Act 
� Micro entrepreneurs also bore the brunt of the Nguvu Kazi (Human Resource 
Deployment) Act of 1983 which, in effect, declared self­employed entrepreneurs to 
be “loiterers” and “unproductive” members of society, and sought to move them 
out of the cities into “productive” farming in rural areas! 
Source: Swantz & Tripp (1996:16­17, 18­20, 22); Tripp (1996: 1996: 43, 46­47) and; the Arusha Declaration 
1967. 
The orientation to this context resulted in two types of antagonistic behaviour: on the one 
hand, the officials in the party and government developed a strong anti­informal sentiment, 
especially towards self­advancement by small private businesses in rural and urban areas, 
in an attempt to suppress exploitation and corruption, and, on the other hand, it triggered 
counter anti­statist legal and administrative sentiments and distrust on the part of the poor. 
The result was that, the policy and reforms adopted by the government began to be 
perceived by the poor as another form of state interference in their private affairs, 
something that needed to be ignored, avoided or resisted (Table 7.9). 
Table 7.9: Reflection on the anti­formal (legal) institutional sentiments and distrust on the 
part of the poor 
Source Observation 
Tripp, 1996:67 
� The Tanzanian experience shows that the expansion of informal economy 
activities have been associated with the widespread evasion of and non­
compliance with the key institutional reforms and policy priorities. The massive 
scale of non­compliance and evasion make the cost of securing compliance [in 
terms of administrative and legal regulations] for the government extremely high 
Hyden, 
200716755 
� The vast majority of the rapidly increasing number of urban residents in Africa 
operates in the informal sector by doing their best to avoid the ‘‘claws” of the city 
councils and other regulatory institutions. A large percentage of these residents 
constitute the one­dollar a day population that the international development 
community hopes to reach through its interventions…Although this economy of 
affection may eventually vanish, it continues to be important as long as the degree 
of market penetration remains limited and the state control ineffective. 
A resident of 
Manzese, one of 
the biggest 
informal market 
areas in Dar­es 
salaam (Quoted in 
Tripp, 1996:55­
56) 
� I do not know why the government wants to license Shughuli ndogo ndogo (small 
businesses). They do not have any capital. Some with small businesses have lost 
their husbands and have six or seven children and can’t get employment. Others 
may be too old to work. They just want to make money to live, and then the 
government wants them to pay for a license. This question should be looked at 
again. Even the President has said that people should be left alone to conduct their 
small businesses, but it won’t make a difference because the City Council won’t 
stop their harassment. 
Even after the official recognition (from the early 1980s) of the importance of the informal 
economy (following the failure of the formal sector to absorb an increasing proportion of 
the labour force as a consequence of economic crisis of the late 1970s and early 80s), the 
government did not change in its efforts to try to control and regulate the activities of 
informal sector operators as closely as possible through licence, business regulations and 
taxation (Tripp, 1996:51­52). Moreover, there remained disagreement among authorities 
over whether or not informal small businesses constituted gainful work”. Thus, while many 
informal sector operators found legalization of informal activities an improvement to the 
past institutional and policy context, the harassment, corruption and interferences 
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associated with the new regulations posed a new set of problems which did little more than 
provoking resentment against the legal system and the administrative authorities. 
What is interesting from the institutionalist point of view is Tripp’s (1996:56) observation 
that, while the cost of a licence, harassment and corruption, is important in explaining why 
the poor did not like to formalize their economic activities, possibly even more significant, 
was their rejection of state control and regulation of a part of life that was considered their 
own. Any attempt by the government to regulate their activities was seen as interference of 
the right to control the means of subsistence, which could prove disastrous at a time when 
survival is so precarious. 
A similar trend was reported in the ILD­Property and Business Formalization survey report 
in 2005. The report indicated that, laws and regulations governing business and property in 
Tanzania, were either not provide people with the necessary mechanisms to attain high 
productivity and to generate capital or made it too difficult and expensive for most people 
to enter and remain within the formal business system (Table 7.10). 
Table 7.10: Constraining Regulations/Procedures Governing Business and the Costs Involved 
No. Aspect of Business Regulations/Procedures Governing the Aspect and Costs Involved 
1. To obtain a secure, 
registered legal title over a 
piece of property 
To obtain a secure, registered legal title over a piece of property, a poor 
citizen of mainland Tanzania must contend with two procedures that 
together can take upwards of 8 years, involve 68 bureaucratic steps and 
cost US$ 2,252. 
2. To obtain a building 
permit 
Since a building permit that complies with development standards is 
required to obtain security of tenure, the person will also have to follow 
21 administrative steps that take 257 days to complete, representing a 
cost of US$ 1407. 
3. To have a plot surveyed to 
gain formal access to land 
To have a plot surveyed to gain formal access to land in mainland 
Tanzania, an individual will have to complete 22 administrative steps 
that take some 84 days to complete and cost US$ 932. 
4. To transfer and register 
rights of occupancy 
To transfer and register rights of occupancy in cities other than Dar es 
Salaam, a person will have to contend with 19 administrative steps that 
take 380 days to complete and cost some US$ 1,443. 
5. Starting the operations of 
a private company 
The procedure for legally incorporating, registering, and starting the 
operations of a private company in Dar es Salaam entails wading through 
95 administrative steps in 24 government offices over 283 days, and 
paying a total of US $ 3,816. 
The procedure for legally incorporating, registering, and starting the 
operations of a private company in Mbeya involves 103 administrative 
steps in 24 government offices over 379 days at a cost of US $ 5,506. 
6. Starting up the operations 
of a sole proprietorship 
The procedure for legally recognizing, registering, and starting up the 
operations of a sole proprietorship in Dar es Salaam entails carrying out 
28 administrative steps in 13 government offices over 86 days at a cost 
of US $ 234. 
7. To continue operating 
legally 
The obligations and formalities that private companies must fulfil to 
continue operating legally involve complying with 16 different laws, in 
the best of cases. 
Source: URT­MKURABITA, (2005:2­3): Diagnosis Report Volume II 
Again, apart from these constraints, it was also found that, many Tanzanians struggled 
equally hard and resourcefully to evade the law or the tax authorities by inventing all sorts 
of clever methods to hide out in the shadows of the legal system, by either keeping a low 
profile of their business or operating at night and behind the doors. According to the 
report, it was virtually impossible for 90% of Tanzanians to enter the legal economy and 
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the obstacles that they would have to overcome to access the legal system and obtain 
organizational structures, credit, capital, markets beyond their immediate families were 
insurmountable. Thus, people decided to use an informal self­organized system of 
institutions that allow them to govern their actions independent of legal system (URT, 
2005:4 &5). 
7.3 The Paradox of Formal (Legal) Superiority and Inaccessibility 
The government interpreted the formal­informal tension in terms of the superiority and 
inaccessibility of the formal (legal) system and market economy principles. The informal 
sector was seen as lagging on account of its weak institutional foundation and the inability 
of its actors (the poor) to cope with the untenable legal institutional environment. Based on 
that belief, it initiated a series of measures aimed at empowering the majority of the poor 
citizens to participate in the national formal development processes by formalizing their 
property and activities. 
The government did not think that, the opposite could have been the case; that is, although 
the inaccessibility of the legal system is one of the constraining factors for the 
disengagement of the poor in the legal economy, it is probably its illegitimate and less 
trustworthy status, conferred on it by the poor in the informal economy which is the source 
of the problem. In other words, it is its inferiority before the informal system, which is 
mostly trusted and preferred by the poor, that explains the dilemma. While the government 
sees the legal system as superior, the poor see it as inferior and unreliable. Thus, the 
inaccessibility of the legal system is artificial. Its inaccessibility is subjective, mainly 
explained in terms of the silent strike and apathy on the part of the poor to associate with it 
and associated economy. 
This suggests that the problem, insofar as poverty alleviation is concerned, is not the 
inability of the poor to access the formal (legal) system, but rather, inability of that system 
to reach the poor and influence their behaviour towards a desired development path. Weak 
outreach of legal system and its illegitimate and untrustworthy status given to it by the 
poor is a challenge to poverty alleviation­oriented reforms. 
7.4 Conclusion 
The picture that emerges from the analysis is that of the failure of the reforms in “getting 
institutions right”. The central argument being that, the failure of reforms reflects the 
failure to understand what makes formal institutions self­defective. It is clear from the 
analysis that the development logics associated with poverty alleviation and embedded in 
the legal system and the market economy do not correspond to historical realities of the 
majority poor Tanzanians. The importance of reforms and the need for institutional 
mechanisms that benefit the poor is therefore, not yet in place. According to the analysis, 
reforms have resulted in an institutional order which functions against the poor and provide 
weak, contradictory and uncertain institutional context. Specifically, it has been learnt that, 
the reforms have failed to address historical legacies such as: institutional syncretism; 
ethical duality; weak legal foundation of the market and weak legal system outreach; 
bureaucratic regulation of production and market economy; underdeveloped commercial 
laws, expansion of informal economy; and stereotypical view and distortion of modern 
institutions. These problems constitute the functioning character of the neo­liberal 
institutional order and remain the main challenge to reformers and policy makers in the 
country. 
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______________________________________________________________ 
Chapter 8 
The Organization of Production and Conditions of Poverty 
8.1 The Character of Organization of Production 
As discussed in chapter 4, cooperatives, local authorities and bureaucracy have been key 
institutions of organization of production in Tanzania. Following the failure of Ujamaa, the 
government re­introduced cooperatives and local authorities in the early 1980s as a way of 
providing the producers with additional channels for participation and control over 
resources and production process. However, the reform from bureaucratic and statist 
single­channel marketing system where only cooperative unions, marketing boards, and 
crop authorities could undertake marketing functions, to a neo­liberal (market) model 
characterized by “neo­statist marketing system” where cooperatives and other private 
traders59 engage in a bureaucratically regulated market (Amani et al., 1992:8; Cooksey 
2003:70), did not resolve the tension between bureaucratic tendencies of control of 
production process and the need for promoting the autonomy of producers in a free market 
economy. 
The reforms towards a more market­oriented and private sector driven economy from the 
mid 1980s, particularly in agricultural sector, had little improvement on bureaucratic 
control of production process. For example, Samoff (1989:14) described the model in 
1980s as characterised by intensification of the effort to consolidate the position of the 
governing class and increasing technical definition of development rather than political 
mobilization for production. The government embarked on what has been wrongly 
described as “deregulation and decontrol60” of production and marketing system of 
agricultural products, particularly non­traditional export crops in 1986, food crops in 1989 
and traditional export crops (coffee, cotton and sisal) in 1993/94. The so called 
deregulation and decontrol of agricultural marketing was meant to pave the way for the 
participation of cooperatives and private traders in the marketing aspects of all crops in a 
competitive marketing environment i.e. through competitive prices and free entry at all 
levels of the marketing channel (URT, 2008:4). 
However, while these processes were taking place, the government continued to impose 
regulations on production and marketing system which, according to Amani et al., (1992:8­
9), not only created restrictive conditions and uncertainty among private traders and 
cooperatives, but also promoted grain trade which was biased in favour of the enclave 
economic regions that were relatively shielded from actual government enforcement of 
marketing regulations. 
59 In 1991, responding to the major financial difficulties of the cooperative unions, the government passed the 
Cooperatives Act, which recognized the cooperatives as private institutions owned and managed by the members (Baffes, 
2003:2) 
60 
According to Standing (2008:363) the language of deregulation took hold in the 1980s when the so­called Washington 
Consensus came into being, even though in the case of the labour market, it was a serious misnomer, since what the 
World Bank and others in its wake were proposing was a dismantling of protective regulations and a substitution of pro­
individualistic, pro­market regulations. In the last quarter of the twentieth century, there were more new labour market 
regulations introduced around the world than in any comparable period in history. 
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The call for “bringing the state back in” and “getting institutions right” beginning in the 
early 1990s was accompanied by re­empowerment of state bureaucratic agencies (the main 
feature of the neo­statist model of organization of production) which entailed a reversal to 
a more interventionist model of economic organization (Cooksey, 2003:70). Because of 
what was claimed to be absence of regulatory institutions to ensure effective and equitable 
participation in production process (URT, 1997:17, 2001:10, 2008: iv), various regulatory 
mechanisms were adopted. They included: registration, deregistration and inspection of 
cooperative activities; control of local authorities’ resources and functions and reducing 
them into mere bureaucratic institutions for organization and management of social service 
delivery and control of local population (Pallotti, 2008; Mmuya and Lemoyan, 2009:16­
18); control of traditional export crops through re­empowerment of export crop boards 
which taxed traders and exports and regulated markets (Cooksey 2003:70; URT,2008:4) 
and ; regular imposition of local administrative restrictions on private grain trade on the 
basis of what Amani et al., (1992:1) described as “outdated notions of food security in 
which local food exports ware to be avoided at all cost”, creating government anti­grain 
marketing tendencies. This problem still exists, as one interviewee complained: 
What surprises me is that, for a very long time, even this year and as we speak now, the 
government, I mean the Prime Minister…bans the sale of food crops outside the country or 
even outside the districts and regions. If you ask…they will tell you, they are protecting the 
farmers from a shortage of food or that the farmers are going to sell everything and begin 
begging the government to supply them with food! Why are they putting restrictions on 
famers not to sell their maize and rice while they are saying that Tanzania is a free market 
economy…what is free here now…eeh? They need to pay, for example, school fees and 
medical care and without money you will not get anything…but they still interfere with 
your business. When you grow these crops, you are alone, weeding alone, but when you 
want to sell, you have to get permission from the government…! I don’t understand this…! 
(Interview No.7) 
Other regulatory mechanisms are: the adoption of too intrusive licensing procedures 
imposed by Cash­crop Industry Acts through crop boards (Baffes, 2003:12); arbitrary and 
oppressive treatment of farmers by local authorities, inter alia through taxation; the 
proliferation of sector policies and strategies that privileged the state as initiator rather than 
facilitator in production process; and the continued practice of government­guaranteed 
bank lending to certain co­operative unions in enclave economic sectors and regions 
(Cooksey, 2003:69 &70). 
So in practice, production and marketing system have experienced more regulation and re­
regulation than deregulation or decontrol. Consequently, there has been excessive 
bureaucratic control and regulation of cooperatives which, despite the fact that they are still 
potential institutions of organization of production, particularly on access to financial 
resources (Table 8.11), they have been perpetuating income inequality (Table 8.20) and the 
legacies of unequal regional division of labour. 
In general, the analysis highlights multiple contradictions of neo­liberal (market) model. 
There is a tension between the need for creating autonomous cooperatives and other 
private organizations through market forces and the government desire for directed 
production through neo­statist re­regulated market. This dilemma has created confusion 
and uncertainty in production process. While the government insists on promoting 
cooperative production in rural areas, control of resources including land is still in the 
hands of the bureaucracy (see chapter 7). Moreover, the new model tries to inject market 
behaviour into rural areas, and influence production strategies in agricultural sector without 
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reference to historical institutional realities of organization of production. The peasants 
long considered passive recipients of bureaucratic instructions and directives, and who 
were socialized to believe that money and capitalism were immoral and sources of evil, are 
now seen as active and autonomous entrepreneurs, customers and consumers (Pallotti, 
2008:224­225; 227) in the monetary capitalist economy. The implementation of the new­
model is made more complex by the fact that, reforms have strengthened rather than 
weakened the hegemony of the bureaucracy in the management of the economy. 
Furthermore, far from being a neutral actor within the market system, the government 
continues to favour the dirigiste model of Statist­organization of production of the Ujamaa 
era, and is actively regulating production and marketing processes to secure the allegiance 
of producers and their associations to its economic interest even though this is likely to 
affect negatively, participation in production process (Cooksey 2003:85; Pallotti, 
2008:232). With excessive bureaucratic interference in the marketing system, producers 
have little control of future transactions (Baffes, 2003:13) and are vulnerable to both, the 
vagaries of the free markets such as manipulation of the marketing system by influential 
companies and dubious deals between private actors and government regulators, and the 
continued bureaucratic regulations of the market system. It is this situation which led 
Cooksey (2003:76 &79) to conclude: “the market is not so much liberalised as chaotic”. 
8.2 The Structure of the Economy and Patterns of Growth 
Since the mid 1980s, the main drivers of economic growth have been the “enclave” 
sectors, which have had little direct developmental impact on the poor majority. For 
example, while the mining sector has recorded the highest growth rate since 1990 (Table 
8.1) followed by tourism and manufacturing (although these had relatively lower growth 
rates in the 1990s) indicated large increases in the 2000s, the growth in agriculture 
averaged 4.8% only from 2000 to 2005 and 3.9% in 2006. 
Table 8.1: The Structure of the Economy and Patterns of Sectoral Growth (in percentages %) 
(1990­2006) 
No. Average Annual growth rate 
Economic Sector/Year 1990­94 1995­99 2000­05 2006 
1 Agriculture 3.1 3.6 4.8 3.9 
Crops 3.2 3.9 4.8 4.0 
Livestock 2.5 2.7 4.1 2.4 
2 Industry 2.0 5.4 9.0 8.5 
Mining & Quarrying 11.8 14.8 15.2 15.6 
Manufacturing 0.4 4.6 7.3 8.5 
3 Service 1.9 3.8 6.1 7.5 
Trade, Hotels & Restaurants 2.0 4.5 7.1 4.3 
Source: Utz (2006:21) and URT (2007: 44 & 45) 
However, despite its fragile growth and declining contribution to economic production, 
Agriculture is the second largest sector in GDP (Table 8.2) and the sector in which the 
majority of people, particularly in rural areas, are engaged. According to HBS 2007, more 
than two thirds of all Tanzanians are engaged in agriculture and related economic 
activities, with the large majority of them living in rural and other urban areas. However, 
while agriculture is the sector in which the majority of the poor are engaged, in terms of 
value added, it is the lowest compared to others. So, the main issue is not necessarily the 
number of people engaged in it, but the value added to the outcome of their labour which is 
important in poverty alleviation and has implications on inequality and insecurity. 
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Table 8.2: Shares of GDP by Economic Sector (Current Prices ­2001 series annual estimates 
in %) (1998­2006) 
Economic 
Sector/Year 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Agriculture 30.3 30.2 29.5 29.0 28.6 28.7 29.5 27.6 26.5 
Crops 22.9 22.6 21.7 21.4 21.4 21.8 22.4 20.5 19.5 
Livestock 4.4 4.8 5.1 5.0 4.8 4.7 4.8 5.0 4.9 
Industry 18.5 18.3 17.9 18.0 19.6 21.0 20.8 20.8 21.0 
Mining & 
Quarrying 
1.4 1.4 1.5 1.8 2.1 2.4 2.6 2.9 3.2 
Manufacturing 9.7 9.1 8.8 8.4 8.3 8.3 8.1 7.9 7.9 
Services 44.0 44.9 45.3 45.5 44.2 42.7 42.0 42.5 43.8 
Trade & 
Repair 
13.0 13.1 12.8 13.0 12.4 12.0 11.4 11.0 11.5 
Hotels & 
Restaurants 
2.8 2.9 2.8 2.8 2.6 2.4 2.3 2.5 2.6 
GDP(Market 
Prices) 
83.1 83.7 83.9 83.9 84.2 84.4 83.6 84.1 84.3 
Source: URT (2007: 40) 
The data in Table 8. 3 and 8.4 reveal that more than 81% of rural households and 37 % of 
“other urban” (mainly peri­urban areas) households are in agriculture, hunting and forestry. 
There is also a rising profile of “enclave” economic production and a declining 
contribution of agriculture in the economy (Table8.2) indicating that the structure and 
patterns of sectoral growth are skewed towards enclave production rather than agriculture. 
Table 8.3: Percentage Distribution of Economically active and Currently Employed 
Population (15+ years) by Main Occupation and Geographical Area (2007) 
Occupation Geographical Areas Total 
Dar es salaam Other Urban Rural 
Legislators, Administrators 1.4 0.7 0.1 0.3 
Professionals 2.0 1.1 0.1 0.4 
Technician and Associate Professionals 5.3 4.6 1.3 2.2 
Clerks 1.6 0.8 0.0 0.3 
Services & Shop sale Workers 27.0 20.5 3.6 8.4 
Agriculture and Fishery workers 5.4 38.3 81.7 68.1 
Craft and Related Workers 11.3 9.3 2.9 4.6 
Plant & Machine Operators and 
Assembly 
5.8 3.5 0.5 1.5 
Elementary Occupations 40.1 21.1 9.6 14.1 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: URT (2009) Household Budget Survey (HBS) 2007; page 35, Table 5.2 
Since economic growth is a necessary (though not sufficient) condition for sustainable 
poverty alleviation (URT, 2002:10) and that it is in agriculture and related activities that 
the bulk of the poor earn their living, this pattern of economic growth has serious 
limitations with regard to poverty alleviation initiatives and efforts at addressing inequality 
and socio­economic insecurity. Thus, unless reforms influence the structure and patterns of 
economic growth in favour of sectors that are mostly engaged by the poor, poverty, 
inequality and socio­economic insecurity will continue to haunt the country. 
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Table 8.4: Percentage Distribution of Economically active and Currently Employed 
Population (15+ years) by Main Industry and Geographical Areas (2007) 
Industry Geographical Areas Total 
Dar es salaam Other 
Urban 
Rural 
Agriculture Hunting & Forests 5.0 37.7 81.2 67.7 
Fishing 0.5 1.3 1.4 1.3 
Mining 0.3 2.6 0.6 0.9 
Manufacturing 4.4 3.9 0.6 1.4 
Production of Electricity, gas and water 0.9 0.5 0.2 0.3 
Construction 4.8 2.8 1.0 1.6 
Trade (retail and wholesale) 27.3 18.6 3.6 8.1 
Hotel and Restaurants 4.7 3.2 0.6 1.4 
Transport and communication 7.1 2.9 0.4 1.4 
Financial Services 0.7 0.2 0.1 0.1 
Estate Leasing 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1 
Admin, Defence &Public Safety 5.6 3.1 0.5 1.3 
Education 2.3 2.6 1.1 1.4 
Health and Social welfare 1.9 1.8 0.4 0.7 
Other Services 31.9 16.2 7.7 11.1 
Private household employing other persons 2.3 2.1 0.4 0.9 
Diplomatic offices and Foreign service 
organizations 
0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: URT (2009) Household Budget Survey (HBS) 2007; page 36, Table 5.3 
The question of most interest to institutional analysts is, “Why is there this inequality in 
sectoral economic growth?” This requires a detailed investigation of the nature and 
patterns of resource allocation as well as national, regional and sectoral prioritization. 
8.3 Marginalization of Rural and Agricultural Sector 
An important argument under historical institutionalism is that institutions provide 
mechanisms for the mobilization of bias. The salient impact of market­oriented reforms in 
Tanzania has been their tendency to push the poor out of agricultural sector or, as Hyden 
(2007:16754) put it: “a move out of agriculture”, by drawing them into off­farm petty 
businesses as a way of integrating them into the market economy. 
Although the government insists that agriculture remains the main source of livelihood for 
the majority, and its performance significantly determines the overall improvement in 
people's living standards, it also acknowledges that economic reforms have been 
accompanied by biased prioritization in favour of the non­agricultural sectors. For 
example, in 2002, the government argued that the fast growth of mining sector was mainly 
due to deliberate government policy that aimed at promoting its development through such 
measures as institutional, legal and fiscal support, promotion of private sector participation, 
granting tax holidays and sale and transfer of mining rights (URT, 2002:76). Such efforts 
were hardly observed in the agricultural sector, and it was this bias that pushed the 
Government to adopt the “Kilimo Kwanza (Agriculture First) Resolution” in August 2009 
with the aim of combating poverty through pro­commercial agricultural productivity and 
transformation. 
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The ambivalence of the government stance over the agricultural sector can also be 
observed in the differences in terms of the priority sectors between the MKUKUTA and 
2005 CCM Party Manifesto (Table 8.5). While, in the Manifesto, the agricultural sector is 
the key and targeted to grow at a rate of at least 20% by 2010, Mkukuta appears less 
ambitious and strives for a growth rate of the agricultural sector of 10% by 2010. When it 
comes to activities/measures for achieving growth in the agricultural sector, the Manifesto 
is far more comprehensive than the Mkukuta with regard to which sectoral priority is less 
important to the general economic outcomes. As Selbervik (2006:8) observed, generally, 
but perhaps particularly within this area, the Manifesto is specific regarding its measures 
compared to the Mkukuta. 
Table 8.5: Priority on Key Productive Sectors between Mkukuta (Government) and the 
Manifesto (the Party)(2006) 
Issue/ 
Document 
Mkukuta Position (Government) Manifesto Position (the Party) 
Priority of 
Key 
Productive 
Sectors 
� The manufacturing sector is targeted to 
grow at a rate of 15% by 2010. The 
agricultural sector is mentioned but 
with a less ambitious push for its 
growth: at a growth rate of only 10% 
by 2010. 
� The emphasis on industry is not 
explicit but the industrial sector is 
nevertheless seen as key 
� Improving the investment climate 
market systems to facilitate an increase 
in trade 
� The agricultural sector is the key area 
that is targeted to reach a growth rate of 
at least 20% by 2010. The 
manufacturing sector is hardly 
mentioned! 
� The emphasis on industry is explicit 
and seen as a key sector targeted to 
grow at a rate of 10% by 2010 
� Improving the investment climate and 
market systems to facilitate an increase 
in trade 
Source: Selbervik (2006:9) 
A similar trend is observable in the government report of the Tanzanians’ Perception 
Survey entitled “The Views of the People 2007”.61 According to the report (Table 8.6), 
despite the policies and strategies on agricultural development, 75% of farmers reported 
that the government provided them with no services whatsoever, while 76% of livestock 
keepers thought the government was doing nothing to help them. Moreover, there was a 
significant disparity between income groups, with over 82% of the poor farmers declaring 
that the state provided them with no services, compared to 66% of the least poor. 
Table 8.6: Government Assistance provided to improve agricultural and Livestock 
production (2007) 
Farmers in percentage (%) Livestock Keepers in percentage 
(%) 
Government 
Assistance 
Poor Middle Least 
Poor 
All Government Assistance All 
Nothing 82 76 66 75 Nothing 76 
Subsidised fertilizer 1 5 15 7 Extension advice 9 
Supplied improved 
seeds 
4 6 6 5 Price of animal Medicine 
reduced 
4 
Markets 2 4 3 3 Other 3 
Provides loans and 
Credit 
1 1 1 1 Loans /Credit to buy 
livestock 
3 
The views of the people 2007 was the largest perception survey conducted in mainland Tanzania by 2007, involving 
7,879 Tanzanians aged from 7 to 90 years from 10 mainland regions. The aim was to ask their opinion on aspects of 
economic progress, their standard of leaving, quality of and access to economic and social services, and trends in 
governance. 
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61 
Extension 1 3 2 2 Other Don’t know/No 
response 
4 
Other 2 1 1 1 
Don’t know/No 
response 
7 4 5 6 
Source: URT, 2007. Views of the People, pp.17 &19 
8.4 Regional Economic Disparities 
The mobilization of bias and marginalization in economic development are also dominant 
features of regional socio­economic development. According to Mpango (2006:63), 
understanding the causes of the geographically uneven distribution of resources and 
economic growth is vital for at least two reasons. First, it enables reformers and planners to 
unlock the secrets of regional socio­economic inequality and differences in national 
economic growth rates, aspects which are necessary for prioritization and promoting 
growth in poor regions while maintaining it in rich regions. Second, it makes it possible 
quickly to detect and contain extreme economic inequality among different regions which 
show the potential for social and political instability. The same reasons inform this brief 
analysis of regional socio­economic disparities in the country. 
Evidence from the Household Budget Surveys continue to indicate that poverty remains 
predominantly a rural phenomenon, and the salient feature of the economic structure and 
patterns of growth over the last twenty five years is one of persistent regional development 
inequality. The overall pattern of income of Regions (Figure 8.1) shows that the country is 
characterized by an uneven distribution of income across regions, with Dar es Salaam 
dominating all other regions. In general, the structure and patterns of growth and resource 
allocation have been concentrated predominantly in the urban areas, while rural areas have 
lagged behind. 
Source: Philip Mpango in Utz, Robert J. ( 2006) (ed); page 65; Figure 3.1. 
There are few signs that the regional development pattern has started to change, so that the 
rural poor are beginning to participate in a significant way and benefit from the current 
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steady economic growth. For example, the first observation that can be made when looking 
at the trend and distribution of industrial establishments and employees between 1999 and 
2003 (Table 8.7) is the large gap between Dar es Salaam and the other regions, which 
reveals the depth of regional disparity. 
Table 8.7: Regional Distribution of Industrial Activities and Employees ­1999­2003 
Region 1999 2001 2003 
NE EM NE EM NE EM 
Dodoma 1 141 1 10 1 16 
Arusha 50 6,018 49 723 50 2,103 
Kilimanjaro 37 6,778 35 1,333 36 2,016 
Tanga 53 8,506 42 688 43 948 
Morogoro 13 12,047 19 1,905 19 3,132 
Pwani 1 28 ­ ­ ­ ­
Dar es Salaam 213 21,593 263 6,562 298 9,213 
Lindi 5 73 4 29 4 29 
Mtwara 3 72 3 23 3 22 
Ruvuma 10 2,151 8 120 8 123 
Iringa 16 12,975 20 967 18 309 
Mbeya 15 2,398 18 1,279 22 1,168 
Singinda 2 50 2 19 2 49 
Tabora 6 988 5 303 6 284 
Rukwa 2 79 2 22 2 25 
Kigoma 2 143 2 113 1 66 
Shinyanga 14 2,451 10 767 10 788 
Kagera 22 1,474 28 304 26 296 
Mwanza 34 4,184 34 924 33 987 
Mara 7 633 11 35 13 329 
Total 506 82,782 556 16,126 595 22,497 
Source: URT (2003) Annual Survey of Industrial Production ­1999. Vol. IIA, Dar es Salaam, National 
Bureau of Statistics; URT (2007) Annual Survey of Industrial Production, 2001­2003. Dar es Salaam, 
National Bureau of Statistics; Note: NE=Number of Establishments and; EM=Employees 
Distribution of Registered Business and Workers by Region (Table 8.8) shows similar 
picture. In 2007, Dar es Salaam alone accounted for more than 42% of the total business in 
the country, followed far behind by Mbeya (7%), Shinyanga and Iringa (5%) and Ruvuma 
and Kagera (4 %). Interestingly, regional economic inequality is associated with a 
historical pattern of regional division of labour and differential integration into market 
economy, with most of the non­enclave regions, such as Lindi, Mtwara, Kigoma, Rukwa 
and Dodoma, having the lowest proportion of industrial establishments (Table 8.7) and 
business activities (Table 8.8). The reason for the differences in the business distribution of 
these regions can be attributed to the differential integration into market economy and 
biased policy prioritization of both colonial and post­colonial governments. 
Table 8.8: Number and Percentage Distribution of Registered Business and Workers by 
Region including Dar es Salaam (2007) 
No. Regional No. Of 
Businesses 
% Of 
Businesses 
No. Of 
Workers 
% Of Workers 
1. Dodoma 3,822 1.8 15,187 1.9 
2. Arusha 6,861 3.2 22,516 2.8 
3. Kilimanjaro 4,542 2.1 17,935 2.2 
4. Tanga 5,159 2.4 20,061 2.5 
5. Morogoro 7,303 3.4 30,546 3.8 
6. Pwani 6,065 2.8 22,789 2.9 
7. Dar es salaam 93,430 42.9 348,568 43.6 
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8. Lindi 1,963 0.9 6,473 0.8 
9. Mtwara 2,236 1.0 9,929 1.2 
10. Ruvuma 9,125 4.2 33,146 4.1 
11. Iringa 10,561 4.8 39,038 4.9 
12. Mbeya 14,456 6.6 40,706 5.1 
13. Singida 5,677 2.6 20,196 2.5 
14. Tabora 2,350 1.1 8,075 1.0 
15. Rukwa 4,844 2.2 19,046 2.4 
16. Kigoma 4,140 1.9 15,065 1.9 
17. Shinyanga 11,726 5.4 46,888 5.9 
18. Kagera 9,215 4.2 31,334 3.9 
19. Mwanza 6,120 2.8 21,670 2.7 
20. Mara 5,900 2.7 23,192 2.9 
21. Manyara 2,504 1.2 7,954 1.0 
Total 217,999 100.0 800,314 100.0 
Source: URT (2008) Business Survey 2007: Other Regions Report­ Vol. 1, pages 15 & 16 and Dar es 
Salaam Regional Report­ Vol. 1, page 12. Note. Percentages calculated by Author and may not sum to 100 
exactly because of rounding. 
There is also an indication that the main logic behind the reforms is to make the poor less 
dependent on land and agriculture and transform peasant smallholder practices into 
commercial agricultural production. Since the current poverty alleviation policies and 
initiatives are based on market production and business promotion, peasant farmers are 
institutionally induced to participate in off­farm businesses at the expense of agricultural 
production62 . The result of this has been a shift in agricultural production and resource 
allocation, from smallholder agricultural production to petty business. 
Table 8.9: Distribution of Main Activities of Adults (15+ years) in the previous Seven Days by 
Geographical Area (2007) 
Activity Dar es Salaam Other Urban Rural Areas Tanzania 
Mainland 
2000/01 2007 2000/01 2007 2000/01 2007 2000/01 2007 
Farming/livestock/fishing 3.0 3.1 26.1 27.6 74.1 72.5 61.8 57.3 
Employee ­ government 3.8 5.2 5.1 5.3 1.2 1.6 1.9 2.7 
Employee ­ other 19.1 21.7 11.1 11.6 2.1 3.1 4.7 6.5 
Self­ employed with 
employees 
5.9 5.4 4.4 3.7 0.9 0.9 1.8 1.9 
Self ­employed without 
employees 
17.4 24.7 15.6 21.7 2.8 7.1 5.7 11.6 
Unpaid family helper in 
business 
7.7 1.0 7.5 0.9 3.1 0.7 4.1 0.8 
House wives/house 
maker/household chores 
20.1 21.7 14.7 10.3 6.0 5.3 8.3 7.8 
Student 11.5 8.0 9.8 10.8 6.8 4.2 7.6 5.8 
Not active 11.5 9.2 5.7 8.1 3.1 4.6 4.1 5.7 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: URT (2009) Household Budget Survey (HBS) 2007: page 38, Table 5.6. 
For example, one of the main objective of Property and Business Formalization Programme adopted by the 
government in 2005 is to empower the marginalized majority in the informal sector including subsistence agriculture by 
formalizing their properties mainly land, so that they can use it as a collateral to access credits and other financial 
services in order to establish and expand their “business”. In 2006 the government established a fund of Tsh. 21billion 
famously known as “J.K Fund” (J.K stands for current President’s names­Jakaya Kikwete) which aimed at promoting 
small­business as part of economic empowerment of the poor. 
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62 
According to HBS 2007, while farming and related activities continue to dominate the 
activities of households’ adult members in rural areas, there has been a decline in the 
number of adults involved in farming and related activities in rural areas (Table 8.9), from 
74.1 % in 2000/01 to 72.5% in 2007. The decline in the engagement in farming and related 
activities has also been accompanied by a significant increase in involvement in business 
activities in rural areas, from 39.6 % in 2000/01 to 44.9% in 2007 (URT, 2009:40). A 
move out of agriculture has a potential for diversification into off­farm sources of income 
and marginalization of agriculture. This is not to imply that off­farm business production is 
wrong, but it does suggest that, since the majority of both the poor live in rural areas and 
depend on agriculture as the main sector and source of their income, and due to the fact 
that historically, they have been less acquainted with business and that the existing 
institutional order work against them, diverting them out of agriculture unprepared may 
subject them to idleness, socio­economic vulnerability and insecurity. One interviewee 
made the following observation regarding this problem: 
“...there is something which is worrying me but which the government is doing nothing 
about: many people are idle and disengaged in production. In both the rural and urban 
areas, you will find people hanging around doing nothing and, when you ask them, what 
are you doing today, they will tell you “nipo tu bwana”...(meaning, I am just hanging 
around…). Many people are idle...not doing anything! Imagine! And we are crying…our 
country is poor! (Interview No.19) 
8.5 Accessibility to Productive Resources 
The current initiatives in the struggle against poverty place considerable emphasis on the 
ownership and access to resources that can be put to productive use and by which the poor 
can construct their own routes out of poverty. In this respect, the alleviation of poverty and 
severe inequality and insecurity depend, to a large extent, on how the poor are enabled to 
have access to productive resources to meet the increasing socio­economic needs and to 
institutions of protection from the loss of the acquired resources and insecurities associated 
with it. When accessibility to productive resources is cramped by malfunctioning markets 
and disabling or regressive institutional order, then climbing out of poverty, inequality and 
insecurity becomes difficulty. 
(a) Financial Institutional Constraints 
One objective of the reforms is to broaden the base of economic engagement by opening 
up more economic opportunities for the majority of people who have been historically 
locked outside the privileged circles of the economy. The focus is to bring more people 
outside the hitherto privileged groups to acquire the means necessary for development. 
Access to financial resources in the form of credits or loans is one of those means. 
However, the current character of financial sector development and credit flows among the 
priority sectors of the poor raises questions as to whether it facilitates or inhibits poverty 
alleviation. 
Table 8.10: Number of Agricultural Households Receiving Credit (from all sources) by Sex of 
household head ­2002/03 
Household Receiving Credit Not 
Receiving 
Credit 
Total Agriculture 
Household Male % Female % Total 
Receiving 
Credit 
123,271 83 25,750 17 149,020 4,656,294 4,805,315 
Source: URT, 2006: National Sample Census for Agriculture (NSCA) 2002/2003: pg 108. 
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According to the NSCA, 2002/2003 (Table 8.10), very few households in Tanzania have 
access to credit. Out of the 4,805,315 agricultural households, only 3% had access to 
credit. Of all households receiving credit, 83% were men headed households and only 17% 
were women headed ones. While imperative under the current poverty alleviation 
initiatives, access to credit via financial institutions (commercial banks) was the least 
frequently mentioned source by households, scoring only 2% (Table 8.11). Interestingly, 
cooperatives were mentioned as the main source of credit to majority households. Their 
contribution to credit accessibility indicates that, despite their inferior position they occupy 
within the current system, they remain important institutions in the struggle against 
poverty. 
Table 8.11: Number of Agricultural Households Receiving Credit by Main Source of Credit 
in Tanzania Mainland­2002/03 
Family 
and 
Relativ 
es 
Commer 
cial 
Bank 
Co­
operativ 
e 
Saving 
& 
Credit 
Society 
Trader 
/ 
Trade 
store 
Private 
Individu 
al 
Religious 
Organization/N 
GO/ 
Project 
Othe 
r 
Total 
47,722 3,340 52,324 12,434 13,281 5,845 11,317 2,890 149,1 
53 
% 32 2 35 8 9 4 8 2 100 
Source: URT 2006 National Sample Census for Agriculture (NSCA) 2002/2003: Smallholder Household Characteristics 
and Access to Services and Natural Resources; National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), Dar es as Salaam; pg 109. 
The main reason for the limited access to credit was lack of awareness (Table 8.12) of the 
means for accessing credit (37%) and the usefulness in agricultural production (22.2%). 
There might be different interpretations of this, but the most appealing factors include the 
differential exposure to modern financial institutions due to biased regional distribution of 
modern economic facilities associated with the colonial and post­colonial enclave modes 
of production and the mobilization of bias against the use value of money and the role of 
financial institutions, as championed by the Ujamaa economic architects. According to the 
NSCA (2002/03), while very few agricultural households had access to credit, fewer 
women headed households (17%) received credit as compared to men (83%) (URT, 
2006:25). As discussed in Chapter 4, being based on traditional­patriarchal extended 
family organization of production, Ujamaa inculcated differential gendered perception of 
and access to financial institutions between men and women. Therefore, the problem of 
access to credit reflect differential exposure to these institutions based on gender 
categorization in which women were confined to domestic while men to economic 
activities. This deferential socialization to financial institutions created what we can call 
“financial illiteracy” more among women than men as the legacies of Ujamaa. In that 
context, financial illiteracy should be seen as part of the problem associated with Ujamaa 
institutional reforms and social group economic reorientations in which men and women 
occupied different positions. The financial institutions were developed to bypass the 
majority in favour of the few in enclave economies most of whom were men creating 
“double exclusion” of women: as part of the majority poor (both men and women) and as a 
specific gender category versus men within the poor. 
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Table 8.12: Number of Agricultural Households reporting the main reasons for Not Using 
Credit on the Tanzanian Mainland­2002/03 
Not Not Did not Interest Did not Difficu Credit Othe Don’t Total 
neede availab want to rate know lt Grante r know 
d le go into /cost too how to Bureau d too about 
debt high get cracy late credit 
credit 
193,1 895,15 467,042 135,713 1,764,65 118,73 30,184 15,83 1,035,6 4,656 
28 6 9 7 3 04 ,055 
% 4.1 19.2 10.0 2.9 37.9 2.6 0.6 0.3 22.2 100.0 
URT 2006 National Sample Census for Agriculture (NSCA) 2002/2003: pg 110. 
In 2003, the Government declared that “there has been no improvement in the access to 
credit in the last 10 years” (URT 2006: 25) in the country. More than four years later, 
patterns in the availability of agricultural credit are unchanged. According to the 
government report on the VOP 2007 (Table 8.13), the majority of farmers saw most of the 
agricultural credit services, agencies or markets as not changing significantly and many 
more saw a downward rather than an upward trend. In particular, poor farmers were more 
critical of the trends than the better off. According to them, while availability of credit 
improved by 3%, no improvement whatsoever was noticed regarding the cost of credit in 
terms of interest and repayment schedules. Based on the findings, and the context of this 
study, it can be argued that financial institutional reforms have not been potential in 
improving productive capacity of the poor through access to credit which is important to 
poverty alleviation. 
Table 8.13: Trends in the AAC, Changes in the last Three Years, by Poverty Headcount 
Poor (Percentage %) Middle (Percentage %) Least Poor (Percentage %) 
AA 
C 
IM 
PT 
NCG GTW DK/ 
NOP 
IMP 
T 
NC 
G 
GT 
W 
DK/ 
NO 
IMP 
T 
NC 
G 
GT 
W 
DK/ 
NO 
AC 3 21 40 37 4 23 42 32 7 23 41 28 
CC 0 15 27 57 2 15 32 52 2 16 31 51 
Source: URT, 2007.Views of the People, p.16;Note: AAC= Availability of Agricultural Credit; 
AC=Availability of Credit; Cost of Credit; IMPT=Improvement; NCG= No Change; GTW= Getting Worse; 
DK/NOP=Don’t Know / No Opinion. 
(b) Legal and Administrative Constraints 
The current laws and regulations governing economic aspects, particularly business and 
property, either do not provide people with the necessary mechanisms for attaining high 
productivity and generating capital or make it too difficult and too expensive for most to 
enter and remain within the market system, no matter how hard they try (URT, 2005:2). 
For example, to gain access to debt commercial court services (Table 8.14), one has to pass 
through 9 stages, involving 96 steps in not less than 390 waiting days, costing more than 
$11,000. Soliciting land delivery and building permits (Table 8.15) involves 13 stages, 68 
steps and 2,883 waiting days, accompanied by a cost of more than $2,250. 
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Table 8.14: Selected Regulations /Procedures Governing Establishment of Business ­ Tanzania 
Mainland­(2005) 
Procedure Stages Steps Waiting time to complete 
the procedure 
Present value 
of total costs 
(days) (US$) 
1. Legal Incorporation of a 
Public Company 
XIV 117 341 $6,290 
2. Object tax matters III 76 378 $1,378 
3. Movable Guarantees VI 64 297 $1,674 
4. Debt Magistrate Court XI 97 616 $4,745 
5. Debt Commercial Court IX 96 390 $11,167 
6. Customary Law ­Loan III 16 49 $121 
7. Objecting Administrative 
decisions 
III 15 570 $1,939 
8. Arbitration Civil Court II 13 67 $656 
9. Bankruptcy V 33 252 $2,599 
Source: URT­MKURABITA, (2005): Diagnosis Report Volume V­B 
In general, these findings correspond to the observation made by Ellis and Mdoe in 2003, 
that the institutional environment facing, particularly, rural citizens did not foster the 
flourishing of diverse activities required for rapid poverty reduction, and that the legacy of 
the past in the form of the obstructive public agency responses to business, trade and 
exchange continued to impact on socio­economic initiatives of rural citizens. It was only a 
small minority with the requisite personal networks and contacts in the local or national 
public sector who were able to avoid or rise above the legal restrictions with which most 
rural citizens were obliged to comply (Ellis and Mdoe, 2003:1379­1380). 
Table 8.15: Regulations /Procedures Governing Real Estate – the Tanzanian Mainland­(2005) 
Procedure Stages Steps Waiting time to 
complete the 
procedure 
Present value 
of total costs 
(days) (US$) 
1. Land Delivery & Building Permit XIII 68 2883 $2,252 
2. Property Transfer III 19 380 $1,443 
3. Land Allocation IX 47 2626 $937 
4. Building Permit IV 21 257 $1,407 
5. Land Survey III 22 84 $932 
6. Mortgage Claims V 25 752 $4,571 
7. Attaching Unregistered Property II 10 76 $2,904 
Source: URT­MKURABITA, (2005): Diagnosis Report Volume V­A 
8.6 Poverty and Inequality in Production 
The country’s experience shows a small decline of income poverty and a mixed picture of 
trends in inequality. According to the findings from the HBS, the 1990s and 2000s have 
not brought significant gains in the alleviation of income poverty for the majority of the 
population. Table 8.16, which shows the percentage of the population living below the 
poverty lines in the three surveys, reveals that some 34% of people fell below the basic 
needs line and 17% below the food poverty line in 2007. Nationally, and in rural areas, 
there has been a small decline since 2000/01 in the proportion living below both poverty 
lines. In Dar es Salaam and other urban areas, however, there has been very little change in 
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the proportion living below the food poverty line, which identifies the very poorest. The 
overall fall in poverty levels since 2000/01 is not significant, and poverty remains highest 
in rural areas, where 38% of the population falls below the basic needs poverty line (URT, 
2009:48­49). 
Table 8.16: Incidence and Depth of Poverty in Tanzania­1991­2007 
Year Dar es salaam Other Urban Rural Areas Tanzanian 
Mainland 
PL PBPL PL PBPL PL PBPL PL PBPL 
Food 1991/92 3,031 13.6 2,387 15.0 1,958 23.1 2,083 21.6 
2000/01 6,719 7.5 5,607 13.2 5,107 20.4 5,295 18.7 
2007 13,098 7.4 10,875 12.9 9,574 18.4 10,219 16.6 
Basic 1991/92 4,040 28.1 3,182 28.7 2,611 40.8 2,777 38.6 
Needs 2000/01 9,203 17.6 7,680 25.8 6,996 38.7 7,253 35.7 
2007 17,941 16.4 14,896 24.1 13,114 37.6 13,998 33.6 
Source: URT (2009) Household Budget Survey (HBS) 2007: page 48­ Table 7.1) and page 49 (Table 7.2). 
NOTE: PL= Poverty line per Adult Equivalent for 28 days (TZ Shs); PBPL=Percentage of Population below 
PL. 
Although the proportion of the population who is poor has declined, the absolute number 
of individuals who are poor will have increased since 2000/01 because of population 
growth (Table 8.17). Using official projections, which imply about 20% growth in the 
population since 2000/01, 12.9 million people are living below the basic needs poverty 
line, compared with 11.4 million in 2000/01. Poverty remains an overwhelmingly rural 
phenomenon, where about 83% of the poor are located (URT, 2009:48­49). 
Table 8.17: Distribution of the Poor in Tanzania (2007) 
Dar es salaam Other Urban Rural Areas Tanzanian 
Mainland 
2000/01 20007 2000/01 20007 2000/01 20007 2000/01 20007 
Total Population 
‘000 
1,845 2,882 4,405 6,778 25,650 28,632 31,900 38,291 
Share of Population 5.8 7.5 13.8 17.7 80.4 74.8 100 100 
Number of Poor: 
Food poverty ‘000 138 212 581 874 5,233 5,267 5,965 6,353 
Basic Needs ‘000 325 474 1,136 1,636 9,926 10,760 11,388 12,870 
Percentage of Poor: 
Food Poverty 2.3 3.3 9.7 13.8 87.7 82.9 100 100 
Basic Needs 2.9 3.7 10.0 12.7 87.2 83.6 100 100 
Source: URT (2009) Household Budget Survey (HBS) 2007; page 51, Table 7.3. 
While the picture that is reflected from data shows that the problem of poverty is not 
severe and that things are becoming much better, there are issues that need to be taken into 
account before one can be sure of what is seen in these data. As a requirement for 
quantitative poverty analysis, two pre­determined absolute poverty lines were used: the 
Food Poverty Line (reflecting estimates of the costs of a set of basic foods) and the Basic 
Needs Poverty Line (providing estimates of other non­food expenditures). Despite the fact 
that, setting a universal quantitative set of fixed basic and non­basic food expenditures as a 
measure of poverty is controversial, Meena (2008:14) argued that, the poor do not define 
poverty in terms of income alone. Instead, they emphasize the importance of access to and 
control over productive resources such as land, inputs, and production oriented services, as 
well as entitlements to social security. In other words, she insisted, the poor would tend to 
focus on conditions which have led to their inability to earn a decent income, the 
amelioration of which will enable them to improve their living conditions. This argument 
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is in line with the enforced poverty concept prevalent during ujamaa. We have seen in 
chapter 7 and in some section of this chapter how reforms have negatively affected the 
poor in terms of access to productive resources. The overwhelming evidences on 
institutional constraints and marginalization of the poor contradict with the relatively low 
levels of poverty presented by poverty line measures. Moreover, there have been changes 
to poverty lines (Table 8.16) at both national and regional levels and the government 
acknowledged that, poverty estimates in 2000 was more accurate than in the previous years 
(URT, 2001:79), a fact which makes it difficult to conclude that what is presented in the 
data is the actual picture of the situation. 
Furthermore, from social income perspective, the monetary income measure of poverty 
undermines the complexity of poverty analysis. According to this perspective, to survive in 
every society an individual must have some source of income, but what counts as income 
is more than currently perceived in poverty line based analysis. Any individual in any 
society, it is argued, has up to six sources of income which together constitute the 
person’s social income(SI): the income from Self­production (whether self consumed , 
bartered or sold) (SP); the money wage or income received from work (W); the value of 
support provided by the family or the community (CB); the amount of benefits provided by 
the enterprise in which the person might be working (EB); the value of state benefits 
(insurance benefits or other transfers, including subsidies paid directly to workers or 
through firms to them, and the value of social services ( SB) and ; private income benefits 
from investments including private social protection (PB).Therefore, social income (SI)= 
SP+W+CB+EB+SB+PB (Standing, 2004:198, 2009:9). In Tanzania, like in many African 
countries, CB source is higher than any other sources of income (Standing, 2004:200) and 
are not easily captured by poverty line measures. This entails that, the food and basic 
needs approach to poverty analysis leaves out more of other needs in the society. However, 
in a country in which for several years most of the basic needs were provided for free, 
expenditure on the part of the poor does not only indicate a burden rather than a relief, but 
also a sacrifice on other equally important social services. 
Table 8.18: Gini Coefficients 
Dar es salaam Other 
Urban 
Rural Areas Tanzanian Mainland 
1991/92 0.30 0.35 0.33 0.34 
2000/01 0.36 0.36 0.33 0.35 
2007 0.34 0.35 0.33 0.35 
Source: URT, 2009. Household Budget Survey­2007, p.51, Table 7.4 
The figures on income inequality presented in Tables 8.18 and 8.19 show small changes in 
the status and patterns of inequality in the country. Inequality is highest in urban areas 
outside Dar es Salaam and lowest in rural areas. In terms of levels of consumption per 
capita, the poorest fifth of the population accounts for just 7% of total consumption 
expenditure, while the richest fifth accounts for 42%. The ratio shows a slight fall since 
2000/01, most markedly in other urban areas, although the changes in the shares are small. 
In general, for Mainland Tanzania and rural areas, both measures show that income 
inequality unchanged since 2000/01 (URT, 2009:51). 
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Table 8.19: Percentage Share of Consumption Expenditure by Quintile ­2007

Quintile Dar es salaam Other Urban Rural Areas Tanzanian Mainland 
2000/01 20007 2000/01 20007 2000/01 20007 2000/01 20007 
Q1­poorest 7.0 7.3 6.6 6.8 7.5 7.5 7.1 7.2 
Q2 11.3 12.2 11.5 12.1 12.3 12.4 11.7 12.0 
Q3 16.1 16.6 16.6 16.7 16.4 16.6 16.0 16.3 
Q4 23.0 22.5 22.8 22.4 22.4 22.3 22.2 22.3 
Q5­richest 42.5 41.4 42.6 42.0 41.4 41.2 43.0 42.2 
Ratio of Q5:Q1 6.0 5.7 6.5 6.1 5.5 5.5 6.0 5.9 
Source: URT, 2009. Household Budget Survey­2007, p. 52, Table 7.5. 
Again, the Gini Coefficient which is an overall measure of how equal or unequal an 
income or expenditure distribution is, is measured on monetary basis as a point­estimate of 
equality at a certain time and not life­span changes in income. Therefore, it is difficult to 
determine the continuous changes in the status of inequality. Moreover, its limited 
conception of income (the money wage or income received from work) leaves a lot out of 
analysis. For example, in the social income perspective noted previously, it is argued that, 
what matters are not just the differences and levels, but also the security of the income. 
According to Standing (2004), some groups receive less income than they earn, not only 
because of taxes but because intermediaries control access and deduct some of it, thereby 
concealing their true poverty and income insecurity and; women are often victims of this 
kind of impoverishment and insecurity(emphasis added). So, the main problem is not only 
“inequality of income”, but also “inequality of income security” which cannot be explained 
by the Gini Coefficient measures. The relatively low value of inequality index may also be 
partly reflecting the widespread nature of poverty across the country, which is 
predominantly rural, rather than absence of it (Meena, 2008:16). 
Table 8.20: Inequality in Annual Earnings by Sector, Gender and Type of Employment (%)­
2007 
Sector All Employees Regular Employees Casual Employees 
M W T M W T M W T 
Private Sector 
Private profit making 
Institutions 
25.5 8.0 34.0 23.8 7.6 31.4 2.1 0.5 2.5 
Private non­profit making 
Institutions 
4.1 1.7 5.9 4.0 1.7 5.7 0.1 0.0 0.2 
Cooperatives 1.2 0.4 1.6 1.2 0.4 1.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Sub­total 31.2 10.2 41.4 29.0 9.0 38.6 2.2 0.5 2.8 
Public Sector 
Central government 17.8 6.5 24.2 17.4 6.4 23.7 0.4 0.1 0.5 
Local government (Urban) 1.8 1.9 3.7 1.8 1.9 3.6 0.1 0.0 0.1 
Local government 
(District) 
8.8 3.2 12.0 8.6 3.2 11.8 0.2 0.0 0.2 
Parastatal profit making 
Institutions 
11.6 3.8 15.4 11.5 3.8 15.2 0.2 0.0 0.2 
Parastatal non­profit 
making Institutions 
2.5 0.8 3.3 2.5 0.8 3.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Sub­Total 42.5 16.2 58.6 41.7 16.0 57.7 0.8 0.2 1.0 
Total 73.7 26.3 100.0 70.6 25.6 96.3 3.0 0.7 3.7 
Source: URT (2007) Employment and Earning Survey (Analytical Report ­2002); pages: 34 &36. Note: 
M=Men; W=Women and T=total 
Moreover, data on income earnings indicate existence of higher levels of inequality than it 
is reflected on Gini Coefficient measures. Income earnings are major part of income to 
employees and in this respect are to a great extent a measure of the level of living of the 
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workers and welfare of their families in general and therefore, a crucial dimension of 
poverty alleviation (URT, 2002, 2007). The 2002 earnings survey indicated that, annual 
earnings differed considerably across sectors, and between gender and categories of 
employment. Table 20 shows that, employees in the government (central and local) had the 
highest earnings of about 39.9% of total earnings while employees of the private profit 
making earned 34% and those in cooperatives recorded the lowest share of 1.6% only. In 
all sectors women had the lowest earnings, again, with cooperatives being at the lowest 
level. Similar trend was observed in different categories of employment. While in general, 
regular employees were better remunerated than the casual employees, women employees 
had lower earnings than their men counterparts in both regular and causal employment. 
Moreover, Table 8.21 shows that, the total per capita income is highest in Dar es Salaam, 
at Tsh. 80,144, and lowest in rural areas, at Tsh. 28, 418. 
Table 8.21: Mean Per Capita Household Monthly Income by Source (Tshs, HBS 2007) 
Source Dar es 
salaam 
Other 
Urban 
Rural Tanzanian 
Mainland 
HBS­2007 
Employment in cash 28,898 12,727 2,812 6,787 
Employment paid in kind 84 309 53 104 
No­farm self­employment 38,826 34,654 10,241 17,166 
Agricultural income 1,036 5,673 11,324 9,426 
Producers’ Cooperatives 39 135 73 82 
Imputed rent 56 60 10 23 
Interests & Dividends 71 49 9 22 
Rent received 724 1,023 118 338 
Transfer & other receipts 10,410 9,599 3,777 5,413 
Total, 2007 HBS 80,144 64,231 28,418 39,362 
Total, 2000/01 HBS with price inflation 78,680 58,722 27,279 34,601 
Ratio of totals 1.02 1.09 1.04 1.14 
Source: URT, 2009. Household Budget Survey – 2007, p.62, Table 9.1 
While farming and related activities continue to dominate the main activities of household 
adult members in rural areas (Table 8.22) overall, there has been a decline in the 
involvement in of both men and women in this sector but with women being more likely 
than men to engage in it. There is also an increase of both men and women who are self­
employed without employees in all areas, although women are still less likely to be self­
employed. 
Table 8.22: Distribution of Main Activities of Adults (15 to 60 years) by Geographical Area 
and Gender (2000­2007) 
Activity Dar es salaam Other Urban Rural Areas Tanzanian 
Mainland 
2000/0 
1 
2007 2000/0 
1 
2.007 2000/01 2007 2000/01 2007 
Farming/livestock 2.8 3.4 25.4 24.6 77.0 69.8 63.7 55.0 
/fishing/forest (3.3) (2.9) (28.3) (30.1) (74.8) (74.9) (62.8) (59.4) 
Employee ­ 4.4 6.4 6.9 6.9 1.8 2.4 2.8 3.6 
government (3.1) (4.1) (3.6) (4.0) (0.6) (0.9) (1.2) (1.8) 
Employee ­ other 27.1 31.4 16.7 15.9 3.4 4.4 7.2 9.1 
(11.2) 12.8) (6.5) (7.9) (1.1) (2.0) (2.6) (4.2) 
Self­ employed 9.1 7.3 6.5 5.0 1.4 1.4 2.7 2.7 
with employees (2.8) (3.6) (2.8) (2.5) (0.7) (0.4) (1.1) (1.1) 
Self ­employed 23.6 27.4 20.5 24.1 3.8 8.8 7.8 13.4 
without (12.7) (22.3) (13.4) (19.6) (2.2) (5.6) (4.6) (9.9) 
employees 
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Unpaid family 8.1 0.5 10.5 0.9 6.0 0.7 6.9 0.7 
helper in (13.0) (1.4) (15.1) (1.0) (8.7) (0.7) (10.0) (0.8) 
business63 
Housewives/home 0.3 7.6 0.6 3.7 0.6 2.9 0.5 3.5 
­maker/household (38.0) (34.5) (20.1) (16.0) (7.0) (7.4) (11.1) (11.7) 
chores 
Student 10.0 8.9 4.7 12.2 2.6 5.0 3.4 6.7 
(7.3) (7.2) (3.9) (9.5) (1.5) (3.5) (2.2) (5.0) 
Not active 14.6 7.0 8.3 6.7 3.5 4.5 5.0 5.2 
(8.6) (11.2) (6.2) (9.3) (3.5) (4.6) (4.3) (6.1) 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: URT, 2009. Household Budget Survey­2007, p.39, Table 5.7. Note: Women are represented by 
numbers in the brackets 
Looking at the pattern of employment in terms of main source of income, Table 8.23 
shows that, in both rural and urban areas, there has been a decline in the proportion of 
formal employment households that are increasingly dependent on off­farm self­
employment. 
Table 8.23: Percentage of household income by source (HBS 2007) 
Dar es Salaam Other Urban Rural Tanzanian Mainland 
2000/01 2007 2000/ 
01 
2007 2000/01 2007 2000/0 
1 
2007 
Employment in 
cash 
41.1 35.9 24.1 22.1 7.8 8.1 12.0 13.0 
Employment paid 
in kind 
0.6 0.1 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.2 0.5 0.2 
Non­farming self­
employment 
29.1 37.6 32.8 37.1 17.8 27.3 20.6 30.0 
Agricultural 
income 
1.9 2.4 19.6 17.7 60.4 49.6 51.4 39.7 
Producers’ 
Cooperatives 
0.6 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.4 0.4 
Interests & 
Dividends 
0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 
Rents 1.8 1.4 1.2 1.1 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.5 
Transfer & other 
receipts 
24.7 24.1 21.2 21.3 12.8 14.1 14.7 16.1 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: URT, 2009. Household Budget Survey­2007, p. 63, Table 9.2. 
Again, the above findings contradict with the relatively low levels of inequality presented 
by the Gini Coefficient measures. Findings on coverage and inequality of social security 
benefits in Table 8.30 show similar picture. 
8.7 Poverty and Socio­economic Security 
The research on socio­economic insecurity in the country is limited although, by many 
standards, the development conditions associated with the ongoing reforms and the status 
of poverty and inequality indicates that insecurity remains the most serious problem. For 
example, by looking at the status of poverty, inequality, occupational security and social 
protection, one can establish the depth and breadth of insecurity. We have already seen that 
63 There was a change in the question related to the category of unpaid family helper. Therefore, there is a great 
likelihood that some individuals previously classified as unpaid family helper were classified as self­employed without 
employees a fact which inflated this category 
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poverty and inequality have continued to affect the majority of people with little prospect 
of improvement in the near future. A similar picture is observed with regard to other 
aspects of social security. 
(a) Status of Occupational Security 
The ILFS of 2006 reveals that agriculture is still one of the dominant sector in which the 
majority of people are engaged (Table 8.24), accounting for 75.1%. The next largest sector 
is (sic) the informal sector, followed by other private, with 10.1% and 8.6% of the 
employed population respectively. A higher proportion of women than men are recorded 
for the agricultural sector and household economic activities. The remaining sectors record 
a higher proportion of men than women. 
Table 8.24: Percentage of Employment by sector and sex for the population aged 15+ (2006) 
Sector of Main Employment Men Women Total 
Central/Local government 3.6 1.7 2.6 
Parastatal Organization 0.6 0.2 0.4 
Agriculture 70.5 79.4 75.1 
Informal 11.5 8.8 10.1 
Other Private 12.6 4.8 8.6 
Household economic activities 1.1 5.1 3.1 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: URT,2007. Integrated Labour Force Survey­2006, p.36. 
The depth and breadth of occupational insecurity is reflected in the status of employment 
occupied by the majority of the poor. The problem is that, despite high levels of 
employment,64 two thirds (67.2%) are self­employed in subsistence agriculture­own farms 
or shambas (Table 8.25), with women being more likely to occupy this status (71.7%) than 
men (62.4%). In contrast, 15.3% of men are paid employees, while only 6.1% of women 
occupy this status. Self­employed persons account for 10.9% of all employed persons and 
unpaid family helpers account for 11.4% 
Table 8.25: Employment Status for the economically active Population aged 15+ (2006 ) 
Employment Status Male Female Total 
Paid Employee 15.3 6.1 10.5 
Self­employed (non­agricultural) with 
employees 
2.6 1.0 1.8 
Self­employed (non­agricultural ) 
without employees 
10.0 8.2 9.1 
Unpaid family helper (non­agricultural) 1.5 5.3 3.5 
Unpaid family helper (agricultural) 8.1 7.7 7.9 
Work on own farm or shamba 62.4 71.7 67.2 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: URT, 2007. Integrated Labour Force Survey­2006, p.38. 
These relatively high rates of poverty, inequality and insecurity do not result from a lack of engagement in economic 
activity. Indeed, in 2006, 89.6% of the population aged 15 years and above was recorded as being economically active, 
with rates of 90.5% for men and 88.8% for women (National Bureau of Statistics 2007). Further, among the 
economically active population, the overwhelming majority is under­employed rather than unemployed (Meena 
2008:14). 
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64 
A further problem is that much of the paid work exists in the informal sector. Table 8.26 
shows that, in 2006, 40% of the population engaged in informal sector activities compared 
to 35% in 2001. It also reveals that the concentration of informal activities is higher in 
urban (55.0%) than in rural households (33.0%). However, the percentage of households 
that engage in informal sector activities in urban areas has declined, from 61% in 2001 to 
55% in 2006, while that in the rural areas has increased from 27% in 2001 to 33% in 2006, 
confirming the process of shifting away from engagement in agriculture noted earlier. 
Table 8.26: Trend of Households with Informal Sector Activities, 2001 and 2006 
Area 2001 2006 
Number Percentage Number Percentage 
Dar es salaam 223,707 62 529,175 57 
Other Urban 554,347 61 809,839 54 
Urban Total 778,054 61 1,339,014 55 
Rural 1,235,777 27 1,973,760 33 
Total 2,013,832 35 3,312,774 40 
Source: URT, 2007. Integrated Labour Force Survey­2006, p.43 
In terms of unemployment, the ILFS of 2000/01 revealed that, the number of unemployed 
persons had more than doubled in ten years from 405,722 in 1990/91 to 912,772 in 
2000/01, with the number of unemployed women being 57.4 % and men 42.6%. It was 
also noted that unemployment was higher in urban areas for both gender (URT, 2002:73). 
In 2006 about 56% of the unemployed population were women (Table 8.27) and nearly 
60% of them lived in urban areas compared to only 45% of the unemployed men (URT, 
2007:57). The trend thus shows that, women continued registering a higher level of 
unemployment than men in all areas, except rural. However, the relative low rate of 
women unemployment in rural area is a result of their engagement in agricultural activities 
which, as discussed earlier, has low value of the outcome of labour which is important in 
poverty alleviation. 
Table 8.27: Unemployed rate and population 15+ years by Gender and Area, 2006 
Gender Dar es Salaam Other Urban Rural Total Population 
Men 242,369 196,120 529,359 967,848 
% 25.0 20.3 54.7 100.0 
Rate 23.0 13.6 8.1 ­
Women 413,623 311,652 501,270 1,226,545 
% 33.7 25.4 40.9 100.0 
Rate 40.3 19.2 7.0 ­
Total Rate 31.5 16.5 7.5 11.7 
Source: URT, 2007. ILFS­2006, p.57 
There is also an interesting phenomenon associated with poverty alleviation initiatives 
through primary education: the expansion of primary education and growing 
informalization of occupational activities. One of the goals of MKUKUTA is to ensure 
equitable access to education through increased free enrolment in primary education as a 
way of developing human resource to improve the quality of life and social wellbeing 
conditions that are believed to be necessary for poverty alleviation (URT, 2007:19­20). As 
a result of government efforts, the primary education enrolment rate increased from 66.5% 
in 2001 to 96.1% in 2006 (URT, 2006:15). Data on engagement in the informal sector by 
educational level (Table 8.28) indicate that about 67% of the population engaged in the 
informal sector as their main activity in 2006 had completed primary school. So, expansion 
of primary education has been accompanied by expansion in informal sector engagement. 
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Table 8. 28: Engagement in the informal sector (as main activity) by educational level and 
sex, 2006 (in %), 2007 
Education level Male Female Total 
Never attended 8 15 11 
Primary not completed 11 10 10 
Primary completed 69 66 67 
Secondary and above 12 10 11 
Total 100 100 100 
Source: URT, 2007. Integrated Labour Force Survey ­2006, p. 44 
(b) Status of Social Security 
We have learnt in chapter 5 that, the country’s social security set­up largely followed the 
ILO’s social security system. The type and contents of benefits were offered according to 
the ILO Social Security (Minimum Standards)65 which became part of standards guiding 
social security schemes under the Ujamaa’s universal social protection system. 
The universal social protection system ended with the adoption of the IMF and World 
Bank’s structural adjustment programmes in the mid 1980s. Based on neo­liberal economic 
theory according to which, the public sector expenses are considered wasteful and public 
social security programmes represent an important part of these public finances wastage, 
World Bank and IMF pushed for reforms against universal public social protection system 
as a way of creating favourable conditions for market economy. As a result, the universal 
social security system was replaced by the so called “social safety nets”66 which became 
part of what Wuyts (2006:2) described as “traditional types of single­cause crisis 
responses” such as to cater for food shortage caused by drought, rescue of flood victims, 
interventions for HIV/AIDS victims, old age, childhood, disabilities and maternal health 
insecurities. According to him, formal social assistance programmes for the poor were 
reduced to schemes of local poverty management, often with patronising characteristics 
and lack of continuity. Thus, from the mid 1980s, social security schemes became the main 
form of formal social protection along with (sic) social safety nets. Moreover, in 
conditions where, like in Tanzania, institutions of social protection are weak, processes of 
informalization of socio­economic activities are rapid and, potential conditions for 
incidences of poverty and inequality are high, selective social protection is likely to 
perpetuate insecurity among the poor. 
(i) The Character of Social Security System 
Social security system in Tanzania is greatly affected by the institutional context in which 
it was developed. The system is characterized by multiplicity of schemes founded on 
different legal and administrative regulations, catering for different social groups and 
65 The ILO’S guidelines for setting minimum benefits provided that a social security scheme should cover the following 
contingencies:­ Old­Age (Retirement);Invalidity; Employment Injury; Survivors; Medical Care; Sickness; 
Unemployment; Maternity and ; Family allowance 
66 
According to Standing (2007:514), “social safety net” is the term which rose in 1990s as a result of the ascendancy of 
supply­side economics particularly from World Bank, IMF and OECD representing “selective”, “targeted” measures, 
usually means­tested, supposedly developed to rescue the victims of structural reforms associated with the rollback of 
public social spending and erosion of various forms of social protection required to boost economic growth in developing 
countries. Apart from patronizing stigmatizing by dividing society between “the most in needy” or “deserving” and those 
“undeserving”, the concept is empirically irrelevant. 
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sectors and using different methods of benefit computation which leads to incoherencies 
and inequality in distribution of social security services. Due to historical legacies of 
excessive bureaucratic regulation of socio­economic life, social security schemes are 
highly controlled and regulated by administrative institutions. Table 8.29 shows that, all 
schemes are placed under a particular Ministry which, under existing legal framework, has 
enormous power over key issues related to the functioning and management of schemes. 
For example, though generally there is very limited possibility of portability of members' 
benefits from one scheme to another, the law provides that, it is the Minister responsible 
for the Scheme who has the power to make regulations providing for all matters required 
for giving effect to transfer and portability of benefit rights (Social Security­Regulatory 
Authority­Act of 2008). Other researchers have also reiterated this problem. In the early 
2000s, Mchonvu and others identified bureaucratic monopoly, forced membership and 
authoritarian character of administrative regulations of these schemes, as part of the 
reasons for rights to social security being not conferred upon citizens (Mchonvu et al., 
2002:17). Dau (2003:33) found that, the management of social security schemes faced 
undue interference from government, especially with respect to investment matters and 
selection of the management and boards of directors. 
(ii) Coverage and Inequality in Social Security 
In terms of the coverage, social security schemes cover a very limited proportion of the 
population and have not reached most of the urban and rural poor. In 2003, the government 
estimated that, of the 33.5 Tanzania’s population only 2.7% was covered by the mandatory 
formal social security system, and, of the 16 million active working populations, only 5.4% 
was covered. The fate of the majority was left to the informal, traditional social security 
systems built on family and/or community support (URT, 2003:4­5). For example, by 2003 
the NSSF’s membership was 450,000, while the PPF covered about 90,000 members. The 
PSPF covered 193,000 employees; the LAPF covered just 45,000 and NHIF 180,000 
(Table 8.29). 
67 
Table 8. 29: Structure and Coverage of Social Security in Tanzania by 2003
No Social 
Security 
Fund 
Coverage Members Contribution 
Rates 
Responsible 
Ministry 
1. NSSF All private sector employees ; and 
non pensionable employees in the 
government 
450,000 Employer 10% 
Employee 10% 
Labour, Youth 
Development and 
Sports 
2. PPF Essentially, employees in the state­
owned parastatal organizations; 
members can register in the 
private sector also 
90,000 Employer 15% 
Employee 5% 
Finance 
3. PSPF All central government employees 
& 
Executive Agencies 
193,000 Employer 15% 
Employee 5% 
Finance 
4. LAPF Employees of local governments in 
the 
45,000 Employer 10% 
Employee 10% 
Local 
Government and 
Although we were not able to get current data on membership trends of various pension funds, the Report of the 
committee appointed by the Minister for Education and Vocational Training in 2008 to determine the shortcomings 
limiting the provision of quality services by pension funds particularly the problem of low pension benefits of Academic 
Staff of Public Universities in Tanzania, revealed that status of membership and benefit had not changed significantly, by 
2008. For example by 2007 PPF had 92, 000 members and continued to be the lowest social security benefit conferring 
scheme in the country (see URT­MoEVT, 2008) 
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cities, municipalities, towns and 
districts 
Regional Ad 
ministration 
5. NHIF Initially, central government 
employees; to expand to all 
government employees 
elsewhere 
180,000 Employer 3% 
Employee 3% 
Health 
Source: Dau, (2003), p. 32. Note: NSSF=National Social Security Fund; PPF=Parastatal Pensions Fund; 
PSPF=Public Service Pensions Fund; LAPF=Local Authorities Provident Fund; NHIF=National Health 
Insurance Fund 
Apart from incoherencies, low coverage and benefits, multiplicity of social security 
schemes has resulted into double contribution and erosion of incomes of members thereby 
affecting their ability to afford other equally important social needs. For example, 
contributions to NHIF which was initially limited to central government employees before 
the mid 2000s, has been made a mandatory to all government employees who before then, 
received health services and insurance as part of employees’ obligation. Currently, they 
have to contribute for health insurance as a separate social security service. These 
conditions has been the source of tension between the government and workers’ unions 
particularly those under PPF. Part of the reasons as to why PPF members have been into 
conflict with the government is inequality in social security benefits and the lower benefits 
offered under the scheme. 
Table 8. 30: Tanzania Social Security (Pension) Funds ­Benefits Inequality Scenario 
Parameter PPF NSSF PSPF LAPF 
Period of Service, PS = 25 yrs (300 
months) since 1
st 
July, 1984; 
Average Gross Monthly Salary = 1,500,000/­
PS [months] 300 (48 + 252) 300 300 300 
PF 1/960, 1/600 (1/720 .... 1/600) 1/540 1/540 
CF [years] 12.5 18 [12.5 for 
Total MP] 
15.5 15.5 
Basis APE AME LMS­A, SA LMS­A, SA 
Basis Amount 
[TShs] 
18,000,000 1,500,000 10,000,000 10,000,000 
CPG [TShs] 26,437,500 36,000,000 77,500,000 77,500,000 
MP [TShs] 528,750 675,000 416,667 416,667 
Total MP for CF 
[TShs] 
79,312,500 145,800,000 
[101,250,000] 
77,500,000 77,500,000 
Total Pension 
[TShs] 
105,750,000 181,800,000 
[137,250,000] 
155,000,000 155,000,000 
Source: URT 2008:31; Table 6;Keys:AME=Average Monthly Earnings (the computed mean of earnings 
divided in 12 months); APE=Annual Pensionable Emoluments (Amount of wages received by an employee 
annually); CF=Commutation Factor (a numeric figure applied in calculating pensions that takes into account 
of post retirement life expectancy (for Tanzania the value is 15.5); CPG=Commuted Pension Gratuity; 
MP=Monthly Pension; PF=Pension Factor (an accrual rate factor used in calculations of pensions such as 
1/960, 1/600, 1/540 meaning one free months’ salary for every 960, 600 or 540 months an employee works); 
PS=Period of Service; SA=Specified Amount. 
As shown in Table 8.30, workers covered under schemes outside the central and local 
government bureaucracy (the PPF and NSSF) are the lowest paid when compared to 
workers under the central and local government schemes (the PSPF and LAPF). For 
examples, estimates of total pension per worker for 25 years at an average gross monthly 
salary of Tsh.1, 500,000.00 is Tsh.105, 750,000.00 for PPF and 137, 250,000.00 for NSSF 
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which are lower by Tsh. 50, 000,000.00 and Tsh.17, 750,000.00 respectively, compared to 
Tsh. 155,000,000.00 paid under PSPF and LAPF. Interestingly, the lowest paying schemes 
are those open to private sector employees and other formal employment outside the 
mainstream bureaucracy.  Therefore, social security schemes provide inadequate and 
unequal social benefits to some members, hence leaving them in poverty and insecurity 
when faced with various contingencies. 
These weaknesses of formal social security system: institutional multiplicity and 
incoherencies; limited coverage; multiple contribution, inequality and inadequate 
payments; monopolistic, bureaucratic management and compulsory membership and ; 
limited information and portability of benefit rights, have reduced social security services 
into social privileges than rights. Data on the status of social security and protection 
services for the elderly from the VOP 2007 below partly illustrate this argument. 
In the case of the main sources of subsistence for the elderly, Table 8.31 shows that, the 
majority, especially women, depend on their immediate family for subsistence, while 34% 
of men and 20% of women still work full­time with very few receiving pension. Moreover, 
there is no social pension scheme for the elderly in the country. This implies that, the 
majority who feel insecure do not have immediate source of income and this perpetuates 
their insecurity further. 
Table 8.31: Main Sources of Subsistence for the Elderly (Over 60 years), 2007 
Main Sources of Subsistence Male Female All 
Children/Family around me 34 60 45 
Full­Time work 34 20 28 
Remittances 20 22 21 
Part­time work 8 3 7 
Pension 7 1 5 
FBOs, NGOs/CBOs, neighbors 1 2 2 
Source: URT (2007) Views of the People­2007, Page 43. Note: Multiple responses were arrowed; 
FBOs=Faith Based Organizations; NGOs=Non­governmental Organizations; CBOs= Community Based 
Organizations. 
In terms of help when encountering problems, almost all (88%) of the elderly (Table 8.32) 
said that their immediate family would help them if they had a serious problem, while 38% 
depended on friends and neighbours. About 11% saw no help forthcoming from any 
source. Furthermore, security in old age was identified as a big concern among the elderly, 
with 75% concerned about losing the strength to work as they grow older, and 66% fearing 
hunger, poverty and a loss of independence through ill­health (URT­VOP, 2007:xi; URT­
PHDR, 2007: 82). 
Table 8.32: Expected Sources of Help for the Elderly, 2007 
Sources of Help when having serious 
problems 
Male 
(%) 
Female 
(%) 
All 
(%) 
Immediate Family 88 88 88 
Friends and neighbours 38 38 38 
Clan, peer group 35 29 33 
Religious Leaders/bodies 22 18 21 
Local government 13 10 12 
Older people’s group 12 10 11 
Nobody 10 12 11 
Local NGOs/CBOs 5 6 5 
Source: URT (2007) Views of the People­2007, Page 44. Note: NGOs=Non­governmental Organizations; 
CBOs= Community Based Organizations. 
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Although it is the government’s policy that women (particularly pregnant women), the 
elderly and young children are “the most in needy” and should be given free treatment, the 
policy is unknown to some of them and, even when known, it is often ignored by the 
service providers who insist on cash payment and subject the target groups to humiliation 
and stigmatization (URT­VOP, 2007:44­45, emphasis added). For example, the results of 
the VOP 2007 on the payment for healthcare (Table 8.33) show that 35% paid it 
themselves and 27% had their costs paid by family members, 9% from health insurance 
and other sources, while 14% received no treatment. Thus, about 76% of the elderly did 
not receive free treatment, which was received by only 15%. 
Table 8.33: Paying for Healthcare, 2007 
Payment for Treatment Male % Female % All % 
I paid myself 43 27 35 
My family paid for me 18 41 27 
I received free treatment 15 14 15 
I received no treatment 13 16 14 
Other 8 9 7 
Health Insurance 2 3 2 
Source: URT (2007) Views of the People­2007, Page 44 
The VOP 2007 report also mentioned that nearly half of the over 60s (48%) did not know 
that they were entitled to free treatment in government facilities (42% of men, 58% of 
women). In addition, approximately 18% said they had been refused treatment in a 
government facility because they could not afford to pay for the services, while 13% 
indicated they had been refused free treatment due to lack of proof of age (URT­VOP, 
2007:44). 
What are of great interest insofar as institutional analysis is concerned are the syncretistic 
character and weak formal rules and regulations associated with the social security system, 
which are easily ignored by the service providers, thus rendering the whole system 
dysfunctional. The VOP 2007 confirmed that, while in many of the study sites the elderly 
knew they were entitled to free medical services, the problem was that the policy was 
ignored in practice, and the experience was similar in both rural and urban communities. 
Table 8.34 presents some perceptions of the difficulties in accessing free health care by the 
elderly in the country. 
Table 8.34: Perceptions on Difficulties in Accessing Free Health Care by the Elderly, 2007 
Study Site & Views of the People 
Focus Group Kiswahili Meaning in English 
Women’s Focus 
Group: Korogwe 
“Kwenye redio wanasema akina 
mama, wazee, na watoto wadogo 
wanapewa huduma bure lakini eneo 
hili ni kitendawili na halijawahi 
kutokea.” 
“Through the radio they say that women, the 
elderly and young children should be given 
free treatment, but in this area, that is a 
paradox; it has never happened.” 
Elderly Focus 
Group: Tanga 
“Msamaha wa matibabu wa wazee 
huku ni kama haupo, ukienda na barua 
utaambiwa hakuna dawa. Maduka ya 
dawa tunayoagizwa ni ya madaktari 
wenyewe.” 
“Exemption from medical costs for the 
elderly is kind of non­existent here; if you 
go with a letter, you are told that there are 
no drugs. The pharmacies we are told to 
consult are owned by the doctors 
themselves.” 
Elderly Focus 
Group: Dar es 
Salaam 
“Kuhusu matibabu ya bure ya wazee 
bila kunyanyaswa…tunaambiwa tu, 
lakini inatakiwa pesa. Mfano unaweza 
“About exemption from medical 
charges…we are just told, but payments are 
demanded. For example, you may be 
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ukaambiwa nenda huko 
walikotangaza matibabu ya 
bure…Umesikia wapi matibabu ya 
bure?” 
scoffed at and told to go where they 
announced free medical care; where did you 
hear about free medical care?” 
Focus Group: 
Lindi 
“Alienda kupata huduma akaulizia 
sera hiyo akakataliwa huduma mpaka 
atoe pesa. Jibu la wauguzi wanasema 
hawajui…Vikongwe wanahudumiwa 
na pesa.” 
He went to get treatment and asked about 
the [exemption] policy ­ he denied treatment 
until he paid. The attendants’ response was 
that they don’t know [about exemption]. 
The elderly get served if they pay.” 
Source: URT (2007) Views of the People­2007, Page 45­Box No.7. 
8.8 Conclusion 
The picture of conditions of poverty, inequality and socio­economic insecurity that 
emerges from the analysis is worrisome. The findings reveal the existence of: institutions 
and policies biased against sectors important to the poor; excessive bureaucratic 
interference in production process; limited access to financial resources; low coverage, 
multiple contribution and inequality in social security benefits and; potential conditions for 
emergence of new incidences of poverty, inequality and insecurity. A key message that 
emerges from the analysis is that, reforms have not created a favourable environment for 
poverty alleviation and promotion of socio­economic security for the majority of the poor. 
The general institutional context, therefore, is tolerant to growing poverty, inequality and 
socio­economic insecurity. 
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___________________________________________________________________ 
Chapter 9 
Corruption and Poverty Alleviation 
9.1 The Concerns for Corruption 
Corruption was declared a scourge of the newly independent Tanzania in the early 1960s. 
The founding father Mwalimu Julius Nyerere, cited corruption as a vice that threatened to 
undermine the struggle of the party, the government and the millions of Tanzanians in 
building a new nation founded on freedom, unity, human equality and justice. Adding 
corruption to his list of the three enemies: poverty, ignorance and disease, he insisted that 
for people to have absolute confidence in their government, it was paramount to ensure the 
proper use of resources in the war against these four enemies. He strongly argued that 
corruption was a greater enemy to the welfare of the people and it deserved to be treated 
almost in the same way as treason (Nyerere, 1966:82; CTS Newsletter, 2009). He never 
believed that people could reap the true benefits of independence if corruption were 
allowed to continue, adding that people's confidence in their government, including the 
very foundations of justice, was at risk if corruption was allowed to thrive (Timamy, 
2005:383; Kaduma, 2004:42). For example, three of the “Ten Pledges” of TANU, which 
were regularly recalled by both party leaders and members, included (in no particular 
order): “I pledge to work to eliminate/eradicate poverty, ignorance, disease and 
oppression”; “Corruption is the Enemy of Justice; I will not involve myself in corrupt 
practices”; and “I will not use my official position or that of any other personal for person 
gain”. These pledges reflected the normative life expected to be the basis of both 
leadership and social life of the people after independence (TANU Pledges 1962, quoted in 
Kaduma, 2004:42). Since then, the government has adopted different reforms (Appendix: 
9A) to address the problem, depending on the changing circumstances of development. 
The first generation of anti­corruption initiatives were associated with the adoption of the 
Republican Constitution of 1962, which marked the beginning of the “imperial presidential 
system” and consolidation of bureaucratic rule and led to the transfer of collective and 
individual responsibility of higher public officials, from popular representative institutions 
such as the national assembly, to the presidency and thus to the bureaucracy itself. This 
was followed by adoption of the single­party constitution of 1965, which led to the 
replacement, by the ruling party, of the public officials’ ethical enforcement roles of the 
popular representative institutions. The party became the counter­bureaucratic control 
mechanism and government­citizen information transfer centre. The elevation of the party 
into a constitutional category, similar to legal institutions, and the replacement of popular 
representative institutions by the same, led to the formation of a single­party accountability 
system which undermined legal mechanisms. Much of unethical behaviour cases of the 
political leaders and administrative officials were sent to the Party Organs for ruling and 
very few were legally handled. Therefore, the character of the single­party system 
frustrated the legal ethical enforcement mechanisms, creating a paradise of impunity for 
corrupt public officials. 
The adoption of Ujamaa in 1967 marked the beginning of the second generation of anti­
corruption initiatives which were a consolidation of the first generation and an expansion 
of controls over officials’ behaviour as a way of promoting integrity. The main objective 
was to separate private interests and the benefits of the public officials from those of the 
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official positions and duties they held. However, Ujamaa complicated the matter by 
prohibiting both public officials and citizens from engaging in any private wealth 
accumulation, thereby limiting individual desire and orientation to private self­capital 
accumulation for investment and businesses entrepreneurship. It was this constraint on 
individual private economic engagement that became associated with the economic crises 
that began to bedevil the country in the late 1970s and that created the wrong impression of 
the intention behind the Ujamaa ethical enforcement mechanisms, justifying ill­prepared 
abandonment of most of them during the transition to neo­liberal capitalism, creating an 
enforcement vacuum that led to an eruption of corruption. 
Corruption regained its central position in both domestic policies and international 
development aid initiatives in the country in the mid 1990s. As a response to that, the 
government adopted the third generation of anti­corruption initiatives. This was in response 
to the worsening conditions of corruption resulting from abandonment of the normative 
principles of Ujamaa and adoption of the laissez­faire economic policies of the Second 
Phase Government, commonly known in Kiswahili as “Ruksa” policies. These policies 
were characterised by bureaucratic lenience and legal paralysis. There were two forces 
behind the rejuvenation of anti­corruption initiatives: The pressure came from growing 
domestic anti­corruption sentiments, in the party and society. For instance, Julius Nyerere 
delivered a series of speeches, which have come to be known as “Usia wa Baba wa 
Taifa
68
”, in which he declared that Tanzania reeked of corruption. He argued that the state 
had been shaken and had produced several “faults” in its walls and foundation (implying 
collapse of the moral foundation of leadership). It was his conviction about leadership 
morality which pushed him to play a pivotal role in supporting Benjamin Mkapa’s party 
candidacy in 1995. Nyerere believed that Mkapa stood for integrity and anti­corruption, in 
contrast with the outgoing President, Mr. Ruksa (1985­1995), who, at the end of his 10 
years of leadership in 2005, had turned into Mr. Reeking. The pressure also came from the 
donor community. This was a result of shifts in their concerns over corruption which 
reflected changing perspectives on the reasons for socio­economic deterioration despite 
structural adjustment. It was also a result of the growing misuse of aid by government 
officials through corrupt means, which not only threatened development initiatives but also 
the repayment of debt and implementation of aided development programmes.69 As Szeftel 
(2000:288) put it: “Creditors in the metropolitan core were less tolerant of officials in 
peripheral states diverting aid and public resources, into their own pockets... and the need 
to ensure that governments in these regions repay their debts to their (Western) creditors 
[and] corruption [is not] a threat to the programmes they administer”. In part, it reflected 
the neo­liberal concern for promoting market friendly development through getting 
institutions right, by regulating the role of the state in economic affairs and strengthening 
private ownership and free market operations. “Tackling corruption, from this perspective, 
involved reducing the ability of state officials to impose political costs on business by 
appropriating resources for themselves” (ibid). 
Therefore, from 1995, corruption became a major component of reforms within a national 
good governance framework, emphasizing creation of a government system that is 
68 Literally meaning:“an advice full of wisdom from the Father of the Nation”. It is now used as “a dying advice” left by 
him as a guide to the Nation and to the leadership. In these speeches, he explained the key problems facing Tanzania and 
tried to provide solutions. The central message in his speeches was a call for moral and committed leadership to lead the 
Nation in the current challenging domestic and international environment. 
69 Whether they prioritised economic restructuring (like the international financial institutions), poverty reduction (the 
World Bank and DFID since 1997), governance reforms (Britain, the EU) or human rights and democracy (the Nordic 
countries), corruption represents a threat to their programmes. This was illustrated by the high cost of corruption, both to 
the countries affected and to the aid programmes. 
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transparent and responsive, managed by officials who are accountable, efficient, ethical 
and professional (Afrobarometer, 2006:2). 
9.2 The Concept of Corruption 
While it is not our intention to dwell on the debate about what constitutes corruption and 
what does not, it is important to note that, since the declaration of “the war against 
corruption” in the early years of independence, corruption has always been defined as 
abuse of public office (both political and administrative) for private gain. In other words, 
the conception of corruption rested on the assumption of a separation between the state or 
its agents and the rest of the society and it was the violation of this public/private 
distinction between individuals that defined corrupt behaviour (Szeftel, 2000:298; Heilman 
et al, 2000:497; Cooksey, 2005:1; Haller and Shore, 2005:5). 
While we maintain the above conception, mainly because it associates anti­corruption 
initiatives with the legal process, we would like to expand on that by adopting two 
anthropological assumptions about corruption that are closely related to the historical 
institutionalist view of human relations and agency in underdeveloped countries. First, 
corruption should be seen as a form of historically developed exchange (social, economic 
and political), which forms part of the way in which individuals in society connect with the 
state. The growth and expansion of this “form of exchange”, towards the state or 
otherwise, depends on the functioning nature of the institutional order, particularly the 
character of the resource distribution system. The more monopolistic and state centred the 
system is, the greater the exchange tendencies towards the state and vice versa. Second, the 
effect of corruption goes beyond the minimalist view of theft and misuse of public money, 
to encompass inflated contracts, distorted development policy priorities, increased 
exploitation and inequality and heightened uncertainties and insecurities. 
Therefore, it is possible to see corruption not necessarily as personal moral decay, but as a 
structural pathology. It is part of institutional processes of state creation and recreation. In 
other words, in modern state systems, and in the globalization processes, corruption is a 
structural aspect of social exchange adopted as a negotiating instrument for access to state 
power and economic opportunities. When there are stiff competition and disagreements on 
the normative principles of social exchange and accessibility to the state and economy, and 
the state is unable to enforce rational moral behaviour among and between social groups, 
corruption becomes an instrument for opening up access to the market and state in order to 
benefit from within, and through them. This implies that, unless we are informed about the 
character of the institutional context in and through which social conduct and exchanges 
take place, we will be unable to explain why corruption occurs in the way it does (Haller 
and Shore, 2005:8). So, understanding corruption and its effect on development requires an 
understanding of the context in which both are created, negotiated and sustained. 
9.3 Institutional Reforms, Corruption and Poverty 
As already noted, corruption in Tanzania is, as in most African countries, an institutional 
pathology resulting from the formation of the colonial and post colonial state and the 
nature of its involvement in the economy. Broadly, the antecedents of the pathology are to 
be found in the nature of restructuring of the state and economy and the resultant mode of 
wealth accumulation. The process not only produced corruption itself, but also created an 
institutional context which embedded and protected it. 
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Analysis of institutional development in chapter 4, indicate that, corruption emerged with 
the colonial reforms and was complicated by the post­independence reaction to those 
changes. It was a result of more complex reforms which went beyond the process of 
separating the “public” and “private” spheres in the society in which the two spheres are 
believed to have existed in fusion prior to colonialism.70 It was also more than a 
transplantation of legal­rational bureaucratic organizations into a supposedly “inhospitable 
environment”, thereby creating “two morally incompatible publics” and hence severing the 
“organic umbilical cord” of responsibility and accountability between the state and 
society.71 While these may constitute part of the explanation of the phenomenon, this study 
has revealed one important, but overlooked, part of the explanation: the development of 
“regressive and syncretistic institutional order” characterised by excessive bureaucratic 
regulations and weak legal institutions. 
We have seen that, from the inception of colonialism, the bureaucracy was developed at 
the expense of other institutions that are needed in checking its inherent authoritarian and 
discretionary functioning tendencies: the political representative, legal and civil society 
institutions. Responding to economic interests, the colonial authorities discouraged 
development of political (representative) and civil society institutions as a way of 
suffocating the struggle by indigenous Africans against colonial exploitation. While the 
same was true for legal institutions, bureaucratic institutions were considered mutable to 
political and legal resistance due to their inherent discretionary tendencies and functional 
flexibility that was tantamount to colonial economic and political logic: resource 
exploitation and accumulation, free from counter political and legal resistance. And legal 
institutions were introduced as instrument of the colonial officials and their African 
assistants to enforce compliance with colonial interests and to protect themselves against 
the aggrieved native population. 
The adoption of a “dual administrative system”, consisting of both the regressive 
bureaucratic institutions of European colonial archetype and protected traditional (native) 
administration of the colonial Africa, set in motion a development trajectory of regressive 
and syncretistic institutional order, a breeding ground for corruption. In an attempt to 
redress some of the legacies of the colonial system, and respond to the demands of the new 
and poor country, the independent government ended up consolidating the problem. The 
adoption of the republic constitution in 1962 consolidated executive powers in the political 
framework equivalent to “imperial presidency”; the abolition of civil organizations outside 
structures of the state and the only ruling party ­ TANU/CCM in 1964; the adoption of a 
single party system in 1965; the adoption of Ujamaa in 1967 and the consequent 
70 These are ideas advanced by Ekeh (1975:91­93) in his article “Colonialism and the Two Publics” in Africa, in which 
he argued that the experience of colonialism led to the emergence, in postcolonial Africa, of “two publics” instead of 
one, as in the West: the primordial public­ associated with traditional African societies ­ with moral values incompatible 
to those of the civic public ­ which is historically associated with the colonial administration and post­colonial 
institutions, such as the military, the civil service, the police, etc. Furthermore, while in the West, the private and the 
public realms have a common moral foundation in that, what is considered morally wrong in the private realm is also 
considered morally wrong in the public realm. In Africa, the opposite is the case: the primordial public is moral and 
operates on the same moral imperatives as the private realm while the civic public is amoral and lacks the generalized 
moral imperatives operative in the private realm and in the primordial public. Therefore, the civic public is characterised 
by a lack of moral linkage with the private realm. Many of Africa's political problems are said to be due to the dialectical 
relationships between these two. 
71Ibid; See also Heilman et al, (2000:498) who argued that corruption started with colonialism and the attempt to impose 
a legal­rational administration. The result was the struggle for the separation of the public and private, with the view of 
making officials use their positions for public interest. While the legal­rational administration has been the ideal type of 
organizational structure in the public and private realm in the west, meeting the standard behaviour required in 
underdeveloped countries like Tanzania is difficult partly due to the incompatible moral foundations and absence of any 
organic link between the state and society. 
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nationalization of the major means of production; the abolition of private property rights; 
the suffocation of individual (private) self­advancement outside the statist economy; the 
creation of a state­centred resource distribution system; the expansion and entrenchment of 
bureaucratic institutions into the everyday life of the society; the weakening of legal 
institutions and their subordination to bureaucratic regulations; and the abolition of local 
government in 1974 and replacement with a decentralized regional administrative system 
under the direct control of the central government, were all part of the process of 
consolidating the problem. This resulted into three main problems which perpetuate 
corruption and mediate its impact on poverty alleviation. 
9.3.1 Existence of Overwhelming Impunity 
It is well documented in the legal literature that one of the assumptions behind the legal 
approach to anti­corruption initiatives is the expected legal cost of corrupt acts, particularly 
in terms of the legal penalties supplemented by social penalties in the form of “immoral 
stigmatization” and the isolation of the culprit. The most obvious cost is the risk of getting 
caught and legally punished. However, the probability of getting caught depends on the 
effectiveness of the legal system (Treisman, 2000:402) and other accountability 
mechanisms. In the literature on legal institutionalism, two related aspects are 
distinguished. First, legal systems differ in the degree of protection and the opportunities 
for recourse they offer to citizens in general and private property owners, particularly those 
harmed by corrupt acts of officials. There is an argument that common law systems (found 
in Britain and its former colonies) differ in this dimension from civil law systems (found in 
continental Europe and its former colonies). Whereas common law was traditionally 
developed as a defensive mechanism of the parliament (representing both citizens in 
general and property owners in particular) against attempts by the sovereign (the State) to 
intrude into and regulate the socio­economic life of society, civil law systems (in 
Napoleonic, Bismarckian, or other forms) developed more as an instrument used by the 
sovereign (the State) for its own construction and to control the economic life of the 
society.72 Second, legal systems differ not just in the formulations and intent of the laws 
but also in the expectations and practices that govern how they are enforced. Therefore, the 
conceptions of the prospective role of law, as part of the institutional order responsible for 
preserving the general social order, differ across countries. 
It is believed that, while in the common law system, the practices of the ideals of the social 
order are strongly associated with adherence to laws as, not only a matter of legal 
procedures, but also as rituals, by contrast, in the civil law system, the practices of the 
ideals of the social order are more closely associated with respect for the bureaucratic 
hierarchy and the authority of the political offices. Thus, there is a general belief that 
differences in colonial and postcolonial reform experiences, particularly those related to 
the legal systems and other moral enforcement mechanisms are responsible for differential 
degrees of a country’s corruption susceptibility (ibid, 403). Based on the foregoing 
analysis, it can be argued thus: the lower the risk of exposure (probability of getting 
72 According to the legal literature, Common law developed from precedents established by judges, usually allied with 
the property­owning aristocracy against the Crown, while civil law developed from codes drawn up by jurists at the 
sovereign’s bidding. It is hypothesized that the greater protection of property against the state, embodied in the common 
law systems, improved various aspects of government. Another way in which the common law systems might reduce 
corruption is through their greater flexibility ­ legal precedents which incrementally incorporate aspects of customary 
law, as occurred in various British colonies. The less dissonance that occurs between law and prevailing moral and 
traditional norms, the greater legitimacy the legal system will tend to have, and the more reliably will the law be enforced 
and, thus, the greater the likelihood of reducing corruption. 
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caught) and prospective penalties, the higher the probability of widespread corrupt 
behaviour. 
The history of reforms in Tanzania testifies to this fact (see chapter 7), by painting a 
picture of the development of a syncretistic institutional order, the characteristics of which 
promote a low risk of exposure and legal penalties for corruption. The legal system itself is 
frustrated by bureaucratic regulations and discretion which allow for those involved in 
corrupt practices to enjoy impunity. Historically, there are rarely any genuine trials of the 
guilty, nor of effective legal or political measures against those involved in corruption 
scandals. The impunity is not because of a lack of interest or absence of moral 
condemnation on the part of society; quite the contrary. Syncretistic institutions create a 
dilemma of desires for action against corruption because there is always a loop­hole for 
culprits to avoid being held to account. This has been the dominant feature of the 
Tanzanian state and its relation with the economy and society. 
For example, when the economic crisis hit the country in the late 1970s and early 1980s 
and later the state withdrew from the economy, the existence of a syncretistic order 
facilitated the expansion of corrupt and predatory alliances between and among public 
officials and businessmen, wanting to catch up with the lost years of Ujamaa. Weak legal 
institutions of protection and excessive bureaucratic regulations provided security for them 
to contemplate corruption with a sense of impunity. The champions of the post­Ujamaa 
reforms, led by the Bretton Woods Institutions, construed the escalation of corruption as a 
consequence of the overly developed state, its excessive regulation of the economy and, 
the “administration” rather than “the market” being entrusted with the allocation of 
resources. Therefore, reducing the size of the state through streamlining its structures and 
the number of employees were seen as appropriate ways of cutting back on the 
opportunities for corruption on the part of state officials and their allies. But, neither the 
reduction in the size of the state, nor the increased role of the market and private sector, 
helped to reduce corruption. Instead, according to Heilman et al., (2000:501), “corruption 
became rampant and increasingly sophisticated as the relationship between the state and 
the private sector grew in complexity”. By the mid 1990s, the country “reeked of 
corruption”,73 which had spiralled out of leadership control, forcing donors to freeze aid to 
Tanzania. 
The failure of these reforms partly reflected a false diagnosis of the problem. The problem 
was not essentially the size of the state and an administrative allocation of resources. It was 
mainly the regressive and syncretistic character of the state accompanied by bureaucratic 
regulations and weak legal foundations of the economy. Moreover, the economic and 
political reforms in the post­Ujamaa era exacerbated the problem on two accounts: by 
severing the institutional accountability link between the people and the single party­
CCM” and between the government and the Party and; by maintaining an incoherent 
integrity enforcement system. During Ujamaa, many cases related to abuse of public office 
were dealt with within the “Single Party and Government” framework (political and 
administrative control system) rather than legal institutions and processes. It is still 
common for the ruling party and the government to use political and administrative 
structures to deal with cases of abuse of official duties and responsibility rather than to 
allow them be handled by legal processes.74 This has created competing accountability 
73 In March 1995, the late Mwalimu Julius K. Nyerere, then the highly influential retired first president of the Republic 
and the most accredited founding father of the nation and the ruling party CCM, accused both the party and government 
top leaders of allowing corruption to get out of hand and declared that the country “reeked of corruption”. 
74 For example, in 1996, the Prime Minister dissolved the Dar es Salaam City Council because of its failure to perform its 
functions. The explanation was that: the city council was beyond repair because of corrupt practices, a failure to collect 
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enforcement mechanisms and undermines the foundations of accountability (the rule of 
law), a principle of democratic government. In most cases, the integrity enforcement 
system is still based on the Ujamaa logic, even though the institutional base for its proper 
functioning has been destroyed. As a result, it ends up protecting political and 
administrative interests against legal prosecution. 
9.3.2 Moral Circumvention and the Plight of the Poor 
One of the impacts of institutional syncretism is the creation of confusion and paralysis 
which allows a great deal of moral circumvention and corrupt conduct among social 
groups, with little possibility of holding culprits accountable. In Tanzania, it has been 
accompanied by the fallacious pretence of perceiving corruption as a morally convenient 
form of resource negotiation and a coping mechanism under difficult economic conditions. 
The institutions set for “the war against corruption” enjoy a low profile of public 
confidence, as much of those “big” political elite and public servants alleged to have been 
involved in the colossal misappropriation of public resources continue to swim in the order 
with impunity (Mmuya and Lemoyan, 2009:33). The exclusion of the poor from 
mainstream production processes and resource flow, and plundering of natural resources as 
a means of primitive wealth accumulation is tolerated and protected. In general, ethical 
principles that are supposed to govern the actions of different social groups in situations 
where there are consequences for others are easily bypassed (Chachage, 2001:8). The 
concerns of the public and aspirations of the majority are ignored because there are 
loopholes for justification of almost everything that the government does. Many decisions 
made by public officials are attempts to balance their interests and those of the public, 
leading to uncertainty and unpredictable behaviour by public officials. The approach to 
Land Policy adopted by the government (Table 9.1) is a testimony to this. 
Table 9.1: Two Government Initiatives towards Legal and Policy Reforms on Land with 
Different Motives in 1992­1994 
The Context 
The background to the production of the current Land Policy and Laws is the inconsistency in the existing 
land legislation and escalation of land conflicts and disputes in Tanzania, which became apparent from the 
early 1980s. 
Approach: Adoption of Two Incoherent Legal and Policy Reforms Initiatives 
The PCILM The MLHUD­Committee 
1 The President appointed a 
Presidential Commission of Inquiry 
into Land Matters (PCILM) to 
investigate and propose a land 
policy. This Commission gathered 
people's views and made 
recommendations on the basis of 
those views. 
Around the same time, the Ministry of Land, Housing and 
Urban Development (MLHUD) created its own 
committee for the same purpose. This committee worked 
through workshops, seminars and desk­work. 
2 The Presidential Commission arose 
due to the number of complaints 
received from the public about land 
The Ministry was motivated by what it considered to be 
inconsistencies in the existing outdated land laws, which 
made it difficult to plan and administer land matters 
revenue, misallocated land and rampant embezzlement of public funds. The city council case is an example of central 
government taking control over local government and establishing lines of accountability, enforced through central 
administrative agency without legal measures being taken against the officials involved in corrupt practices. Similar 
political and bureaucratic mechanisms were used in resolving the popular Arumeru­Arusha revolt in 1998 and the CCM 
party discipline of the mayor and two other councillors over a corruption scandal in the Arusha Municipality in 2007. 
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conflicts and litigation. 
3 The Presidential Commission was 
to look into administrative powers 
and regulations due to the growing 
failure of land administration 
The Ministerial Committee's concerns were 
inconsistencies and the lack of clarity in the existing land 
law which hindered the liberalization policies 
4 The PCILM interest was to 
restructure the land tenure and 
management through the 
diversification and democratization 
of the source of radical titles. 
The Ministry wanted pro­liberalization land legislation 
and to protect smallholders' rights to land from land 
grabbers, while at the same time responding to the 
interests of the investors. 
5 The PCILM Report Suggested a 
Framework for New National Land 
Policy and Law, recommending 
(among other things) the 
establishment of a National Land 
Commission (NLC) and that all 
land should be divided into National 
Lands and Village lands and that the 
President should be divested of the 
radical title to land. 
The proposal of the PCILM was rejected on the ground 
that it limited the state’s access to resources for 
development projects, including giving it to investors as 
liberalization policies required. Since it could not accept 
the Land Commission's proposal, the government hired 
the Tropical Research & Development, Inc of the USA in 
1994 to quickly write a technical report, financed by the 
World Bank in preparation for the January 1995 policy 
meeting. It is these American consultants who helped the 
government come with its own Land Policy. Later, the 
Land Act was drafted by an Overseas Development 
Administration Consultant, Professor Patrick MacAuslan, 
who endorsed excessive bureaucratic control of land 
again. Only a few aspects of the PCILM Report were 
taken as supplements. 
6 The PCILM Suggestions which 
were based on people's views and 
aimed promoting legal processes on 
land maters by reducing excessive 
bureaucratic regulations was 
rejected 
The MLHUD Committee’s Suggestions which aimed at 
maintaining bureaucratic interest on access and control 
over land were accepted. 
Source: Chachage (2001) Corruption: Some Reflections on Its Nature; Department of Sociology, September 
2001, pages 8­10; The PCILM 1994: Volume I 
There are three lessons we can deduce from Table 9.1. First, lesson is related to syncretistic 
behaviour of the government expressed in terms of adopting two approaches to legal and 
policy reform initiatives of land which had different motives and represented different 
interests. Second, we see how the government could bypass a legally appointed 
(presidential) Land Commission's proposal in favour of a bureaucratically appointed 
Ministerial Foreign Technical Consultants’ Report. Finally, we learn that the government 
adopted a National Land Policy and Land Acts in line with the Ministerial position rather 
than the people’s views.75 The proposed land policy seemed to have ignored the grievances 
75 The belief that the Report of the Presidential Commission of Inquiry on Land Matters represented the interests and 
aspirations of the majority poor workers and peasants in rural and urban area, as opposed to the Ministry’s appointed 
bureaucratic Committee, is based on the independence of the Commission and authenticity of the methodology, coverage 
and arguments. As the Chairman of the Commission (Professor Issa Shivji) explained in the preface of the Report: “I 
believe I would be expressing the sentiment of all my former colleagues on the Commission when I say…[t]his Report is 
…an authentic record of the grievances, complaints , hopes and fears of the sons and daughters of the soil. Never before 
has such a record been produced in the country. I can say without hesitation that the Wananchi were not only the 
fountains of inspiration to the commission but the ultimate source of major ideas presented…in the language of their 
daily experience and practical wisdom.[O]ur Report, therefore, is rooted not in some grand theory but in the great 
wisdom of the people” (URT­PCILM, 1994:xii). The interests presented in the Ministry’s Committee Report are well 
captured by Yoshida (2005:143): “It is clear that the government bureaucracy …wanted to keep control of land matters 
under the executive arm. They could not accept the main part of the recommendations of the Presidential Commission, 
which argued against the intervention of the government in the alienation of land for development purposes or for 
investors who were approved by the Investment Promotion Centre. In this way the…bureaucracy supported the position 
of World Bank. It is important to note that, the Commission had refused an offer of the World Bank’s financial support 
for the process of Inquiry on land matters arguing that, it was the responsibility of Tanzanians and that, it was ready to 
use whatever resources available in the country to accomplish that responsibility without foreign assistance(Interview No. 
11). 
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of the large majority of land users (poor peasants and pastoral communities) expressed 
through the Commission. No wonder, inadequacies of the Land Policy and Acts resurfaced 
soon after adoption and called for urgent review. 
Similar problems arose in the government approaches to some of corruption scandals. One 
highly publicized example was the scandal concerning the importation of some 200,000 
bags of sub­standard rice and wheat flour in 1992/3, which the Government chemist ruled 
as being unfit for human consumption76. When the government opened a case against the 
importer, the latter hired the SGS (a pre­shipment inspection firm) to prove its innocence 
by taking the sample of grain to the TBS (Tanzania Bureau of Standards) for analysis. In 
establishing a standard for double talk, the following “syncretistic” public statements were 
made (Table 9.2), leaving a great deal of possible misinterpretations of whether or not the 
sample proved that the consignment had items unfit for human use. The World Bank 
(2001:20) described these tendencies as characterised by “frequent policy reversals and 
overlapping authority”. 
Table 9.2: A Case of Syncretistic Approach to Corruption 
The SGS vs. TBS analysis Statements on the scandal 
SGS to TBS (Tanzania Bureau of Standards) “determine its suitability for human 
consumption.” TBS report: “the results should not be regarded as representative of the quality of 
any commercial consignment nor be used for any commercial negotiations. The sample has 
passed all the requirements for self­raising flour and can be used for the intended purpose”. 
SGS: “they [TBS] did not clarify if the samples sent to them are fit for human consumption. 
In this situation, we are not in a position to issue our report for human consumption.” The TBS 
press release following the release of 6,000 Metric tons of flour read: “[We] issued a report on the 
one sample tested to the effect that the sample had ‘passed all the requirements for self­raising 
flour and can be used for its intended purpose’. The intended use for self­raising flour is baking. 
Whether or not it is suitable for human consumption is another matter and the TBS did not state 
this” (!!). 
Source: World Bank (2001:2) 
So, development processes in Tanzania take place within an order which produces “mixed 
signals” of morality and normative values to the people it is supposed to influence. No 
clear roles of institutions can be easily comprehended, including the lines of accountability 
and other integrity enforcement mechanisms. This results into confusion and paralysis 
which perpetuate corruption and in turn, are reinforced by it. Furthermore, reforms have 
resulted in an order in which corruption and poverty occupy different institutional and 
moral positions in the society. Thus, while both have been historically and rhetorically 
perceived and condemned as enemies of humanity and development, in practice, 
corruption has been tolerated as an alternative means of access to the state controlled 
resources necessary for (among others) the struggle out of poverty. In other words, while 
reforms seek to alleviate poverty, the same reforms promote contemplation of corruption 
as a convenient negotiation mechanism for resource accessibility. This tendency towards 
these two social problems has created a dilemma in the struggle against poverty. The 
What is more strange about the scandal is that the case could not continue any further, because five (5) key persons in 
the case could not testify due to death: (two from the government chemist’s office ­ including its head and technical 
standards officer ­ which produced the findings and ruled the flour and rice unfit for human consumption, two from 
customs ­ which issued the company an “indulgence” to store them in an unprotected, “constructive” warehouse; and one 
health officer from the Temeke Local Government Authority in Dar es salaam where the constructive warehouse was 
located and which forwarded the samples of the grains to the Government Chemist for investigation. 
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struggle against corruption is not institutionally and morally linked with that of poverty. 
Thus, the simultaneity of the two struggles is incompatible and results in the worsening of 
both problems. 
9.4 The Scope and Status of Corruption 
Determining the scope and status of corruption is important in ascertaining the severity of 
the problem and the extent of its impact on poverty alleviation. While doing this in 
developing countries like Tanzania is a formidable challenge (partly because of the nature 
of the problem and the difficulty involved in correcting accurate information about it, and 
the absence of well documented regular assessments), however, a general scope and status 
of the problem can be drawn through an examination of the available data and reports. The 
relevant starting point is the Warioba Commission Report of 1996. According to that, by 
the mid 1990s, corruption had become deeply rooted and widespread in the country. 
Distinguishing between petty and top­level corruption, the report argued, the former 
category had developed in all public sectors and become bothersome to ordinary citizens, 
while top­level corruption had became the means used by top public servants to 
accumulate wealth. Corruption had also gone to the extent of flouting or bending laws, 
rules and regulations in order to serve the interests of rich corruption givers. The report 
argued that, because of the distortion of the political and social­economic life of the 
country, corruption may have made the citizens despair that they could receive justice 
without it, which led them to lose confidence in their leaders who were supposed to protect 
them against injustice. Corruption had also resulted in disrespect for laws, regulations and 
procedures, and most leaders never acknowledged it as a grave problem. The report 
identified the following as the main causes of corruption: erosion of integrity among 
leaders; administrative laxity and lack of transparency; cumbersome procedures for 
obtaining public service; problems with administrative laws and regulations; a lack of 
political will; the emergence of competitive conspicuous consumption; and the closeness 
of corrupt businessmen and leaders in politics and government (ESRF, 2002:11­12). The 
report revealed that law enforcement was in a state of paralysis, as the enforcement 
agencies wined and dined with the corruption architects, leaving ordinary members of the 
public without reliable legal protection. In the words of the Commission, “cases of justice 
[were] bent in accordance not of the weight of the evidence but of bribes” (Muganda 
1997:2): 
Table 9.3: Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index (1998­2000) 
Year 1998 1999 2000 
Sample Size 85 99 90 
Ranks 
Kenya 74 90 82 
Uganda 73 87 80 
Tanzania 82 93 77 
SSA Countries with “better” scores 10 11 12 
SSA Countries with “worse” scores 3 3 3 
Raw Score (1=very corrupt; 10=clean) 
Kenya 2.5 2.0 2.1 
Uganda 2.6 2.2 2.3 
Tanzania 1.9 1.9 2.5 
Sub­Saharan Africa 3.5 3.34 2.84 
Source: (World Bank 2001:5); Note: SSA = Sub­Saharan Africa 
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To give an indication of the severity of corruption in the country, Transparency 
International’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI)77 (Table 9.3) for 2000, ranked Tanzania 
77 out of 90 countries sampled, while, in 1999, it was 93 out of 99. Again, in 2003, eight 
years after the Warioba Report, REPOA conducted an opinion survey to determine the 
view of the people of the government’s performance in combating corruption. The results 
(Table 9.4) indicated that 50% believed that corruption was increasing and this belief was 
in all regions. 
Table 9.4: Opinions on government performance in combating corruption (%) ­2003 
Dar es Salaam Other towns Rural areas Tanzania 
M F T M F T M F T M F T 
Corruption 
is increasing 
61 55 60 54 59 55 49 47 49 50 50 50 
Corruption 
is falling 
26 29 27 30 22 28 35 26 34 34 27 33 
No response 13 15 13 16 19 16 16 27 17 16 24 17 
Total 100 99 100 100 100 101 100 100 100 100 101 100 
Source: REPOA, 2003:15 
Finally, Parliamentary Reports (Hansards), research reports and investigative journalism 
stories on corruption scandals (Table 9.5) provide a picture of the pervasiveness of 
corruption. These, according to Hussmann and Mmuya (2007:177), confirm the existence 
of large­scale corruption and entrenched networks of corruption and state capture, a sign 
that predatory political and economic elites have taken root in the country since the 
evidence of their existence was published in the Warioba Report of 1996, endangering the 
initiatives for promoting economic growth and poverty alleviation. 
Table 9.5: The Cumulative Amount of Money Lost Through Some Corrupt and Dubious 
Deals (2006­2009) 
No. Corruption Scandal Amount Lost (in Billions of 
Tanzanian Shillings) 
Year 
A The BOT’s EPA Scandal 133 2007/08 
B The BOT’s Twin Tower Construction Scandal 221 2007/08 
C The BOT’s Dubious Insurance Expenditure 
Scandal 
7.3 2007/08 
D Sub­total on BOT Scandal 361.3 2007/08 
E TANESCO Dubious Contracts (IPTL Scandal + 
The Richmond Scandal 
335.7 2007/08 
F Sub­total TANESCO + BOT Scandal 697 2007/08­
2008/9 
G The Military Radar Transaction Scandal 58 By 
2006/07 
H The Dubious Mining Contract Scandal 700 (70 per annum) 1998/99­
2008/09 
I The MOF Fraud and Tax Exemption Scandal 11.8 2003/04­
2006/07 
According to Szeftel (2000:291), the CPI presents an index score which calculates how corrupt each country is 
perceived to be by influential individuals. In most cases, those surveyed fall into one of the following categories: 
expatriate business executives, business analysts in Europe or the US, US academic experts, top and middle level 
management in foreign and domestic companies, senior business leaders, expert staff, foreign and domestic business 
executives. So, they are the perceptions of businessmen, executives, politicians and media correspondents. Thus, it is 
important to ask who determines the views about what is corruption and what is not. The CPI rankings normally endorse 
the widespread prejudicial perception that corruption is worst in developing countries. To this extent, the Index reinforces 
the view that corruption is characteristic of developing countries 
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77 
J The NDC Scandal 2 2007/08 
K The MNRT Scandal (Donors Aid Money 
Missing) 
41.6 2008/09 
L The PO­PSM 
Ghost 
MOHSW (1,511 Ghost 
Employees) 
4.48 2007/08 
M Employees’ 
Payments 
MOEVT (1000 Ghost 
Employees) 
3 2007/08 
N Government Unaccounted Money ( CAG Report) 6.8 2007/2008 
976 2008/09 
3,100 2006/07­
2007/08 
O Recovered Corrupt Money by PCCB 13.2 2008 
P Unpaid Government Loans by Prominent 
Politicians 
180 2008/09 
Source: Corruption Tracker System (CTS) Online Newsletter; Accessed Date: 2009­05­26 
09:22:46. Key: BOT =Bank of Tanzania; EPA =External Payment Accounts; CAG =Controller and Auditor 
General; PCCB = Prevention and Combating of Corruption Bureau; MOF= Ministry of finance; NDC= 
National Development Corporation; MNRT=Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism; PO­PSM 
=President’s Office and Public Service Management; MHSW= Ministry of Health and Social Welfare; 
MOEVT= Ministry of Education and Vocational Training 
9.5 Impact of Corruption on Poverty Alleviation 
9.5.1 Policy­making Distortions 
Apart from frequent policy reversals and overlapping authority, pervasive corruption leads 
to policy distortions which undermine poverty alleviation initiatives. Policy distortions 
occur as a compromise in social group struggles for state­controlled resources which 
manifest itself in the form of distortive negotiations of formal rules of the game, predatory 
alliances and solidarity, adoption of dubious economic contracts and reckless abuse of 
laws. 
(a) Struggles for State­controlled Resources 
As discussed in chapter 4, Ujamaa created a monopolistic statist­resource distribution 
system which imposed limitations on productive resource accessibility to the majority 
working outside the formal state machinery. Access to resources became organised under 
the state, while the state organs at different levels emerged as frameworks for access to 
resources. Other avenues were mutilated, leaving access to and/or association with the state 
the only means to self­advancement. It also created inequality in terms of social group 
proximity to the state and resources under its control. At the end of Ujamaa and consequent 
re­opening of the economy and politics, Tanzania confronted a situation in which, there 
was a politico­bureaucratic elite who had never been well nurtured in private business and 
economic activities but who enjoyed access to and control over the State (political) power 
and economic resources under its control. However, the economic resources they enjoyed 
began to be taken away in the course of economic liberalization. There was also, a business 
elite (mainly Asian), who had not been nurtured in politics and public engagement, but 
who controlled the economy through protected (private) capitalist economic system. In 
between, there was an emerging middle class elite wanting to benefit from the socio­
economic and political changes by exploiting the possible alliances between the above two 
groups. At the bottom, were workers and peasants struggling for survival in the growing 
informal service sector and small scale agricultural production. 
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There are two issues that played a central role in determining the relationship in the 
production and distribution of resources among the above groups, which has implications 
for the character of corruption that the country faces today and its impact on policy­making 
process. First, there was a failure to dismantle the monopolistic resource distribution 
system as envisioned in the liberalization policies and reform documents. While the 
economy was opened up, accessibility to resources necessary for engagement in the 
“opened economy” continued to depend on access to the state. Moreover, the laws 
provided that access to the state and the resources it controlled could be made through 
joining political parties ­ particularly the ruling party, the CCM. The second issue related 
to the growing tendency of the government to define development in terms of foreign 
investment. Development became a synonym for “foreign investment”.78 The primacy of 
foreign investment led to the belief that investment without a foreign partner could not be 
regarded as investment. Therefore, the alliance or partnership between the domestic and 
foreign businessmen became one of the prerequisites for securing government approval of 
investment and subsequent access to resources. The result was incarceration of all political 
and economic players within the logics of Statist­monopolistic resource distribution 
system, forcing them into alliance against the majority of poor workers and peasants, close 
to what Mmuya and Lemoyan (2009:40) described derogatorily as “Ushoga” (a Kiswahili 
word which partly refers to indecent cohabitation) manifested through recklessly abusing 
the law and politico­administrative responsibility for corruptive motives. 
Now, since the politico­bureaucratic elite had control over the state power but lacked 
economic power; the business elite (particularly Asians) had control of the economy but 
could not expand due to limited access to resources outside the state system and thus, felt it 
imperative to gain control over the state without losing economic power; foreign investors 
did not have enough capital and wanted to get part of it from the state and later have access 
to resources controlled by it in order to invest in the country; the scramble for access to the 
state and resources under its protection was inevitable. In this situation, a more effective 
mechanism for negotiation which could protect their interests and ensure access to and 
acquisition of new benefits was needed. Corruption appeared to be the only effective 
means of ensuring equal distribution of the benefits to each group. That is, the politico­
bureaucratic elite to continue retaining their political power while engaging in private 
economic deals; the business elite retain their economic power and enjoyed political 
prestige which was important for access to resource centres and protection of their business 
dealings; and the foreign investors to have enough capital through manipulation of state 
power and access to the centres of resources through partnership with both groups. 
Corruption became the main instrument of policy negotiation in the market economy. 
In the context presented above, the state is the epicentre of the convergence of the interests 
of the political elite, the administrative elite and the business elite­foreign and domestic. 
From the institutionalist perspective, the state represents the locus of the “institutional 
point of unit of interest” (IPUI), which constitutes access to and control of resources, while 
members of the above mentioned alliance represent the “veto group” organised and 
protected by the state. In the logic of an institutional order, the three actors link and 
interlink among themselves through authoritative decision making entities, such as the 
parliament and local councils, where politics, business and administration of resources 
converge. For example, Mmuya and Lemoyan (2009:41), in one of their studies of local 
In Tanzania, the encouragement of foreign investment led to the enactment of the National Investment (Promotion and 
Protection) Act, 1990, and the establishment of the Investment Promotion Centre (IPC) under the President. This 
government action spurred investors to lease land on a large scale. 
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78 
governance, found that, at the local authority level, the experience revealed that, while the 
business elite sponsored entry of the political leadership into the political slot in exchange 
for the awarding of contracts, the political elite had companies awarded contracts under the 
guidance of the bureaucratic elite in exchange for payments from construction companies 
to whom they awarded contracts. 
Figure 9.1. The Tripartite Alliance between the Bureaucratic, Political and 
Business Elite
79 
1. The 
Political 
Elite 
2. The 
Bureauc 
ratic 
Elite 
3. The 
Business 
Elite 
The State 
(IPUI) 
Source: Adopted with some modification from Mmuya and Lemoyan (2009:42) 
(b) Distortion of formal rules of the game 
In Tanzania, the logic of corruption, being a negotiation mechanism for political and 
economic gains, transcends the commodified form of negotiations (De Sardan 1999:36) 
like overpriced commercial transactions, tax exceptions and monetary payment for access 
to public (political) office through appointment or voting. It has entered into larger 
institutional configurations, in which negotiations and bargaining have shifted to 
negotiations about formal rules of the game. The motive is to legalize the past, present and 
future corrupt practices of “the veto groups”. In 2000, for example, Parliament enacted the 
National Elections Act No 4 on gifts and presents, commonly known as “takrima80” on the 
pretence of upholding the traditional African logic of gift­giving and hospitality gestures, 
79 Warning: We are aware that this kind of diagram is too simplistic to explain and understand the complexities of social 
phenomenon like corruption. It is not meant to be a complete and accurate depiction of the complexities of corruption 
exchange, but to simplify and help us understand the central massage of the nature of that exchange in a particular context. 
As we have repeatedly argued, institutional reforms in Tanzania have resulted in the concentration of resources into the 
State and suffocation of other potential centres of resources outside its institutional framework. While it is true that not all 
corruptions are mediated through the state, in Tanzainan context, it is equally true that major corruption exchanges that 
have greater impact on poverty alleviation have always been mediated, directly or indirectly, through State machinery at 
national or local level. So, the aim is to insist the existence of monopolistic State­resource distribution system which 
attracts scramble and mediation for resources through the State, than other wise. We acknowledge that, such diagrams 
however, don’t work for everyone. 
80 Specifically, takrima (a Kiswahili term) referred to traditional hospitality and was used in the context of elections when 
candidates made offerings to potential voters like handing out t­shirts, food rations and the like. Although the Act was 
criticised for encouraging corruption in the electoral process and therefore the high court ruled in favour of the petitioners 
and against the government, given the syncretistic nature of the political system and the weak position occupied by the legal 
institutions, the practice of takrima continued. 
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which actually legalized corruption. The law acted as a bar against prosecution of the high 
layers in politics if accused of corrupt conduct (Mwananchi, November 2, 2003), thereby 
contributing to the erosion of the integrity of the electoral system (Hussmann & Mmuya, 
2007:175). Thus, the “takrima” law was an illustration of leadership indifference, the 
government’s intent to accommodate corruption and an example of corrupt negotiation of 
rules of the political game. 
(c) Predatory Alliances and Solidarity 
Another way in which corruption distorts policy making is through predatory alliances and 
solidarities of well placed social groups to influence policy process and outcomes. This is 
characterised by the deepening convergence of the political, public service and economic 
elite into mitandao (networks of informal personal connections) of private accumulation 
that take place within and outside the state apparatus. The mutual dependencies are 
organised through negotiation logic, guided by principle of “kulindana” (mutual 
protection against corruption fighters) and “kutetea masilahi” (defending interests) based 
on informal connections, patronage considerations and infiltration of mitandao’s interests 
into policy process. Thus, alongside instances of fierce competition, there exist much 
solidarity of the privileged veto groups with initiatives for, not only setting off alarms of 
anti­corruption in society, but also distorting policies and their legal foundations to 
facilitate exploitation and plundering natural resources (Hussmann & Mmuya, 2007: 181; 
Harsch, 1993:38; De Sardan, 1999:38; World Bank, 2001:17). Since, the formal channels 
of complaints and other communication are ineffective, the solutions to problems which 
are supposed to be handled through the formal channels are redirected to mitandao, which 
often work in favour of members of the privileged social groups, who hold higher places in 
the state and the economy (World Bank, 2001:9). 
In his explanation of the nature of the debate and decisions about adopting the National 
Empowerment Policy and Act in the high government meetings in the early 2000s, one 
interviewee illustrated the functioning of the mitandao and its policy distortive tendencies 
in the following words: 
“You know, when we began the process of preparing the National Economic Empowerment Policy 
then coordinated by the Prime Minister’s office, there were so many things. Among them, was the 
question of indigenization particularly on the issue of who should benefit from the remaining un­
privatized public property (assets) after many of them were taken by the Asian businessmen in the 
early phases of the privatization process in the 1990s. It was at that juncture that we had a great task 
to handle. As you know, almost every Minister has his Indian big business partner! So, when we had 
discussions on policy issues here in the government, the following day, you could hear an Indian 
businessmen talking about exactly the same issues we discussed at our meetings. Eeeh! You remain 
surprised! You see now? But later, we realized that whenever we had a meeting and discussed issues 
which had implications for the Indian businessmen’s businesses, some of the Ministers went out 
after the meeting and held another meeting with these businessmen in which they explained what we 
had just discussed and what the government was planning. They then agreed on the way forward. 
Thus, when we held another meeting, the same Ministers would come up with new arguments 
reflecting their private meetings with their business partners”(Interview No.9). 
A similar observation regarding the character of mitandao, was made by one interviewee 
during the World Bank research on corruption in the country (World Bank (2001:9). The 
interviewee reported: 
“Each Asian community has a kind of ‘Shadow Parliament’ where one person is in charge 
of immigration, another of income tax, and another land. This allows them to avoid the 
middlemen.” The key to corruption in Tanzania is to understand the organogram of each 
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department. You have to know who controls what so you can pay the right person. It 
requires an analysis of each organization. I have a friend who was once the General 
Manager of Tanzania Stationary Manufacturers. The company went bust so they put him 
on a bench somewhere in the civil service where he used to sit reading newspapers. He got 
bored of this and decided he wanted to become a DC (District Commissioner). It was very 
simple; he just figured out the “weak point” in the wall around the Prime Minister. To 
break through, he figured out who surrounded him, located a person from his home area, 
and began the negotiations.” 
(d) Adoption of Dubious Contracts 
Scandals related to dubious contracts (Table 9.5) have become a symbol of corruption and 
distortion of policy priorities in Tanzania. Contracts are deliberately subjected to 
irregularities and abuse of laws in favour of the corruption alliance of the “veto group”. 
They include disrespect for legal procurement procedures, tailoring contract specifications 
so that the winner is a foregone conclusion, forged certifications of competence of 
favoured contract bidders, lenience regarding access and control of natural resources to 
facilitate plunder, administratively dictated tax exemption, negotiations for contracts taking 
place under pressure from political leaders or government officials, over pricing of 
construction tenders to be paid by the government, investing in large and ill­prioritized 
projects with a primary interest of earning rents, and several acts of diverting national 
resources from public use to private ends (Muganda, 1997:5; Cooksey, 2005:9;Hussmann 
& Mmuya, 2007: 178;World Bank, 2001:17). 
These scandals have, at different times, triggered anger among Tanzanians and provoke 
racial and religious comments, which are suppressed not by providing solutions but by 
ignoring or mobilizing political bias against those sentiments. Two examples illustrate the 
tendency. The first is the Loliondo Scandal,81 which upset people, forcing them to resort to 
provocative comments against the government and on matters related to race. The 
following quotation testifies to this: 
“You see God created Tanganyika to be the mother of the children called Tanganyikans. 
And she was given to us to take care of us…But the country is on sale: They are selling the 
land. What about Loliondo, the game parks, everything? They are selling everything and 
they say I am an instigator and what have you. They are sick. They are selling everything, 
all the diamonds are going. The elephants, we had 300,000 at independence. No one 
should point a finger at the British, because they left us with everything intact. Now we 
have got about 8,000 left from 300,000 elephants. Everything is finished and we know 
who is finishing it. It is these people who are coming for elephants not coming to our 
country because we are friends (Angered Reverend Mtikila’s views re­quoted in Hussmann 
& Mmuya 2007: 178). 
Despite such negative sentiments, nothing was done to solve the problem; instead, 
corruption associated with embezzlement of public resources and plunder of natural 
resources increased. Allegations of corruption involving the political and business elites, 
locally and with connections internationally, continued to be the theme of the daily news 
reports. The political elite and public servants who were alleged of misappropriation of 
public resources were never convicted (Mmuya and Lemoyan, 2009:33). In 2009, this 
Loliondo is part of a game reserve on the slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro, in northern Tanzania. In circumstances that 
have never been fully explained by the government, foreign hunters and collectors of game were given a free hand to do 
whatever they desired in a wide track of land in Loliondo. According to Hussmann and Mmuya (2007:178), transport 
planes from the Arab world would land in the middle of the night at Kilimanjaro International Airport, bringing hunters, 
and also spiriting away valuable game which is a national resource. 
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provoked the Catholic Church (later supported by other churches) which issued a 
controversial Pastoral Letter accompanied by an “electoral manifesto”, stressing the dire 
need to revive the Ujamaa ethical principles in order to apprehend leadership immorality, 
resource exploitation, inequality and corruption, which according to the Church, were the 
real causes of umaskini (poverty). The Pastoral Letter and the Manifesto were meant to 
guide people on the issues to take into account during the 2010 general elections. The 
Church claimed that, ethics is its vision in leadership and development and its essence is 
man himself created by God. The purpose of economic activities and politics is man, it 
argued. The Church argued that, one of the gifts brought by Ujamaa, which created the 
foundation of Tanzanian culture and which continues to be accepted by the majority of 
people, includes unity, solidarity, mutual understanding (peaceful co­existence) and a 
vision of a nation as a family (familyhood). These gifts, according to the Church, conform 
to the vision of the Church and their conception goes beyond political ideology. While it is 
true that Ujamaa, like any other socio­economic system, had negative and positive 
consequences, the Church argued, the decisions to change the system and abandon 
everything brought by it was wrong. The consequence has been the adoption of narrow 
focused reforms in a few economic sectors with a greater propensity towards direct 
monetary earnings. This has led to the exclusion of the majority of citizens from the 
mainstream economy, growing inequality and impoverishment (CPT, 2009:1­2). 
Therefore, as the CTS Newsletter of 2009 observed, having prepared against the opposition 
parties, the ruling party (CCM) and its government, all of a sudden, found itself faced with 
an ‘enemy’ (the Church) they had never considered. All of these controversies have 
resulted from the erosion of leadership morality and widespread corruption, which the 
Church believed to be handiwork of the government. 
9.5.2 Diversion and Mismanagement of Productive Resources 
Resource mismanagement based on corrupt motives results in diversion of public resources 
and government revenue away from socio­economic activities done mainly by the poor 
towards private corrupt self­enrichment deals of the higher public officials and big 
businessmen. This narrows the flow of resources into the poverty alleviation initiatives and 
diminishes the government’s capacity to support poverty alleviation programmes. The 
impact of corruption on poverty can be depicted when a comparison is made between 
annual government budgets and the specific expenditure set for priority areas, and the 
amount of money lost through corrupt and dubious contracts. For example, in 2007/08, 
while the government budget (Table 9.6) was 6,067 billion shillings, the money lost 
through corruption stood at 783.28 billion, equivalent to 13% of the total budget. This 
amount lost on corruption was twice that set for the Water and Agricultural sector ( 5.1% 
and 6.2% respectively) and more than the budget for the health and infrastructure sectors 
(10% and 12.8% respectively). It was only 5% lower than that of the education sector 
(18%). An analysis of the Bank of Tanzania (BOT) and the Tanzania Power Supply 
Company (TANESCO) corruption scandals alone (Table 5) amounted to 697 billion 
shillings. In that year, the government estimated the costs of building a classroom block at 
7 million shillings and the starting monthly salary for a primary school teacher was 
120,000 shillings. Thus, the 697 billion shillings could have built 142 primary schools and 
paid the salaries of 6,800 primary school teachers per year.82 Astonishingly, in 2008/09, 
82 The information was retrieved from the Corruption Tracker System (CTS) website on January 10, 2010; 19:20. The 
CTS is managed by Agenda Participation 2000, a Tanzanian non­governmental organisation working to promote a 
culture of Good Governance and Democracy in Tanzania, a unique civil society initiative in the fight against corruption. 
The purpose of CTS is to keep track of the publicly available information on presumed or confirmed cases of corruption 
in order to increase accountability and responsiveness in the fight against corruption. 
176

the government lost about 1,210.8 billion shillings (Table 9.6), equivalent to 16.8% of the 
annual government budget (7,216 billion shillings). This was almost half of the 
government budget set for development purposes. 
The picture we get from the above analysis is that, the failure to achieve poverty alleviation 
objectives is partly due to the fact that a large part of the resources allocated to meet 
national priorities are diverted into private self­enrichment deals by corrupt public 
officials. 
Table 9.6: Government Budget in billions of TShs between the 2007 and 2008 financial years 
2007/08 2008/09 
Total Expenditure (6,067)100% (7,216) 
100% 
Recurrent (3,866)63.7% (4,727) 
65.5% 
Development (2,201)36.3% (2,489) 
34.5% 
Key Priority Sectors 
Education (1,086 )18% (1,430) 
19.8% 
Roads/Infrastructure (777.2)12.8% (973.3) 
13.5% 
Health (589.9)10% (803.8) 11.1% 
Agriculture (379.6) 6.2% (460.0) 6.4% 
Water (309.1)5.1% (230.6 ) 3.2% 
Money Lost through Corruption* (783.28)12.9% (1,210.8) 
16.8% 
Source: Government Budget Speeches for 2007/08 and 2008/09. * For more information see Table 7 
There has also been concern about the ways in which natural resources are managed, with 
the current reforms pushing the poor away from the resources they depend on for survival 
in favour of domestic and foreign investors. In other cases, natural resources are exploited 
at the expense government revenue with little benefit to local communities in areas of 
resources extraction. Mineral extraction is an obvious case in point (Table 9.7). There has 
been public outcry about the dubious mineral contracts authorised by government and the 
ways in which minerals have been exploited at the expense of government revenue and 
local community development, which forced the President in 2008 to appoint a committee 
to look into the matter. 
Table 9.7: Some Aspects of Inquiry and Observations/Arguments made by the PCRAGMMS­2008 
No. Aspect of Inquiry Observations/Arguments 
1. Mineral Policy of 1997 The government has used fiscal incentives as a means of attracting 
investors to the mineral sector but has been too generous, thus 
depriving itself of income. There is no strategy in the mineral policy to 
ensure that income generated from minerals is invested in sustainable 
activities for the benefit of future generations. 
2. Small­scale Mining The Primary mining Licences do not allow Tanzanians to form joint 
ventures with non­Tanzanians, thus denying them the opportunity to 
get the capital and technology required to carry out mining operations. 
3. Authority for the 
Minister to enter into 
Agreements 
The Act gives the Minister responsible for mining the authority to enter 
into agreements without prior consultation with other Government 
authorities 
4. Compensation Issues The Act is silent on compensation for those relocated in order to allow 
mining operations to proceed. This is a source of inconvenience for the 
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people who are relocated. 
5. Charging of Royalty The government loses revenue by charging royalties on the basis of 
netback value. The current royalty rates are very low. 
6. Tax exceptions Government loses huge revenue due to the exemption of excise duty on 
fuel 
7. Mining Agreements Lack of transparency in Agreements entered into between the 
Government and investors creates the perception of corruption. 
8. Corporate Social 
Responsibility 
Mining companies’ contribution to the local communities is negligible 
to the extent that the local communities do not appreciate the existence 
of large scale mines in their localities. 
Source: The PCRAGMMS (2008): pp 7, 10­13, 14 and 30 
The committee, using very diplomatic language, confirmed that, while the government 
willingly entered into agreements with foreign mining companies after formulating and 
promulgating attractive incentive packages, mainly through generous tax exceptions and 
very low royalty rates, it ended up depriving itself of income (URT, 2008:38­39). The 
committee confirmed that the local community and the public in general expressed their 
bitterness about how they saw the mineral resources being exploited and their lives 
impoverished largely for the benefit of foreign investors. 
9.5.3 Weak Institutions of Protection and Declining Public Trust 
(a) Weak Institutions of Protection 
One role of institutions, such as laws and regulations governing resource allocation, is to 
ensure retention by those with the right to ownership, whether customary or otherwise. 
Corruption weakens the institutions of protection and the retention of resources, 
particularly for the poor, who have no capacity to defend rights in the system afflicted by 
corruption. Furthermore, in weak legal processes and excessive bureaucratic regulations 
and discretions, corruption makes all resources legally owned or otherwise negotiable in 
the market. For the poor, this corruption induced negotiability erodes the security of the 
resources they own and subjects them to uncertainties about their future economic 
engagement. This problem is illustrated by the opinions of the following interviewee: 
“Listen! It is these government officials who sell our land to investors as a way of 
increasing their earnings and that of their family members. Because they have several 
meetings in which these honourables…the Councillors, village and ward executive 
officers, council officials, Members of parliament and even higher government officials, 
particularly those from the Ministry of Land sit with those rich people who want our 
resources and then they negotiate and the public officials are paid by those rich people 
handsomely. Now, the moment these officials receive that money, they become very bitter 
to their people. And you wonder why that leader is so bitter? Later, you realize that his 
bitterness is because he doesn’t want people to find out that he has been paid a lot of 
money by those rich people and is at that time looking for land to sell. Therefore, it is 
these government leaders who cause all these problems. For example, in Morogoro, there 
is a rich white man who bought a huge piece of land which, in fact, was enough for his 
business, but because of his lust and antipathy he decided to add another portion of land 
belonging to a livestock keeper who had 200 cows on it. As a result, that rich white man 
decided to use his money by contacting the higher government officials. Surprisingly those 
officials, without even investigating the truth of the matter, sent armed police to arrest the 
livestock keeper, accusing him of excessive possession of cows against the government’s 
instruction on modern livestock keeping methods which demand livestock keepers to have 
few cows. They also accused him of causing a disturbance to the investor. So, they 
arrested him and his cows. Later, the officials auctioned off those cows very cheaply, 
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without his consent. They also charged him for those two accusations. Now, with this kind 
of government behaviour, can you really say that your property is safe? Eeeh? Do you 
think this poverty and land conflict you are talking about will disappear in this country? Or 
do you think our children will find land still available in future? No, I don’t think so! The 
only thing you can expect is that it is the children of these officials who will have access to 
land, as they continue to enrich themselves, together with their families. We have a lot of 
examples of similar cases of land grabbing from the poor and land conflicts in the regions 
of Tanga, Morogoro, Iringa and Dodoma. Everywhere..!” (Interview No. 10) 
(b) Declining Public Trust 
As argued in chapter 8, in order for social groups to co­operate among themselves and with 
the government in a sense of civic responsibility and commitment, a minimum level of 
integrity to ensure public trust must prevail. It is even more important for the government 
to maintain a level of trust if it is to influence successfully, the behaviour of the people it 
governs and direct them towards a desired development path. It is even more important in 
developing countries like Tanzania, where the historical circumstances have left the 
government as the only influential institution to effect collective development engagement. 
However, integrity and trust are not natural behavioural tendencies. They are socially 
constructed through institutional orientations, just like corruption. In an institutional order 
that promote corrupt behaviour, particularly to public and government officials, levels of 
integrity diminish, leading to a weak community feeling and declining public trust. 
Attitudes towards government are part of the indicators of public trust and the likelihood of 
people effectively supporting its initiatives. In Tanzania, corruption has been undermining 
public confidence in the government, which has negative implications for its struggle 
against poverty, as the opinions of an interviewee above suggest. 
Another indicator of the declining public trust is people’s subjective evaluation of the 
government’s performance. A comparison between the 2006, 2007 and 2008 Opinion polls 
(Table 9.8) on government performance, particularly its major organs­Cabinet and 
Parliament ­ indicate a declining rate of respondents who reported having being “very 
satisfied”, while who reported being “fairly satisfied” increased, as did those “not 
satisfied”. For example, while the rate of being very satisfied with performance of 
parliament decreased by 10%, from 39.2% in 2006 to 21.8% in 2007, that of being “not 
satisfied” increased by 14%, from 11.3% in 2006 to 25% in 2007. The rate of being very 
satisfied increased by 11%, from 21.8% in 2007, to 32.7% in 2008. This was partly due to 
the uncovering of a corruption scandal mainly by opposition members of parliament which 
led to the resignation of the Prime Minister and two cabinet ministers on what is known as 
the “Richmond Corruption Scandal”.83 It was during this period that Dubious Mining 
contracts were unearthed and the BOT three big corruption scandals (Table 9.7) were 
raised by members of parliament. However, while Parliament managed to restore public 
trust mainly by uncovering government corruption scandals, the Cabinet continued to lose 
its trust. For example, the rate of being “very satisfied” with its performance fell by 14% 
between 2006 and 2007, and fell further by 2.1% between 2007 and 2008. The rate of 
being “not satisfied” increased by 10% between 2006 and 2007 and by 0.8% between 2007 
and 2008. The lower rate of increase of unsatisfied respondents reflected partly the positive 
image created by the resignation of the corrupt cabinet ministers mentioned above. 
On February 7th 2008, the former Prime Minister, Mr Edward Lowassa, and the two former ministers for Energy and 
Minerals, Dr Ibrahim Msabaha and Mr Nazir Karamagi resigned after the Parliamentary select committee chaired by the 
Kyela Member of Parliament (CCM), Dr Harrison Mwakyembe, accused them of complicity in the dubious 172 million 
US dollars (over 172 billion shillings) Richmond emergency power supply contract. 
179

83 
Table 9.8: Comparison of Oppinion Poll Results on the Performance of the Cabinet and 
Parliament in 2006, 2007 and 2008 
Institution Very 
Satisfied 
Fairly Satisfied Not Satisfied Don’t Know Total 
The Cabinet 
October 2006 33.8(434) 37.9(490) 9.2(119) 19.1(247) 100(1294) 
October 2007 20.2(262) 41.4(536) 19.2(249) 19.2(248) 100(1295 
October 2008 18.1(234) 45.7(590) 20.0(259) 16.2(209) 100(1292) 
Parliament 
October 2006 39.2(503) 40.5(519) 11.3(145) 9.1(116) 100(1283) 
October 2007 21.8(282) 42.5(550) 25.0(324) 10.8(139) 100(1295) 
October 2008 32.7(422) 44.7(577) 13.2(171) 9.4(122) 100(1292) 
Source: REDET: Citizens’ Opinion Polls on the Government Performace; No.13, October 2006; No.14, 
October 2007; and No.15, Nov. 2008 
As Table 9.9 indicates, one of the main reasons for being “fairly” or “not” satisfied with 
the performance of government was its involvement in corruption, which increased by 5 
% from 24% in 2007 to 29% in 2008. Other reasons included being unable to follow­up the 
implementation and authorization of dubious mining contracts. If we take authorization of 
a dubious mining contract as a form of corruption then, in general, corruption becomes the 
main reason for the declining public trust with an increase of 5%, from 34% in 2007 to 
39% in 2008. 
Table 9.9: Reasons for Being “Fairly” or “Not” Satisfied with the Performance of the 
government in Power in 2007 and 2008 
Reasons 2007 2008 
% and No. of Respondents % and No. of 
Respondents 
It does not follow­up on 
implementation 
32.7(424) 30.7(396) 
It is involved in corruption 24.0(312) 29.0(375) 
It authorises dubious Mining 
Contracts 
10.9(141) 10.0(129) 
It does not offer/give Credits/Loans 7.6(98) 11.8(152) 
Does not raise Salaries for Workers 5.1(66) 2.2(28) 
Don’t Know 3.2(41) 3.5(45) 
Others 16.5(214) 12.8(155) 
Total 100(1296) 100(1280) 
Source: REDET: Citizens’ Opinion Polls on the Government Performace; No.14, October 2007; and No.15, 
Nov. 2008 
9.6 Conclusion 
The picture that emerges from the analysis is one of pervasive corruption and existence of 
an institutional order which provides conditions for it to flourish. Access to productive 
resources is not only difficult and limited, but also uncertain. The amount of money lost in 
corruption, the widespread policy distortions and the weakening public trust on 
government institutions, the controversial normative and ethical positions of the two 
problems, suggest that government’s sponsored and guided collective initiatives against 
poverty are highly undermined by corruption. Furthermore, the continued concentration of 
resources in the state, or access to it through the state machinery suggest that state­centred 
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corruption will remain the main form of corruption for years to come and thus, a threat to 
public trust and capacity of state institutions to effect poverty alleviation. 
The chapter has also revealed the importance of historical institutional analysis, 
particularly the gradual institutional change perspective, in explaining not only the impact 
of institutions on the actions and behaviour of the actors, but also the dynamic interaction 
between the two. As discussed in chapter 2, it is argued that institutional arrangements 
have distributional consequences which result in the concentration of resources in a 
particular kind of actor and not in others and that create opportunities for some kind of 
innovation and justification for the actions of the political actors as well. Thus, institutional 
change partly occurs as an outcome of resource distributional conflicts or when problems 
of rule interpretation and enforcement open up space for the actors to implement the 
existing rules in new ways. In the Tanzanian case, two lessons can be drawn. First, the 
concentration of resources in the state has triggered struggle among different actors not 
only over access to the state, but also over influencing the institutional reforms in their 
favour. The adoption of dubious acts and contracts, like those in the mining sector, 
illustrates this point. Second, institutional syncretism and ethical duality have provided an 
opportunity for multiple rule interpretations and distortions which, for example at one 
point, justified the abandonment of “the ujamaa leadership code” and the adoption of a 
controversial “takrima law” which favoured those with control over the resources. 
This supports the idea that, while institutions do limit the actions of the political actors, 
their internal functional properties may provide opportunities for different change agents 
and their associated strategies for institutional change. 
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Chapter 10 
Summary and Conclusion 
10.1 Introduction 
This study examined critically institutional reforms in Tanzania. The principle focus was 
on how the mode of reforms and the character of the resultant institutions impacted on the 
government and citizens’ struggles against poverty and inequality. The focus was on the 
ways in which such reforms influenced the organization of production; accessibility to 
productive resources; public resource control and management; socio­economic security; 
and participation in socio­economic development and poverty alleviation initiatives. 
The study demonstrated the impact of reforms on poverty alleviation, showing how the 
character of reforms and institutions account for the failure of the country to promote 
sustainable development and poverty alleviation. This final chapter presents a summary of 
the findings, discusses the contributions of the thesis, makes an evaluation of methodology 
used and finally provides a conclusion. It consists of five sections: (1) summary of the 
findings; (2) implications of the findings for practice; (3) theoretical contributions; (4) 
methodological evaluation; and (5) conclusion. 
10.2 Summary of the key findings 
(a) The Colonial Mode of Institutional Reform 
The colonial mode of reforms was characterized by disruption of the normative principles 
of Tanzanian customary institutions and imposition of partial and distorted Western 
institutions. That is, while in their physical sense they resembled those of modern western 
institutions, their functioning logics were contrary to socio­economic and political settings 
of Western society. Since the original functions of these institutions­which in the Western 
context sought to promote the producers’ autonomy and protection from undue 
interferences of the state­could not serve the colonial purpose, they were to be reversed. 
The reversal fitted well with the logics of colonialism because, its purpose was to enforce 
compliance of the Africans to colonial interests and limit the mechanisms for advancing 
grievances against the system. 
The consequence of this was the distortion of the foundation of the Tanzanian modern 
institutions which in turn, inculcated into the minds of the people, distrust and negative 
feelings against the functions of these institutions which were transmitted to future 
generations. At independence, the same institutions were adopted to serve the society while 
still distorted. This distortion had great impact on the process of construction of the post­
colonial state and its capacity to organize production and mobilize collective initiatives. 
(b) The Character of the Colonial Institutional Order 
The colonial rule established the first modern institutions in Tanzania characterized by: 
institutional syncretism; highly centralized administrative system with widely unchecked 
power and arbitrary use of authority; weak political representation and social welfare 
institutions; incoherent dual legal system fused with, and subordinated to, administrative 
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system; discriminatory and incoherent dual system of morality and justice and; creation of 
“state landlordism” with the fusion of sovereignty and property into the State under 
administrative regulations. 
The result of this was the creation of dual institutional order (the modern and traditional) 
serving two different societies: the modern for non­Africans and traditional for Africans. 
This led to leadership syncretism (a duality of response on the part of leaders caught 
between the competing logics of institutions and needs of the modern and traditional 
society). There was also development disequilibrium between administrative and economic 
institutions, and legal, political and social institutions. Throughout colonial period, 
development of administrative and economic institutions dominated those in legal, social 
and political sphere. In terms of social group relations, there was differentiation of social 
status based on differentiated institutional positions. Specifically, colonial reforms 
separated the political, economic and social status and allegiance of Africans and non­
Africans. Those within the modern institutions (mostly non­Africans) occupied higher 
social status than those in traditional institutions (the Africans). 
The most notable character of colonial system was the subjection of legal institutions and 
customary laws to administrative authorities and regulations. This created differentiated 
legal procedures and morality. The superior one based on modern legal system and the 
inferior, guided by customary law. The customary law was accepted in so far as it was not 
repugnant to conceptions of humanity, justice and morality defined in modern legal system 
terms. The reforms also initiated the bureaucratization of economic production which 
marked the beginning of bureaucratic model of economic organization in Tanzania. 
(c) The Ujamaa Mode of Institutional Reform 
One challenge faced by the leaders after independence was to redefine the role of modern 
institutions. While customary institutions were considered legitimate, the leaders believed 
that their decentralized and separatist tendencies could create ethnic factionalism and act as 
a disincentive for numerous and diverse tribal groups to remain loyal to the nation. This 
was seen as a constraint to the needs of national building and creation of Ujamaa society. 
Although modern institutions were seen as important for creating modern economy and 
politics, their inherent logic of competitive capitalism, private wealth accumulation and the 
peoples’ negative feelings against their functions were considered a threat to Ujamaa. 
To resolve this tension, a mode of reforms based on transposition, codification and 
unification of diverse institutions was adopted. This resulted into the creation of “a hybrid­
tripartite system” reflective of the country’s diverse customary and modern (western) 
institutions, which however, co­existed uneasily. 
The transposition of customary institutions was accompanied by reinforcement of anti­
Capitalist “state of mind” and creation of pro­Ujamaa “state mind” among people which 
could support Ujamaa principles. As a measure against capitalist exploitation, various 
institutions were adopted to restrict socio­economic practices which supported capitalist 
tendencies. Most of capitalist institutions, which were part of the modern economy and 
politics, were transformed into Ujamaa institutions or allowed to operate under strict 
control of the State or abolished altogether. 
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(d) The Character of the Ujamaa Institutional Order 
Ujamaa institutional order was created to provide a model of public economic 
accumulation, which could insulate society from ruthless capitalist exploitation and its 
consequent inequality and socio­economic insecurity as a pre­condition for poverty 
alleviation. Paradoxically, the prevention of Tanzanians from becoming capitalists and 
exploiters of their fellow citizens and inculcation of negative attitudes and distrust on 
capitalist oriented institutions was selective. While some capitalist (private) economic 
activities were prohibited in the large part of rural areas and in subsistence agriculture, they 
were allowed in enclave cash­crop regions, urban big commercial business sector and 
parastatal sector under bureaucratic regulations. This resulted into the creation of a 
bureaucratic model of organization of production characterized by: 
First, ethical duality: the existence of vague ideological postures containing egalitarian 
ideals and goals along with the ideals of capitalist private accumulation­ a creation of 
“Ujamaa embedded capitalism” as protected capitalism. Thus, while the rhetoric of 
Ujamaa, together with its institutions such as the leadership code of ethics, prevented the 
reorganization of the legal instruments of the state for accumulation, its ethical duality and 
institutional weakness provided opportunities for private accumulation and for public 
officials to contemplate the validity of the policies related to private property ownership 
and enterprise. 
Second, state­centred resource distribution system: the limitation of accumulation through 
private production and concentration of wealth in the state meant that, wealth accumulation 
depended upon the mobilization of privileged connection with the State. The model was 
presented as “public resource accumulation” for collective responsibility and communal 
benefits and it was characterized by accessibility and production without ownership of both 
the means of production and the surplus of the produce of labour. This in turn induced 
what can be called “negative development”. That is, a production without organic self­
sustainable wealth accumulation necessary for maintenance of socio­economic security 
and independence that is self­regulated by what the community enables each individual to 
afford. Therefore, the model tended to concentrate on state interests while undermining the 
benefits of the producers. The allocation of resources and re­distribution of the benefits of 
production were dictated by the bureaucrats at the national level who allocated them 
according to national and not local priorities. This bureaucratic control of production 
undermined the commitment of producers to engage in production and invigorated their 
negative feelings against the bureaucracy and other state institutions. As a result, the 
organization of production through this model ended up limiting private and collective 
development commitment and perpetuating poverty, inequality and insecurity. 
Third, disintegration of the ‘traditional” peasant economy from a “modern” market 
economy: state­directed development undermined competitive private peasant based 
accumulation in favour of state­based accumulation. This state­regulated model of 
accumulation limited peasants’ ability to transform their economic activities into modern 
market economy and perpetuated the same evils that it sought to undo­poverty, inequality 
and insecurity. 
Last, a subordination of legal institutions to administrative regulations. In order to limit 
challenges against “state­directed development” a centralized system of advancing 
grievances was established through a single­party structure which limited other alternative 
185

avenues outside that system. There was also establishment of a new system of 
administration of justice and accountability through political and administrative 
mechanisms, outside the legal system. This led to bureaucratic regulation and interference 
of matters supposed to be dealt through legal system, thereby undermining legal 
institutions and processes of administration of justice and accountability. 
(e) The Neo­liberal Mode of Institutional Reform 
The mode of reforms adopted in 1980s aimed at addressing Ujamaa institutional 
inadequacies by adopting capitalist market economy within a neo­liberal institutional 
order. The mode reinstated market economy and capitalist institutions secretively without 
addressing distortions which these institutions suffered as a result of colonialism and 
Ujamaaism. The mode also maintained the ethical duality and developed an enclave policy 
making system by transferring the role of policy­making from the party and government to 
a group in private research and policy analysis institutions. There was also a continuation 
of: alienation of previously excluded groups in formal economic engagement; 
informalization of socio­economic production; existence of anti­market tendencies; 
excessive administrative regulations and; weak legal foundation of the market economy. 
As a result of this, the neo­liberal order, which currently provides a framework for 
organization of production and poverty alleviation, is characterised by features which 
undermine anti­poverty initiatives. 
(f) The Character of the Neo­Liberal Institutional Order 
(i) Institutional Syncretism and Ethical Duality 
One key characteristic of the neo­liberal order is institutional syncretism and ethical 
duality. This is an institutional archetype which is a synthesis and reconciliation of the 
opposing forces of traditional­ujamaa institutions and modern­capitalist institutions. The 
result is a form of a system which is neither traditional­ujamaa nor modern­capitalist but an 
incorporation of both. This situation has resulted into development process based on 
struggles for accommodation, negotiation and reconciliation of the demands from the 
contending institutions. 
Furthermore, the restoration of capitalist market principles did not significantly alter the 
Ujamaa institutions, particularly, their informal functioning and ethical standards. The 
result has been a creation of a normative order consisting of competing ethical standards of 
ujamaa and neo­liberal capitalism. So, values and principles for social actions come from 
two competing systems­a fluid situation which allows a great deal of personal jousting and 
bargaining on the part of the actors. The individual actor(s) can respond to a social problem 
based on modern­capitalist (formal­legal) values and ethical standards in a given 
circumstance and, at the same time, respond to the same problem using traditional­ujamaa 
(informal) values and ethical standards depending on the changing circumstances. 
In terms of leadership, an individual leader can respond to the poor (or actors in the 
informal sector) in one way for a given social problem and address the rich (or those in the 
formal­legal sector) regarding the same problem in another manner. This phenomenon 
promotes a duality of response to social problems which creates uncertainty, confusion and 
less understanding of the problems and ways forward. So, for the poor, the situation is 
often in flux. The new guidelines, principles and practices for poverty alleviation are 
mixed and not fully understood. The leadership and policies are unpredictable and often 
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vacillate between extremes of values and principles of ujamaa and capitalism. From the 
institutionalist perspective, such syncretistic order causes difficulty and uncertainty in 
decisions, creating conditions for apathy and divided allegiance of people to ethical 
standards needed for individual and collective development commitment. 
(ii) Legal and Administrative Institutional Discrepancy 
The findings has shown that, historically, legal institutions were not created or adopted as 
instruments at the disposal of native Tanzanians in their search for freedom and rights 
against the colonial state nor to promote access to resources and protection of their well­
being. They were adopted as colonial state instruments for control of resources and 
exploitation. The status of legal institutions was that of an administrative mechanism for 
rulership­the means for legitimating and enforcing administrative actions for the 
preservation of the interests of the rulers. As a result of this, legal institutions became 
secondary in status and inferior to administrative institutions. Moreover, due to distortions 
of their functioning and oppressive character, legal institutions rendered themselves useless 
and therefore illegitimate to the majority of people. Despite reforms, the quality of 
institutions, with respect to a legal and administrative regulatory balance, has never been 
attained. 
The elevation of bureaucratic regulations above legal institutions on development matters 
institutionalized the domination of bureaucracy and exposed legal institutions to 
bureaucratic manipulation and inferiority. Due to its inherent nature of multiplicity and 
volatility, the overriding influence of bureaucratic institutions have inflicted the Tanzania’s 
economic management system with uncertainty and weakened the legal foundations of the 
market economy. Since major anti­poverty initiatives are based on market economy and on 
the assumptions of effective legal system, these tendencies remain the main challenge to 
reformers and policy makers. 
(iii) The Dilemma of the Legal Empowerment of the Poor 
According to the government, the fight against poverty through legal empowerment of the 
poor is imperative if it is to be successful and sustainable. The main argument being that, 
clearly defined and accessible property rights create a better environment for investment 
that facilitates access to credit and bank loans. But institutional realities of the country do 
not support this argument. 
First, historically, many Tanzanians were denied access and proper orientation to legal 
institutions including property rights and other commercial services and were exposed to 
bureaucratic regulations as an alternative. The poor never enjoyed the benefits associated 
with the modern economic and commercial system. So, legal empowerment­oriented 
reforms imply, in the first place, a de facto advantage to those with greater historical 
orientation towards its functioning and a disadvantage to the majority who were denied 
access to it. In this context, private property legislation result into greater exclusive than 
inclusive effects. Moreover, because of the distortions and inferior position of legal 
institutions, laws are easily abused and ignored by government officials, even when the 
country is professing a commitment to making the most of socio­economic activities legal. 
Second, while contract and other commercial laws are important part of the market 
economy as they regulate contractual relationships and commitments between individuals 
involved in the exchange of property, they are rudimentary and have been introduced 
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recently. The functioning of these laws is unknown, not only to the common citizens, but 
even to well place government officials and high ranking politicians. 
So, the question here is: how can a person, who has been kept away of these laws or 
negatively oriented to their functioning be a free and independent party to a contract and 
carry out contractual obligations properly without breach and consequent loss? It is this 
situation that makes any attempt to subject the poor to the logics of property rights, 
contractual relations and associated benefits, disadvantageous. 
(iv) The Influence of Informal Institutions and Economy 
The overriding influence of informal rather than formal institutions and expansion of an 
informal economy is another dominant feature of the neo­liberal system. The crucial 
question then is: Why do most Tanzanians remain under the confines of the informal 
institutions and less entrenched in the neo­liberal formal (legal) market­oriented order? 
The findings suggest that the explanation to the problem is found within the historical 
experiences of the society particularly, the oppressive and regressive character of 
institutions adopted by the government against operators in the informal economy. The 
findings reveals that, laws and regulations governing business and property in Tanzania, 
are so constraining and makes it too difficult and expensive for most people to enter and 
remain within the formal business system. Thus, people have decided to use informal self­
organized institutions that allow them to govern their actions independent of legal system. 
(v) The paradox of formal (legal) superiority and inaccessibility 
The general belief that, the formal­informal tension is due to the superiority and 
inaccessibility of the formal (legal) institutions and market principles and that informal 
sector lagged behind on account of its weak institutional foundation and inability of its 
actors (the poor) to cope with the untenable legal environment need to be taken with 
caution. 
The findings suggest that the opposite might be the case. That is, although inaccessibility 
of legal institutions is one of the constraining factors for the disengagement of the poor in 
the formal (legal) economy, it is probably its illegitimate and less trustworthy status 
conferred on it by the poor, and consequently its inferiority before informal institutions 
most trusted and preferred by them, which explains the disengagement. While the 
government and other development practitioners see the legal system as superior, the poor 
see it as unreliable. Thus, the inaccessibility of the legal system is artificial and subjective, 
mainly explained in terms of the silent strike and apathy on the part of the poor to associate 
with it and the economy it regulates. 
The problem insofar as poverty alleviation is concerned, thus, is not the inability of the 
poor to access the formal system, but lather, inability of that system to reach the poor and 
influence their behaviour towards a desired development path. 
(vi) The dilemma of the Market Economy 
The findings reveal tension between the need to create autonomous private organization 
through market forces and to maintain directed production through neo­statist regulated 
market. While the government insists on promoting private sector and market economy, 
control of resources such as land is still under the bureaucracy. Interestingly, the new 
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model tries to inject market behaviour and influence production strategies in the economy 
without reference to historical legacies of the character of organization of production. The 
peasants long considered passive recipients of bureaucratic directives and told money and 
capitalism are immoral and sources of evil are now seen as active and autonomous 
entrepreneurs, customers and consumers. Furthermore, far from being a neutral actor 
within the market system, the government continues to uphold the dirigiste model of 
statist­organization of production and actively regulating production and marketing 
processes. With excessive bureaucratic interference in the marketing system, producers 
have little control of future transactions and are vulnerable to opportunistic manipulations 
of the marketing system by influential companies and uncertain bureaucratic regulations. 
(g) The impact of the Neo­liberal Institutional Order 
(i) Marginalization of Rural and Agricultural Sector 
An important argument under historical institutionalism is that institutions provide 
mechanisms for the mobilization of bias. The salient impact of market­oriented reforms in 
Tanzania has been their tendency to push the poor out of agricultural sector­ “a move out 
of agriculture”, by drawing them into off­farm petty businesses as a way of integrating 
them into the market economy­biased prioritization in favour of the non­agricultural 
sectors. There is also an indication that the main logic behind the reforms is to make the 
poor less dependent on land and agriculture and transform peasant smallholder practices 
into big commercial production. Since the current poverty alleviation policies are based on 
market production and business promotion, peasants are institutionally induced to 
participate in off­farm businesses at the expense of agricultural production. The result of 
this has been a shift in production and resource allocation, from smallholder agriculture to 
petty business. 
The findings suggest that, a move out of agriculture has a potential for diversification into 
off­farm sources of income and marginalization of agriculture. While this does not imply 
that off­farm business production is wrong, it does suggest that, since the majority of the 
poor live in rural areas and depend on agriculture as the main sector and source of their 
income, and due to the fact that historically, they have been less acquainted with business 
and that the existing institutional order work against them, diverting out of agriculture 
unprepared puts them in the danger of future vulnerability and insecurity. 
(ii) Limited Access to Productive Resources 
The current anti­poverty initiatives place considerable emphasis on the ownership and 
access to resources that can be put to productive use and by which the poor can construct 
their own routes out of poverty. In this respect, poverty alleviation depend, to a large 
extent, on how the poor are enabled to have access to productive resources to meet the 
increasing socio­economic needs and to institutions of protection from the loss of the 
acquired resources and insecurities associated with it. However, the findings reveal that 
there is limited access to financial resources in the form of credits or loans. The main 
reason is financial illiteracy resulting from differential exposure to modern financial 
system associated with the colonial and post­colonial enclave modes of production and 
biased socialization against the use value of money and financial institutions. Findings 
further indicate that, the problem of access to credit reflects differential exposure to these 
institutions based on gendered inequality. The socialization of women to domestic 
activities and men to economic activities during Ujamaa resulted into more financial 
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illiteracy among women than men and consequent limited access to resources. This means 
that, financial institutions were developed to bypass the majority in non­enclave in favour 
of the few in enclave economies most of whom were men. This resulted into “double 
exclusion” of women: first as part of the majority poor and second, as a specific gender 
category. 
(iii) Legal and Administrative Constraints 
The findings also reveals that, the current laws and regulations governing economic 
production do not provide people with the necessary mechanisms for attaining high 
productivity and make it too difficult and expensive to enter and remain within the market 
system. 
(iv) Weak Community Feeling and Declining Public Trust 
From historical institutionalist perspective, institutional position determines a person’s 
attitudes toward the changes requisite for successful socio­economic engagement. The 
willingness and ability of people to cooperate and collectively engage in activities of 
public concern depend on shared sense of common feeling over civic responsibility and 
trust, not only among themselves but also with the institutions responsible for the 
regulation of collective engagement. The findings suggest that, the reforms have eroded 
the integrative institutional foundations of Ujamaa, which created a shared identity and 
common feeling about civic responsibility and trust. The weak community feelings 
resulting from the fading of the shared sense of social identity, solidarity and equal 
opportunity to national resources have been coupled with declining public trust or 
confidence in the formal legal, market and administrative institutions. Since poverty 
alleviation requires public mobilization, support and commitment, the declining confidence 
in the integrity of the formal institutions limits their ability to induce the necessary 
behavioural change on the part of the poor which is required for poverty alleviation. 
(v) Discriminatory Social Security System 
One key feature of the social security system in Tanzania is its paternalistic and exclusive 
tendencies. The findings revealed that, the system is characterized by multiplicity of 
schemes founded on different legal and administrative regulations, catering for different 
social groups and sectors and using different methods of benefit computation which leads 
to incoherencies and inequality in distribution of social security benefits. Due to historical 
legacies of excessive bureaucratic regulation of socio­economic life, social security 
schemes are highly controlled and regulated by administrative institutions. In terms of the 
coverage, they cover a very limited proportion of the population and have not reached most 
of the urban and rural poor. Because they provide inadequate and unequal benefits, they 
leave most of members in poverty and insecurity when faced with various contingencies. 
The findings indicate further that, there is incoherence between institutional reforms, anti­
poverty initiatives and social security schemes. These weaknesses have reduced social 
security services into social privileges than rights. Moreover, in conditions where, like in 
Tanzania, institutions of social protection are weak, processes of informalisation are rapid 
and potential conditions for incidences of poverty and inequality are high, selective social 
protection approach perpetuates insecurity. 
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(vii) Perpetual poverty, inequality and insecurity 
The findings on the status of poverty, inequality and insecurity indicate mixed trends. 
While indicators such as Poverty lines and Gini coefficient show a small decline of income 
poverty and a mixed trend of inequality others such as unemployment status; income 
earnings; corruption; the relationship between population growth and the absolute number 
of individuals who are poor; access to productive resources; entitlements to social income 
and security; the nature and patterns of resource allocation; national, regional and 
economic sector prioritization; and social group differential integration into market 
economy show that, reforms have not brought significant gains in the struggle against 
income poverty for the majority of the population and have exacerbated inequality. The 
findings suggest that, what matters are not just the differences and levels of income, but of 
security of that income. So, the main problem is not only “inequality of income”, but also 
“inequality of income security” which is a function of the institutional order in which that 
income is produced and sustained. The findings indicate further that, the character of the 
neo­liberal institutional order has greater tendencies of perpetuating poverty, inequality 
and insecurity, thus undermining poverty alleviation initiatives. 
(viii) Conflicting normative positions between Corruption and Poverty 
The importance of studying corruption in relation to poverty alleviation stem from the 
belief that, just like poverty, corruption is an institutional pathology resulting mainly from 
the nature of reforms and the character of the resultant institutions. The nature of their 
dialectical relationship depends on the functioning character of the institutional order in 
which they are created and sustained. Thus, understanding the context and nature of 
reforms is essential for any meaningful analysis of how corruption and poverty interact in a 
developing country like Tanzania and its implications for development and poverty 
alleviation. 
In our case, the findings indicate that, the reforms have resulted in a system in which 
corruption and poverty occupy different moral positions. While both have been historically 
and rhetorically perceived and condemned as the enemies of humanity and development, in 
practice, corruption has been tolerated as an alternative means for access to state­controlled 
resources. This is seen as the only means to have access to resources necessary for (among 
others) the struggle out of poverty. In other words, while on the one hand, the reforms seek 
to alleviate poverty, on the other, they promote a contemplation of corruption as a 
convenient resource access negotiation mechanism. This syncretistic moral tendency has 
created a dilemma in the struggle against poverty. So, reforms have accelerated with 
corruption and poverty partly because, the struggle against corruption is not institutionally 
and morally linked with that of poverty. 
In general, development processes take place within a system which produces “mixed 
signals” of morality and normative values to the people it is supposed to influence. Roles 
of institutions are not easily and clearly comprehended and lines of accountability and 
other integrity enforcement mechanisms are uncertain. This institutional and moral 
incompatibility makes the success of the simultaneous struggle against the two problems 
impossible and poverty alleviation initiatives untenable. 
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(h) The dilemma of the “war against poverty” approach 
There is an interesting observation from the findings in relation to the relevance of the 
current approach to poverty alleviation. The findings suggest that, from the inception of the 
war against poverty in the early 1960s, the central concern was not poverty as viewed in 
the current economic sense, but in terms of socio­economic insecurity. The war against 
poverty was adopted mainly as a “new reference point of unity” and a political strategy for 
collective commitment rather than a socio­economic initiative in itself. Since Tanzania was 
predominantly peasant society, socio­economic security was the paramount principle of 
organization of production. Struggles for security and survival were part of daily life and 
social ties within the extended family became important mechanism for security and 
survival. Adoption of ujamaa villages aimed at establishing universal socio­economic 
security with emphasis on joint resources utilization to ensure physical survival of 
members and investment in social relations rather than individual enrichment as basis for 
socio­economic insurance and security. Thus, poverty was addressed from the point of 
view of socio­economic insecurity rather than a mere insufficiency of individual income or 
wealth. This is where the challenge of current reforms for poverty alleviation lies. 
While poverty seems to affect specific social groups, socio­economic insecurity goes far 
beyond the borders of the rich­poor divide. For example, commenting on the relevance and 
applicability of Individualisation, Titling and Registration (ITR) in Tanzania’s socio­
economic realities, the PCILM in the early 1990s observed that security of land ownership 
associated with ITR (which informs the current MKURABITA) is based on the conception 
of security “of investments in, and on, land” protected by statutory law which is different 
from the security “of land itself”, which is protected by customary law. According to the 
Commission, while poor farmers in villages feared loss of their lands (their main means of 
livelihood) through various means and mechanisms adopted by the government such as, 
the alienation of land to outsiders, the acquisition of village lands, the expansion of urban 
boundaries and reserve lands and titling, these measures did not necessarily provide 
security against such risks of loss of land for smallholders. As a matter of fact, it insisted 
that, given the negotiability of the titles, titling further facilitates a loss of land by 
smallholders (URT, 1994:118). On the other hand, the customary system had considerable 
security of land rights built in to it and an added advantage of legitimacy in and 
supervision by the local community. The apparent insecurity of customary holders, the 
Commission argued, was a result of the systematic administrative practice which relegated 
customary rights to secondary place, inferior to statutory land rights. But the security 
provided by the title, particularly to a land holder from outside the village was illusory. 
The process of land alienation to an outsider in the face of the needs of the villagers 
generated such hostility that it undermined the security promised by the registered titles 
(URT, 1994:118) 
Discussing the reasons why the majority of the poor confined themselves to the informal 
economy in the late 1990s, Swantz and Tripp implicitly identified socio­economic security 
as the main explanatory factor. According to them, the informal economy in the country 
was the economy of survival, operating along the lines of Karl Polanyi’s “human 
economy” or Scott’s “moral economy” and Hyden’s “economy of affection”, where 
reciprocity and mutuality are paramount and the collective ethos is distributive justice. The 
survival strategies were collective (rather than individual endeavours) and everyone was 
entitled to subsistence (1996, pp.11­12). Investing in the economy of affection thus, 
served a dual purpose: it gave value to the most important human relations, and established 
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wealth as constituting not only the financial status but also the wealth one wielded in 
accessing the people themselves. At the same time, it helped to create a web of ties that 
could be drawn on to facilitate one’s economic endeavours and served as safety valves that 
appreciated the many ways in which humanness was expressed (Swantz and Tripp, 
1996:13; see also Hyden, 2007:16753) and security maintained. In other words, what they 
were suggesting was that, investing in one’s community and in people themselves 
reinforced one’s identity and socio­economic security. 
In the study entitled “Confronting Economic Insecurity in Africa” (2004) under the ILO 
Socio­economic Security Programme, it was found that: first, there was a close link 
between poverty and insecurity, with the majority of the poor being more inclined to 
engage in insecurity prone­activities; second, while income insecurity came close to the 
notion of poverty as commonly understood, the latter was more static than the former. 
Income insecurity not only related to the level of income but also to the factors of risk, 
irregularity and vulnerability surrounding income generation; third, there was still a great 
sense of social solidarity and less social discrimination; and, fourth, fatalism or passivity 
were unlikely to be a major impediment to economic development and the attainment of 
personal income security. Moreover, it was argued that, apart from being a structural 
problem, poverty was a form of insecurity (Paratian and Dasgupta, 2004). 
The findings indicate that socio­economic security still commands a strong recognition as 
the paramount principle of a good society in the country. The poverty rhetoric that is used 
in the current initiatives is biased in favour of economic growth and monetarist view of 
development and undermines attention to institutional aspects insecurity which is equally 
important. Thus, addressing poverty from a point of view that incorporates these aspects 
may have greater impact than confining the struggle to the poverty rhetoric alone or by 
beginning with poverty as a starting point. 
10.3 Implications of the findings for practice 
(a) Institutional Reforms 
The findings indicate that, while reforms and policy changes have taken place and new 
patterns of behaviour introduced, the functioning logics of institutions central to 
development and poverty alleviation have not been fundamentally altered and new patterns 
of behaviour have simply perpetuated it. Specifically, the reforms pursued by the 
government are inadequate due to misconception of institutional problems and realities of 
the society. This implies that, the fundamental character of the Tanzanian institutional 
order need to change before anti­poverty measures can succeed. 
(b) Future Research 
The findings suggest that, in order to understand the nature, character and outcomes of 
poverty alleviation the role of institutions within which the initiatives take place is 
imperative. This study approached the problem through a macro­level institutional analysis 
of the historical evolution of institutions in Tanzania with particular focus on the mode of 
institutional reform and the functioning character of the resultant institutional order. Now, 
a qualitative study is required for micro­level institutional analysis to establish an in­depth 
understanding of the impact of specific institutions on poverty alleviation in the country. 
Further, study on the interaction between the legal and bureaucratic institutions and the 
ways in which that interaction affects people’s engagement in development process in the 
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country is recommended. It is also important to understand the roles of legal and 
bureaucratic institutions in the organization of production in Tanzania’s development 
context as little is known or their roles are taken for granted. This will shed much light on 
the nature and character of economic organization and whether they facilitate or inhibit 
development and poverty alleviation. Historical institutional analysis offers a promising 
future in social science research by providing new ways of interpreting data and 
understanding the nature of development of African societies that other approaches might 
misunderstand or ignore. 
10.4 Theoretical Contribution 
The findings contributed to historical institutionalism by supporting and shedding new 
light on it. 
First, historical institutionalism believes in the idea of path dependency. The concept of 
path dependence involves the argument that once institutions are formed, they take on a 
life of their own and drive socio­economic and political processes. Thus, while there might 
be other institutional choices, once a country is entrenched on a certain arrangement it 
becomes difficult to find an easy alternative reversal to initial choices. One of the 
challenges of the idea of path dependency is to identify an initial institutional choice or the 
origins from which a path dependent analysis can be established. In Tanzanian case, the 
findings revealed that, initial institutional choices of modern economic, political and social 
development began with the imposition of colonialism. So, the possibility of establishing 
clear initial choices made the use of historical institutionalism more relevant. 
Second, historical institutionalists emphasize the idea that once institutions are formed, 
they take on a life of their own and drive socio­economic and political processes. Because 
institutions have a logic of their own, they argue, their interaction and development result 
in consequences unplanned for and unforeseen by actors. Interestingly, the findings 
confirm that institutions adopted in the country at different periods of time resulted to 
unplanned consequences which have impacted negatively on poverty alleviation initiatives. 
Issues such as distrust of formal (legal) institutions, expansion of informalization of socio­
economic activities and the dilemma of ethical duality and protected capitalism are some 
of the examples of such consequences. 
Third, the findings support the argument that while external factors matter in institutional 
reforms their influences depend on support from internal factors and that, the actors 
respond to external pressure by maneuvering and exploiting opportunities within existing 
institutional order. A good example was the bureaucrats’ use of Ujamaa’s ethical duality 
and protected capitalism to justify neo­liberal (market) reforms. 
Last, as noted in the introduction, this was the first study to employ historical 
institutionalism in understanding the impact of institutional reforms on poverty in a 
developing and ex­colonial African country. Moreover, in literature there was no any well 
established historical institutionalist framework for organizing a historical institutional 
impact analysis. So, in an attempt to translate historical institutional theory into a practical 
fieldwork guide we established a historical institutional reform impact approach (HIRIA) 
which we used to analyze the impact of institutional reforms on poverty and inequality in 
the country. HIRIA was based on three hypothetical arguments. First, that, the prospects 
for poverty alleviation are affected by the character of the previous institutional order. 
Second, that, the mode of reforms against poverty affects its subsequent alleviation. And 
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last, that, the functioning character of resultant institutional order affects poverty 
alleviation initiatives and outcomes. It also provided a “dual institutional impact analysis”: 
the contextual institutional impact analysis (CIIA) and instrumental institutional impact 
analysis (IIIA). The adoption of HIRIA situated the study neatly within the historical­
institutionalist school of social research which is historical­context sensitive to a particular 
country and in which inductive techniques can be employed. It also allowed for the 
integration of institutions and actors within a framework which made possible the 
comparative analysis of the reforms at different stages of historical development. At the 
same time, it provided an opportunity to reflect on the dynamics of the interaction between 
the institutions and the actors. We believe that, this framework is a great contribution to 
current debates on institutional theory and can be employed on other related case studies 
which employ historical institutionalism as their theoretical foundation. 
10.5 Methodological Evaluation 
One principle that underpins poverty analysis is the multidisciplinarity of poverty itself. 
While recognizing that a judicious combination of both qualitative and quantitative 
methods can help solve problems that are associated with each type of method taken 
separately, we opted for qualitative methods which was more appropriate for capturing the 
socio­economic and institutional contexts of poverty alleviation in the country. 
Quantitative data, from previous researches and surveys on issues related to poverty 
alleviation, was also used to support qualitative data. This combination proved to be 
fruitful as it enabled us to establish strong arguments. 
In terms of data collection, two methods were used: documentary review as the main 
method and unstructured interview as a supplementary. Under documentary method, both 
primary and secondary documents were collected from various sources subject to specific 
documentary quality assessment criteria and reviewed. After being assured with the 
quality, the next step was to analyze data from those documents. In this process we used 
Qualitative Content Analysis Approach (QLCAA) consisting of three interconnected data 
analysis processes: data reduction, creation of an “extended data text or data display and 
conclusion drawing and verification. This method was very useful as it provided rich and 
in­depth qualitative information on the impact of reforms on poverty alleviation within the 
deep rooted historical context. 
As noted earlier, unstructured interview method was selected as a supplementary method 
to provide the means for updating, clarifying and verifying some information obtained 
from documentary method. It also provided us with the opportunity to experience the 
actual feelings of the key actors in the reform process as well as an exposure to the 
undocumented discourses used by the actors in describing the processes and interactions. 
In other words, it was a way of getting inside the reform context than a mere collection of 
opinions of the actors in the process. Because of the nature of the problem, respondents 
were drawn from purposively selected research sites using snowball sampling technique 
which enabled us to have a direct access to key actors in the reform process. 
10.6 Conclusion 
This study examined critically institutional reforms in Tanzania. The principle focus was 
on how “the mode of institutional reforms” and “the functional character of the resultant 
institutional order” impacted on the government and citizens’ struggles against poverty. 
More precisely, the study aimed at answering the question: Why did institutional reforms 
195

produce disappointing results or at least outcomes which were contrary to those envisioned 
by international and national development agencies, the government and the donor 
community? At the end, the study sought to make a critical argument about the reasons for 
that failure. 
The findings suggest that while there have been some positive gains; institutional reforms 
have affected the government and people’s engagement in development initiatives and 
poverty alleviation. The failures of reforms are a result of misconception, by reformers, of 
historical institutional problems and realties of the society and therefore, adoption of ill­
informed reforms which perpetuate rather than solving problems. More specifically, is the 
failure to resolve problems associated with issues such as: negative orientation of modern 
institutions to socio­economic and political life of Tanzanian society; people’s recurring 
negative perception and distrust against government and market institutions; financial 
illiteracy; excessive bureaucratic organization and regulation of resource allocation and 
socio­economic activities; weak legal foundation of the market economy; excessive 
constraints for access to and participation in the formal economy; enclave economic 
production; and weak political foundation of the war against poverty approach. 
While it may seem strange or, at the very least, intellectually ungrateful to think that of all 
these decades of reforms and analysis of development problems in Tanzania, reformers and 
researchers fell victims of misconceptions of historical institutional realities, the findings 
strongly suggest the existence of that problem which constitute part of the main reasons of 
the failure of various development initiatives. So, getting institutions right should not only 
entail understanding the negative historical realities of the country, but also adopting 
corrective reforms. This implies that, the fundamental character of the Tanzanian 
institutional order need to change before anti­poverty measures can succeed. 
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___________________________________________________________________ 
Appendices 
Appendix 3A: List of Informed Respondents 
Twenty five (25) informed­respondents selected through purposive and snowball sampling 
techniques. 
Interview Institutions and Respondents 
Interview No. 1 Senior Employee: Department of Library and Research Services (The 
Parliament ) 
Interview No. 2 Senior Employee: Vice President’s Office (VPO) 
Interview No. 3 Middle­rank Employee: Poverty Eradication Division­Ministry of Planning, 
Economy and Empowerment (Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs ) 
Interview No. 4 Senior Employee: President’s Office Planning Commission 
Interview No. 5 Middle­rank Employee: United Nations Development Programme(UNDP)­
Tanzania 
Interview No. 6 Middle­rank Employee: Presidential Parastatal Sector Reform Commission 
(PSRC) 
Interview No. 7 Councillor: Sumbawanga Town Council (Rukwa Region) 
Interview No. 8 Senior Researcher: Research on Poverty Alleviation (REPOA) 
Interview No. 9 Senior Employee: National Economic Empowerment Council (NEEC) 
Interview No. 10 Farmer: Moshi ­Kilimanjaro Region 
Interview No. 11 Middle­rank Employee: Vice President’s Office (VPO)­PRS 
Interview No. 12 Senior Employee: Regional Administration­Kilimanjaro Region 
Interview No. 13 Councillor: Kigoma Ujiji Town Council­Kigoma Region 
Interview No. 14 Senior Researcher: Economic Research Bureau (ERB) 
Interview No. 15 Senior Employee: HAKIARDHI 
Interview No. 16 Senior Employee: President’s Office ­MKURABITA 
Interview No. 17 Senior Employee: President’s Office Planning Commission 
Interview No. 18 Middle­rank Employee: President’s Office Public Service Management (PO­
PSM) 
Interview No. 19 Senior Lecturer: University of Dar es Salaam 
Interview No. 20 Senior Employee :National Economic Empowerment Council (NEEC) 
Interview No. 21 Central Committee Member: Chama Cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo ( 
CHADEMA) 
Interview No. 22 Middle­rank Researcher: HAKIARDHI 
Interview No. 23 Middle­rank Employee: The Prevention and Combating of Corruption Bureau 
(PCCB) 
Interview No. 24 Central Committee Member: Chama Cha Mpinduzi (CCM) 
Interview No. 25 Senior Employee: President’s Office ­MKURABITA 
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Appendix 4A: The Structure of the Extended Family

G/ FATHER 
G/MOTHER 1 G/MOTHER2 
Father 1 Father2 Father 1 Father 2 
Wife 1 Wife2 
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married 
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Sons 
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Sons 
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Appendix 4B: Principles of Social Status in Tanzanian tribal life

Principle of Social 
Status 
Explanation 
Gerontocracy According to this principle, a status of a person had a dynamic quality and developed 
socially through generation class system. An individual progressed while passing 
through different stages of life associated with particular social status 
Talentocracy/ 
Exceptionality 
A person could also acquire a special status due to his exceptional talents or skills 
such as blacksmith, rainmaking, supernatural power to bless, heal or curse 
Heroism War warriors and heroes also had their status derived from their ability to defend the 
society against external enemies 
Sex and Marriage Sex and marriage were other factors determining one’s status in the society. Sex for 
example, determined access to other social generational status. In most cases, 
exceptional talent status, heroic status and generosity status were directly associated 
with males than females. Just as being a male or female had implication in terms of 
one’s status in society so was being married or unmarried 
Generosity This was the most respected and highest form of social prestige in the society and it 
was attained only through one’s voluntary acceptance of sharing his wealth with 
others and less tendency towards individual self­wealth accumulation for personal 
benefit, power and prestige. It was considered to be the highest moral upright and a 
symbol of highest level of humanity 
Source: Stoger­Eising (2000: 122­123). 
Appendix 5A: Trend of Selected Quality Of Life Indicators in Tanzania, 1960­1986 
Indicators Tanzania Low income sub­
Saharan Africa 
1960 1970 1980 1986 Grouped 1982 
A. BASIC INDICATORS 
1. Average life expectancy at birth 35 41 51 54 46 (1975­80) 48 
2. Male 32 40 49 50 43 (1975­80) 45 
3. Female 38 45 48 58 48 (1975­80) 50 
4. Infant mortality rate (IMR) 190 160 137 119 125 (1975­80) 240 
B. NUTRITION 
5. %of Children with low birth weight 12 13 13 15 14 (1972­80) 14 
6. % of Children suffering from: 
­moderate malnutrition 55 50 48 50 43 (1983­86) 44 
­severe malnutrition 8 8 6 7 7 (1983­86) 7 
7. Daily per capita calories supply as % of 
requirement 
81 88 89 120 85 (1983­86) 91 
C. HEALTH 
8. % of Population with access to drinking 
water: 
20 23 50 45 50 (1983­86) 42 
Urban 65 70 80 60 88 (1983­86) 64 
Rural 10 15 45 34 39 (1983­86) 14 
9. % of Population with access to health 
services: 
Total 50 70 88 90 76 (1983­86) 74 
Urban 60 85 99 100 99 (1983­86) 99 
Rural 45 60 80 85 72 (1983­86) 60 
Source: Kaijage, Frederick & Tibaijuka, Anna (1996), p.36
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Appendix 5B: Trend of Selected Quality Of Life Indicators in Tanzania, 1960­1986

Indicators Tanzania Low income sub­Saharan Africa 
1960 1970 1980 1986 Grouped 1982 
10. Health budget as : 
% of GDP ( nearest unit) 1 3 2 1 1 (1980) 1 
% of government budget 2 6 6 43 3 (1980) 3 
D. EDUCATION 
11. Primary school enrolment ratio: 
Gross total 20 33 93 68 65 (1980­86) 64 
Male 33 48 93 75 70 (1980­86) 69 
Female 18 18 93 67 56 (1980­86) 56 
12. Adult Literacy rate 10 15 90 80 43 (1980­86) 44 
Male 55 (1980­86) 53 
Female 35 (1980­86) 33 
13. Education Budget as % of GDP 2 5 2 2 3 (1980­86) 3 
E. WOMEN 
14.Enrolment ratio of Females as % of 
Males: 
Primary School 20 35 48 50 n.a n.a 
Secondary school 10 23 32 38 n.a n.a 
University 5 7 25 14 n.a n.a 
15. Maternal mortality rates 453 463 ­ 197 260 (1975­80) 250 
Source: Kaijage, Frederick & Tibaijuka, Anna (1996), pp.37­38 
Appendix 5C: Functional analysis of government budget, 1970­71/1990­91 
Year Genera 
l Public 
service 
Defen 
ce 
Educa 
tion 
Hea 
lth 
Social 
security 
& 
welfare 
services 
Housi 
ng & 
Com 
munit 
y 
ameni 
ties 
Other 
comm 
unity 
social 
servic 
es 
Econo 
mic 
servic 
es 
Other 
purpo 
ses 
Total Total 
Basic 
needs* 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1970­71 20.10 7.05 13.68 6.17 0.47 2.19 2.50 37.98 9.96 100.0 25.01 
1971­72 17.06 9.85 14.35 6.02 1.12 1.39 1.78 37.05 11.39 100.0 24.66 
1972­73 18.95 9.05 13.29 6.51 0.40 1.17 2.14 36.78 11.71 100.0 23.51 
1973­74 16.22 10.72 11.80 6.37 0.44 1.90 1.66 40.37 6.59 100.0 22.17 
1974­75 16.05 11.73 12.22 6.87 0.33 1.62 2.09 42.63 6.45 100.0 23.13 
1975­76 15.83 12.16 14.10 7.16 0.37 1.84 2.43 36.91 9.21 100.0 25.90 
1976­77 17.40 12.27 13.58 7.05 0.24 1.16 2.28 38.02 7.86 100.0 24.31 
1977­78 14.99 15.09 14.34 7.23 0.24 0.89 2.04 36.37 8.80 100.0 24.74 
1978­79 14.44 24.40 11.64 5.36 0.26 0.88 1.69 32.10 9.22 100.0 19.00 
1979­80 16.65 8.70 12.64 5.65 0.41 1.15 2.17 40.74 9.37 100.0 22.02 
1980­81 10.47 11.09 12.55 5.61 0.31 1.31 1.21 37.06 12.40 100.0 20.99 
1981­82 17.95 12.53 12.47 5.38 0.28 1.03 2.07 29.82 18.49 100.0 21.23 
1982­83 17.09 8.06 13.09 5.29 0.31 1.09 2.00 26.99 20.95 100.0 21.78 
1983­84 22.02 12.79 11.85 5.46 0.29 0.98 2.05 25.97 18.77 100.0 20.00 
1984­85 29.93 13.89 7.29 4.98 0.47 0.98 1.24 24.17 16.06 100.0 15.96 
1985­86 26.21 9.09 7.51 4.37 0.38 0.64 1.91 24.29 24.60 100.0 14.81 
1986­87 25.50 14.58 6.45 3.66 0.28 0.50 0.50 16.49 32.15 100.0 11.39 
1987­88 27.78 10.42 5.44 4.47 0.30 0.91 2.58 16.26 31.84 100.0 13.70 
1988­89 26.49 9.06 5.70 4.95 0.32 0.77 2.21 16.83 33.67 100.0 13.95 
1989­90 30.90 8.50 7.23 5.00 0.36 0.51 2.68 15.82 29.00 100.0 15.78 
1990­91 23.31 6.21 6.95 4.93 0.42 0.58 2.10 22.15 33.35 100.0 14.98 
Source: Kaijage, Frederick & Tibaijuka, Anna (1996), p. 50;♣ Include: agriculture, administration, 
industries, energy water, transport & tourism; * To get total allocation to basic needs, add column­34567. 
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Appendix 9A: Anti­Corruption Initiatives in Tanzania (from 1958 to 2007)

Year Anti­Corruption 
Initiatives 
Explanation and Implication to Public Officials’ Ethical Requirement 
1958 Prevention of 
Corruption 
Ordinance, Cap 400). 
The Act was passed by the Legislative Council (LEGCO) to control and 
stamp out corruption. The Act was a reflection of the fact that corruption 
was already taking root in the country 
1959 Colonial Leadership 
Rules of 1959 
These rules were issued by the Governor of Tanganyika demanding that 
leaders should not: be directors of commercial enterprises; be employed 
or in receipt of salaries from trade unions or cooperative unions; involve 
themselves in businesses which will interfere with their ministerial jobs; 
use secret information obtained within their positions for their own benefit 
or that of their friends; should not support any project/plan from which 
they hope to benefit; should not use their positions to favour people where 
justice is required; should not take bribes; should not buy shares in 
companies; and, should not announce news or write books or articles in 
newspapers while still ministers. 
1962 The Republican 
Constitution of 1962 
The Republican Constitution of Tanzania marked the beginning of the 
presidential system and lay a foundation for “imperial presidency”, in that 
it combined in the president the powers of the head of state and 
government and shifted the collective and individual responsibility of the 
higher public officials from the national assembly to the president 
Civil Service Act of 
1962 (Cap 509) 
In this Act, civil servants were supposed to serve the general public 
skilfully and diligently. They were supposed to be governed by rules and 
regulations. They were supposed to be politically impartial and transparent 
in the execution of their duties. The virtues were to be fairness, integrity, 
confidentiality and secrecy. 
1965 Adoption of One 
Party system as a 
“Constitutional 
Category” 
This led to the formation and consolidation of syncretistic “Monoparty 
politico­administrative accountability” institutional mechanisms. The Party 
became the hub of the ethical enforcement system in the country 
1966 Ombudsman Office­­
Permanent 
Commission of 
Enquiry. 
The Ombudsman was adopted as a means to prevent abuse of power by 
those in authority in the absence of opposition parties. It was created as an 
institution for both internal and external controls of self­restraint of public 
officials, with the express aim to safeguard the rights of the people against 
abuse of power, maladministration and arbitrary decisions. 
1967 Adoption of Arusha 
Decralation and A 
Leadership Code 
A Leadership Code was introduced specifying conflict of interest rules and 
prohibiting party and government officials from engaging in any private 
business, limiting severely the ability to earn wealth through the hiring of 
labour or renting property, and discouraging private capital accumulation 
and investment by the smallest and largest businesses alike. 
1970 Corruption 
Ordinance­ Cap 400 
amendment of 1970 
by Act No 1/70. 
This Act, among other things, empowered police officers authorized by the 
President or attorney General to require public officers to account for their 
properties. It also authorized the police to search any person if it was 
reasonably suspected that the person was in possession of property 
corruptly acquired. 
Civil Service 
Regulations Act of 
1970 (Cap 509). 
In this Act, civil servants were supposed to serve the general public 
skilfully and diligently. They were supposed to be governed by rules and 
regulations; rule abiding citizens in public service, judicious, fair and 
frank. They were supposed to be politically impartial and transparent in 
their execution of duties. The virtues were to be fairness, integrity, 
confidentiality and secrecy. 
1971 The Repeal of Act 
No 1/70 in 1971, by 
the Prevention of 
Corruption Act, 1971 
(Act 16:71). 
What this new Act did was to increase the penalties, and empowered the 
Attorney General to prohibit transfer of property corruptly acquired 
1973 The Leadership Code The Act aimed at safeguarding the values and self­discipline of those in 
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Act No 6 of 1973 the public service 
1975 Anti­Corruption 
Squad (The 
Amendment of the 
Prevention of 
Corruption Act, 1971 
(Act 16:71) in 1975 
The Squad was supposed to: undertake measures to prevent corruption in 
public and private sectors; investigate and prosecute (subject to the 
directions of the Director of Public Prosecution) for offenses under the Act 
or offenses on corruption in general; and advice the Government, the 
community, corporations and institutions on ways and means to prevent 
corruption. 
1977 The creation of an 
Ethics Secretariat of 
Public Leaders 
The 1977 United Republic Constitution under clause 132 made provision 
for the creation of an Ethics Secretariat of Public Leaders. The Secretariat 
was given authority to enquire into any alleged or suspected abrogation of 
the code of ethics by leaders 
The Controller and 
Auditor General 
This was another important institution which was provided in the 1977 
Constitution. Its functions are: examination, enquiry into and auditing of 
all accounts of public revenue. It also checks that the collection is in 
accordance with the law and the treasury regulations, and that government 
property are safeguarded and properly used 
1982 Local Government 
(District Authorities) 
Act No 7 of 1982 
and Local 
Government (Urban 
Authorities) Act No. 
8 of 1982 
The Acts become effective in 1984. One of the aims was to ensure good 
governance through the rule of law, transparency and accountability to 
prevent corruption on local government resource management system 
1983 The Economic 
Sabotage Act of 
1983 
It was adopted to address the proliferation of the parallel market and to 
prevent the government avenues from corruption. The aim was to 
incarcerate individuals (officials and private businessmen) profiting from 
the massive leakages of products from official channels 
1984 The Economic and 
Organised Crimes 
Control Act of 1984 
The Act repealed the Economic Sabotage Act of 1983 and incorporated 
offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act as economic offences 
Adoption of “own­
funds" import license 
scheme (OF). 
The OF led to the legalization of the widespread parallel market and 
corrupt private importation deals by granting import licenses to 
individuals with access to their own foreign exchange without having to 
purchase the corresponding amount of official foreign exchange 
The Bill of Rights, 
(Constitutional 
Amendment of 1984) 
The Bill of Rights specified citizen Basic Rights and Duties and 
introduced them into the 1977 Constitution which become effective in 
1985 aiming at protecting partly, individual human rights in the country 
1985 The Elections Act 
No 1 of 1985 
Also, introduced were specific laws as far as political corruption, mainly in 
the form of elections, were concerned. The Elections Act provided that 
corruption, bribery and treating or undue influence in relation to elections 
were offences punishable by law. 
1989 Civil Service Act 
1989 (Act No 16) 
Just like under the previous Acts, the civil servants were supposed to be 
governed by rules and regulations; rule abiding citizens in public service, 
judicious, fair and frank. They were supposed to be politically impartial 
and transparent in their execution of duties. The virtues were to be 
fairness, integrity, confidentiality and secrecy 
1990 The Elections Act 
No 20 of 1990 
Act provided that corruption, bribery and treating or undue influence in 
relation to election were offences punishable by law 
1991 So called Zanzibar 
Declaration of 
February 1991 
The National Executive Committee of the CCM revised the Arusha 
Declaration, stating that a party member could draw more than one salary, 
rent out houses in order to pay back a mortgage, and acquire shares in a 
private company. 
The Declaration syncretistically replaced the Arusha Declaration (1967) by 
maintaining the ideological, institutional and policy rhetoric of the latter, 
creating overwhelming confusion among government officials not to speak 
of the common citizens. With this change, the Leadership Code was 
undermined, allegedly paving the way for more openly exercised corrupt 
practices. 
The Prevention of 
Corruption Bureau 
With the amendments of Anti­Corruption Squad related laws in 1991, the 
squad became what was known as the Prevention of Corruption Bureau. 
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1995 The Public 
Leadership Code of 
Ethics 1995 
Public Leadership Code of Ethics Act No 13 of 1995 replaced the 
Leadership Code Act No 6 of 1973. The aim of the Act was to lay down 
the basic principles with which the public leaders were supposed to abide. 
Leaders were supposed to be honest, clean, impartial and transparent ­ in 
sum, people of scrupulous integrity 
The Public Leaders' 
Ethics Secretariat 
Monitoring of Public Leaders and Abuse of Power Accountability and 
Transparency; Research and Statistics; and Education and Publicity 
1996 The Warioba 
Commission 
Upon assuming office in 1996, President Mkapa established the Warioba 
Commission to inquire extensively into corruption at all levels and 
throughout the country. The Commission found that corruption was 
rampant in all sectors of the economy, public services and politics 
nationwide. It handed 70 names to President Mkapa for prosecution. 
However, it is widely believed that none of those “big names” were 
prosecuted 
The National Anti­
Corruption Strategy 
and Action Plan 
(NACSAP) 
To addresses corruption in the central ministries and civil society and 
media involvement in anti­corruption activities 
2000 The National Good 
Governance 
Framework 
The National Good Governance Framework was adopted in 2000 to 
promote transparency, simplify the rules and procedures and make 
information accessible to the public 
2001 The Commission for 
Human Rights and 
Good Governance 
Act No. 7 of 2001 
The 13th Constitutional Amendment of 2000 led to the establishment of 
the Commission for Human Rights and Good Governance in 2001 as a 
successor to the ombudsman office 
The Finance Act 
(2001) 
They are considered important milestones in reducing opportunities for 
corruption, although their full application and effectiveness in practice has 
still to be proven. 2004 Public Procurement 
Act (2004) 
2007 The Prevention of 
Corruption 
(Amendment) Act of 
2007 
The Prevention and Combating of Corruption Bureau (PCCB), with a 
three­pronged mandate to investigate corrupt practices, promote preventive 
measures and raise public awareness 
Source: Extracted from Hussmann and Mmuya (2007:179­180); Chachage (2001: 2­3) and Cooksey (2006:5) 
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